Watson, M. v. Dr. Caleb ( 2019 )


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  • J-S41004-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    MYRON WATSON                               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant               :
    :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    DOCTOR CALEB, JOHN STEINHART,              :   No. 385 MDA 2019
    AND CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS                 :
    Appeal from the Order Entered February 5, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Civil Division at
    No(s): S-224-2019
    BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                             FILED AUGUST 09, 2019
    Myron Watson appeals pro se from the trial court’s order denying his
    petition to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and dismissing his complaint. We
    affirm.
    Watson, an inmate at SCI-Mahanoy, filed a pro se complaint against
    Appellees/Defendants, Doctor Caleb1 (a medical-contract provider), John
    Steinhart (Chief Health Care Administrator (CHCA) at SCI-Mahanoy),2 and
    ____________________________________________
    1   Nothing in the record indicates Caleb’s first name.
    2 Steinhart is the only Appellee that has filed a brief on appeal. We note that
    Steinhart’s defense of sovereign immunity does not apply to medical
    professionals. See Williams v. Syed, 
    782 A.2d 1090
    (Pa. Commw. 2001)
    (prison health care administrator, as Commonwealth employee, falls within
    medical professional liability exception to sovereign immunity).
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S41004-19
    Correction Care Solutions,3 asserting “negligence/wanton conduct” (Count 1),
    “misfeasance and nonfeasance” (Count 2), and improper “policies, practices
    and/or customs” (Count 3). See Plaintiff’s Complaint, 2/4/18, at 5-7. The
    coversheet to Watson’s pro se complaint designates his action as one of
    “Professional Liability/Negligence.”
    Watson claims that he was prescribed cholesterol medication by Dr.
    Caleb and that the renewal of the medication was delayed causing an
    increased risk of him developing arteriosclerosis.             Watson asserts that
    Steinhart, as the prison grievance officer, disregarded his complaints and that
    Correct Care Solutions exercised “relaxed oversight of its employees when
    prescribed medications are delayed.”           Appellant’s Brief, at 7. He also avers
    that “as a result of the delay in providing the prescribed medications, [Watson]
    has undergone great pain and suffering, and, thus, a claim for those injuries
    is made.” Plaintiff’s Complaint, 2/4/18, at ¶ 45. Finally, Watson alleges that
    his civil rights were violated where the Defendants’ actions demonstrated “a
    deliberate indifference . . . to [Watson’s] constitutional rights.” 
    Id. at ¶¶
    52,
    57.
    On February 5, 2018, the trial court entered an order dismissing
    Watson’s complaint, which it deemed as one alleging medical malpractice, for
    ____________________________________________
    3 Correct Care Solutions is an independent company that provided medical
    personnel, like Dr. Caleb, to administer medical services to prison inmates.
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    J-S41004-19
    failure to attach a certificate of merit, see Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3,4 as well as for
    frivolity under Pa.R.C.P. 240(j). Watson filed a timely notice of appeal. He
    raises the following issue for our consideration: “Whether the trial court erred
    and abused its discretion by dismissing [Watson’s] complaint as frivolous
    pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)[,] mischaracterizing his complaint as one in
    medical malpractice.” Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
    Appellate review of a decision dismissing an action pursuant to Rule
    240(j) “is limited to a determination of whether the plaintiff’s constitutional
    rights have been violated and whether the trial court abused its discretion or
    committed an error of law.” Ocasio v. Prison Health Servs., 
    979 A.2d 352
    ,
    354 (Pa. Super. 2009). Pursuant to Rule 240(j):
    (1)    If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or
    proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a
    petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court
    prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action,
    proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or
    if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or appeal is
    frivolous.
    Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1). An action is frivolous under Rule 240(j) “if, on its face, it
    does not set forth a valid cause of action.” 
    Id., citing McGriff
    v. Vidovich,
    
    699 A.2d 797
    , 799 (Pa. Commw. 1997).
    We agree with the trial court that Watson’s action is frivolous. See Bell
    v. Mayview State Hosp., 
    853 A.2d 1058
    (Pa. Super.2004) (complaint
    ____________________________________________
    4  Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1042.3 requires a plaintiff to file a
    certificate of merit in a professional liability action in which it is alleged that a
    licensed professional deviated from the acceptable standard of care.
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    J-S41004-19
    against hospital, clinic and various psychologists properly dismissed as
    frivolous under Rule 240(j), where it did not set forth valid cause of action for
    medical malpractice, defamation, fraud and negligence). Watson’s complaint
    fails to aver exactly what harm or damages he has suffered as a result of
    Defendants’ alleged “malfeasance and nonfeasance.” Straw v. Fair, 
    187 A.3d 966
    (Pa. Super. 2018) (to state claim for negligence, plaintiff must allege:
    legal duty to conform to standard; failure to conform to standard; reasonably
    close causal connection between conduct and resulting injury; and actual
    damage or loss).5 In fact, in his complaint Watson lists his total cholesterol
    ____________________________________________
    5 We do not necessarily agree with the trial court that Watson’s complaint was
    one sounding in medical malpractice. A medical professional liability action is
    defined in the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act as
    “[a]ny proceeding in which a medical professional liability claim is asserted,
    including an action in a court of law or an arbitration proceeding.” 40 P.S. §
    1303.103. Moreover, a medical professional liability claim is “[a]ny claim
    seeking the recovery of damages or loss from a health care provider arising
    out of any tort . . . causing injury or death resulting from the furnishing of
    health care services which were or should have been provided.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Specifically, claims of medical malpractice necessarily raise questions
    involving medical judgment. Grossman v. Barke, 
    868 A.2d 561
    , 567 (Pa.
    Super. 2005). Medical malpractice has been defined as “the unwarranted
    departure from generally accepted standards of medical practice resulting in
    injury to a patient.” 
    Id. at 655.
    Notably, a distinguishing feature of a medical
    malpractice suit is often the need for expert testimony. 
    Id. Here, Watson
    alleges that Dr. Caleb and Steinhart failed to ensure that his prescribed
    medications were provided to him.
    However, even if we construed Watson’s claims to raise a claim of medical
    malpractice, it would similarly fail for Watson’s failure to state the harm he
    endured as a result of Plaintiffs’ actions, as well as a lack of a certificate of
    merit. See 
    Grossman, supra
    (“When a plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim
    sounds in negligence, the elements of the plaintiff's case are the same as
    those in ordinary negligence actions.”).
    -4-
    J-S41004-19
    levels (including a breakdown of HDL and LDL levels) and triglyceride levels
    from March 2013 through June 2018. He claims that on December 15, 2017,
    he ran out of his cholesterol medication. However, Watson’s total cholesterol
    and triglyceride levels in June 2018, after his medication had not been
    renewed and he was no longer taking it, were lower than those recorded in
    March 2013, September 2014, and September 2016, when he was taking his
    medication.
    Moreover, Watson’s claim for punitive damages similarly fails to state a
    claim. See 
    Williams, 782 A.2d at 1096
    (“Neither mere negligence, nor even
    gross negligence, shows sufficient culpability to justify a punitive damage
    award;” punitive damages proper in cases of outrageous behavior or
    egregious conduct showing evil motive or reckless indifference to rights of
    other) (citation omitted).
    Likewise, we find Watson’s civil rights claim is frivolous.    In order to
    establish a claim of a violation of civil rights with regard to medical treatment,
    a plaintiff must establish that he suffered from a serious medical need and
    that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that need. 
    Ocasio, 979 A.2d at 356
    .      A deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
    prisoners constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation where:               (1) the
    deprivation suffered by the prisoner is objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2)
    a prison official’s act or omission results in the denial of the minimal civilized
    measure of life’s necessities. See Kretchmar v. Dep’t of Corr., 
    831 A.2d 793
    , 798 (Pa. Commw. 2003). Claims of negligence or medical malpractice
    -5-
    J-S41004-19
    do not necessarily rise to the level of deliberate indifference of a serious
    medical need. Rouse v. Plantier, 
    182 F.3d 192
    (3rd Cir. 1999). Here, we do
    not find that Watson suffered seriously from the Defendants’ acts or
    omissions; thus, he has failed to set forth a valid claim for a civil rights
    violation.
    Order affirmed.6
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/9/2019
    ____________________________________________
    6 We note that technically under Rule 240(j) when an individual simultaneously
    files an action and a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court
    prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action once it determines the
    action is frivolous. Thus, having determined Watson’s action was, indeed,
    frivolous, the trial court should not have acted on his IFP petition. Since the
    result is the same, however, we affirm the order. We caution the trial court
    in future cases to strictly comply with Rule 240(j).
    -6-