Com. v. Woodlyn, P. ( 2019 )

J-A13012-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
PAUL WOODLYN, III :
:
Appellant : No. 548 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 19, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0000956-2017
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2019
Appellant, Paul Woodlyn, III, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered January 19, 2018, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.
We affirm.
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
case as follows:
[A]round 3:15 in the afternoon of November 18, 2016, Jayanna
Powell, age eight, her two brothers and her sister were walking
home from school when they came to the intersection of 63rd
Street and Lansdowne Avenue in West Philadelphia. As the
children crossed the intersection, [Appellant], driving a Nissan
automobile, veered around a stopped car and struck Jayanna,
knocking her onto the hood of his car, then hitting the windshield,
then into the air, where she finally landed by a tree. [Appellant]
was speeding prior to hitting the children, and he never slowed
down, attempted to stop or even apply the brakes. Jayanna was
hit so hard, the impact knocked her out of her shoes. The car also
scraped the knee of Jayanna’s brother, Hassan. Jayanna received
injuries to her head, spine, liver and heart, which proved fatal
within two hours. The cause of death was the blunt impact trauma
____________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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from the automobile. [Appellant] kept driving, despite seeing this
child land on his windshield. [Appellant] parked the vehicle for a
while, then picked up his girlfriend, Jasmine Glover. When they
stopped at a Wawa, a tow truck driver noticed the heavy damage
to the vehicle and recommended A&P Auto Body Shop in Exton,
Pennsylvania for repairs. [Appellant] told the repair shop that he
had hit a deer. After learning of the fatal hit and run from the
television news, the body shop owner called the police, who
forensically matched the car to the accident. [Appellant]
confessed to hitting the child and leaving the scene.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/18, at 3 (internal citations omitted).
[Appellant] was arrested on December 1, 2016, and charged
with homicide by vehicle, accidents involving death or personal
injury, involuntary manslaughter and recklessly endangering
another person. [Appellant] was bound over on all charges
following a preliminary hearing on February 1, 2017. When
arraigned before a jury, [Appellant] pled guilty to accidents
involving death or personal injury (hit and run)[1] but not guilty to
the remaining charges. A jury was empaneled from October 30th
through November 3, 2017, after which [Appellant] was convicted
of involuntary manslaughter, and recklessly endangering another
person.[2] The jury found [Appellant] not guilty of homicide by
vehicle. On January 19, 2018, [Appellant] was sentenced to three
to six years’ incarceration to be followed by four years’ probation
for accidents involving death or personal injury, a consecutive one
to two years’ imprisonment followed by five years’ probation for
involuntary manslaughter and six to twelve months consecutive
incarceration for recklessly endangering another person for an
aggregate sentence of four and one-half to nine years’
incarceration with seven years’ probation. A timely appeal was
made to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.[3]
____________________________________________
1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742(a).
2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
3 Appellant’s sentence was amended on January 24, 2018, and he filed his
notice of appeal on February 20, 2018. Appellant’s amended sentence
included three years of probation for the involuntary manslaughter conviction,
as opposed to the five years of probation included in the original sentence.
Amended Sentencing Order, 1/24/18, at 1-2.
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Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/18, at 1-2.
Appellant presents the following issue for our review: “Whether verdict
[was] against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence when the jury
acquitted Appellant of homicide by vehicle but convicted Appellant of
involuntary manslaughter under the same facts.” Appellant’s Brief at 5. We
first observe that a challenge to the weight of the evidence must be properly
preserved:
(A) A claim that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for
a new trial:
(1) orally, on the record, at any time before
sentencing;
(2) by written motion at any time before sentencing;
or
(3) in a post-sentence motion.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A).
Herein, Appellant did not make a motion raising a weight-of-the-
evidence claim before the trial court, as the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure require. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). Appellant did not raise this claim at
any time prior to or at sentencing, nor did he file a post-sentence motion.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(a). The fact that Appellant included an issue challenging the
verdict on weight-of-the-evidence grounds in his 1925(b) statement and the
trial court addressed Appellant’s weight claim in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion
did not preserve his weight-of-the-evidence claim for appellate review in the
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absence of an earlier motion. Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483,
494 (Pa. 2009). Thus, to the extent Appellant’s claim challenges the weight
of the evidence, such claim is waived.
The standard for evaluating sufficiency claims is as follows:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder[’s].
In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established
by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered.
Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943-944 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Despite stating in his issue raised on appeal that Appellant is challenging
his conviction for involuntary manslaughter on the basis that it conflicts and
is inconsistent with his acquittal of homicide by vehicle, Appellant focuses his
argument on appeal on causation. Appellant’s Brief at 10. Specifically,
Appellant asserts that the necessary determination is whether his actions were
a direct cause of the victim’s death. Id. In support of his position, Appellant
presents the following argument, which we repeat here verbatim:
Here, Appellant and the victims did not see each other until the
impact. The victims unfortunately crossed the intersection against
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the red light. There was no factual determination of either
Appellant’s or the victim’s speed at the time of travel. Finally, no
matter what speed Appellant was driving, he could not have
possibly avoided impact given the distance he was from the
victims and the two second perception and reaction time involved.
In this case, the jury misjudged the degree to which victim
conduct cause[d] the death. Victims hurried across [the] street
against traffic light busy school day, bus travelled to obstruct
vision and turned Appellant could never stop in time.
Id. at 10-11.
Although Appellant raised this issue of causation in his Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement, he did not present this issue in his statement of questions
involved on appeal. Accordingly, we could deem this issue waived on this
basis. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (“No question will be considered unless it is stated
in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”). We
decline to find the entire issue waived, however, and address Appellant’s claim
to the extent he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction
for involuntary manslaughter as stated in his issue presented.
The offense of involuntary manslaughter is defined as: “[a] person is
guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of an
unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful
act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another
person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a). Stated differently, “involuntary manslaughter
requires 1) a mental state of either recklessness or gross negligence, and 2)
a causal nexus between the conduct of the accused and the death of the
victim.” Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60 A.3d 146, 151 (Pa. Super. 2013).
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The Crimes Code defines the term “recklessly” as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustified risk that the material element exists or will result from
his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor’s situation.
Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 868-869 (Pa. 2003) (quoting 18
Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3)).
In seeking to define the requirement that a criminal defendant’s
conduct be a direct factor in the death of another, the courts of
this Commonwealth have held that “so long as the defendant’s
conduct started the chain of causation which led to the victim’s
death, criminal responsibility for the crime of homicide may
properly be found.”
Fabian, 60 A.3d at 152.
In considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction
of involuntary manslaughter, the trial court provided the following analysis:
[Appellant] was speeding down a street in his neighborhood
at 3:15 p.m. on a school day. [Appellant] grew up and lived in
the neighborhood. He knew there was a school a few blocks away.
The video from SEPTA showed a school bus a block or so away.
The car in front of him stopped - [Appellant] didn’t even try to
apply the brakes - there are no skid marks on the roadway at all
- he barreled through the intersection and plowed into the
children. Eight year old Jayanna bounced onto his hood and then
his windshield, then into the air and onto the ground and
[Appellant] didn’t even slow down.
Caroline DeMarco, an eye-witness on 63rd Street that
afternoon, described [Appellant] as “just really barreling down
63rd Street...when the car was coming towards me, the car was
at full speed. It never broke. It never braked...The car never
braked, no.” Steffoni Bryant had picked up his daughter at school
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that afternoon and saw the accident as it happened. Mr. Bryant
testified:
“And this other car was coming down 63rd awfully fast.
And it hit Jayanna so hard, that the impact of his car
hit her. And it, you know, knocked her shoes and
book bag off her feet...I never seen nothing like that
in my entire life. [Appellant], he didn’t stop. He just
kept going. He could have stopped. He could have
stopped. People tried to get him to stop. He wouldn’t
stop at all. He just kept going, you know. And people
that was out there, they are trying to flag him down
for him to stop. He wouldn’t stop.”
Mr. Bryant testified that the speed limit was twenty-five
miles an hour, that [Appellant] was “way over the speed limit,”
that he maintained the same speed after he hit Jayanna and that
he never hit the brakes. Tyrone Hamilton was the School Crossing
Guard at 63rd and Lansdowne Avenue on the afternoon of
November 18th, 2016, who, although he did not see the accident
testified that he heard the ‘thud’ of the impact but no screeching
of brakes beforehand and that the car never stopped.
Officer Patrick Gallagher was the accident investigation officer
assigned to investigate this accident who testified that he is
trained to look for skid marks, that he examined the roadway at
the scene and there were no pre or post-impact skid marks.
Lastly, [Appellant’s] flight and concealment after the accident
clearly could have been considered by the jury as circumstantial
evidence of [Appellant’s] consciousness of guilt. Clearly, the
evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to convict
[Appellant] of involuntary manslaughter as well as recklessly
endangering another person.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/18, at 5-6 (internal citations omitted).
The trial court’s summation of evidence is supported by the record.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction of involuntary
manslaughter. Appellant acted recklessly with disregard to a substantial risk
by driving significantly above the speed limit through an intersection nearby
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to a school and children. N.T., 11/1/17, at 5-6. The evidence reflects that
Appellant did not stop or attempt to slow down upon encountering the
children. N.T., 10/31/17, at 112, 128; N.T., 11/1/17, at 10. Indeed, he did
not stop or slow his vehicle after hitting the victims. N.T., 11/1/17, at 6.
Furthermore, the evidence indisputably supports the conclusion that
Appellant’s conduct “started the chain of causation which led to the victim’s
death.” Fabian, 60 A.3d at 152. Thus, we agree with the trial court’s
conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s conviction
of involuntary manslaughter.
Furthermore, to the extent Appellant argues that his conviction for
involuntary manslaughter cannot stand because he was acquitted of homicide
by vehicle and the verdicts are inconsistent, we conclude that he is entitled to
no relief on this basis. First, the elements of the two crimes differ and
evidence could be sufficient to establish one crime and not the other. Pursuant
to Section 3732(a) of the Vehicle Code:
[a]ny person who recklessly or with gross negligence causes the
death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law
of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the
operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except
section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or
controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a felony of
the third degree, when the violation is the cause of death.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3732(a).
Accordingly, to sustain a conviction under Section 3732(a), the
Commonwealth is required to prove that Appellant caused the victim’s death
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by acting recklessly or with gross negligence, while violating a law or municipal
ordinance under the conditions set forth in the statute. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732(a).
Thus, homicide by vehicle requires proof that the death was caused by acting
recklessly or with gross negligence while violating a law or municipal
ordinance. Involuntary manslaughter does not require proof of violation of
a Commonwealth law or municipal ordinance. 75 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a). Indeed,
as outlined above, a conviction for involuntary manslaughter can stand where
the person caused the death of an individual while engaged in a lawful activity,
but did so recklessly or in a grossly negligent manner. 75 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a).
Accordingly, a conviction of involuntary manslaughter is not inconsistent, per
se, with an acquittal of homicide by vehicle.
Furthermore, the law is clear that even an inconsistent verdict is allowed
to stand as long as the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 35 A3d 1206, 1208 (Pa. 2012). Our Supreme
Court has “continued to embrace the principle that juries may reach
inconsistent verdicts, along with its corollary that we may not interpret a jury
acquittal as a specific factual finding with regard to the evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Moore, 103 A.3d 1240, 1247 (Pa. 2014). As explained
previously, Appellant’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter was supported
by sufficient evidence. Thus, Appellant is entitled to no relief on this basis.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/28/19
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