Com. v. Robinson, N. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
NORMAN ROBINSON
Appellant No. 2064 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered November 6, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No: CP-67-CR-0002111-2014
BEFORE: WECHT, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:FILED OCTOBER 16, 2015
I agree with the distinguished Majority that the evidence was sufficient
to support Appellant’s convictions. I disagree, however, that the trial court
abused its discretion in fashioning the jury instruction, necessitating a new
trial. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
At issue here is the proper interpretation of Section 6111(g)(4), 1 and
in particular, whether that statute applies only to completed purchases of
firearms—as contended by Appellant, or also to attempted purchases—as
argued by the Commonwealth. The Majority finds both interpretations are
reasonable, and therefore that the statute is ambiguous. Because this
ambiguity should have been resolved in Appellant’s favor, the Majority
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111(g)(4).
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concludes that the trial court erred in interpreting the statute broadly,
consistent with the Commonwealth’s suggestion. Majority Memorandum, at
11-12.
In my opinion, Section 6111(g) is not ambiguous, as it clearly includes
in its scope attempted purchases of firearms. Section 6111(g), in relevant
part, provides:
Any person, purchaser or transferee commits a felony of the
third degree if, in connection with the purchase, delivery or
transfer of a firearm under this chapter, he knowingly and
intentionally:
(i) makes any materially false oral statement;
(ii) makes any materially false written statement, including a
statement on any form promulgated by Federal or State
agencies; or
(iii) willfully furnishes or exhibits any false identification
intended or likely to deceive the seller, licensed dealer or
licensed manufacturer.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111(g)(4). (emphasis added). I find this statute’s use of
the terms “any person” and “in connection with” to be unambiguous so as to
include persons like Appellant, who was charged with and convicted of
making a materially false statement in connection with his attempted
purchase of a firearm. With respect to the use of the term “any person,” I
agree with the trial court’s statutory analysis that this term includes persons,
in addition to purchasers and/or transferees:
As we stated at the Appellant’s trial, the inclusion of “any
person” [in Section 6111(g)(4)] clearly means the statute
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intends to differentiate between actual purchasers and any other
person, who in our mind is any other person who is not an actual
purchaser or transferee. If the legislature’s intent was only to
include purchasers and transferees then it would not have
included the phrase “any person.”
Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/15, at 9. (Reference to Notes of Testimony
omitted.) This interpretation of the term “any person” within § 6111(g)(4)
is consistent with our rules of statutory construction that require we give full
meaning and effect to all words of a statute. 1 Pa. C.S.A. §1921(a).
I similarly find interpretation of the term “in connection with” to be
unambiguous. The common and approved usage of this term we are
obligated to employ, see 1 Pa.C.S.A. §1903(a), does not suggest it is a
limiting term such that a violation only is deemed to occur when a purchase,
delivery, or transfer is actually completed. The term “in connection with”
connotes activity that is in conjunction with or in reference to a purchase,
delivery, or transfer of a firearm. See Webster’s New College Dictionary
(2009). Providing materially false information in connection with the
attempt to purchase a firearm is precisely activity conducted in conjunction
with or in reference to the purchase of a firearm. Any other interpretation,
as the Majority admits, would lead to the absurd result the General
Assembly meant to criminalize a false written statement on an application
when a purchase is completed, but not when a background check catches
the falsehood before the purchase is concluded. Majority Memorandum, at
10-11. See also 1 Pa.C.S.A. §1922(1) (in ascertaining legislative intent it is
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presumed the general Assembly did not intend an absurd result). Certainly,
linguistic machinations can be employed to create ambiguity in almost any
statutory provision, but our rules of construction guide us to reasonable
constructions. Because I believe the construction urged by Appellant is not
reasonable, I cannot agree with the Majority’s opening premise that the
interpretations by both parties are reasonable so as to open the door to find
ambiguity in this statute in order to permit application of the rule of lenity.
Majority Memorandum, at 11. After applying well-settled principles of
statutory construction to § 6111(g)(4), I cannot conclude the statute results
in ambiguity as maintained by the Majority, and therefore, would find no
error in the challenged jury charge by the trial court. Other of our cases
also supports the conclusion no error was committed by the trial court.
In Commonwealth v. Baxter, 956 A.2d 465 (Pa. Super 2008) (en
banc), appeal denied, 968 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 2009), defendant was granted a
new trial on the grounds that prosecution under Section 6111(g)(4) violated
his due process rights and the separation of powers doctrine because the
defendant provided untruthful answers in response to a federal form, not a
state form. This Court explained:
[T]he trial court found that because § 6111(b) specifically lists
only identifying information as being required from a
prospective purchaser, [defendant] was not put on fair notice
by § 6111(g)(4) that false statements to any additional
questions (such as those on the federal form) could subject him
to prosecution in this Commonwealth. Consequently, the trial
court concluded that § 6111(g)(4), as applied in this case to
support a state prosecution, violated due process. Further, the
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trial court found it was violative of the separation of powers
doctrine because the Commonwealth, in effect, endorsed the
federal form’s additional questions by charging [defendant] for
providing allegedly false information thereon. In doing so, the
trial court concluded the Commonwealth operated outside the
statutory framework formulated by the legislature for conducting
background checks.
Baxter, 469-70 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Upon review, we disagreed with the trial court and concluded:
[P]rosecution under Section 6111(g)(4) is not dependent solely
upon the prospective purchaser of a firearm providing false
information as to his or her identifying information as listed in
Section 6111(b)(1). Rather, the plain language of Section
6111(g)(4), when taken in proper context of the statute as a
whole, clearly places prospective purchasers on notice that
they will be subject to prosecution for a third degree felony if
they make any oral or written materially false statement in
connection with that attempted purchase of a firearm.
Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Emmil, 866 A.2d 420 (Pa. Super.
2004), defendant was convicted of making false statements to authorities in
connection with an attempted firearm purchase. Id. at 421.
Specifically, the conduct giving rise to the prosecution and conviction of
defendant in Emmil was summarized as follows:
On August 1, 2003, [defendant] attempted to
purchase a firearm at Rightnour MFG Co. in Centre
County. To effect transfer of the firearm,
[defendant] was required by Commonwealth law to
complete a Firearm Transaction Record and undergo
a background check. On the Firearm Transaction
Record there is a question asking if the applicant has
ever been adjudicated mentally defective or
committed to a mental institution. [Defendant]
responded in the negative, then signed the form
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acknowledging that all statements on the form were
true and correct and that he could be punished by
law if he had falsified any information on the form.
The form was then transferred to the PA State Police
to run the background check on [defendant].
Through the PA Instant Check System it was
discovered that [defendant] had been involuntarily
committed under Section 7302 of the [Mental Health
Procedures Act, 50 P.S. §§ 7101 et seq.] and
involuntarily committed for psychiatric treatment
under Section 7303 by the Centre County Mental
Health/Mental Retardation Office.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/04, at 1-2.
[Defendant] was subsequently charged with violating two
provisions of the Crimes Code: Section 4904 (relating to
unsworn falsification to authorities) and Section 6111(g)(4)
(relating to making false statements in connection with the
purchase of a firearm), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4904 and 6111,
respectively. He filed a motion to suppress evidence which the
trial court denied after a hearing. Upon his convictions Appellant
was sentenced to a 6-month term of probation.
Emmil, 866 A.2d at 421 (emphasis added). On appeal, we affirmed the
convictions.
As Baxter and Emmil demonstrate, this Court has consistently
interpreted Section 6111(g)(4) to cover prospective (attempted) purchases
of firearms. As such, the trial court did not err in clarifying for the jury that
the crime at issue here included not only completed transactions but also
prospective (attempted) purchases.
Based on the express and unambiguous language of the statute, I
believe the Majority erroneously concludes that Section 6111(g)(4) is
ambiguous. I also believe the trial court’s instruction, which did instruct that
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the jury must find Appellant acted knowingly and intentionally, accurately
and adequately reflected the law and did not constitute an abuse of
discretion or error of law.2
In light of the foregoing, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
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2
As the Majority recognizes, “A trial court has wide discretion in phrasing
its jury instructions, and can choose its own words as long as the law is
clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its
consideration.” Majority Memorandum, at 7 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Jones, 954 A.2d 1194, 1198 (Pa. Super. 2008)). Further:
Our standard of review for the trial court's instructions to a jury
is well established. When reviewing a challenge to part of a jury
instruction, we must review the jury charge as a whole to
determine if it is fair and complete. Reversible error occurs only
where there is an abuse of discretion or an inaccurate statement
of the law.
Commonwealth v. Hanford, 937 A.2d 1094, 1097 (internal citations,
quotations and brackets omitted).
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