Com. v. Siderio, J. ( 2019 )

J-S77038-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
JASON V. SIDERIO, :
:
Appellant : No. 2626 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 11, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004420-2015
BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2019
Jason V. Siderio (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his negotiated guilty plea. Upon review, we affirm.
Michael Joseph Walsh was fatally shot in South Philadelphia on January
22, 2015. In March 2015, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with the
murder of Walsh, two felony and one misdemeanor counts relating to
violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and one misdemeanor count of
possessing an instrument of crime.
On July 11, 2017, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one
count of third-degree murder, one second-degree felony count of person not
to possess a firearm, and one misdemeanor count of possessing an
instrument of crime. The trial court sentenced Appellant on the same date
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S77038-18
to an aggregate term of 25 to 50 years in prison in accordance with the plea
agreement.1
Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. Within the motion, Appellant made a bare assertion of his innocence
and averred that he did not enter into the plea voluntarily and knowingly.
Motion to Withdraw Plea, 8/20/2017, at ¶¶ 4-5. Specifically, he contended
that his decision to plead guilty was “clouded by the pressure of the
consequences of a verdict of guilty” and that he did not understand the
guilty plea colloquy. Id. Following argument, the trial court denied
Appellant’s motion on August 2, 2017.
This timely-filed appeal followed.2 Appellant presents one issue for our
consideration: whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Appellant’s Brief at 6.
This Court reviews the denial of a post-sentence motion to withdraw a
guilty plea by the following standard.
It is well-settled that the decision whether to permit a defendant
to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Although no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea
exists in Pennsylvania, the standard applied differs depending on
whether the defendant seeks to withdraw the plea before or
after sentencing. When a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea
after sentencing, he must demonstrate prejudice on the order of
1 Appellant also pleaded guilty and was sentenced during the same hearing
in an unrelated case.
2 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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manifest injustice. [A] defendant may withdraw his guilty plea
after sentencing only where necessary to correct manifest
injustice.
***
Manifest injustice occurs when the plea is not tendered
knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly. In
determining whether a plea is valid, the court must examine the
totality of circumstances surrounding the plea. Pennsylvania law
presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was aware of
what he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of
proving otherwise.
Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 664–65 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Inter alia, the law imposes
a stricter standard for post-sentence withdrawal motions in order to balance
“the tension … between the individual’s fundamental right to a trial and the
need for finality in the proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d
1103, 1106 (Pa. 2015).
On appeal, Appellant concedes that his answers during the colloquy at
the plea hearing “appear[] to show that [his] plea of [g]uilty was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary,” and that he is bound by the answers he provided
under oath at the plea colloquy. Appellant’s Brief at 10. Nevertheless,
Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
based upon his averment in the motion that he did not understand the
colloquy and his counsel’s statement during the colloquy that Appellant
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“seemed to understand his rights.”3 Id. at 11 (emphasis in original) (citing
N.T., 7/11/2017, at 16).
Our review of the transcript of the plea hearing reveals that following
Appellant’s oral colloquy, a brief exchange took place between the trial court
and Appellant’s counsel.
THE COURT: Beginning with [Appellant’s counsel] first.
[Counsel], have you discussed with your client his right to plead
not guilty in the homicide case and go to trial?
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: I have, your Honor.
THE COURT: Did he seem to understand his rights?
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you satisfied that he’s competent and qualified
to enter into this negotiated plea of guilty?
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: I am.
N.T., 7/11/2017, at 16-17 (emphasis added).
Appellant’s argument that his counsel’s response somehow
demonstrated the unknowing nature of his plea is utterly unconvincing.
3 To support his claim of manifest injustice, Appellant briefly mentions his
alleged innocence in passing in the summary of his argument. Appellant has
waived this claim; a mere reference in a summary of the argument is not a
substitute for a developed argument with citations to the record and
authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Even if Appellant had preserved the
issue in his brief, “this Court has held that post-sentence claims of innocence
do not demonstrate manifest injustice.” Commonwealth v. Kpou, 153
A.3d 1020, 1024 (Pa. Super. 2016); Commonwealth v. Myers, 642 A.2d
1103, 1108 (Pa. Super. 1994) (“A defendant’s post-sentence recantation of
guilt does not rise to the level of prejudice on the order of manifest injustice
sufficient to require that he be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty.”).
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Appellant’s counsel could not read Appellant’s mind to be certain whether
Appellant truly understood his rights. Counsel has no choice but to
communicate his assessment of whether Appellant seemed to understand his
rights based upon Appellant’s expressions, statements, questions, and other
clues.
Moreover, Appellant fails to elaborate upon what specifically he did not
understand about the colloquy. The Commonwealth provided a description
of the elements of all three crimes to which Appellant was pleading guilty as
well as a detailed recitation of the facts it believed it could establish at trial.
N.T., 7/11/2017, at 23-25, 34-42. The record reveals that the trial court
conducted an extensive colloquy in plain wording, which covered the
following: the potential sentence; the sentence recommended by the
Commonwealth; the terms of the plea agreement; the elements of the
crimes to which Appellant was pleading guilty; Appellant’s age of 34;
Appellant’s ability to read, write, and understand the English language based
upon his completion of the eleventh grade; Appellant’s state of mind free
from the influence of drugs, alcohol, prescribed medications, or mental
illness; the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty; and the effect upon
any probation or deportation. Id. at 4-45.
Appellant affirmatively testified under oath that he was not threatened
or forced to plead guilty, and there was no other understanding between him
and the Commonwealth other than what was set forth in the plea
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agreement. Id. Further, he discussed his decision to plead guilty with his
attorneys; he was satisfied with the advice and representation of counsel;
the facts set forth by the Commonwealth during the plea hearing were
essentially true; he signed the written colloquy after he had read it and had
it explained to him so that he understood it; and he understood the rights
described by the trial court that he was giving up by pleading guilty. Id.
Appellant’s concession in his brief4 is correct: his statements under oath
foreclose him from asserting that he did not understand the colloquy. See
Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“A
person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in
open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for
withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea
colloquy.”).
Furthermore, Appellant spoke up when he had a question relating to
his sentence in his other case, and did not speak again when offered the
opportunity. Id. at 4-5, 47. He also signed a detailed written colloquy,
where he indicated in writing that he understood what he was signing. See
Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 7/11/2017, at 3.
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that Appellant
has not demonstrated the manifest injustice necessary to permit him to
4 See Appellant’s Brief at 10.
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withdraw the plea after sentence was imposed. The guilty plea colloquy in
this case establishes that he willingly and voluntarily agreed to plead guilty,
after negotiating a favorable plea bargain, with full understanding of the
consequences of his decision and of the rights he would be giving up by
pleading guilty.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/13/19
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