In the Int. of: A.S.L., Appeal of: C.C. ( 2019 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.S.L., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: C.C., FATHER : No. 106 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered December 7, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000913-2018
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.S.L., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: C.C., FATHER : No. 107 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered December 7, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001715-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 29, 2019
Appellant, C.C. (“Father”), appeals from the orders entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petition of the
Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”) for involuntary
termination of Father’s parental rights to his minor child, A.S.L. (“Child”), and
changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption. We affirm and grant counsel’s
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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petition to withdraw.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Father and A.L.L. (“Mother”) are the natural parents of Child. Mother has two
additional minor children, D.L. and A.L., who, together with Child, resided with
Mother. Father is not D.L. or A.L.’s biological father, and Father did not reside
with Mother, Child, D.L., and A.L.
On February 2, 2017, DHS received a General Protective Services
(“GPS”) report alleging Child had head lice and had not attended school since
January 3, 2017. The report additionally stated Child had fine motor skill and
visual issues and should undergo psychoeducational analysis. On March 10,
2017, DHS received a second GPS report, alleging that several drug-related
incidents occurred at Mother’s home, which put Child and D.L. in danger, and
Mother continued to use drugs. The report also stated Child continued to miss
school.
DHS filed a dependency petition for Child on June 29, 2017, and the
court appointed a guardian ad litem for Child. On July 14, 2017, the court
adjudicated Child dependent. Following a permanency review hearing on
September 28, 2017, the court ordered DHS to retain legal custody of Child,
set Child’s placement goal as reunification, and granted Mother and Father
supervised visitation. The court held additional permanency review hearings
on December 14, 2017, and March 15, 2018, and made no significant changes
to custody or visitation. Following the March 15, 2018 hearing, however, the
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court noted Father had minimally complied with the permanency plan and was
discharged from the Achieving Reunification Center for lack of participation.
On September 24, 2018, the court appointed a child advocate for Child.
DHS filed petitions on November 14, 2018, to terminate parents’ parental
rights and to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. After a hearing on
December 7, 2018, the court granted DHS’ petitions. Father filed timely pro
se notices of appeal as to Child at each relevant docket number (AP-0000913-
2018 and DP-0001715-2017), even though Father still had counsel of record.1
Father did not file a contemporaneous statement of errors complained of on
appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
This Court consolidated Father’s appeals sua sponte on January 11,
2019, and ordered Father’s counsel to file a Rule 1925 statement by January
22, 2019. On January 28, 2019, this Court entered an order noting Father’s
counsel had failed to comply with the January 11, 2019 order and remanding
the case for the trial court to determine if counsel had abandoned Father. On
the same day, Father’s counsel filed in the trial court a Rule 1925(c)(4)
statement of intent to file an Anders2 brief. On January 30, 2019, this Court
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1 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
The Anders procedure, whereby appointed counsel seeks to withdraw from
representation, has been applied since 1992, to cases involving the
termination of parental rights. See In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275
(Pa.Super. 1992). This Court extended the Anders procedure to appeals from
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issued a rule to show cause why this Court should not dismiss Father’s appeals
for counsel’s failure to comply with the January 11, 2019 order. Counsel filed
a response to the show cause order on February 11, 2019, and on February
21, 2019, this Court discharged the show cause order and referred the matter
to the merits panel. On March 17, 2019, counsel filed an application to
withdraw and an Anders brief in this Court.
As a preliminary matter, counsel seeks to withdraw her representation
pursuant to Anders, supra and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 602 Pa. 159,
978 A.2d 349 (2009). Anders and Santiago require counsel to: (1) petition
the Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review of the
record, counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; (2)
file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise him of
his right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief to raise any additional
points the appellant deems worthy of review. Santiago, supra at 173-79,
978 A.2d at 358-61. Substantial compliance with these requirements is
sufficient. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa.Super.
2007). After establishing that counsel has met the antecedent requirements
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goal change orders, as long as the appellant was also appealing from an
involuntary termination decree. See In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 905-06
(Pa.Super. 2017) (extending Anders procedure for withdrawal of
representation to cases involving goal change orders, even without any
accompanying involuntary termination orders).
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to withdraw, this Court makes an independent review of the record to confirm
that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Commonwealth v. Palm, 903 A.2d 1244,
1246 (Pa.Super. 2006). See also Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d
266 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc).
In Santiago, supra, our Supreme Court addressed the briefing
requirements where court-appointed appellate counsel seeks to withdraw
representation:
Neither Anders nor [Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495
Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981)] requires that counsel’s brief
provide an argument of any sort, let alone the type of
argument that counsel develops in a merits brief. To repeat,
what the brief must provide under Anders are references
to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal.
* * *
Under Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by
counsel’s examination and assessment of the record and
counsel’s references to anything in the record that arguably
supports the appeal.
Santiago, supra at 176, 177, 978 A.2d at 359, 360. Thus, the Court held:
[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed
counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a
summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations
to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4)
state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Id. at 178-79, 978 A.2d at 361.
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Instantly, Father’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw. The petition
states counsel conducted a conscientious review of the record and determined
the appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel also supplied Father with a copy of the
brief and a letter explaining Father’s right to retain new counsel or to proceed
pro se to raise any additional issues Father deems worthy of this Court’s
attention. In the Anders brief, counsel provides a summary of the facts and
procedural history of the case. Counsel refers to relevant law that applies to
Father’s issues. Counsel further states the reasons for the conclusion that the
appeal is wholly frivolous. Therefore, counsel has substantially complied with
the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago.
Father has not responded to the Anders brief pro se or with newly-
retained private counsel. Counsel raises the following issues on Father’s
behalf:
WHETHER THERE IS NO NON-FRIVOLOUS ISSUE
REGARDING THE TERMINATION OF FATHER’S PARENTAL
RIGHTS?
WHETHER THERE IS NO NON-FRIVOLOUS ISSUE
REGARDING CHANGING THE GOAL TO ADOPTION IN THIS
MATTER?
(Anders brief at 4).
Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases implicates the
following principles:
In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our
standard of review is limited to determining whether the
order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence,
and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to
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the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972
A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. … We must employ
a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order
to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder
of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of
witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is
on the party seeking termination to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for
doing so.
In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.
2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony
that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable
the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re
J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may
uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for
the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201
(Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings are
supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even if the record could support an opposite
result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191-92 (Pa.Super.
2004).
In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d
1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165
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(2008)).
DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental
rights to Child on the following grounds:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
* * *
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will
not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
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parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
the date of removal or placement, the conditions
which led to the removal or placement of the child
continue to exist and termination of parental rights
would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). “Parental rights may be
involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is
satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In
re Z.P., supra at 1117.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his… parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under
the standard of best interests of the child.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:
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To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence
of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the
filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled
intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or
failure to perform parental duties. In addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to
perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights
may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if
the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to
perform parental duties.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,
the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the
parent’s explanation for his… conduct; (2) the post-
abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)
consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights
on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted). Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination
petition:
[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given
case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
provision. The court must examine the individual
circumstances of each case and consider all explanations
offered by the parent facing termination of his… parental
rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of
the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary
termination.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.
718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
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2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not
limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include
acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D.,
797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002). “Parents are required to make diligent
efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities.” Id. at 340. The fundamental test in termination of parental
rights under Section 2511(a)(2) was long ago stated in the case of In re
Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975), where the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court announced that under what is now Section 2511(a)(2), “the petitioner
for involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence;
and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied.” In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa.Super.
1998).
“Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires that:
(1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six months; (2)
the conditions which led to removal and placement of the child continue to
exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., supra at 1118.
“[T]o terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the following
factors must be demonstrated: (1) [t]he child has been removed from
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parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist;
and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa.Super.
2003). “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12–month time frame for a parent to
remedy the conditions that led to the children's removal by the court.” In re
A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003). Once the 12–month period has
been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that
led to the child's removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith
efforts of DHS supplied over a realistic time. Id. Termination under Section
2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current
willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement
or the availability or efficacy of DHS services. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835
A.2d 387, 396 (Pa.Super. 2003); In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra.
Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination
will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520
(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability
are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The
court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying
close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.”
Id. Significantly:
In this context, the court must take into account whether a
bond exists between child and parent, and whether
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termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship.
When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony. Social workers and
caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally,
Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.
In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide
for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements
within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be
considered unfit and have his… rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d
1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental
obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association
with the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a
place of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with
good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
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to the best of his… ability, even in difficult circumstances. A
parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
while others provide the child with …her physical and
emotional needs.
In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his… child is converted, upon
the failure to fulfill his… parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper
parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy,
safe environment.” Id. at 856.
On appeal, goal change decisions are subject to an abuse of discretion
standard of review. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa.Super. 2006).
In order to conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion, we must determine that the court’s
judgment was “manifestly unreasonable,” that the
court did not apply the law, or that the court’s action
was “a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will,”
as shown by the record. We are bound by the trial
court’s findings of fact that have support in the record.
The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with
the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the
witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony.
In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
When the trial court’s findings are supported by
competent evidence of record, we will affirm, “even if
the record could also support an opposite result.”
Id. at 822-23 (internal citations omitted).
The Juvenile Act controls the disposition of dependent children. In re
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R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1217 (Pa.Super. 2008). Section 6351 provides in
relevant part:
§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child
* * *
(f) Matters to be determined at permanency
hearing.—At each permanency hearing, a court shall
determine all of the following:
(1) The continuing necessity for and
appropriateness of the placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent
of compliance with the permanency plan
developed for the child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward
alleviating the circumstances which necessitated
the original placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the
current placement goal for the child.
(5) The likely date by which the placement
goal for the child might be achieved.
(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to
finalize the permanency plan in effect.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
* * *
(9) If the child has been in placement for at
least 15 of the last 22 months or the court has
determined that aggravated circumstances exist
and that reasonable efforts to prevent or
eliminate the need to remove the child from the
child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to
preserve and reunify the family need not be
made or continue to be made, whether the
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county agency has filed or sought to join a
petition to terminate parental rights and to
identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified
family to adopt the child unless:
(i) the child is being cared for by a relative
best suited to the physical, mental and
moral welfare of the child;
(ii) the county agency has documented a
compelling reason for determining that filing
a petition to terminate parental rights would
not serve the needs and welfare of the child;
or
(iii) the child’s family has not been provided
with necessary services to achieve the safe
return to the child’s parent, guardian or
custodian within the time frames set forth in
the permanency plan.
* * *
(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the
determinations made under subsection (f) and all
relevant evidence presented at the hearing, the court
shall determine one of the following:
(1) If and when the child will be returned to
the child’s parent, guardian or custodian in cases
where the return of the child is best suited to the
safety, protection and physical, mental and moral
welfare of the child.
(2) If and when the child will be placed for
adoption, and the county agency will file for
termination of parental rights in cases where
return to the child’s parent, guardian or custodian
is not best suited to the safety, protection and
physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.
(3) If and when the child will be placed with a
legal custodian in cases where the return to the
child’s parent, guardian or custodian or being
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placed for adoption is not best suited to the
safety, protection and physical, mental and moral
welfare of the child.
(4) If and when the child will be placed with a
fit and willing relative in cases where return to
the child’s parent, guardian or custodian, being
placed for adoption or being placed with a legal
custodian is not best suited to the safety,
protection and physical, mental and moral
welfare of the child.
* * *
(f.2) Evidence.—Evidence of conduct by the parent
that places the health, safety or welfare of the child at
risk, including evidence of the use of alcohol or a
controlled substance that places the health, safety or
welfare of the child at risk, shall be presented to the
court by the county agency or any other party at any
disposition or permanency hearing whether or not the
conduct was the basis for the determination of
dependency.
(g) Court order.—On the basis of the
determination made under subsection (f.1), the court
shall order the continuation, modification or
termination of placement or other disposition which is
best suited to the safety, protection and physical,
mental and moral welfare of the child.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f), (f.1), (f.2), (g).
“When the child welfare agency has made reasonable efforts to return a
[dependent] child to [the child’s] biological parent, but those efforts have
failed, then the agency must redirect its efforts towards placing the child in an
adoptive home.” In re N.C., supra at 823 (citing In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d
967, 973 (Pa.Super. 2004)).
Although the agency has the burden to show a goal change
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would serve the child’s best interests, “[s]afety,
permanency, and well-being of the child must take
precedence over all other considerations” under Section
6351. In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2009),
appeal denied, 601 Pa. 702, 973 A.2d 1007 (2009)
(emphasis in original); In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 978
(Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 782, 959 A.2d 320
(2008). “[T]he parent’s rights are secondary” in a goal
change proceeding. In re D.P., supra.
Because the focus is on the child’s best interests, a goal
change to adoption might be appropriate, even when a
parent substantially complies with a reunification plan. In
re N.C., supra at 826-27. Where a parent’s “skills,
including [his] judgment with regard to the emotional well-
being of [his] children, remain problematic[,]” a goal change
to adoption might be appropriate, regardless of the parent’s
compliance with a permanency plan. Id. at 825. The
agency is not required to offer services indefinitely, where a
parent is unable to properly apply the instruction provided.
In re A.L.D., [supra at 340]. See also In re S.B., supra
at 981 (giving priority to child’s safety and stability, despite
parent’s substantial compliance with permanency plan); In
re A.P., 728 A.2d 375, 379 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal
denied, 560 Pa. 693, 743 A.2d 912 (1999) (holding where,
despite willingness, parent cannot meet “irreducible
minimum parental responsibilities, the needs of the child
must prevail over the rights of the parent”). Thus, even
where the parent makes earnest efforts, the “court cannot
and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for
permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress
and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901
A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006).
In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d 339, 347 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa.
648, 12 A.3d 372 (2010) (some internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the brief of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Vincent
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Furlong, we conclude Father’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion
comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented.
(See Trial Court Opinion, filed February 15, 2019, at 3-8) (finding: record
demonstrated Father’s ongoing inability to provide care for Child, due to
Father’s failure to remedy conditions, which brought Child into DHS’ care; at
termination hearing, case manager testified Child came into care due to
truancy, medical neglect, and poor condition of home; case manager noted
Father failed to achieve his SCP objectives; specifically, Father did not enroll
in drug treatment program until November 20, 2018, after DHS had filed
underlying petition to terminate parental rights; additionally, Father tested
positive for amphetamines, PCP, and cannabis during pendency of termination
proceedings; case manager also testified she observed Father under influence
during visitation with Child; case manager added Father was somewhat
bonded with Child, but that Child had not ever lived with Father, and Father
had not provided Child with financial support or physical care; case manager
opined Child’s pre-adoptive parent, Child’s grandmother, met all Child’s needs
and that Child wanted to be adopted; case manager explained termination of
Father’s parental rights would be in Child’s best interest and would not cause
Child irreparable harm; Child’s counsel confirmed she spoke to Child about
adoption, and Child said she wished to be adopted; court found case manager
and Child’s counsel credible). Following our independent review of the record,
we agree with counsel that the appeal is frivolous. See Dempster, supra.
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Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion and grant
counsel’s petition to withdraw.
Orders affirmed; counsel’s petition to withdraw is granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/29/19
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