Citizens Bank of PA v. Kwon-Lee, S. ( 2019 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
CITIZENS BANK OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SEUNG YUN KWON-LEE :
:
Appellant : No. 1043 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered June 19, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Civil Division at
No(s): 2015-03550
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2019
Appellant, Seung Yun Kwon-Lee, appeals pro se from the order granting
the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Appellee, Citizens Bank of
Pennsylvania, in this mortgage foreclosure action. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the procedural history of this case as follows:
In this Mortgage Foreclosure action, [Appellee] commenced
foreclosure proceedings against Defendant mortgagors1 by
Complaint on June 29, 2015 in response to their alleged default
on monthly payment obligations contained in a HELOC2 (“Note”)
and secured by a mortgage on the Defendants’ property.
[Appellant] filed her answer on July 28, 2015. [Appellee] filed an
amended complaint on June 20, 2016. [Appellant] filed various
non-responsive pleadings between July 22, 2016 and July 25,
2017.6 Following oral argument, on April 10, 2018, [Appellee’s]
preliminary objections filed on August 8, 2017 were sustained and
[Appellant’s] counterclaims7 were dismissed with prejudice.
[Appellee] thereafter filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
After briefing and oral argument by both parties, this [c]ourt
granted [Appellee’s] Motion. [Appellant] filed her notice of appeal
from the June 18, 2018 Order on June 26, 2018. On June 27,
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2018, this [c]ourt directed [Appellant] to file a Concise Statement
of Errors.
1 This action was originally brought against co-
defendants E. Hoon Kwon and Seung Yun Kwon-Lee.
Defendant E. Hoon Kwon did not file an answer to the
Complaint and has not participated otherwise in the
proceedings to date.
2 Home Equity Line of Credit.
6 See generally Def.’s Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaims, July 22, 2016; Def.’s Improved
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, November
29, 2016; Def.’s Mot. to Compel Discovery, January
6, 2017; Def.’s Second Counterclaim, February 27,
2017; Def.’s New Matter and Mot. to Strike Pl.’s False
Affidavits, May 18, 2017; Def.’s Amended
Counterclaim upon New Matter, July 25, 2017.
7 [Appellant’s] claims against [Appellee] included,
inter alia, slander of title, abuse of civil process,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud,
identity theft, forgery, and various violations of state
and federal law. See generally id.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/14/18, at 1-2 (certain footnotes omitted).
On July 16, 2018, Appellant filed her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of
errors. The trial court filed its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on
September 14, 2018.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether [Appellee] raised illegal allegations.
2. Whether [Appellee] has attached the note underlying the
mortgage.
3. Whether [Appellant] has executed a promissory note secured
on her mortgage[.]
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4. Whether the Court erred by admitting HELOC into evidence as
a Note.
5. Whether [Appellee] is the true holder of the debt and has
standing to foreclosure [sic].
6. Whether the Complaint Verification was defectives pursuant to
Pa.R.C.P. 1024(b), thus precluding judgment.
7. Whether [Appellee’s] counsel illegally engaged in Tampering
with Evidences [sic][.]
Appellant’s Brief at 1.
Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s issues, we must determine
whether those issues are properly before us. The trial court has asserted that
Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement is incomprehensible and
unnecessarily expansive. We agree.
A concise statement of errors complained of on appeal must be specific
enough for the trial court to identify and address the issues the appellant
wishes to raise on appeal. Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (quoting Lineberger v. Wyeth, 894 A.2d 141, 148 (Pa. Super.
2006)). Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925 provides that a Rule
1925(b) statement “shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the
appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent
issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). “Issues not included in the
Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this
paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). See also
Commonwealth v. Lopata, 754 A.2d 685, 689 (Pa. Super. 2000) (stating
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that “[a] claim which has not been raised before the trial court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal”).
This Court has considered the question of what constitutes a sufficient
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on numerous occasions and has established that
“[an] appellant’s concise statement must properly specify the error to be
addressed on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa.
Super. 2011). “[T]he Rule 1925(b) statement must be specific enough for the
trial court to identify and address the issue an appellant wishes to raise on
appeal.” Id. (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
The compulsory requirement of adhering to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 is captured
in the following excerpt from Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394 (Pa. Super.
2004):
In Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa.
1999), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically held that
“from this date forward, in order to preserve their claims for
appellate review, [a]ppellants must comply whenever the trial
court orders them to file a Statement of Matters Complained of on
Appeal pursuant to [Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure]
1925.” Lord, 719 A.2d at 309. “Any issues not raised in a
1925(b) statement will be deemed waived.” Id. This Court
explained in Riley v. Foley, 783 A.2d 807, 813 (Pa. Super. 2001),
that Rule 1925 is a crucial component of the appellate process
because it allows the trial court to identify and focus on those
issues the parties plan to raise on appeal. This Court has further
explained that “a Concise Statement which is too vague to allow
the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional
equivalent to no Concise Statement at all.” Commonwealth v.
Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686-[6]87 (Pa. Super. 2001). “Even if
the trial court correctly guesses the issues Appellants raise[] on
appeal and writes an opinion pursuant to that supposition the
issues [are] still waived.” Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d
908, 911 (Pa. Super. 2002).
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Kanter, 866 A.2d at 400.
Our law further makes clear that satisfaction of Pa.R.A.P. 1925 is not
simply a matter of filing any statement. Rather, the statement must be
concise and sufficiently specific and coherent as to allow the trial court to
understand the specific allegation of error and offer a rebuttal. These
requirements are evident in the following language from Dowling:
When a court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing,
that is not enough for meaningful review. When an appellant fails
adequately to identify in a concise manner the issues sought to be
pursued on appeal, the trial court is impeded in its preparation of
a legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues.
. . . While Lord and its progeny have generally involved situations
where an appellant completely fails to mention an issue in his
Concise Statement, for the reasons set forth above we conclude
that Lord should also apply to Concise Statements which are so
vague as to prevent the court from identifying the issue to be
raised on appeal. In the instant case, [a]ppellant’s Concise
Statement was not specific enough for the trial court to identify
and address the issue [a]ppellant wished to raise on appeal. As
such, the court did not address it. Because [a]ppellant’s vague
Concise Statement has hampered appellate review, it is waived.
Dowling, 778 A.2d at 686-687 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, as we stated in Reeves:
There is a common sense obligation to give the trial court notice
as to what the trial court should address in its Rule 1925(a)
opinion. While there is a middle ground that [an appellant] must
travel to avoid having a Rule 1925(b) statement so vague that the
trial judge cannot ascertain what issues should be discussed in the
Rule 1925(a) opinion or so verbose and lengthy that it frustrates
the ability of the trial judge to hone in on the issues actually being
presented to the appellate court, see Kanter v. Epstein, 866
A.2d 394 (Pa. Super. 2004), that is not an onerous burden to place
on [an appellant]. It only requires using a little common sense.
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Reeves, 907 A.2d at 2-3.
In addition, we note that, “[a]lthough this Court is willing to liberally
construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special
benefit upon the appellant.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498
(Pa. Super. 2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 252 (Pa.
Super. 2003)). “To the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in
a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of
expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Adams, 882 A.2d at 498
(citing Commonwealth v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 1996)).
In essence, the purpose of requiring a concise statement of matters
complained of on appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) is to allow the trial court to
easily discern the issues an appellant intends to pursue on appeal and to allow
the court to file an intelligent response to those issues in an opinion pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement fails in this
regard.
The trial court offered the following comments regarding Appellant’s
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, which compels our conclusion:
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), [Appellant] filed a statement
of errors on July 16, 2018. [Appellant’s] pro se statement of
errors, consisting of five pages and fifty-one numbered
paragraphs, is both inscrutable and unnecessarily expansive. As
well as we can glean, [Appellant] raises four issues for review:
whether the Court erred in granting [Appellee’s] motion for
judgment on the pleadings where (1) [Appellant] did not sign the
mortgage documents; (2) [Appellee] did not provide proper
documentation of the mortgage in its pleadings; (3) [Appellee]
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does not have standing to foreclose on [Appellant’s] property; and
(4) there was no verification of the judgment amount awarded to
[Appellant]. As discussed infra, these issues are meritless. All
other issues in [Appellant’s] statement of errors are completely
frivolous, redundant, incomprehensible, are an obvious effort to
delay, and/or to punish [Appellee] for bringing suit against her
and this [c]ourt for ruling adversely to her.14 We also note that
we have given [Appellant] ample time and opportunity to present
her case, considering her pro se status, and have fully considered
all her arguments throughout the life of this matter.15 At this time,
it appears that [Appellant’s] continued efforts to use the judicial
system to resist foreclosure, instead of allowing the foreclosure to
move forward and the subject property to be sold as ordered, are
simply attempts to further delay this process.16 [Appellant] does
not now raise any genuine issue of material fact with which to
continue proceedings, and presents no legal argument with which
to bolster a claim that this court erred by granting [Appellee’s]
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, this [o]pinion
is written in support of our judgment [p]ursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a).
14 [Appellant] variously accuses [Appellee] of
“tampering” and “defacing” documents, creating and
submitting false and fraudulent evidence to the court,
false swearing, identity theft, and conspiracy.
[Appellant] accuses the court of allowing [Appellee] to
engage in fraudulent and criminal activity by “simply
ignoring the counsel’s behavior,” and entering
unlawful Orders.
15 We have granted [Appellant] extensions of time to
file and leave to amend pleadings, provide access to
a county-funded interpreter to aid with her case (of
which she neither requested nor took advantage),
allowed her to fully participate at oral argument on
two separate occasions, and have been otherwise
lenient with the requirements of civil procedure in the
interest of ensuring her access to the judicial system.
See Order of Court, In Re: Pl.’s Mot. to Make Rule
Absolute, March 17, 2016 (Peck, J.); Order of Court,
In Re: Def.’s Mot. for Extension of Time to Answer,
October 17, 2016 (Peck, J.); Order of Court, In Re:
Def.’s Mot. to Compel Discovery, February 8, 2017
(Peck, J.); Order of Court, In Re: Def.’s Mot. for Leave
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to Amend Counterclaim upon New Matter, June 16,
2017 (Peck, J.).
16We will also note that according to the record in this
case, [Appellant] has continued to reside in the
subject property without making any payments
toward the mortgage since July 20, 2014.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/14/18, at 2-3 (brackets and certain footnotes omitted).
Our review of the certified record reflects that Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) document rambles on for five pages in a barely coherent fashion,
listing fifty-one confusing statements that fail to present thoughtfully any legal
issues. The ultimate result of Appellant’s presentation is that any issues
Appellant wished to raise in this appeal are lost in the midst of the incoherent
litany laid out in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Thus, due to the
presentation of Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, the trial court was
compelled to guess at the issues that Appellant sought to preserve and raise
on appeal. However, even if the trial court correctly guessed the issues
Appellant wanted to raise, and wrote its opinion pursuant to that supposition,
the issues are waived. Kanter, 866 A.2d at 400. Given the foregoing, we
conclude that Appellant’s challenges to the trial court’s order granting
judgment on the pleadings are waived. Therefore, we affirm the order.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 04/15/2019
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