Com. v. Williams, K. ( 2015 )

J-S39032-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
KENNETH WILLIAMS, :
:
Appellant : No. 2140 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on September 10, 2012
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0001587-2010;
CP-51-CR-0003262-2010; CP-51-CR-0003265-2010;
CP-51-CR-0007274-2010
BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2015
Kenneth Williams (“Williams”) appeals, nunc pro tunc, from the
judgment of sentence entered following his conviction of six counts each of
robbery and criminal conspiracy, and four counts of possessing an
instrument of crime “(PIC”).1 We affirm.
In its Opinion, the trial court summarized the procedural and factual
history of this case, which we adopt as though fully restated herein. See
Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 1-5.
Williams presents the following claims for our review:
I. Is [Williams] entitled to an arrest of judgment with regard
to his conviction for six counts of robbery, six counts of
criminal conspiracy and four counts of [PIC] since the
evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdicts of guilt as
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(i), 903, 907.
J-S39032-15
the Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden of proving
[Williams’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
II. Is [Williams] entitled to a new trial as a result of the
pretrial [O]rder that granted the Commonwealth’s [M]otion
to [C]onsolidate?
III. Is [Williams] entitled to an arrest of judgment since the
trial court erred when it denied [Williams’s M]otion to
dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600?
IV. Is [Williams] entitled to a new trial as a result of the trial
court’s ruling that denied his request to redact a portion of
the statements he gave to police?
Brief for Appellant at 5.
Williams first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
convictions. Id. at 15. Williams argues that “the testimony presented at
trial did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] was a co-conspirator
or accomplice to the crimes of robbery, criminal conspiracy or [PIC].” Id. at
20. Williams contends that he was not identified by any Commonwealth
witness as being involved in the crimes. Id. Rather, Williams asserts, the
case against him violated the corpus delicti rule, as it was “almost
exclusively based on the statements he provided to police.” Id.
In its Opinion, after setting forth the appropriate law, the trial court
thoroughly addressed Williams’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying each of his convictions, and concluded that they lack merit. Trial
Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 6-11. We agree with the sound reasoning of
the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on the basis of its
Opinion with regard to Williams’s first claim. See id.
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Williams next claims that the trial court improperly granted the
Commonwealth’s Motion to Consolidate the charges against him. Brief for
Appellant at 38. According to Williams, “[a] review of the facts of each of
the incidents shows that there are more differences than similarities that
would militate against consolidation.” Id. at 42. Williams contends that
“there is no evidence that each of the robberies is unique[,] or that the
evidence of each robbery would have been admissible in the trial of the
others to prove common plan or scheme by [Williams].” Id. Williams
acknowledges that at the hearing on the Commonwealth’s Motion, the
Commonwealth presented evidence that Williams allegedly drove his co-
conspirator to each location to commit the robbery; the crimes occurred
within a period of 31 days; the crimes occurred within a three-mile radius of
each other; the crimes occurred between 9:00 p.m. and 11:15 p.m.; and
each victim was robbed by the co-conspirator at gunpoint. Id. at 45.
Notwithstanding, Williams asserts that the location, time manner and
circumstances of each crime was not unique, and did not exhibit a pattern
warranting consolidation. Id.
“In reviewing a trial court decision to consolidate offenses for trial, our
standard is abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d
246, 260 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Offenses charged in separate informations may be tried together
if they are “based on the same act or transaction” or if “the
evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a
separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the
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jury so that there is no danger of confusion.”
[Pa.R.Crim.P.] 582(A)(1). The court has discretion to order
separate trials if “it appears that any party may be prejudiced”
by consolidating the charges. [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 583.
Our Supreme Court has established a three[-]part test,
incorporating these two rules, for deciding the issue of joinder
versus severance of offenses from different informations. The
court must determine
whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be
admissible in a separate trial for the other; whether such
evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to
avoid danger of confusion; and, if the answers to these
inquiries are in the affirmative, whether the defendant
will be unduly prejudiced by the consolidation of offenses.
Thomas, 879 A.2d at 260 (some citations omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Williams’s challenge to the
consolidation of the charges for trial, and concluded that it lacks merit. Trial
Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 11-12. We agree with the sound reasoning of
the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis. See id.In his third claim, Williams argues that the trial court erred in denying
his Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. Brief for Appellant at
47. In particular, Williams disputes the trial court’s failure to attribute to the
Commonwealth the delay from November 2, 2009, to February 4, 2010. Id.
at 49. Williams asserts that during this time period, he was not transported
from Montgomery County to Philadelphia, as “February 4, 2010 was given as
the earliest possible day for a protracted room.” Id. Williams contends that
it is the Commonwealth’s responsibility to assure that he was transported to
Philadelphia. Id.
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Williams states that during the June 16, 2010 scheduling conference,
he was given a trial date of January 13, 2011. Id. Williams argues that this
delay was not necessarily beyond the Commonwealth’s control, “since, as
previously stated, it is the Commonwealth’s obligation to assure that the
accused is tried within the time limitations of Rule 600.” Id. Therefore,
Williams claims, the trial court improperly determined “that the time frame
totaling 306 days was excusable delay[,] and that the Commonwealth
exercised due diligence in bringing [him] to trial.” Id.
We review such claims according to the following principles:
In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of
a trial court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its
discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with
law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court,
after hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is
not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion
the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record,
discretion is abused.
The proper scope of review ... is limited to the evidence on
the record of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the
findings of the [trial] court. An appellate court must view the
facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this
Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule
[600]. Rule [600] serves two equally important functions: (1)
the protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the
protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s right
to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given
to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both
to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those
contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule
[600] was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from
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good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the
Commonwealth.
So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of
the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy
trial rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a
manner consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime.
In considering [these] matters ..., courts must carefully factor
into the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the
individual accused, but the collective right of the community to
vigorous law enforcement as well.
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 486-87 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citations omitted).
Rule 600 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial
(1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to
commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial,
or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.
(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed
against the defendant shall commence within 365
days from the date on which the complaint is filed.
***
(C) Computation of Time
(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any
stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when
the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall
be included in the computation of the time within which trial
must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be
excluded from the computation.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
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In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Williams’s claim and concluded
that it is without merit. Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 12-14.
Specifically, the trial court determined that “the time frame totaling 306
days was excusable delay and the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in
bringing [Williams] to trial.” Id. at 14. We agree with the sound analysis
and conclusion of the trial court, as expressed in its Opinion, and affirm on
this basis. See id. at 12-14.
Finally, Williams claims that the trial court improperly failed to redact a
portion of Williams’s statements to police. Brief for Appellant at 51.
Specifically, Williams argues that the trial court should have redacted the
portion of his statement “that referenced other robberies for which he was
convicted in another jurisdiction or never charged or convicted.” Id.
According to Williams, “[b]y allowing the Commonwealth to present
testimony concerning other robberies that [Williams] may have committed
resulted in the trial court’s permitting the jury to hear evidence of unrelated
criminal activity.” Id. at 52.
The following standard governs our review of the admissibility of
evidence:
Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial
court clearly abused its discretion. Admissibility depends on
relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically
tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a
fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable
inference or presumption regarding a material fact.
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Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law,
upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after
hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the
law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record,
discretion is abused.
Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Levanduski, 907 A.2d 3, 13-14 (Pa. Super.
2006) (en banc) (internal citations omitted)).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed this claim and concluded that
it lacks merit. Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 14-15. We agree with the
sound reasoning of the trial court, and affirm on the basis of its Opinion with
regard to this claim. See id.Additionally, we note the following.
The harmless error doctrine, as adopted in Pennsylvania, reflects
the reality that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect
trial.” We have described the proper analysis as follows:
Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates either:
(1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the
prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the erroneously
admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other
untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the
erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly
admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was
so insignificant by comparison that the error could not
have contributed to the verdict.
Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 671-72 (Pa. 2014) (citations
omitted).
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Here, the challenged statements are cumulative of other, previously
admitted evidence. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/14, at 15 (citing N.T.,
1/26/12, at 8). As such, our review discloses that any error by the trial
court was harmless. See Hairston, 84 A.3d at 671-72.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/14/2015
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