In Re: Adoption of M.S., Appeal of: T.S. ( 2019 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF M.S., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
APPEAL OF: T.S., FATHER : No. 668 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Decree Entered March 28, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Orphans' Court at No(s): A-5-2019
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 06, 2019
Appellant, T.S. (“Father”), appeals from the decree entered in the
Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, which terminated Father’s
parental rights to his minor child, M.S. (“Child”). We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant
facts of this appeal. Therefore, we have no need to restate them. We add,
on October 12, 2017, the Lackawanna County Children and Youth Services
(“Agency”) learned: Father may have kidnapped Child and did not have
formula for Child; T.S. (“Mother”) admitted using illicit drugs; and Father
tested positive for marijuana and cocaine. That same day, the court entered
a protective custody order, upon the Agency’s petition, and placed Child in
kindship care. Subsequently, the court adjudicated Child dependent on
November 6, 2017.
The Agency filed a petition to terminate parents’ parental rights to Child
on January 24, 2019. On March 25, 2019, the court conducted a termination
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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hearing as to both parents, where the court heard testimony from caseworker
Rebecca Brojack and visitation worker Jennifer Radzwillowicz. At the hearing,
one attorney represented Child as both her guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and
legal counsel, and indicated there was no conflict between Child’s legal and
best interests in light of her young age.1 The court terminated parents’
parental rights to Child by decrees dated March 25, 2019, and entered March
28, 2019. On April 24, 2019, Father timely filed a notice of appeal and
contemporaneous concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).2 Father’s notice of appeal referenced both relevant
dependency and adoption trial court docket numbers.
On June 14, 2019, this Court issued a rule to show cause why Father’s
appeal should not be quashed for failure to comply with Commonwealth v.
Walker, ___ Pa. ___, 185 A.3d 969 (2018). Appellant filed a response on
June 20, 2019, explaining he intended to appeal only from the order
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1 Child was 18 months old at the time of the termination hearing. See In Re:
T.S., ___ Pa. ___, 192 A.3d 1080 (2018) , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139
S. Ct. 1187, 203 L. Ed. 2d 220 (2019) (holding appointment of second counsel
for child, in contested termination proceedings, is not required to represent
separate legal interests of child, where child’s legal interests and best interests
do not diverge; due to child’s young age (less than three years old),
presumption exists that child was too young to express subjective preferred
outcome of termination proceedings; therefore attorney-GAL could fulfill
statutory mandate for appointment of counsel and represent both best
interests and legal interests of child).
2 Mother did not file a notice of appeal and is not a party to this appeal.
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terminating his parental rights to Child, which the court entered at the
adoption docket number. On June 25, 2019, this Court discharged the rule to
show cause and deferred the matter to the merits panel.3
Father raises two issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND/OR MANIFESTLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DETERMINING THE AGENCY SUSTAINED ITS BURDEN OF
PROVING THE TERMINATION OF FATHER’S PARENTAL
RIGHTS IS WARRANTED UNDER SECTIONS 2511(A)(1)
AND/OR 2511(A)(2) OF THE ADOPTION ACT?
EVEN IF THIS COURT CONCLUDES THE AGENCY
ESTABLISHED STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR THE
TERMINATION OF FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS, WHETHER
THE TRIAL COURT NEVERTHELESS ERRED AS A MATTER OF
LAW AND/OR MANIFESTLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DETERMINING THE AGENCY SUSTAINED ITS ADDITIONAL
BURDEN OF PROVING THE TERMINATION OF FATHER’S
PARENTAL RIGHTS IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF…CHILD?
(Father’s Brief at 10).
As a prefatory matter, issues not raised in a Rule 1925 concise
statement of errors will be deemed waived. Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d
141 (Pa.Super. 2006). See also In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505 (Pa.Super. 2007)
(applying Rule 1925 waiver standards in family law context). “Rule 1925(b)
waivers may be raised by the appellate court sua sponte.” Commonwealth
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3 Father’s concise statement and appellate issues demonstrate he is
challenging on appeal only the order terminating his parental rights to Child.
Thus, we see no jurisdictional impediments to our review under Walker,
supra (requiring separate notices of appeal from single orders which resolve
issues arising at separate trial court docket numbers).
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v. Hill, 609 Pa. 410, 428, 16 A.3d 484, 494 (2011).
Here, in his first issue on appeal Father challenges the termination of
his parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1) and (a)(2) of the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. Father failed to raise in his concise
statement, however, any claim regarding termination of his parental rights to
Child under Section 2511(a)(2). Thus, Father failed to preserve any claim
regarding Section 2511(a)(2), and his first issue is waived to the extent he
attempts to present argument related to Section 2511(a)(2). See
Lineberger, supra.
Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases implicates the
following principles:
In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our
standard of review is limited to determining whether the
order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence,
and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to
the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.”
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972
A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. … We must employ
a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order
to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder
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of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of
witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is
on the party seeking termination to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for
doing so.
In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super.
2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony
that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable
the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re
J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may
uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for
the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201
(Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings are
supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
court’s decision, even if the record could support an opposite
result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191-92 (Pa.Super.
2004).
In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d
1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165
(2008)).
The Adoption Act governs the involuntary termination of a parent’s
parental rights to a child and provides, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
or failed to perform parental duties.
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* * *
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b). “Parental rights may be involuntarily
terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along
with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., supra
at 1117.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his… parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under
the standard of best interests of the child.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:
To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the
moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence
of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the
filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled
intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or
failure to perform parental duties. In addition,
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Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to
perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights
may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if
the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to
perform parental duties.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,
the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the
parent’s explanation for his...conduct; (2) the post-
abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)
consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights
on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted). Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination
petition:
[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given
case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
provision. The court must examine the individual
circumstances of each case and consider all explanations
offered by the parent facing termination of his...parental
rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of
the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary
termination.
In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.
718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination
will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520
(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability
are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The
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court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying
close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.”
Id. Significantly:
In this context, the court must take into account whether a
bond exists between child and parent, and whether
termination would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship.
When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony. Social workers and
caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally,
Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.
In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide
for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements
within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be
considered unfit and have his…rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d
1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental
obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association
with the child.
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Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a
place of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with
good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
to the best of his…ability, even in difficult circumstances. A
parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
while others provide the child with [the child’s] physical and
emotional needs.
In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
“[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his…child
is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his…parental duties, to the child’s right
to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a
permanent, healthy, safe environment.” Id. at 856.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Andrew J.
Jarbola, III, we conclude Father’s remaining claims merit no relief. The trial
court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the
questions presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, dated May 20, 2019, at 4-7)
(finding: (1) Father failed to attend more than five visits with Child within six
months before Agency filed petition to terminate his parental rights; during
visits Father attended, he required significant redirection to interact
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appropriately with Child; Father failed to develop bond with Child and did not
complete any parenting classes, which would enable him to perform his
parental duties; lastly, Father failed to maintain sober lifestyle to ensure Child
would be safe if returned to Father’s custody and care; (2) Agency proved
Child thrives within loving, foster home, and has strong, loving bond with her
foster parents and foster siblings; Child refers to foster parents as mom and
dad; at conclusion of March 2019 hearing, attorney/GAL for Child indicated to
court there was no conflict of interest between Child’s best interest and legal
interest, due to Child’s age; Child’s counsel argued for termination and opined
it was in Child’s best interests; chief among concerns for Child were Child’s
well-being, permanency, and consistency; termination of Father’s parental
rights served Child’s best interests). The record supports the trial court’s
decision. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/6/2019
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Circulated 08/28/2019 03:58 PM
INRE: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
OF LACKAWANNA COUNTY
RELINQUISHMENT OF M.S.,
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
A MINOR
NO. A-5-2019
148 DP 2017
OPINION PURSUANT TO PA.R.A.P. 1925
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JARBOLA, J. i"·.."> \�:;���.·:
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I. INTRODUCTION -1j
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The Lackawanna County Office of Youth and Family Services (hereinafter ,.-Age.�cyt)F :
i,._;.)
petitioned this Court to terminate the parental rights ocf,g, (uh,-Hll«'J and ·r,s. ( M��ij) with
11
respect to minor child M.S. (D.0.8. 091 /2017). A hearing on the Agency's petition occurred
on March 25, 2019. This Court weighed and considered the relevant evidence submitted and
terminated both parents' rights. With regard to Father , this Court granted the
Agency's petition for the reasons that follow.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
o.nd Mother are the
natural parents ofM.S. (hereinafter "Minor Child"). The minor child was initially placed in
kinship foster care after both parents testified as to their drug use, and Father tested positive for
the same. (N.T., March 25, 2019, pp. 8). The minor child was declared dependent by the Court
on November 6, 2017. Id. at 9.
Since the minor child's placement over eighteen months ago, Father has failed to comply
with the Agency's service recommendations/directives. While Father claims he has secured
stable housing, it is evident that he has not successfully completed parenting or domestic
violence classes, submitted to the required number of drug screens, participated in Drug and
Alcohol Treatment Services (hereinafter "DATS"), or been consistent with visitation with the
minor child-all of which were directed by the Agency. Id. at 10, 13.
As the minor child was adjudicated dependent at roughly three weeks of age, the Agency
required that Father participate in parenting classes. Id. at 9. The Agency made two referrals to
Father's Group in Lackawanna County but Father was unsuccessfully discharged from the
parenting class both times for failure to attend. Id. at 14. The Agency also made a referral for
safe care classes at Mother and Father's request. Id. Safe care classes would have occurred in
Father's home, thereby eliminating any potential issues with transportation; however, Father was
again unsuccessfully discharged for noncompliance and lack of attendance. Id. at 33-34.
In addition to parenting classes, the Agency directed Father to attend and participate in
domestic violence classes as well as Drug and Alcohol Treatment Services ("DATS"). Id. at 12-
13. Once again, Father was unsuccessfully discharged from both programs for noncompliance.
Id. In conjunction with his required attendance at drug and alcohol treatment sessions, Father
was directed to submit to a total of225 drug screens for the Agency over the course of the minor
child's dependency. Id. To date, Father has only submitted to 16 drug screens, half of which
yielded a positive result. Id.
Regarding Father's contact with the minor child, Father has been on a biweekly visitation
schedule throughout the child's dependency. Id. at 48. Despite that schedule, Father has been
unable, by the Agency's standards, to progress beyond biweekly visitation; been inconsistent in
his attendance of visits; and has failed to appear multiple times over the course of the minor
child's dependency. Id. Notably, Father had not seen the minor child since November of 2018,
prior to the Agency filing its Petition to Terminate. Id. at 48-49. While Father has participated
2
in activities like feedings and diaper changes at those visits he did attend, he also required a great
amount of redirection to interact with the minor child more. Id. at 15, 49.
The minor child, on the other hand, is thriving. She demonstrates a strong, loving bond
with her foster parents, referring to them as mom and dad. Id. at 23-24. She is healthy and well-
adjusted and has developed a good rapport with her foster siblings. Id. For these reasons, and
due to Father's history, at the conclusion of the March 2019 hearing, the Guardian ad Litem
argued fervently for termination in favor of permanency and consistency for minor child. Id. at.
63-64. The Court agreed with the Guardian ad Litem and parental rights were terminated. Id. at
65. Upon termination of Father's parental rights, the Appellant in the instant case filed a Notice
of Appeal and Concise Statement of Errors Complained Of on April 24, 2019.
III. DISCUSSION
Parental rights with respect to a child may be involuntarily terminated on any one of the
grounds set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(l)-(9). A two-pronged analysis is required before
terminating a parent's rights. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511; In Re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super.
2007). First, the Court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent's conduct
warrants the termination of parental rights. Id. Thus, the Court must find that the party seeking
termination has met its burden in demonstrating the applicability of one of the nine grounds
enumerated in 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a). Id. Next, the Court must determine whether terminating
the parent's rights would be in the best interest of the child. Id.; 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(b).
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a. Did the Court err as a matter of law and/or manifestly abuse its discretion in
terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 P A.C.S.A. §2511(a)(8)?
Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(8), parental rights regarding a child may be terminated
where:
[t]he child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or
under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have
elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist ....
Where a TPR is sought on this ground, "the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to
remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice
of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(b).
In the case at hand, the minor child was removed from Mother and Father's care and
placed in kinship foster care after both parents testified before Judge Braxton of Lackawanna
County that they were using "molly" and Father tested positive for marijuana and cocaine.
(N.T., March 25, 2019, pp. 8). The minor child was declared dependent by the Court on
November 6, 2017, more than 18 months ago, and this Court is satisfied that the Agency has
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions which led to minor child's removal
continue to exist. Id. at 8-9, 65. Although Father has managed to secure safe housing for the
minor child, Father has failed to comply with the Agency's service directives, failed to maintain
a sober lifestyle, and failed to establish a bond with the minor child.
Primarily, throughout the entirety of the minor child's dependency, Father was required
to maintain a sober lifestyle. As such, he was directed to submit to drug screening a total of 225
times in order to provide confirmation of the same; however, Father only completed 16 of those
225 screens, yielding a positive result half of the time. Id. at 12-13. Father was also
unsuccessfully discharged from his outpatient drug and alcohol classes due to noncompliance
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and failure to attend. Originally, the Agency set up drug and alcohol classes through
Lackawanna County DATS and later transferred them to Wyoming Valley Drug and Alcohol
when Father and Mother moved; however, Father did not attend either program. Id. at 12-13.
Father instead chose to disregard the Agency's directives regarding drug and alcohol screening
and services, demonstrating an utter unwillingness to cooperate as directed or to put the minor
child's interests before his own.
This Court also finds it noteworthy that Father has failed to develop an appropriate bond
with the minor child. Id. at 17, 50. Father has been inconsistent in his visits with the minor child
since the beginning of her dependency. Starting October 4, 2018, through the date of filing the
Petition to Terminate Father's Rights, visits were scheduled with the minor child twice a week;
however, Father ultimately only attended five visits. Id. at 48-49. In fact, as of the date of the
March hearing, and prior to the Agency's filing of the Petition to Terminate, Father had not
attended a visit with the minor child since November 26, 2018. Id. Further, at those visits Father
did attend, he did not appear to have a bond with the minor child. Id. at 49, 57. While Father did
participate in activities like feedings and diaper changes, he required redirection on numerous
occasions from the caseworker to interact more with the child. Id. At the March hearing date,
the caseworker testified that there was little to no bond between Father and the minor child, such
that she was in agreement with terminating Father's parental rights. Id. at 49.
This Court does note that, in line with the Agency's directives, Father has actively taken
steps to secure stable housing. Id. at 40. Father currently rents a room at a home in Wilkes-
Barre, and, although the home is structurally sound, the Agency explained to Father that they
would need the names, birthdates, and social security numbers of the other individuals residing
in the home in order to run security checks and ensure the minor child is safe. Id. Father
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allegedly indicated that it would not be a problem to provide the agency with that information
but ultimately failed to do so, again demonstrating an utter unwillingness to cooperate as directed
or to put the minor child's interests before his own. Id.
Father argues that he experienced medical issues that prevented him from acting in
compliance with the Agency's directives. Id. at 14-15; 40-41. He alleges that he suffered a
stroke roughly halfway through the minor child's dependency as well as developed MRSA in
January of 2019, both of which prevented him from seeing the minor child and participating in
his required classes/programs. Id. However, it was testified to at the March 2019 hearing that
Father has failed to provide signed medical consents or any medical records in order to confirm
his claims or diagnoses. Id. Further, the caseworker testified that if Father had simply taken the
mandated universal precautions, then he still would have been able to attend the scheduled visits
with the minor child despite having MRSA. Id. at 56.
b. Did the Court err as a matter of law and/or manifestly abuse its discretion in
terminating Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 PA.C.S.A. §2511(a)(l}?
Turning to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(l), the Court may terminate an individual's parental
rights where "[t]he parent, by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition [of termination], either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties."
As discussed above, Father has not attended more than five visits with the minor child
within the six months preceding the Agency's Petition to Terminate Father's Parental Rights.
(N.T., March 25, 2019, pp. 48-49, 57). Further, at those visits Father did attend, he required a
great amount of redirection to appropriately interact with the minor child. Id. Father has also
still not developed a bond with the minor child nor has he completed any parenting classes that
would allow him to appropriately perform his parental duties. Id. at 49, 57. Lastly, Father has
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not proven that he is maintaining a sober lifestyle such that the minor child would be safe if
returned to Father's custody and care. Id. at 12-13.
c, Did the Court err as a matter of law and/or manifestly abuse its discretion in
determining termination of Father's parental rights is in the best interests of the child?
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds the Agency has met it burden of establishing by
clear and convincing evidence that Father's conduct warrants termination of his parental rights.
Id. at 64-65. The Court must now turn to consideration of the second prong of its analysis. By
statute, "primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child" must be given. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b).
The Court is satisfied that the Agency has proven that the minor child is currently
thriving within a loving home. Further, the Agency has demonstrated that the minor child has a
strong, loving bond with her foster parents. (N.T., March 25, 2019, pp. 23-24). In fact, the
minor child refers to her foster parents as mom and dad. Id. She also appears to have developed
a bond with her foster siblings- she knows each sibling's name and enjoys spending time with
them. Id.
At the conclusion of the March 2019 hearing in this case, the Attorney for the minor child
indicated to the Court that she had no conflict of interest serving as both the child's attorney and
the child's Guardian ad Litem due to the child's age. Id. at 63. The Guardian in this case thn
argued for termination and opined that it would indeed be in the minor child's best interests. Id.
at 63-64. Chief among the Guardian's concerns for the minor child's well-being, as well as this
Court's, is the sense of permanency and consistency that the minor child is no doubt entitled to.
Id. at 63-64. As such, this Court found that termination of Father's parental rights would best
serve the minor child's interests.
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d. Did the Court err as a matter of law and/or manifestly abuse its discretion in finding
that the conditions that led to removal have not been remedied and reunification of
parent and child was not imminent at the time of the hearing?
Following the hearing. Father alleges on appeal that this Court erred as a matter of law in
terminating his rights by finding that the conditions that led to the removal have not been
remedied and reunification of parent and child were not imminent at the time of hearing. As
stated above, the conditions that led to the minor child's removal have not been remedied as
Father has failed to drug screen the required number of times for the Agency and the times that
he did screen resulted in positive results half of the time. Id. at 12-13. Additionally, Father has
failed to complete any of the requisite parenting, drug and alcohol, or domestic violence classes
recommended by the Agency. Id. Further, there is no imminence to reunite the minor child with
Father as the minor child is thriving with her foster parents and recognizes them as her parents,
even referring to them as mom and dad. Id. at 23-24.
I. CONCLUSION
As this Court determined that the Agency met its burden and for the foregoing reasons,
the Court terminated Father's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511. This Court agreed
that the minor child deserves permanency and termination of Father's rights was in the best
interests of the minor child.
BY THE COURT:
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D J.J�I ,J.
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