Com. v. Constantini, D. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S21029-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    DAVID FRANCIS CONSTANTINI               :
    :
    Appellant             :    No. 3135 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 10, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-23-CR-0000744-2011
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                              FILED MAY 07, 2019
    David Francis Constantini (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
    sentence imposed following the revocation of his probation and resentencing.
    Appellant’s appellate counsel (Counsel) seeks to withdraw from representation
    pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967) and Commonwealth
    v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa. 2009).        Upon review, we grant Counsel’s
    petition to withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
    On April 12, 2012, a jury found Appellant guilty of retail theft and
    receiving stolen property.     On June 26, 2012, the trial court sentenced
    Appellant to an aggregate term of two to four years of incarceration followed
    by 3 years of probation.
    On August 2, 2012, while still under supervision, Appellant pled guilty
    to possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia,
    possession with intent to deliver, and criminal conspiracy at docket number
    J-S21029-19
    CP-23-CR-3160-2017.         Consequently, on October 10, 2018, the trial court
    held a Gagnon II hearing,1 at the conclusion of which the court found
    Appellant in violation of his supervision, revoked his probation, and imposed
    a new sentence of two to four years of incarceration. On October 11, 2018,
    Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal and on October 15, 2018, he
    filed a pro se post-sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence, which was
    denied by operation of law.2
    On appeal, Counsel has filed an Anders brief and a petition to withdraw.
    There are particular mandates that counsel seeking to withdraw pursuant to
    Anders must follow.         These mandates and the significant protection they
    provide to an Anders appellant arise because a criminal defendant has a
    constitutional right to a direct appeal and to counsel on that appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Woods, 
    939 A.2d 896
    , 898 (Pa. Super. 2007). We have
    summarized these requirements as follows:
    Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders must file
    a petition averring that, after a conscientious examination of the
    record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly frivolous. Counsel
    must also file an Anders brief setting forth issues that might
    ____________________________________________
    1 The Gagnon II hearing requires two inquiries: (1) whether the probationer
    has in fact violated one of the conditions of his probation, and, if so, (2) should
    the probationer “be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to
    protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation[.]”             Gagnon v.
    Scarpelli, 
    411 U.S. 778
    , 784 (1973).
    2 During his violation of probation proceedings, Appellant was represented by
    Jeffrey Bauer, Esquire; on appeal, Appellant is represented by Patrick
    Connors, Esquire. In the interim, Appellant filed his notice of appeal and post-
    sentence motion pro se.
    -2-
    J-S21029-19
    arguably support the appeal along with any other issues necessary
    for the effective appellate presentation thereof.
    Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders petition
    and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the right to
    retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points
    worthy of this Court’s attention.
    If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical requirements of
    Anders, this Court will deny the petition to withdraw and remand
    the case with appropriate instructions (e.g., directing counsel
    either to comply with Anders or file an advocate’s brief on
    Appellant’s behalf).
    
    Id.
     (citations omitted).
    Additionally, there are requirements as to precisely what an Anders
    brief must contain:
    [T]he Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s
    petition to withdraw … must: (1) provide a summary of the
    procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer
    to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports
    the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
    frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the
    appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
    record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have
    led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. When faced with a purported Anders brief, we
    may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first deciding
    whether     counsel   has   properly   requested    permission    to   withdraw.
    Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 
    951 A.2d 379
    , 382 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
    omitted).    If counsel has met these obligations, “it then becomes the
    responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the
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    proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal
    is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 354 n.5.
    Instantly, we conclude that Counsel has complied with the above
    requirements outlined above.       Counsel has filed a petition with this Court
    stating that after reviewing the record, he finds this appeal to be wholly
    frivolous. Application to Withdraw Appearance, 2/22/19, ¶ 3. In conformance
    with Santiago, Counsel’s brief includes summaries of the facts and procedural
    history of the case and discusses the only issue he believes might arguably
    support Appellant’s appeal. See Anders Brief at 4-7. Counsel’s brief sets
    forth his conclusion that the appeal is frivolous and includes citation to
    relevant authority. See id. at 7. Finally, Counsel has attached to his petition
    to withdraw the letter that he sent to Appellant, which enclosed Counsel’s
    petition and Anders brief and advised Appellant of his right to proceed pro se
    or with private counsel and to raise any additional issues that he deems worthy
    of this Court’s consideration. We therefore turn to the merits.
    The single issue presented by Counsel in the Anders brief is whether
    Appellant’s new sentence of two to four years of incarceration was harsh and
    excessive under the circumstances. This issue challenges the discretionary
    aspects of Appellant’s sentence.
    “The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence
    is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.”
    Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 
    91 A.3d 1247
    , 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    -4-
    J-S21029-19
    “An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction
    when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” 
    Id.
     We conduct
    this four-part test to determine whether:
    (1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the
    time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the
    appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth
    a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of
    his appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant
    raises a substantial question for our review.
    Commonwealth v. Baker, 
    72 A.3d 652
    , 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
    omitted). “A defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a
    plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing
    code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.”
    Commonwealth v. Dodge, 
    77 A.3d 1263
    , 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013)
    (quotations and citations omitted).
    Although Appellant preserved his sentencing claim by filing a post-
    sentence motion and a timely notice of appeal, and the Anders brief includes
    a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, we conclude that Appellant’s simple assertion
    that his sentence was excessive and harsh under the circumstances does not
    present a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 
    47 A.3d 155
    ,
    159 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“[A] bald assertion that a sentence is excessive does
    not by itself raise a substantial question justifying this Court’s review of the
    merits of the underlying claim.”).     Appellant’s claim does not challenge a
    specific provision of the sentencing code nor does it cite any particular
    fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process that Appellant believes
    -5-
    J-S21029-19
    has   been   violated.    Appellant’s   sentencing   claim   amounts     to   an
    unsubstantiated assertion that his sentence was excessive. Because Appellant
    does not present a substantial question for our review, “we will not review his
    sentencing claim.” See 
    id.
    Finally, after conducting our own independent review of the record, we
    have determined that there are no issues of merit and agree with Counsel’s
    assessment that Appellant’s direct appeal is frivolous. We thus find this appeal
    to be wholly frivolous and permit Counsel to withdraw.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/7/19
    -6-