In the Interest of: K.L., Appeal of: A.L. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S07014-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: K.L., A MINOR          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: A.L., BIOLOGICAL                :
    MOTHER                                     :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 1787 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Decree Entered October 3, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
    Orphans' Court at No(s): 73 Adoptions 2018
    BEFORE:      OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                             FILED FEBRUARY 25, 2019
    A.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the October 3, 2018 decree terminating
    her parental rights to her 11-year-old daughter K.L. (“Child”). On this direct
    appeal, court-appointed counsel has filed an application to withdraw and a
    brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967) and In re V.E.,
    
    611 A.2d 1267
    (Pa. Super. 1992).1              We conclude that Mother’s counsel
    complied     with   the    procedural     requirements   necessary   to   withdraw.
    Furthermore, after independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the
    appeal is wholly frivolous.        We, therefore, grant counsel’s application to
    withdraw and affirm the decree terminating Mother’s parental rights.
    ____________________________________________
    1 In In re V.E., 
    611 A.2d 1267
    , 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992), this Court extended
    the Anders principles to appeals involving the termination of parental rights.
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S07014-19
    Child was born in 2007.           On May 8, 2014, Child was adjudicated
    dependent because of Mother’s mental health struggles and Child’s refusal to
    attend school. On October 16, 2014, the trial court ended the dependency.
    On September 22, 2016, Child was again adjudicated dependent because of
    Mother’s drug use and mental health problems. On April 27, 2017, the trial
    court ordered Child removed from Mother’s care and placed in a foster home.
    On March 15, 2018, Cumberland County Children and Youth Services
    (“CYS”) filed a petition for goal change and a petition to terminate Mother’s
    parental rights as to Child. On September 28, 2018, the trial court held a
    termination hearing.2 On October 3, 2018, the trial court terminated Mother’s
    parental rights as to Child.3 This timely appeal followed.4
    Counsel raises two issues in his Anders brief:
    1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and committed
    an error of law when it found, despite a lack of clear and
    convincing evidence, that sufficient grounds existed for a
    termination of [Mother’s] parental rights under . . . 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 2511(a)[?]
    2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion and committed
    an error of law in determining it would be in [C]hild’s best interest
    to have parental rights terminated, when it failed to primarily
    ____________________________________________
    2 A guardian ad litem represented Child’s best interest and separate counsel
    represented Child’s legal interest.
    3Child’s legal father and biological father consented to the termination of their
    parental rights as to Child.
    4 Mother and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 1925.
    -2-
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    consider [C]hild’s developmental, physical[,] and emotional needs
    and welfare, thus contravening . . . 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(b)[?]
    Anders Brief at 5.
    Before reviewing the merits of this appeal, we must first determine
    whether counsel has fulfilled the necessary procedural requirements for
    withdrawing as counsel. See Commonwealth v. Blauser, 
    166 A.3d 428
    ,
    431 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). To withdraw under Anders, court-
    appointed counsel
    must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious
    examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly
    frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth
    issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any
    other issues necessary for the effective appellate presentation
    thereof. Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders
    petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the
    right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional
    points worthy of this Court’s attention.
    Commonwealth v. Cook, 
    175 A.3d 345
    , 348 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned up).
    If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the
    responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the
    proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal
    is in fact wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    , 355
    n.5 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted). It is only when both the procedural and
    substantive requirements are satisfied that counsel will be permitted to
    -3-
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    withdraw. In the case at bar, counsel has met all of the above procedural
    obligations.5 We now turn to whether this appeal is wholly frivolous.
    We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights for an
    abuse of discretion.      In re G.M.S., 
    193 A.3d 395
    , 399 (Pa. Super. 2018)
    (citation omitted). “The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
    convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
    for termination[.]” In re Adoption of J.N.M., 
    177 A.3d 937
    , 942 (Pa. Super.
    2018), appeal denied, 
    183 A.3d 979
    (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted).
    The first issue raised in counsel’s Anders brief is whether the trial court
    erred in concluding that the requirements of section 2511(a) were satisfied.
    “In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need only
    agree with any one subsection under [s]ection 2511(a).” In re Interest of
    D.F., 
    165 A.3d 960
    , 966 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 
    170 A.3d 991
    (Pa.
    2017) (citation omitted).        The trial court found that the requirements of
    sections 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8) were satisfied. We focus our attention on
    section 2511(a)(8), which provides that a parent’s rights to a child may be
    involuntarily terminated if
    [t]he child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
    court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months
    or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child
    continue to exist[,] and termination of parental rights would best
    serve the needs and welfare of the child.
    ____________________________________________
    5   Mother did not file a response to counsel’s Anders brief.
    -4-
    J-S07014-19
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).
    In this case, there is no dispute that Child was removed from Mother’s
    care for at least 12 months at the time of the termination hearing. Hence, we
    initially focus our inquiry on whether the conditions which led to Child’s
    removal from Mother’s care continued to exist at the time the trial court
    terminated Mother’s parental rights. As noted above, Child was removed from
    Mother’s care because of her drug use. Over one year later, at the time of
    the termination hearing, CYS could not confirm Mother’s progress with respect
    to drug treatment. See N.T., 9/28/18, at 19.
    More importantly, Mother failed to receive any mental health treatment
    or counseling. 
    Id. at 54-55.
    Mother knew that mental health treatment and
    counseling were critical to gaining physical custody of Child. See 
    id. at 49.
    Because Mother failed to remedy the situation that led to Child’s removal from
    her care, and, as discussed below, termination of parental rights would best
    serve the needs and welfare of Child, the trial court correctly concluded that
    the requirements of section 2511(a)(8) were satisfied.
    Having determined that CYS proved by clear and convincing evidence
    the requirements of section 2511(a)(8), we next consider section 2511(b)’s
    requirements. The focus in terminating parental rights under section 2511(a)
    is on the parent, but the focus under section 2511(b) is on the child. See In
    re M.Z.T.M.W., 
    163 A.3d 462
    , 464 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
    Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights
    would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional
    -5-
    J-S07014-19
    needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained,
    Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and
    the term bond is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
    however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
    between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of
    our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
    is a major aspect of the []section 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
    it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
    court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
    In re Adoption of C.D.R., 
    111 A.3d 1212
    , 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (cleaned
    up). Moreover, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination
    must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and
    whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
    Child testified at the termination hearing that she preferred to have
    Mother’s parental rights terminated. N.T., 9/28/18, at 7. She explained that
    Mother “can’t do what she’s supposed to do.” 
    Id. at 8.
    She then clarified that
    Mother was not receiving the mental health and drug treatment necessary for
    Mother to properly care for her. See 
    id. Child’s foster
    mother and a CYS
    caseworker confirmed that Child’s foster mother was providing the necessary
    care and support for Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs.
    The guardian ad litem concurred with these witnesses’ testimony. Contrast
    this with the lack of care and support that Child received when she was living
    with Mother. The trial court found that Child needs stability in her life and
    that foster mother provides that stability while Mother does not. We agree
    with this finding.   Accordingly, we conclude that CYS proved by clear and
    -6-
    J-S07014-19
    convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s
    best interest.
    In sum, we conclude that the issues raised in counsel’s Anders brief are
    wholly frivolous.   Furthermore, after an independent review of the entire
    record, we conclude that no other issue of arguable merit exists. Therefore,
    we grant counsel’s request to withdraw. Having determined that the issues
    raised on appeal are wholly frivolous, we affirm the decree terminating
    Mother’s parental rights.
    Application to withdraw as counsel granted. Decree affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 02/25/2019
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1787 MDA 2018

Filed Date: 2/25/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021