Maggitti, U. v. Maggitti, V. ( 2022 )

J-A13040-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
URVE MAGGITTI : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
VICTOR J. MAGGITTI, JR. :
:
Appellee : No. 2420 EDA 2021
Appeal from the Order Entered October 26, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Civil Division at No(s): 2021-07135-CT
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 28, 2022
Appellant, Urve Maggitti, appeals pro se from the order entered in the
Chester County Court of Common Pleas, which denied Appellant’s motion to
seal the complaint and attached exhibits in this breach of contract action. We
vacate and remand for further proceedings.
The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
September 9, 2021, while the parties were in the process of obtaining a
divorce, Appellant field a pro se complaint against Appellee, Victor J. Maggitti,
Jr., alleging breach of contract and other claims related to Appellee’s attempt
to modify a divorce agreement between the parties. Attached to the complaint
were two exhibits. Exhibit A is an email containing the details of the parties’
divorce agreement, and Exhibit B is another email where Appellee attempts
to modify the monetary amounts in the initial agreement. Contemporaneously
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with filing the complaint, Appellant filed a motion to seal the complaint and
exhibits. On September 13, 2021, the trial court denied the motion to seal,
finding that although both parties wished for the complaint and exhibits to be
kept private, Appellant did not show good cause that closure is necessary to
prevent a clearly defined and serious injury.
On September 14, 2021, Appellant filed a praecipe to withdraw the
complaint. On September 16, 2021, she filed a motion to reconsider the
court’s September 13, 2021 order, requesting again that the court seal the
complaint and exhibits. The court denied the motion for reconsideration that
same day.
Appellant subsequently filed a second motion for reconsideration
arguing that, because of the pending divorce action between the parties, the
breach of contract complaint pertained to the existing prenuptial agreement
between the parties. She also argued that Exhibit A constituted a confidential
agreement pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3105 (governing effect of agreement
between parties in divorce proceedings).
On October 26, 2021, the trial court granted in part and denied in part
the motion for reconsideration. The court granted Appellant’s request to seal
Exhibit A, finding that she had shown good cause for its closure. However,
the court denied Appellant’s request to seal the complaint and Exhibit B
because, it concluded, Appellant failed to identify any allegation that contains
confidential information under the Case Records Public Access Policy of the
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Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 23, 2021. The
court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal, and Appellant filed none.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
I. Was it error for the Court of Common Pleas of Chester
County, Pennsylvania to not allow the statutory 20-days for
the opposing party to weigh in on the Motion to Seal
confidential information?
II. Was it error for the Court of Common Pleas of Chester
County, Pennsylvania to deny Motion to Seal Complaint
which contained sensitive confidential information?
III. Was it error for the Court of Common Pleas of Chester
County, Pennsylvania to grant Motion to Seal regarding one
Exhibit A and deny … Motion to Seal to another Exhibit B
that contained similar confidential information?
IV. Was it error for the Court of Common Pleas of Chester
County, Pennsylvania to deny Appellant’s request for oral
argument and/or an evidentiary hearing?
V. Was it error for the Court of Common Pleas of Chester
County, Pennsylvania to deny Appellant’s request to seal
confidential information contained in the original pleading
the Verified Complaint and in the Exhibit “B”?
(Appellant’s Brief at 3-4).
Preliminarily, we must discern whether Appellant’s challenge is properly
before us. An appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order certified
as a final order; (2) an interlocutory order as of right; (3) an interlocutory
order by permission; or (4) a collateral order. See Pa.R.A.P. 341, 311, 312,
and 313, respectively. “A collateral order is an order separable from and
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collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important
to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is
postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.”
Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
“[T]he collateral order doctrine is a specialized practical application of
the general rule that only final orders are appealable as of right. Thus, Rule
313 must be interpreted narrowly, and the requirements for an appealable
collateral order remain stringent in order to prevent undue corrosion of the
final order rule.” A.A. v. Glicken, 237 A.3d 1165, 1169 (Pa.Super. 2020)
(quoting Melvin v. Doe, 575 Pa. 264, 272, 836 A.2d 42, 47 (2003)).
An issue is separable if it can be examined without analysis
of the claims presented in the underlying litigation. See
[Ben v. Schwartz, 556 Pa. 475, 729 A.2d 547, 552
(1999)]. To determine whether an issue is sufficiently
important to support application of the collateral order
doctrine, “[a court should] weigh the interests implicated in
the case against the costs of piecemeal litigation.” Id. “[I]t
is not sufficient that the issue be important to the particular
parties. Rather it must involve rights deeply rooted in public
policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.” Id.,quoting Geniviva v. Frisk, 555 Pa. 589, 725 A.2d 1209,
1213-1214 (1999). “[A]n issue is important if the interests
that would potentially go unprotected without immediate
appellate review are significant relative to the efficiency
interests sought to be advanced by adherence to the final
judgment rule.” Finally, irreparable loss results from
postponement if no effective means of review exist after the
entry of final judgment. See Schwartz, 729 A.2d at 552.
A.A., supra at 1169.
In A.A., this Court held that an order denying a motion to seal a petition
to approve a settlement agreement constituted a collateral order. Specifically,
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we determined that the issue of sealing the petition to approve the settlement
agreement was entirely separable from the merits of the underlying medical
malpractice action. This Court explained that immediate appellate review was
even more important because the parties had already resolved their dispute.
Finally, the Court decided that the appellants’ claim would have been
irreparably lost if the appeal was denied since it was improbable that there
would be a future appealable order that would allow the appellants to raise
their claim. Id. at 1169-70.
Here, we similarly hold that the order denying Appellant’s request to
seal the complaint and Exhibit B constitutes a collateral order. The issue of
the confidentiality of the complaint and Exhibit B is entirely separable from
the underlying action. In addition, like in A.A., the parties here have
apparently resolved the breach of contract action (by virtue of Appellant’s
praecipe to withdraw the complaint), so appellate review is even important,
as Appellant’s request to seal will likely be irreparably lost in the absence of
immediate review. Consequently, the prerequisites for the collateral order
doctrine are met. See id.; Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
Before considering the merits of the claim, however, we must also
discern whether there remains an actual case and controversy. At every stage
of the judicial process, an actual case or controversy must exist to avoid
dismissal for mootness. In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en
banc). Nevertheless, this Court has held that “moot appeals will be reviewed
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where a party to the controversy will clearly continue to suffer detriment due
to the decision of the trial court.” Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole, 673 A.2d
348, 353 (Pa.Super. 1996) (en banc). Here, soon after filing her breach of
contract action, Appellant withdrew the complaint. Her only remaining issue
concerns sealing the complaint and Exhibit B. Although Appellant has
withdrawn her action, she will continue to suffer the detriment of her filings
being publicly accessible. Therefore, an exception to the mootness doctrine
applies and we proceed with our merits review. See id.We combine Appellant’s issues. Appellant argues the trial court
improperly denied her motion to seal the complaint and Exhibit B. Appellant
insists that the complaint and exhibits were related to a divorce proceeding
between the parties, and contained sensitive private and confidential
information about the parties, which constitute confidential information under
the Case Records Public Access Policy at 204 Pa.Code § 213.81, Section 8.0
(governing “confidential documents” and designating agreements between
parties as used in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3105 as “confidential”). Appellant contends
that the court erred in differentiating between the exhibits to the complaint,
and asserts that both exhibits, and the complaint itself, contained similar
confidential information. We agree that relief is due.1
____________________________________________
1 Due to our holding that the court should have sealed the complaint and both
exhibits, we decline to reach Appellant’s ancillary issues concerning whether
the court was required to give Appellee 20 days to respond to the motion and
whether the court should have conducted a hearing on the motion.
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A trial court’s decision to grant or deny closure of the record will be
reversed by this Court only upon a determination that the trial court abused
its discretion. A.A., supra at 1170.
In order to justify closure or sealing the record a party must
overcome the common law presumption of openness.
Fundamental to democratic government, public access to
civil trials enhances the quality of justice, affords a broader
understanding of the operation of the courts, and promotes
confidence in and respect for our judicial system. To rebut
the presumption of openness, and to obtain closure of
judicial proceedings and records, a party must demonstrate
good cause. Good cause exists where closure is necessary
in order to prevent a clearly defined and serious injury to
the party seeking it.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Documents filed in divorce, and matters related to divorce are public
records; however, the public’s right of access may be limited where the access
serves no useful public purpose or legitimate interest. Katz v. Katz, 514 A.2d
1374, 1380 (Pa.Super. 1986). This Court has noted that “[d]ivorce cases
present one exception to the general rule of openness” and “[t]he details of
divorce ‘involve matters which are essentially private in nature and...lack any
useful, public purpose.’” R.W. v. Hampe, 626 A.2d 1218, 1222 (Pa.Super.
1993) (quoting Katz, supra at 1379).
Here, the instant case is not specifically a divorce action. Nevertheless,
upon reviewing the complaint and attached exhibits, it is clear that those
documents are completely entwined in the parties’ divorce action. The
complaint details the specifics of an agreement between the parties
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concerning their financial responsibilities to one another as part of a quick
divorce that they hoped to obtain, and the exhibits are emails between the
parties discussing the mechanics of this agreement. Neither the complaint
nor the exhibits serve any useful public purpose or legitimate interest, rather
they involve matters related to the divorce which are private in nature. See
R.W., supra; Katz, supra. Further, Appellant has shown that good cause
exists to seal the records because they reveal private financial information of
the parties.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred when
it denied Appellant’s request to seal the complaint and both attached exhibits.
Accordingly, we vacate the court’s order and remand so that the trial court
may enter an appropriate order sealing the complaint and both exhibits.
Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/28/2022
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