Gourmet's Delight Mushrooms v. Keating, P. ( 2019 )

J-A13034-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
GOURMET’S DELIGHT MUSHROOMS, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LP, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
PAUL D. KEATING, SUSAN S. :
KEATING, SEAN C. SMITH, MALLORY :
P. AUSTIN, SARAH BERDOULAY, :
TROY ST. JOHN, RICHARD A. MASHA, :
TERESA R. MASHA, JULIE B. :
ENGILES, GARY M. MACK, BARBARA :
L. MACK, WILLIAM D. WALKER, :
MARGARET W. WALKER, JOSEPH :
SAMUEL COX, ANNE M. JEAVONS, :
ERIC G. JEAVONS, PATRICK G. :
TALWIN, LINDA A. TIBERIA, ROBERT :
S. REYNOLDS, WENDY L. REYNOLDS, :
LOUIS F. DONAGHUE, MARIANNE C. :
DONAGHUE, CHRISTOPHER M. :
WURM, VIRGINIA C. NORTH, JANET :
A. SMITH, MARY ANN HITCHENS, :
ARTHUR R. TAYLOR, JR., CYNTHIA L. :
TAYLOR, ANTHONY L. LAURIA, LINDA :
S. LAURIA, DANNY MILANO, CARRIE :
MILANO AND LYNN ARRINGTON :
:
APPEAL OF: LYNN ARRINGTON : No. 3413 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered October 26, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Civil Division at No(s): 2017-07576-RC
GOURMET’S DELIGHT MUSHROOMS, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LP, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
PAUL D. KEATING, SUSAN S. :
KEATING, SEAN C. SMITH, MALLORY :
P. AUSTIN, SARAH BERDOULAY, :
TROY ST. JOHN, RICHARD A. MASHA, :
TERESA R. MASHA, JULIE B. :
J-A13034-19
ENGILES, GARY M. MACK, BARBARA :
L. MACK, WILLIAM D. WALKER, :
MARGARET W. WALKER, JOSEPH :
SAMUEL COX, ANNE M. JEAVONS, :
ERIC G. JEAVONS, PATRICK G. :
TALWIN, LINDA A. TIBERIA, ROBERT :
S. REYNOLDS, WENDY L. REYNOLDS, :
LOUIS F. DONAGHUE, MARIANNE C. :
DONAGHUE, CHRISTOPHER M. :
WURM, VIRGINIA C. NORTH, JANET :
A. SMITH, MARY ANN HITCHENS, :
ARTHUR R. TAYLOR, JR., CYNTHIA L. :
TAYLOR, ANTHONY L. LAURIA, LINDA :
S. LAURIA, DANNY MILANO, CARRIE :
MILANO AND LYNN ARRINGTON :
:
APPEAL OF: SEAN C. SMITH, :
MALLORY P. AUSTIN, SARAH :
BERDOULAY, TROY ST. JOHN, :
ARTHUR TAYLOR, CYNTHIA TAYLOR, :
RICK MASHA, TERESA MASHA, GARY :
M. MACK, BARBARA L. MACK, :
WILLIAM D. WALKER, MARGARET W. :
WALKER, JOSEPH S. COX, PATRICK :
G. TALWIN, LINDA A. TIBERIA, :
ROBERT S. REYNOLDS, WENDY L. :
REYNOLDS, LOUIS F. DONAGHUE, :
MARIANNE C. DONAGHUE, :
CHRISTOPHER M. WURM, VIRGINIA :
C. NORTH, JANET A. SMITH, MARY :
ANN HITCHENS, ANTHONY L. LAURIA, :
LINDA S. LAURIA, DANNY MILANO, :
AND CARRIE MILANO : No. 3436 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered October 26, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Civil Division at No(s): 2017-07576-RC
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2019
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Twenty-eight neighboring property owners (collectively, the
Neighbors)1 appeal from the October 26, 2018 order granting summary
judgment in favor of Gourmet’s Delight Mushrooms, LP (Gourmet), and
denying summary judgment to the Neighbors. Specifically, this consolidated
appeal challenges the trial court’s interpretation of certain deed restrictions,
and the determination that the deed restrictions did not apply to Gourmet’s
land development plan. Upon review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand for proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
Factual Background
We glean the following background from the record. Gourmet owns a
property in London Grove Township (London Grove Property), on which
Gourmet operates a mushroom-growing business. In 2005 and 2014,
Gourmet purchased two properties (Benmark Property and Irwin Property,
respectively), which are contiguous to its London Grove Property and located
entirely in Franklin Township, in order to expand its mushroom growing
operations. Gourmet subsequently merged the Franklin Township properties
(collectively, Gourmet Property).
The Irwin Property is subject to the following deed restriction (Irwin
Restriction), which was recorded in 1951.
1 Default judgments were entered below against Paul D. Keating, Susan S.
Keating, Julie B. Engiles, Anne M. Jeavons, and Eric G. Jeavons. These
individuals were not parties to the motions for summary judgment and are
not parties to this appeal.
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ALSO UNDER AND SUBJECT to the provision that no mushroom
houses shall be erected or maintained upon the above-described
premises by said Grantees, their heirs, assigns or occupiers of
said premises. []
The Benmark property is subject to a similar deed restriction (Benmark
Restriction), which was recorded in 1955.
UNDER AND SUBJECT, also, to the restriction that no mushroom
house shall be erected on the within conveyed premises for a
period of ninety (90) years. []
Mushroom Growing & Mushroom Houses
To understand better the issues in this case, we provide the following
background on mushroom growing and mushroom houses. “The evolution of
mushroom houses has been gradual and the result of much trial and error.”
Robert Snetsinger, Mushrooms and Penn State: Past, Present, Future,
BULLETIN 767, May 1970, at 2 (Gourmet’s Memorandum of Law, 7/25/2018,
at Exhibit A). In 1950, standard mushroom houses existed that worked best
for mushroom growing, but variations and modifications also existed at that
time based on new technology. ALBERT M. KLIGMAN, HANDBOOK OF MUSHROOM
CULTURE 20-21, 36 (2d ed. 1950) (Neighbors’ Summary Judgment Record,
9/25/2018, at SJ_0167-0168, 0170). By 1970, “[a] typical small mushroom
farm … consist[ed] of ‘double’ mushroom houses, an open composting yard,
and storage areas.” Snetsinger, supra, at 2 (Gourmet’s Memorandum of
Law, 7/25/2018, at Exhibit A). Regardless of the style of mushroom house,
mushroom growing consists of six steps: (1) Phase I composting, (2) Phase
II composting, (3) spawning, (4) casing, (5) pinning, and (6) cropping.
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Daniel J. Royse and Robert B. Beelman, Six Steps to Mushroom Farming,
PENN STATE EXTENSION, 1, https://extension.psu.edu/six-steps-to-mushroom-
farming (SJ_0205).
“Phase I composting lasts from 6 to 14 days, depending on the nature
of the material at the start and its characteristics at each turn. There is a
strong ammonia odor associated with composting[.]” Six Steps to
Mushroom Farming, supra, at 5 (SJ_0209). In 1950, Phase I composting
began immediately behind the mushroom house or, less often, under an
open structure known as a shed. KLIGMAN, supra, at 35-36 (SJ_0169-0170).
After the last turning, the compost was moved into the mushroom house to
begin Phase II composting. Id. at 121, 125-26 (SJ_0173, 0176-0177).
Phase II composting consists of pasteurization to kill insects, pest
fungi, and other pests, as well as conditioning to remove ammonia, in order
to transform the compost into a medium that will promote the growth of
mushrooms. Six Steps to Mushroom Farming, supra, at 5 (SJ_0209);
KLIGMAN, supra, at 125 (SJ_0176). Today, Phase II composting occurs in
one of three places: in wooden trays in an environmentally controlled Phase
II room, in beds that are placed directly in the room used for all steps of
mushroom growing, or in an insulated tunnel. Six Steps to Mushroom
Farming, supra, at 5-6 (SJ_0209-0210).
The third phase, spawning, is also known as Phase III composting. In
this phase, grain mixes with calcium carbonate, and is then cooked,
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sterilized, cooled, and inoculated with mushroom mycelia. Following these
steps, the mixture becomes spawn, which is distributed onto the Phase II
compost in order to seed the compost with mushroom mycelia. Id. at 9
(SJ_0213); David Meigs Beyer, Ph.D., Basic Procedures for Agaricus
Mushroom Growing, PENN STATE EXTENSION, 7-9,
https://extension.psu.edu/basic-procedures-for-agaricus-mushroom-growing
(SJ_0188-0190). “In recent years, the use of bulk Phase III compost has
increased in popularity because it allows an increase in the number of crops
a grower can expect from his production rooms.” Six Steps to Mushroom
Farming, supra, at 10 (SJ_0214). The spawning phase ends once the
compost is fully-grown with spawn. Id. at 10 (SJ_0214).
The fourth phase is casing. “Casing is a top-dressing applied to the
spawn-run compost on which the mushrooms eventually form.” Id.
The fifth phase is pinning. During pinning, mushrooms grow from
initials, to pins, to buttons, and ultimately to mushrooms. Id. at 13
(SJ_0217). During the final and sixth phase, cropping, mushrooms are
harvested. Id. at 14 (SJ_0218).
Procedural Background
On August 2, 2017, Gourmet filed a complaint against the Neighbors
seeking a declaratory judgment that the deed restrictions against the
erection or maintenance of mushroom houses on the Gourmet Property did
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not apply to its proposed composting facility. The Neighbors filed an answer
and new matter.
On July 25, 2018, Gourmet moved for summary judgment against the
Neighbors. On September 24, 2018, some neighbors 2 moved for summary
judgment, and filed a brief in support of their motion and in opposition to
Gourmet’s motion.
Gourmet’s Motion for Summary Judgment
In its motion for summary judgment, Gourmet argued that the deed
restrictions did not apply, as a matter of law, to facilities used solely for
composting. Gourmet’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/25/2018, at 5.
According to Gourmet, the term “mushroom house” as used in the 1950s is
unambiguous and has a clearly established meaning: a “long and narrow
block building with no windows.” Memorandum of Law in Support of
Gourmet’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/25/2018, at 9. As such,
Gourmet argued that “the proposed composting facility, within which no
mushrooms are grown, cannot violate the prohibition.” Gourmet’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, 7/25/2018, at 5 (unnecessary capitalization altered).
2 Specifically, Sean C. Smith, Mallory P. Austin, Sarah Berdoulay, Troy St.
John, Arthur R. Taylor, Jr., Cynthia Taylor, Rick Masha, Teresa Masha, Gary
M. Mack, Barbara L. Mack, William D. Walker, Margaret W. Walker, Joseph S.
Cox, Patrick G. Talwin, Linda A. Tiberia, Robert S. Reynolds, Wendy L.
Reynolds, Louis F. Donaghue, Marianne C. Donaghue, Christopher M. Wurm,
Virginia C. North, Janet A. Smith, Mary Ann Hitchens, Anthony L. Lauria,
Linda S. Lauria, Danny Milano, and Carrie Milano. Lynn Arrington joined the
other neighbors’ summary judgment motion on October 23, 2018.
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Gourmet further argued that the deed restrictions were building restrictions,
not use restrictions. Id.
In support of its interpretation of the deed restrictions, Gourmet
attached to its Memorandum of Law several exhibits, consisting of excerpts
from various books and websites. See Gourmet’s Memorandum of Law,
7/25/2018, at Exhibits A-E.
Neighbors’ Response & Motion for Summary Judgment
In response to Gourmet’s motion, and in support of their own motion
for summary judgment, the Neighbors argued that the term “mushroom
house” as used in the 1950s had a different meaning than Gourmet’s
interpretation. According to the Neighbors, “the term ‘mushroom house’
was understood to encompass the entire mushroom operation, including the
preparation of mushroom compost, which took place both immediately
beside and within the mushroom house and which compost is essential to
growing mushrooms.” Neighbors’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
9/24/2018, at 2.
Contrary to Gourmet’s contention, the Neighbors argued that the deed
restrictions were intended as restrictions on mushroom uses “in and around
mushroom houses, including mushroom growing and the preparation of
mushroom compost,” and not just a restriction on a particular style of
building. Id. at 3. The Neighbors maintained that “[t]he mushroom
composting proposed by Gourmet violates the [d]eed [r]estrictions because
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the proposed composting is part and parcel of the ‘vertically integrated’
system with Gourmet’s existing mushroom growing operation” on the
London Grove Property. Id. Therefore, the Neighbors sought a declaration
that the deed restrictions prohibit any and all mushroom-growing uses,
including the preparation of mushroom compost, and that the restrictions
prohibit Gourmet from expanding its mushroom operations onto the
Benmark and Irwin Properties. Id. at 4.
The Neighbors further argued that the “object or purpose of the parties
in restricting ‘mushroom houses’ would be to prevent a mushroom operation
from operating near residential properties” because of “odor, sanitation
issues, water runoff, pests and insects, and the potential devaluation of
nearby residential properties.” Neighbors’ Brief in Opposition to Gourmet’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, 9/24/2018, at 16.
In support of their interpretation of the deed restrictions, Neighbors
filed of record several documents, including, inter alia, excerpts from various
books and websites. See Neighbors’ Summary Judgment Record,
9/25/2018, at SJ_0163-SJ_0228.
Trial Court Decision
In granting Gourmet’s motion for summary judgment and denying the
Neighbors’ motion, the trial court found the term “mushroom house”
unambiguous. According to the trial court, a “mushroom house is a thing,
not a process. That thing is a mushroom house, not a composting wharf. …
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Since a composting wharf is not a mushroom house, it follows that there is
no prohibition against erecting or maintaining a composting wharf.” Trial
Court Opinion, 10/26/2018, at 8. Thus, the trial court granted Gourmet
relief, and held that Gourmet was permitted to construct the proposed
composting facility and perform composting activities on the Gourmet
Property.
Issues on Appeal and Relevant Legal Principles
This timely-filed appeal followed.3, 4 On appeal, the Neighbors argue
that the trial court (1) misinterpreted the deed restrictions and (2) erred in
concluding Gourmet’s proposed expansion was limited to Phase I composting
outdoors on a composting wharf. Neighbors’ Brief at 3, 26, 40.5 According
3 Both the Neighbors and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. In
lieu of a separate opinion, the trial court issued a statement relying on its
October 26, 2018 memorandum. Trial Court Opinion, 12/17/2018.
4 “[A]n order denying summary judgment is ordinarily a non-appealable
interlocutory order. However, an order in a declaratory judgment action that
either affirmatively or negatively declares rights, status, and other legal
relations is a final order.” Good v. Frankie & Eddie’s Hanover Inn, LLP,
171 A.3d 792, 794 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Thus, this appeal from the trial court order denying the Neighbors’
motion for summary judgment and granting Gourmet’s motion is properly
before us.
5 Because Appellant Arrington filed her own motions and brief, which joined
the other neighbors’ motion for summary judgment, brief in support thereof
and in opposition to Gourmet’s motion for summary judgment, brief on
appeal, and reply brief filed by the remaining Neighbors, when this Court
cites any document filed by the Neighbors, we are referencing those
documents filed on behalf of Sean C. Smith, Mallory P. Austin, Sarah
Berdoulay, Troy St. John, Arthur Taylor, Cynthia Taylor, Rick Masha, Teresa
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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to the Neighbors, the term “mushroom house” in the 1950s referred to a
building in which the second through sixth phases of mushroom growing
took place, and immediately beside which the first phase of composting took
place. Id. at 32-33. As such, the Neighbors contend that the trial court
erred in concluding that the deed restrictions did not apply to Gourmet’s land
development plan. Id. at 40.
We begin with the relevant legal principles. “In a declaratory
judgment action, just as in civil actions generally, summary judgment may
be granted only in those cases in which the record clearly shows that there
are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. Hogan,
852 A.2d 352, 354 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). When reviewing a challenge to an order granting summary
judgment,
[w]e may reverse if there has been an error of law or an abuse
of discretion. Our standard of review is de novo, and our scope
plenary. We must view the record in the light most favorable to
the non[-]moving party and all doubts as to the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the
moving party. Furthermore, [in] evaluating the trial court’s
decision to enter summary judgment, we focus on the legal
standard articulated in the summary judgment rule. The rule
states that where there is no genuine issue of material fact and
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
Masha, Gary M. Mack, Barbara L. Mack, William D. Walker, Margaret W.
Walker, Joseph S. Cox, Patrick G. Talwin, Linda A. Tiberia, Robert S.
Reynolds, Wendy L. Reynolds, Louis F. Donaghue, Marianne C. Donaghue,
Christopher M. Wurm, Virginia C. North, Janet A. Smith, Mary Ann Hitchens,
Anthony L. Lauria, Linda S. Lauria, Danny Milano, and Carrie Milano.
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the moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of
law, summary judgment may be entered. Where the nonmoving
party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely
rely on his pleadings or answers in order to
survive summary judgment. Failure of a non-moving party to
adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and
on which he bears the burden of proof establishes the
entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.
Carlino E. Brandywine, L.P. v. Brandywine Vill. Ass'n, 197 A.3d 1189,
1199-200 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “[W]e review the trial
court’s denial of summary judgment for an abuse of discretion or error of
law.” Hildebrand v. EQT Prod. Co., 165 A.3d 969, 971 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
A trial court’s construction of a deed is a question of law, which
compels de novo review.
When interpreting deeds, this Court’s primary objective must be
to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties. When the
language of the deed is free from ambiguity, the intent of the
parties must be determined from the language of the deed.
Conversely, when the language is ambiguous, intent is
determined by the situation and conduct of the parties,
surrounding circumstances, the object they had in view and the
nature of the subject matter. Further, if the language in a deed
is ambiguous, “then all of the attending circumstances
existing at the time of the execution of the instrument
should be considered to aid in determining the apparent object
of the parties.” Starling v. Lake Meade Prop. Owners Ass'n,
Inc., [] 162 A.3d 327, 341 ([Pa. ]2017) (citation omitted;
emphasis in original).
Russo v. Polidoro, 176 A.3d 326, 329 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some citations
and quotation marks omitted).
“Restrictive covenants[,] which restrict the use of property, although
not favored by the law, are legally enforceable. Restrictive covenants are to
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be strictly construed against persons seeking to enforce them and claiming
benefit thereof and in favor of the free, unrestricted use of property.”
Logston v. Penndale, Inc., 576 A.2d 59, 62 (Pa. Super. 1990) (citations
omitted).
Moreover, restrictive covenants are divided into two categories,
building restrictions and use restrictions. Building restrictions
are concerned with the physical aspect or external appearance of
the buildings. Use restrictions involve the purposes for which
the buildings are used, the nature of their occupancy, and the
operations conducted therein.
Richman v. Mosites, 704 A.2d 655, 658 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). Where the restrictive covenant is a building
restriction, “the purposes for which the disputed parcel may be used are
irrelevant.” Id.
The distinction between a building restriction and a use
restriction is a “basic rule of construction.” This Court will not
allow extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent to contradict the
express statement contained in the restrictive covenant. “A
building restriction and a use restriction are wholly independent
of one another and, … the one is not to be extended so as to
include the other unless the intention so to do is expressly and
plainly stated[.]”
Id. at 658-59 (citations omitted).
Analysis
Upon review of the record, we do not agree with the trial court that
the term “mushroom house,” as used in the 1950s, is unambiguous.
Certainly, a fact-finder could agree with Gourmet’s interpretation of the deed
restrictions and that they do not apply to the proposed land development
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plan. However, we conclude that Neighbors have set forth sufficient
evidence, which, if believed, would permit a reasonable fact-finder to
conclude that “mushroom house” was used in the 1950s as a term of art to
describe an indoor facility where five of the six phases of mushroom growing
took place, and beside which composting began.
In considering whether the deed restriction is a building restriction or
use restriction, we are guided by this Court’s decision in Buck Hill Falls Co.
v. Clifford Press, 791 A.2d 392 (Pa. Super. 2002). In that case, this Court
reviewed separately two restrictions. The first restriction prohibited the
keeping of poultry. The second restriction stated that “no barn, stable,
cowshed, [or] chicken house ... shall ... be erected or constructed upon any
part of the hereby granted premises.” Id. at 398 (quotation marks
omitted). Giving effect to the intention of the parties and the nature of the
subject matter at the time of the restriction, this Court found the definition
of “chicken house” obvious. “The ordinary usage and plain meaning of the
phrase ‘chicken house,’ as well as common sense, require that a structure
built to house chickens or poultry be defined as a ‘chicken house.’” Id.
Likewise, a reasonable fact-finder here could conclude that the
ordinary usage and plain meaning of “mushroom house” in the 1950s could
not be separated from the use of that building to grow mushrooms. As
such, any structure built to grow mushrooms could be considered a
“mushroom house,” regardless of its architectural style. Thus, while the
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deed restrictions herein reference a structure, a reasonable fact-finder could
conclude that the deed restrictions are actually use restrictions because they
involve “the purposes for which the buildings are used, the nature of their
occupancy, and the operations conducted therein” and not simply the
external appearance of the buildings. Richman, 704 A.2d at 658 (citations
omitted).
Pursuant to the land development plan, Gourmet’s plans for expansion
on the Benmark and Irwin Properties include the following:
a[n] 84,150 square foot, three-sided building[,] having a length
of 510 feet and a width of 165 feet connected to a 45,900
square foot covered wharf and a 57,540 square foot uncovered
wharf and a separate 137,700 square foot four-sided building
having a length of 540 feet and a width of 255 feet[.] …
Development of the Gourmet Property will permit Gourmet to
relocate its existing composting activities from the London Grove
Property to the proposed composting facility and to construct
additional mushroom growing rooms in the area on the London
Grove Property vacated by the relocation of Gourmet composting
activities.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/26/2018, at 5-6 (unnecessary capitalization altered).
According to Gourmet, the composting facility will be used solely for
composting and include “a flat concrete turning wharf.” Gourmet’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, 7/25/2018, at 5. The facility itself will not involve
any mushroom growing, but will include, in addition to the composting
wharf, storage of raw materials and areas designated for spray irrigation of
stormwater. Id.; Memorandum of Law in Support of Gourmet’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, 7/25/2018, at 2-3.
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On the other hand, Neighbors argue that Gourmet’s land development
plan indicates it will use the Gourmet Property specifically for Phases I, II,
and III composting. Neighbors’ Brief in Opposition to Gourmet’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, 9/24/2018, at 8. As indicated supra, Phases II and III
composting took place within the standard “mushroom house” structure
used in the 1950s. Additionally, based upon a letter written by Gourmet’s
counsel, Gourmet has indicated that the proposed composting facility for the
Gourmet Property “will include a designated area to be used for mushroom
growing.” Letter, 8/13/2014, at 1 (unnumbered) (Neighbors’ Summary
Judgment Record, 9/25/2018, at SJ_0159). Moreover, the Neighbors argue
that Gourmet’s earlier attempts to have the Neighbors release the properties
from the deed restrictions demonstrate a belief on Gourmet’s behalf that its
intended use of the Gourmet Property is not permitted under the deed
restrictions. Neighbors’ Brief in Opposition to Gourmet’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, 9/24/2018, at 19-20; see also, e.g., Letter,
3/21/2005 (SJ_0145) (requesting release of restriction in order to build
office building, and proposing in exchange a new restriction against
commercial composting).
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the competing definitions
of “mushroom house,” as well as the uncertainty in the record as to what
specific mushroom-growing phases Gourmet plans to pursue on the Gourmet
Property, evidence a dispute of material fact. Our Supreme Court has
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emphasized “that it is not [a] court’s function upon summary judgment to
decide issues of fact, but only to decide whether there is an issue of fact to
be tried.” Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 862 (Pa. 2005) (citing Pa.R.C.P.
1035.2(1)). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to Gourmet. See Selective Way Ins. Co. v.
Hospitality Group Servs., Inc., 119 A.3d 1035, 1051 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(en banc) (reversing grant of summary judgment in declaratory judgment
action where there was an issue of fact to be decided by the trial court).
Conclusion
Because there is enough evidence in the record, which, if believed,
would permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the deed restrictions
prohibit mushroom growing, and that the deed restrictions would apply to
Gourmet’s proposed land development plan for the restricted properties.
Thus, we hold that there is a dispute of material fact as to what “mushroom
house” means and whether the deed restrictions apply to Gourmet’s
proposed land development plan. Accordingly, we affirm6 the trial court’s
order denying the Neighbors’ motion for summary judgment, reverse the
trial court’s order granting Gourmet’s motion, and remand for proceedings
consistent with this memorandum.
6 “To the extent that our reasoning differs from that of the trial court, … we
may uphold a decision of the trial court if there is any proper basis for the
result reached[.].” Generation Mortg. Co. v. Nguyen, 138 A.3d 646, 651
n.4 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
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Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for
proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/16/19
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