In Re: M.G., Appeal of: M.G., Father ( 2019 )


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  • J-S36036-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: M.G., MINOR CHILD              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: M.G., FATHER               :
    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 401 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Orphans' Court
    at No(s): Adoptee 43 of 2018
    IN RE: Z.G., MINOR CHILD              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: M.G., FATHER               :
    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 402 MDA 2019
    Appeal from the Decree Entered February 28, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Orphans' Court
    at No(s): Adoptee 44 of 2018
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:         FILED: AUGUST 19, 2019
    The Appellant, M.G. (Father), seeks review of the February 19, 2019
    order and February 28, 2019 decree entered in the Court of Common Pleas of
    Northumberland County Orphans’ Court (orphans’ court), granting the
    petitions of Northumberland County Children and Youth Services (CYS) and
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S36036-19
    involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights to his minor sons, M.G. (born
    April 2014) and Z.G. (born May 2015) (Children).1 We affirm.
    I.
    An evidentiary hearing on the petitions for involuntary termination of
    Father’s parental rights was held on December 3, 2018, and December 28,
    2018.2 At the hearing, the orphans’ court heard the testimony of Father; Kim
    Carpenter (a CYS caseworker); Z.P. (Children’s foster parent); Kathryn
    Hollenbach     (a   CYS     casework     supervisor);   R.G.   (Children’s   paternal
    grandfather); and J.C. (Children’s paternal grandmother).
    M.G. was born on April 29, 2014 and Z.G. was born on May 24, 2015.
    Both children were placed by CYS into Shelter Care on May 5, 2016. Father
    was incarcerated for nine months prior to the Children’s placement.              The
    orphans’ court summarized its findings and the procedural history of this
    matter as follows.
    The two little boys in question have been in [f]oster [c]are
    for 31 months or[,] stated in other terms, over two and a half
    years! Thus, both boys have spent more than half of their lives in
    [f]oster [c]are. This is totally unacceptable. Minor children
    ____________________________________________
    1Children’s mother, A.L.R., voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to
    Children. She has not participated in this appeal.
    2 At the termination hearing, Children were represented by legal interest
    counsel and a guardian ad litem. See In re Adoption of L.B.M., 
    161 A.3d 172
    , 174-75, 180 (Pa. 2017) (pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), a child who
    is the subject of a contested involuntary termination proceeding has a
    statutory right to counsel who discerns and advocates for the child’s legal
    interests).
    -2-
    J-S36036-19
    deserve a life of stability, nurturing and care. We are in no way
    disparaging what the foster parents have done. Foster parents
    rarely get the recognition they deserve. But the primary purpose
    of foster care is to provide a short term period of placement until
    the natural parents can “get their act together”. Two and a half
    years should have provided more than enough time.
    [Father] was provided over 129 occasions to visit with his
    sons. He took advantage of 19[,] some of which were during court
    hearings. Thus, he missed 110 occasions to meet with his
    children. This amply demonstrates where his priorities lie. He
    also cannot use his three incarcerations as an excuse as the three
    incarcerations total 18 days.
    The agency has attempted to provide multiple services for
    all the parties. [Father] did participate in two of the services
    provided. However, the primary issue with [Father] and the
    natural mother are their refusals to follow the recommendations
    of the mental health professionals. [Father] had a [p]sychiatric
    evaluation and refuses to comply with the recommendations.
    He has been inconsistent with his housing. He currently
    resides in a bedroom at his own father’s residence. [Father] is in
    fact a transient, living in New York when convenient and living in
    Pennsylvania when convenient.         As far as this [c]ourt is
    concerned, he has no permanent place of abode. The New York
    State children’s authorities disapproved the interstate compact
    relative to [Father]. On the occasions when the boys do meet with
    their [f]ather they “act out” upon their return to the foster home.
    These young boys have languished in foster care long
    enough. They deserve stability, love and support. They are still
    young enough not to suffer adverse consequences of systematic
    placements. [Father] has been given more than enough time and
    offered resources to straighten his life out and become a parent.
    His failings are more than evident. Turning to the best
    interest of these little boys, this too, is more than evident. They
    deserve the opportunity for a full and fulfilling life with parents
    who will nurture and support them.
    Orphans’ Court Opinion, 2/19/19, at unnumbered 2-3.
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    The orphans’ court issued an order on February 19, 2019, granting CYS’s
    petitions.3   Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of
    errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
    This Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated the appeals.                  Father’s brief
    presents a single issue that CYS did not present evidence of the effect severing
    the bond between Father and Children would have on the minor children.
    Father’s Brief, at 7. Father asserts there was a bond between Father and
    Children and that they like to see him.              
    Id. at 9.
      Farther argues that no
    evidence was presented detailing the effect that terminating this bond would
    have on Children. 
    Id. As further
    discussed below, we hold that the orphans’
    court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights.
    II.
    A.
    We review Father’s claims in accordance with the following standard of
    review.
    ____________________________________________
    3  The order, which is dated January 28, 2019, includes the docket numbers
    relating to each child. However, the order was only filed at the docket for
    M.G. Subsequently, on February 28, 2019, the court entered separate decrees
    terminating Father’s rights involuntarily. With regard to M.G., the decree was
    redundant, as the court had already granted CYS’s petition. As to Z.G., Father
    filed his notice of appeal on February 27, 2019, before the court entered the
    decree terminating his parental rights. Nonetheless, Father’s appeal is
    properly before us because, “[o]ur rules provide that if appeal is prematurely
    filed. . ., the appeal is perfected when a final, appealable order is subsequently
    entered.” In re N.W., 
    6 A.3d 1020
    , 1021 n. 1 (Pa. Super. 2010).
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    J-S36036-19
    The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
    requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
    credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
    by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
    courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
    or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
    of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
    court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
    the record would support a different result. We have previously
    emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
    observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
    In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
    Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of
    parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511. It requires a bifurcated analysis.
    . . . Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
    seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
    termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
    determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
    or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
    the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
    needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
    of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
    concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
    parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
    of permanently severing any such bond.
    In re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
    While the orphans’ court here found that CYS met its burden of proof
    under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b), Father only
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    challenges the orphans’ court’s conclusions with respect to Section 2511(b),4
    which provides as follows:
    § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
    ***
    (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
    of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
    environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
    income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
    control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
    to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
    efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
    which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    ***
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
    With respect to Section 2511(b), we consider whether termination of
    parental rights will best serve Children’s developmental, physical and
    emotional needs and welfare.          See In re Z.P., 
    994 A.2d 1108
    , 1121 (Pa.
    Super. 2010). “In this context, the court must take into account whether a
    bond exists between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy
    an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” 
    Id. “[A] parent’s
    basic
    ____________________________________________
    4 Father waived any challenge to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and the subsections
    thereof by failing to challenge that section in his brief. See Krebs v. United
    Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 
    893 A.2d 776
    , 797 (Pa. Super. 2006)
    (holding that an appellant waives issues that are not raised in both his or her
    concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and the statement of
    questions involved in his or her brief on appeal).
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    constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted,
    upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
    proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent,
    healthy, safe environment.” In re B.N.M., 
    856 A.2d 847
    , 856 (Pa. Super.
    2004) (internal citations omitted).
    It is sufficient for the orphans’ court to rely on the opinions of social
    workers and caseworkers when evaluating the impact that termination of
    parental rights will have on a child. In re Z.P., supra at 1121. The orphans’
    court may consider intangibles such as the love, comfort, security and stability
    the child might have with the foster parent. See In re N.A.M., 
    33 A.3d 95
    ,
    103 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also In re T.D., 
    949 A.2d 910
    , 920–23 (Pa.
    Super. 2008), appeal denied, 
    601 Pa. 684
    , 
    970 A.2d 1148
    (2009) (affirming
    the termination of parental rights where “obvious emotional ties exist between
    T.D. and Parents, but Parents are either unwilling or unable to satisfy the
    irreducible minimum requirements of parenthood,” and where preserving the
    parents’ rights would prevent T.D. from being adopted and attaining
    permanency).     Ultimately, the concern is the needs and welfare of a child.
    In re Z.P., supra at 1121.
    B.
    Here, the record reflects that the best interests of Children were served
    by terminating Father’s parental rights. Children have been in foster care for
    more than half of their lives.     N.T., 12/3/18, at 23-24.      Children’s foster
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    J-S36036-19
    parents care for Children and they are doing well and are bonded to their
    foster parents. N.T., 12/28/18, at 40. Children’s foster parents also care for
    Children’s three siblings and are a permanency option for Children. 
    Id. at 42.
    Children’s guardian ad litem met with Children and reported Children like
    where they live and want to be adopted. 
    Id. at 151.
    During Children’s time in care, Father missed 110 out of 129 offered
    visits, and Children acted out following the few visits Father attended. N.T.,
    12/3/18, at 9. While Father regularly called Children, they were angry and
    defiant following the calls. N.T., 12/28/18, at 41-42.
    The orphans’ court appropriately considered Children’s need for safety
    and stability and determined that termination of Father’s parental rights best
    met Children’s needs and welfare. After careful review, the record supports
    the orphans’ court’s decision, and we do not discern an error of law or abuse
    of discretion.   Accordingly, we affirm the order and decree involuntarily
    terminating Father’s parental rights.
    Order affirmed; Decree affirmed.
    President Judge Panella joins the memorandum.
    Judge Shogan concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/19/2019
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 401 MDA 2019

Filed Date: 8/19/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024