Com. v. Ramsey, M. ( 2019 )


Menu:
  • J-S81030-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    MARQUISE LAMAR RAMSEY                      :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1348 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 18, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-06-CR-0000620-2015
    BEFORE:      STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                            FILED FEBRUARY 25, 2019
    Appellant, Marquise Lamar Ramsey, appeals from the Judgment of
    Sentence entered on July 18, 2018, in the Berks County Court of Common
    Pleas following a hearing.         He challenges the discretionary aspects of his
    violation of probation (“VOP”) sentence. In addition, Appellant’s counsel has
    filed an Anders1 Brief, together with a Petition to Withdraw as Counsel. After
    careful review, we affirm Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence and grant
    counsel’s Petition to Withdraw.
    On August 20, 2015, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to a charge
    of Prohibited Offensive Weapons2 and the court sentenced him to three years’
    probation. While on probation, police arrested Appellant and, on November
    ____________________________________________
    1   Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967).
    2   18 Pa.C.S. § 908(a).
    ____________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S81030-18
    17, 2017, charged him in a new case with Persons Not to Possess Firearms,
    Receiving Stolen Property, Possession of a Controlled Substance, and
    Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. On July 6, 2018, Appellant pleaded guilty
    to the Persons Not to Possess3 charge and the court sentenced him to 3 to 10
    years’ incarceration.
    On July 18, 2018, the trial court held a VOP hearing at which Appellant
    admitted to violating his probation.           The VOP court revoked Appellant’s
    probation and sentenced Appellant to 6 months’ to 4 years’ incarceration. The
    VOP court ordered Appellant to serve this VOP sentence consecutive to the 3-
    to 10-year sentence imposed for the 2018 convictions.
    On July 19, 2018, Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion challenging
    the VOP court’s Order that he serve his VOP sentence consecutive, rather than
    concurrent, to the sentence imposed on his new conviction.
    On August 2, 2018, the trial court denied Appellant’s Motion. This timely
    appeal followed. The trial court ordered Appellant to comply with Pa.R.A.P.
    1925.      Appellant’s counsel filed a           Statement of Intent to File an
    Anders/McClendon Brief pursuant to Rule 1925(c)(4). The trial court filed a
    Rule 1925(a) Opinion.
    On October 24, 2018, counsel filed the Anders Brief and Petition to
    Withdraw as Counsel. Appellant did not file a pro se or counselled response
    to either the Brief or the Petition.
    ____________________________________________
    3   18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
    -2-
    J-S81030-18
    As a preliminary matter, we address counsel’s Petition to Withdraw.
    “When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits
    of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.”
    Commonwealth v. Daniels, 
    999 A.2d 590
    , 593 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation
    omitted).   In order for counsel to withdraw from an appeal pursuant to
    Anders, our Supreme Court has determined that counsel must meet certain
    requirements, including:
    (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
    citations to the record;
    (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
    supports the appeal;
    (3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
    (4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is
    frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
    controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
    conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    , 361 (Pa. 2009).
    In the instant case, counsel has complied with all of the requirements
    of Anders as articulated in Santiago. Additionally, counsel confirms that he
    sent Appellant a copy of the Anders Brief, as well as a letter explaining to
    Appellant that he has the right to proceed pro se or the right to retain new
    counsel. See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 
    873 A.2d 748
    , 751 (Pa. Super.
    2005) (describing notice requirements).     Counsel appended a copy of the
    letter to his Petition to Withdraw.
    -3-
    J-S81030-18
    Because counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is now this
    Court’s duty to conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there
    are any additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel and render an
    independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.
    See Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 
    188 A.3d 1190
    , 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en
    banc) (noting that Anders requires the reviewing court to “review ‘the case’
    as presented in the entire record with consideration first of issues raised by
    counsel.”).
    We first address the issue raised by counsel in the Anders Brief:
    Whether the sentencing court erred and abused its discretion
    when it sentenced Appellant to a consecutive, rather than
    concurrent, sentence for his probation violation?
    Anders Brief at 6.
    The issue presented in the Anders Brief challenges the discretionary
    aspects of Appellant’s sentence.      See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-
    Dejesus, 
    994 A.2d 595
    , 597-98 (Pa. Super. 2010) (explaining that a
    challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences implicates the
    discretionary aspects of sentencing). A challenge to the discretionary aspects
    of sentencing is not automatically reviewable as a matter of right.
    Commonwealth v. Hunter, 
    768 A.2d 1136
    , 1144 (Pa. Super. 2001). Prior
    to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue:
    We conduct a four[-]part analysis to determine: (1) whether
    appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
    and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
    sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
    [Pa.R.Crim.P. 720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
    -4-
    J-S81030-18
    defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
    question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
    the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).
    Commonwealth v. Evans, 
    901 A.2d 528
    , 533 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations
    omitted).
    In the instant case, Appellant met the first three elements by filing a
    timely Notice of Appeal, properly preserving the issue in a Post-Sentence
    Motion to modify his sentence, and including a Statement of Reasons Relied
    Upon for Allowance of Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) (“Rule 2119(f)
    Statement”). As to whether Appellant has presented a substantial question,
    we note:
    The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
    be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial question
    exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument
    that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
    with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
    to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.
    Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    , 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations
    and quotation omitted).
    With regard to the imposition of consecutive sentences, this Court has
    held:
    A court's exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence
    concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise a
    substantial question. Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 
    2 A.3d 581
    , 587 (Pa. Super. 2010)[.]      Rather, the imposition of
    consecutive rather than concurrent sentences will present a
    substantial question in only “the most extreme circumstances,
    such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh,
    considering the nature of the crimes and the length of
    imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 
    52 A.3d 365
    , 372
    (Pa. Super. 2012)[(en banc)].
    -5-
    J-S81030-18
    [An appellant] may raise a substantial question where [s]he
    receives consecutive sentences within the guideline ranges
    if the case involves circumstances where the application of
    the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable, resulting in an
    excessive sentence; however, a bald claim of excessiveness
    due to the consecutive nature of a sentence will not raise a
    substantial question.
    Commonwealth v. Swope, 
    123 A.3d 333
    , 338-39 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (citation and quotation omitted, emphasis in original).
    In the instant case, Appellant’s bald challenge to the imposition of a
    consecutive sentence following the revocation of his probation does not raise
    a substantial question permitting our review.     Accordingly, we agree with
    counsel and conclude that the issue raised in the Anders Brief is wholly
    frivolous.
    Furthermore, our independent review of the record, conducted in
    accordance with 
    Yorgey, supra
    , confirms counsel’s assertion that there are
    no issues of merit to be considered by this Court and this appeal is, thus,
    wholly frivolous. Thus, we grant counsel’s Application to Withdraw and affirm
    Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence.
    Judgment of Sentence affirmed. Application to Withdraw granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 02/25/2019
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1348 MDA 2018

Filed Date: 2/25/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024