Com. v. Williams, D. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S32011-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    DIA WILLIAMS                               :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1973 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 21, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0007810-2014
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and MURRAY, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                             FILED AUGUST 19, 2019
    Appellant Dia Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
    after he was convicted of aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of
    crime, terroristic threats, and simple assault.1       Appellant argues that the
    evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault
    because the Commonwealth failed to disprove his self-defense claim. He also
    challenges the weight of the evidence. We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the facts of this matter as follows:
    On the evening of June 20, 2014, at 5711 Master Street in West
    Philadelphia, a verbal and physical altercation occurred between
    [Appellant], and the [victim], landlord Demond Gallman[,] in the
    basement of that rental property. [The victim] responded to
    another tenant’s complaint regarding loss of electricity in her unit
    by inspecting the fuse box in the basement of the property and
    observed that the wires in the fuse box had been pulled out and
    disconnected.    [Appellant] then approached [the victim] for
    ____________________________________________
    1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a), 907(a), 2706(a), 2701(a).
    J-S32011-19
    shutting off his electricity due to unpaid rent and asked [the
    victim] if he would be turning [Appellant]’s electricity back on.
    When [the victim] refused to do so, the [Appellant] responded:
    “Well nobody’s electric is getting cut back on.” [Appellant] then
    reached for [the victim]’s wire cutters and refused to return them
    to [the victim]. [Appellant] pushed [the victim] away using one
    hand with force, causing [the victim] to respond by striking the
    [Appellant]’s face with his fist. [Appellant] responded to [the
    victim]’s strike by continuously swinging directly in a stabbing
    motion at [the victim]’s left temple with his right fist—with the
    wire cutters in [Appellant]’s right hand. [The victim]’s chin was
    cut during the altercation, which resulted in significant blood loss
    and ten stitches. [Appellant] attempted to flee by running to his
    room in the rental property. [The victim] followed [Appellant] to
    his room and observed the window screen missing. Police officers
    found [Appellant] at the stoop of the back door of the rental
    property, unable to move due to injury from jumping out of his
    room’s window.
    Police officers recovered the wire cutters used by [Appellant], and
    traces of blood on the basement door and floor at the scene of the
    altercation. Medical records for [the victim]’s treatment and
    images of facial injuries to [the victim]’s chin were produced for
    trial. Police officers also recovered audio recordings of a third
    party tenant, Ms. Roberts.
    Trial Ct. Op., 7/20/18, at 1-2 (record citations and some capitalization
    omitted).
    On December 5, 2016, the matter proceeded to a bench trial, at which
    both the victim and Appellant testified.   At the conclusion of trial, the trial
    court found Appellant guilty of the foregoing crimes. On February 24, 2017,
    Appellant filed a post-verdict motion arguing that he “had a right to defend
    himself and this was a mutual combat situation caused by the alleged victim.”
    See Post-Verdict Mot., 2/24/17. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion on
    April 13, 2017.
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    On July 21, 2017, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Appellant
    moved for extraordinary relief under Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(b) on the basis that he
    acted in self-defense. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 7/21/17 at 6. The trial court
    denied Appellant’s motion and sentenced him to five to ten years’
    incarceration. On July 31, 2017, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion
    preserving a challenge to the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied
    Appellant’s motion on August 2, 2017.
    On August 30, 2017, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.        On
    November 9, 2017, this Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal for failure to file a
    docketing statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 3517. On February 20, 2018, Appellant
    filed a petition to reinstate his appellate rights nunc pro tunc, which the trial
    court granted on February 22, 2018. On March 23, 2018, Appellant filed a
    petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act2 (PCRA), again seeking a
    reinstatement of his appellate rights.
    On June 1, 2018, the trial court reinstated Appellant’s right to file a
    direct appeal nunc pro tunc. That same day, Appellant filed a timely notice of
    appeal. Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
    on June 27, 2018, and raised the following claims:
    1. Th[e trial] court erred, abused its discretion, and unfairly
    prejudiced [Appellant], because the verdict was against the
    weight of the evidence.
    2. Th[e trial] court erred, abused its discretion, and unfairly
    prejudiced [Appellant], because the evidence was insufficient to
    ____________________________________________
    2   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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    convict [Appellant] of aggravated assault. There was insufficient
    evidence to prove [Appellant] attempted “to cause serious bodily
    injury to another, or cause[d] such injury intentionally, knowingly
    or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
    indifference to the value of human life.” Moreover, there was
    insufficient evidence to prove [Appellant] attempted “to cause or
    intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to another with a
    deadly weapon.”
    Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 6/27/18, at 1-2 (citations and some
    capitalization omitted). The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion asserting
    that Appellant’s claims were meritless.
    Appellant raises two issues on appeal:
    [1.] Whether the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to
    convict [Appellant] of aggravated assault[.]
    [2.] Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
    Appellant’s Brief at 8 (full capitalization omitted).
    In his first issue, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to
    present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. 
    Id. at 15.
    In
    support, Appellant refers to his own trial testimony, and concludes that (1)
    the victim “caused, and then escalated, the physical altercation[;]” (2) the
    victim prevented Appellant from retreating; and (3) there was no evidence to
    show that Appellant did not reasonably believe he was in danger of death or
    serious bodily injury. 
    Id. at 18.
    Initially, we note that Appellant did not preserve this issue in his Rule
    1925(b) statement. Likewise, the trial court did not address it. Appellant’s
    claim is therefore waived. See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 
    888 A.2d 775
    ,
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    780 (Pa. 2005); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating that “[i]ssues not
    included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provision
    of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”).
    Even if Appellant properly preserved his claim, we would find it
    meritless. Our standard of review in this context is as follows:
    Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a
    question of law, our standard or review is de novo and our scope
    of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
    we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all
    reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient
    to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
    The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
    need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the
    province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded
    to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
    evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
    every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial
    evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh
    the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
    finder.
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    176 A.3d 298
    , 305-06 (Pa. Super. 2017)
    (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 
    187 A.3d 908
    (Pa. 2018).
    Under the Crimes Code, self-defense is included under the defense of
    justification, which is a complete defense to criminal liability. See 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 502. We have explained that
    [t]he use of force against a person is justified when the actor
    believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose
    of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by the other
    person. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a). When a defendant raises the
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    issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden to
    disprove such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt. While there
    is no burden on a defendant to prove the claim, before the defense
    is properly at issue at trial, there must be some evidence, from
    whatever source, to justify a finding of self-defense.
    Commonwealth v. Bullock, 
    948 A.2d 818
    , 824 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
    omitted).
    To disprove a defendant’s claim of self-defense, the Commonwealth
    must establish at least one of the following:
    1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in danger
    of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or
    continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat
    and the retreat was possible with complete safety. It remains the
    province of the jury to determine whether the accused’s belief was
    reasonable, whether he was free of provocation, and whether he
    had no duty to retreat.
    Commonwealth v. McClendon, 
    874 A.2d 1223
    , 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005)
    (quotation marks and citations omitted).
    “When the defendant’s own testimony is the only evidence of self-
    defense, the Commonwealth must still disprove the asserted justification and
    cannot simply rely on the [fact-finder’s] disbelief of the defendant’s
    testimony[.]”    Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    97 A.3d 782
    , 788 (Pa. Super.
    2014). “If there are other witnesses, however, who provide accounts of the
    material facts, it is up to the fact finder to ‘reject or accept all, part or none of
    the testimony of any witness.’ The complainant can serve as a witness to the
    incident to refute a self-defense claim.” 
    Id. (citations omitted).
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    Here, the victim testified that Appellant took the victim’s wire cutters
    and then shoved the victim when he attempted to grab them. In response,
    the victim punched Appellant, who retaliated by swinging the wire cutters
    toward the victim’s head in a stabbing motion and eventually striking him.
    Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
    verdict winner, there was sufficient evidence to show that Appellant provoked
    or continued the use of force. See 
    Smith, 97 A.3d at 788
    (stating that a
    defendant “must be free from fault in provoking or escalating the altercation
    that led to the offense” (emphasis and citation omitted)); 
    McClendon, 874 A.2d at 1230
    . Therefore, Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails.
    In his next claim, Appellant argues that the verdict was against the
    weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Specifically, he asserts that
    the victim’s testimony was “vague, tenuous, and uncertain.” 
    Id. at 23.
    He
    also claims that the victim displayed “malevolence” towards Appellant, which
    “compels the determination that the [t]rial [c]ourt should not have believed
    the witness.” 
    Id. at 24.
    Appellant concludes that because the victim was not
    credible, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and the trial court
    should have granted him a new trial. 
    Id. Our standard
    of review regarding challenges to the weight of the
    evidence is well settled:
    A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
    is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an
    appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial court’s discretion;
    it does not answer for itself whether the verdict was against the
    weight of the evidence. It is well settled that the [fact-finder] is
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    free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine
    the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial based on a weight
    of the evidence claim is only warranted where the [fact-finder’s]
    verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of
    justice. In determining whether this standard has been met,
    appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s discretion
    was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the
    facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of
    discretion.
    Commonwealth v. Landis, 
    89 A.3d 694
    , 699 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted).
    We have explained that
    [a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in
    the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have
    arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial court
    is to determine that notwithstanding all the evidence, certain facts
    are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them, or to give
    them equal weight with all the facts, is to deny justice. A motion
    for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the
    weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence
    to sustain the verdict; thus the trial court is under no obligation
    to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
    winner.
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
       Further, “[b]ecause the trial judge has had the
    opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will
    give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the
    trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is
    against the weight of the evidence.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    “One of the least
    assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
    conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence
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    and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    Here, the trial court explained that it
    rendered its verdict with ample record of credible evidence. The
    Commonwealth produced audio records of the separate 911 calls
    on behalf of a third-party resident, medical records and
    documentation of head injury to the [victim], testimony from [the
    victim], [Appellant], and law enforcement personnel—all
    corroborating the attack on [the victim] on June 20, 2014. This
    [c]ourt, in its proper discretion, placed higher evidentiary weight
    on the testimony of the complaining witness than that of
    [Appellant], whose testimony lacked credibility.
    Trial Ct. Op. at 5.
    Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial
    court’s ruling. See 
    Landis, 89 A.3d at 699
    . The trial court found the victim’s
    testimony more credible than that of Appellant.       Therefore, the trial court
    appropriately concluded that its verdict was not so contrary to the evidence
    as to require a new trial.    See 
    id. Further, we
    decline to reassess the
    credibility of the Commonwealth’s witnesses and to reweigh the testimony and
    evidence presented at trial. See Commonwealth v. West, 
    937 A.2d 516
    ,
    523 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasizing that the trier of fact is “free to believe
    all, part or none of the evidence,” and “[t]his Court may not [re]weigh the
    evidence or substitute its judgment [f]or that of the fact finder” (citation
    omitted)). Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence
    merits no relief.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/19/19
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1973 EDA 2018

Filed Date: 8/19/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024