Castle 2016 LLC v. Kulp, W. ( 2019 )

J-A01015-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
CASTLE 2016 LLC : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
WAYNE KULP AND OCCUPANTS :
:
Appellant : No. 866 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 27, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 2016-C-2146
BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED APRIL 09, 2019
Wayne Kulp and Occupants (hereinafter “Kulp”) appeal from the
judgment for possession of real property, entered February 27, 2018, in the
Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, in favor of Castle 2016 LLC (“Castle”).
On appeal, Kulp argues the trial court acted without authority when it molded
an arbitration award more than 30 days after it was entered. For the reasons
below, we affirm.
The pertinent facts and procedural history underlying this appeal are as
follows. On July 22, 2016, Castle initiated this ejectment against Kulp and
any other occupants of a property located at 2264 Seipstown Road,
Foglesville, Pennsylvania. Castle subsequently filed a Second Amended
Complaint on June 27, 2017, averring that it obtained the deed to the property
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on May 19, 2016,1 and recorded a Confirmatory Deed on October 31, 2016.
See Second Amended Complaint, 6/27/2017, at ¶ 5. Castle further averred
Kulp and other individuals were residing at the property without right or
permission, and they refused to deliver possession of the property upon
Castle’s demand. See id. at ¶¶ 3, 10-11. Castle did not seek monetary
damages, but rather, only recovery of the premises.
The case proceeded to a hearing before three arbitrators on November
16, 2017. The arbitrators, with one dissenting, entered an award in favor of
Castle and against Kulp in the amount of $0.00. Thereafter, on November 30,
2017, Kulp filed an answer with new matter and a counterclaim. However, on
December 22, 2017, Kulp filed both (1) a praecipe for entry of judgment on
the arbitration award, and (2) a praecipe to discontinue his counterclaim. With
regard to the arbitration award, Kulp specifically requested judgment be
entered as follows:
“ON THE AWARD” OF THE ARBITRATORS, only (and not
otherwise), PURSUANT TO Pa.R.C.P. 1307(c) (and not otherwise),
in “NO AMOUNT,” in favor of [Castle] and against the
DEFENDANTS, in “no amount” (and/or for the amount of “zero”).
Praecipe for Judgment, 12/22/2017 (capitalization in original).
On January 11, 2018, Castle filed a motion for summary judgment,
seeking possession of the property because, inter alia, “[t]he Arbitration
Award entered in favor of [Castle] and against [Kulp] only dealt with the issue
____________________________________________
1 It recorded the deed on June 2, 2016. See Second Amended Complaint,
6/27/2017, at ¶ 5.
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of monetary damages.” Castle’s Motion for Summary Judgment for
Possession, 1/11/2018, at ¶ 21. Kulp filed both a response and a motion to
strike, in which he claimed the case was closed. On February 16, 2018, the
trial court entered an order, denying as moot both Castle’s motion for
summary judgment and Kulp’s motion to strike, and directing,
consistent with the arbitration award on November 16, 2017,
judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff Castle 2016 LLC and
against Defendants Wayne Kulp and Occupants for possession of
the premises known as 2264 Seipstown Road, Fogelsville, Lehigh
County, Pennsylvania [.]
Order, 2/16/2018, at 1-2.2 Castle praceiped for the entry of judgment for
possession on February 27, 2018. That same day, Kulp filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the trial court denied the next day. This timely appeal
followed.3
On appeal, Kulp argues the trial court improperly, and without any
authority, molded the arbitration award more than 30 days after it was
entered to include a judgment of possession. Relying upon Pennsylvania Rule
of Civil Procedure 1307, Kulp maintains a trial court may mold an arbitration
award “ONLY on application, and ONLY for ‘an obvious and unambiguous error’
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2 The order was docketed on February 21, 2018.
3 On March 9, 2018, the same day he filed a notice of appeal, Kulp filed another
motion for reconsideration and a motion for recusal/reassignment to another
trial judge. No rulings on these motions are included in the certified record,
or noted on the docket. On April 5, 2018, the trial court ordered Kulp to file
a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Kulp complied with
the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement on April 24, 2018.
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– which was not present here.” Kulp’s Brief at 13. Kulp emphasizes he
entered judgment on the award on December 22, 2017. Consequently, he
contends after 30 days, the court had no authority to change that award.
Accordingly, Kulp insists “there was no legal authority” for the court’s action
in the present case, and the February 27, 2018, judgment should be stricken.
A challenge concerning “the interpretation and application of a
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure presents a question of law[,]” which we
review under a de novo standard. Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hosp. of the
Sisters of Christian Charity, 32 A.3d 800, 808 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation
omitted), aff’d, 91 A.3d 680 (Pa. 2014).
Kulp has correctly recited the rules regarding appeals from arbitration
awards. See Kulp’s Brief at 12-15. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
Procedure 1307, an arbitration award is final if no appeal is taken within 30
days of the entry of the award on the docket. See Pa.R.C.P. 1307(c).
Subsection (d) of the Rule provides that, “upon application of a party” within
that same 30-day period, a trial court may mold an award “[w]here the record
and the award disclose an obvious and unambiguous error in the award in
mathematics or language[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1307(d). Here, as Kulp states in his
brief, no application was made to mold the award within the requisite 30-day
period.
Nevertheless, we conclude Kulp is entitled to no relief. We agree with
the trial court that its February 16, 2018, order was not an attempt to “mold”
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the arbitration award, but rather a simple clarification. As the court explained
in its opinion accompanying the February 16th order:
The arbitrators’ award stated “ON ORIGINAL CLAIM: We find in
favor of P Castle 2016 LLC and against the D Wayne Kulp and
Occupants in the amount of N.” It is undisputed that “in the
amount of N” means no amount. [Kulp] assert[s] the arbitrators
would have addressed possession of the property in the section of
the award form titled “Alternate Award” had they intended to
address possession of the property. In other words, [Kulp]
contend[s] the arbitrators made no award as to possession of the
property, but did conclude [he] owed no money to [Castle].
Nowhere in [Castle’s] Second Amended Complaint was
there any hint of any claim for money damages, such as rents,
profits or damages. Nor was there any counterclaim before the
arbitrators; that had been filed after the arbitration. Rather,
[Castle] sought only possession of the property, and the
arbitrators’ award clearly stated they found in favor of [Castle] on
the original claim. In fact, it was the only claim before them.
****
The arbitrators decided in favor of [Castle] and against
[Kulp] on the one and only issue before them, viz. Possession of
the property. Therefore, [Castle] is entitled to judgment for
possession of the property and no other relief from [Kulp].
Trial Court Opinion, 2/16/2018, at 2-3.
We find no basis to disagree with the court’s analysis. The only claim
in Castle’s complaint was a claim for possession of the property. See Second
Amended Complaint in Civil Action in Ejectment, 6/27/2017, at 2
(“WHEREFORE, Plaintiff seeks to recover possession of said premises.”). By
finding in favor of Castle “ON ORIGINAL CLAIM,” the arbitrators determined
Castle was entitled to possession. There was no request for monetary
damages; therefore, the arbitrators awarded none. Accordingly, we find the
trial court’s February 16, 2018, order, entering judgment for possession in
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favor of Castle,4 was not an attempt to mold or change the prior judgment,
but rather, a clarification. No relief is warranted.
Judgment affirmed. Kulp’s Application to File Post Argument Brief is
granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/9/19
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4 As noted supra, the February 16, 2018, Order was entered on the docket
on February 21, 2018. Subsequently, Castle filed a praecipe to enter
judgment on February 27, 2018.
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