Com. v. Slatoff, T. ( 2019 )

J-S77045-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
TYLER CHRISTIAN SLATOFF, :
:
Appellee : No. 1792 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered June 6, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0003295-2017
BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:FILED JUNE 11, 2019
Because I find that the trial court erred in concluding that the
Commonwealth abused its discretion, I respectfully dissent.
On April 27, 2017, Tyler Christian Slatoff was arrested for driving
under the influence (DUI) of alcohol, Xanax, and marijuana in Chester
County. Slatoff, who was under the age of 21 at the time, was charged with
DUI,1 disregarding traffic lanes, careless driving, accident involving damage
to unattended vehicle or property, and underage drinking, following an
incident where the police were notified of a driver who had failed to stop
1 Specifically, Slatoff was charged six times under the DUI statute: minor;
controlled substance – impaired ability; controlled substance – combination
of drugs and alcohol; controlled substance – Schedule I; controlled
substance – metabolite; and general impairment. See 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 3802(a)(1), (d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(iii), (d)(2), (d)(3), (e). All charges were
labeled as a first offense.
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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after swerving out of his traffic lane and striking a concrete barrier. When
the police stopped Slatoff, the odor of alcoholic beverage emanated from his
breath, and he admitted to drinking alcohol and taking Xanax. Slatoff failed
field sobriety tests, and a subsequent blood test revealed a blood alcohol
content of 0.075%, as well as the presence of Xanax and THC from
marijuana.2
At the crux of this appeal is Slatoff’s motion to compel admission into
the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) Program3 without the
Commonwealth’s required Drug Court4 condition. Here, the Commonwealth
2 Slatoff has a valid prescription for Xanax. Slatoff did not have a valid
prescription for medical marijuana at the time of his traffic stop. In his
Motion to Compel, Slatoff contends that he is now eligible for medical
marijuana based on his diagnoses. See Motion to Compel, 4/11/2018, at 2.
However, the record before us is devoid of any evidence suggesting that
Slatoff had a valid prescription at the time of his arrest, or has a valid
prescription for marijuana now.
3 ARD is “a pre-trial disposition of certain cases, in which the attorney for the
Commonwealth agrees to suspend prosecution for an agreed upon period of
time in exchange for the defendant’s successful participation in a
rehabilitation program, the content of which is to be determined by the court
and applicable statutes.” Commonwealth v. Lutz, 495 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa.
1985).
4 The Drug Court program is
used as an alternative to the conventional criminal prosecution
process in appropriate cases involving drug-related crimes, or
where offenders are coping with a drug addiction, in order to
achieve the twin goals of reducing the incidence of drug-related
crimes, and preventing recidivism by offenders. Employing
principles of “therapeutic jurisprudence,” these courts combine
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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had not moved for Slatoff’s admission into ARD because Slatoff refused to
comply with the Drug Court condition. At the same time, the
Commonwealth had not denied Slatoff admission either; it had merely
placed conditions on his admission, with which Slatoff did not agree,
prompting Slatoff to withdraw his application for ARD. Therefore, the matter
was only before the trial court on Slatoff’s motion to force the
Commonwealth to admit him into ARD without the Drug Court condition. On
appeal, the Commonwealth alleges the trial court erred in approving Slatoff
for ARD without the prior approval from or motion of the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4, 9.
Given this procedural posture, I find the appropriate standard of
review to be as follows. “As with all questions of law, the appellate standard
of review is de novo and the appellate scope of review is plenary.” In re
Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 214 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation and footnotes
omitted).
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
intensive judicial supervision, drug testing, and comprehensive
treatment to assist offenders in overcoming the substance abuse
problems that enmeshed them in the criminal justice system. In
Pennsylvania, drug courts comprise an integral part of the
Commonwealth’s multi-faceted system of problem-solving
courts, a program which th[e Supreme] Court has taken great
pride in establishing and fostering.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Pozonsky, 177 A.3d 830, 832–33 (Pa.
2018) (citations omitted).
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An accused has no right to demand acceptance into the ARD
program and cannot complain when he is precluded from
participation. An ARD recommendation is solely the province of
the prosecutor, and admission of an offender into the program is
by the grace of the trial court upon the Commonwealth’s
motion. The attorney for the Commonwealth must be free to
submit a case or not submit a case for ARD consideration based
upon her or his view of what is most beneficial for society and
the offender.
Commonwealth v. Stranges, 579 A.2d 930, 934 (Pa. Super. 1990) (en
banc) (citations omitted).
It is well settled that [a] trial court may not object if the
Commonwealth refuses to submit [for ARD] a case unless the
district attorney has abused its discretion by refusing to submit
an individual because of his race or religion or some other
obviously prohibited consideration. The [Supreme] Court held
that a trial judge may not overrule the district attorney
and force him to submit a case to ARD for any reason
related to the protection of society or the likelihood of a
successful rehabilitation.
Commonwealth v. Cline, 800 A.2d 978, 982 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation
and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). An abuse of discretion will
only be found where the Commonwealth bases its decision on something
“wholly, patently and without doubt unrelated to the protection of society
and/or the likelihood of a person’s success in rehabilitation[.]” Lutz, 495
A.2d at 935 (emphasis in original).
In granting Slatoff’s motion to compel his admission into ARD without
the Drug Court condition, “the [trial] court found that the Commonwealth
abused its discretion when it considered Slatoff’s medical disabilities (or drug
use as a symptom of his medical disabilities) as a factor when it assessed his
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likelihood of rehabilitation.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/2018, at 4. In its
opinion, the trial court believes that weekly drug and alcohol counseling
sessions accompanied by testing would be preferable to Drug Court because
it accommodates the Commonwealth’s concerns while not disrupting
Slatoff’s current medical treatment. Id. at 7.
On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that it did not abuse its
discretion in conditioning Slatoff’s admission into ARD on his participation in
Drug Court.
Based on [Slatoff’s] repeated underage consumption of alcohol,
[Slatoff’s] use of alcohol and benzodiazepines combined with
illicit marijuana use, and [Slatoff’s] refusal to participate in the
Drug Court program, the District Attorney did not believe, nor
does it believe at this time, that he would be successfully
rehabilitated by the ARD program. Additionally, the District
Attorney believed [Slatoff’s] failure to properly treat his
substance use problem would pose a continued danger to
society. This decision was not based on any prohibited reasons,
such as race or religion, and was based solely on the likelihood
of [Slatoff’s] rehabilitation and the protection of society.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 30-31 (footnote and unnecessary capitalization
omitted).
My review of the record indicates that the Commonwealth’s Drug Court
condition on Slatoff’s admission into ARD was reasonably related to the
protection of society and the likelihood of his successful rehabilitation.
Furthermore, while Slatoff’s use of Xanax may be related to the treatment of
his medical disability, his underage drinking, illegal use of marijuana, and
choice to mix alcohol and marijuana with his prescribed Xanax, particularly
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before driving a motor vehicle on a public roadway, are decidedly not. While
Slatoff’s doctors and the trial court may not believe that Drug Court,
including a 24-hour detoxification period, was in Slatoff’s best medical
interest, it is clear that the Commonwealth did not exclude Slatoff from ARD
because he had a disability or for any reason not reasonably related to the
protection of society or the likelihood of Slatoff’s successful rehabilitation.
Instead, based on its review of the records before it, the Commonwealth
imposed a condition, Drug Court, in an attempt to help Slatoff achieve
sobriety. Taking into account his actions in the underlying DUI case, the
imposition of this condition is reasonably related to the protection of society
and the likelihood of a successful rehabilitation, even if the trial court
believed a different course of action would be more successful. See Cline,
800 A.2d at 982 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (noting that “a trial
judge may not overrule the district attorney and force him to submit a case
to ARD for any reason related to the protection of society or the likelihood of
a successful rehabilitation”).
In other words, this Court does not review whether the
Commonwealth’s imposed ARD conditions constitute the best means of
rehabilitation. This Court reviews whether the trial court erred in concluding
that the Commonwealth abused its discretion. Accordingly, I conclude that
the trial court erred when it substituted its judgment for that of the
Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth did not abuse its discretion in
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conditioning Slatoff’s admission into ARD on his participation in Drug Court
because it was reasonably related to the protection of society and the
likelihood of his successful rehabilitation.
I am cognizant of the Majority’s concern that a 24-hour detoxification
period and the dictates of Drug Court may not comport with Slatoff’s current
medical treatment. However, that does not mean Slatoff is automatically
entitled to ARD with whatever conditions he or his doctors see fit. As noted
supra, I do not find the Drug Court condition on ARD to be an abuse of
discretion. Slatoff can choose to comply with the conditions required by the
Commonwealth for ARD, or proceed to court on his charges, as do most
defendants, while continuing his current medical regimen. That choice does
not fall into the category of “other such obviously prohibited considerations”
as posited by the Majority. Majority at 6, quoting Commonwealth v.
Fleming, 955 A.2d 450, 451 (Pa Super. 2008). Rather, it is the
consequence of Slatoff’s charges and the Commonwealth’s discretion in
fashioning what it deemed an appropriate condition on hisj-s77045-18
acceptance into ARD instead of proceeding to trial.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order granting the motion
to compel. See Stranges, 579 A.2d at 931 (“As there was no abuse of
prosecutorial discretion, the trial court improperly granted the petition to
compel ARD.”).
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