Com. v. Green, J. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMAL GREEN,
Appellant No. 745 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 26, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009471-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 03, 2016
Appellant, Jamal Green, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 3-6
years’ incarceration, and a consecutive 6-year term of probation, imposed
following his conviction for gun and drug offenses. Appellant’s sole issue on
appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
contraband discovered in the backpack he was wearing when he was
arrested. Appellant claims the search of his backpack was unlawful because
the police did not first obtain a warrant, whereas the trial court found that
the search was lawful pursuant to the search-incident-to-arrest exception to
the warrant requirement. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the pertinent facts of this case as follows:
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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At the [suppression] motion hearing, the Commonwealth
presented the testimony of Philadelphia Police Officers Brian
Geer and Frederick Clough[,] while [Appellant] presented the
testimony of Barbara Brown. Testimony established the
following.
On September 19, 2012, at approximately 3:56 pm, police
officers Geer and Clough were on uniform bike patrol in the area
of Chew and Chelten in Philadelphia [C]ounty. The officers
observed Lauren Greenburg (a/k/a Grouper), a known drug user
and prostitute, wandering around for several minutes. When
[Appellant] approached the area, Ms. Greenburg immediately
walked over to him and they briefly conversed before entering
the laundro[ma]t at 737 Chelten. [Appellant] was carrying a
backpack on his person[,] however[,] neither he nor Ms. Grouper
had any laundry when they entered the laundromat. Officer
Geer rode to the laundromat and observed Ms. Greenburg accept
a small object from [Appellant,] which she placed in her right
front pocket. Officer Geer entered the laundromat and ordered
both [Appellant] and Ms. Greenburg to stop; [Appellant],
however, disregarded the command and walked away. When
Officer Geer repeated his command, [Appellant] ran toward the
back of the laundromat where he tried to enter the manager's
office. [Appellant] turned toward Officer Geer with his hands
behind his back. [Appellant] did not comply with Officer Geer's
command to take his hands from behind his back. Officer
Clough, who entered the laundromat shortly after Officer Geer,
assisted Officer Geer in securing and handcuffing [Appellant].
Officer Geer then exited the laundromat and pursued Ms.
Greenburg. In pursuit, Officer Geer observed her remove an
unknown object from her right pocket and put it into her mouth.
Officer Geer caught up to and struggled with Ms. Greenburg and
she swallowed the object. Officer Clough searched the front part
of [Appellant]'s book bag, which contained marijuana. Officer
Hart who arrived at the laundromat approximately two minutes
after Officers Geer and Clough, recovered a semi-automatic
weapon, a digital scale, and two criminal law books from the
book bag. Recovered from [Appellant]'s right front pants pocket
was United States currency.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 4/8/15, at 2-3.
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Appellant’s suppression motion was denied by the trial court on April
2, 2013, following a hearing. Following his non-jury trial held on February
26, 2014, Appellant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver, 35
P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and person not to possess a firearm, 18 Pa.C.S. §
6105. Appellant was sentenced that same day to 3-6 years’ incarceration
for the gun offense, and to a consecutive term of 6 years’ probation for the
drug offense.
Appellant filed a timely appeal. He filed a timely, court-ordered
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement on September 24, 2014. The trial court issued
its Rule 1925(a) opinion on April 8, 2015. Appellant now presents the
following question for our review:
Did not the lower court err in denying [Appellant]'s motion to
suppress evidence in that, after [Appellant] was detained and
arrested, [his] backpack was opened and searched without a
warrant or any exception to the warrant requirement?
Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
Our standard of review of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence is
well-settled.
[An appellate court's] standard of review in addressing a
challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth
prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only
the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence
for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's
factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court
is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court's
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legal conclusions are erroneous. Where ... the appeal of the
determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of
legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not
binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus,
the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to []
plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
The matter before us concerns the search-incident-to-arrest exception
to the prohibition against unreasonable searches provided by both the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 8
of the Pennsylvania Constitution. “[F]or a search to be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 8, police must obtain a warrant,
supported by probable cause and issued by an independent judicial officer,
prior to conducting the search. This general rule is subject to only a few
delineated exceptions[.]” Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 107 (Pa.
2014) (plurality).
A search conducted incident to arrest is one of these exceptions:
Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, an
arresting officer may, without a warrant search a person validly
arrested. The constitutionality of a search incident to an arrest
does not depend on whether there is any indication that the
person arrested possesses weapons or evidence. The fact of a
lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search.
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979) (internal citations
omitted). Furthermore,
[t]he Supreme Court of the United States and [the
Pennsylvania Supreme] Court have held that the scope of a
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search incident to arrest extends not only to the arrestee's
person, but also into the area within the arrestee's immediate
control. While the breadth of the area that falls within the
arrestee's immediate control has been the subject of much
debate, a warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by
the exigencies which justify its initiation. The two historical
rationales for the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement are (1) the need to disarm the suspect in
order to take him into custody and (2) the need to preserve
evidence for later use at trial.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261, 1271 (Pa. 2001) (internal
citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted).
The pertinent facts concerning the search incident to Appellant’s arrest
are not in dispute. The Commonwealth does not contest that Appellant was
already under arrest when his backpack was searched. Thus, there can be
no serious claim that the search was conducted for the purpose of ensuring
the officers’ safety, as Appellant could not access the bag once restrained.
Additionally, Appellant does not contest the legality of his arrest, and he
admits that he was wearing the at-issue backpack when he was arrested.
Appellant claims, however, that:
Where [Appellant] was handcuffed and in the custody of several
police officers, and where [his] backpack was then taken from
his person, it was incumbent upon the police to obtain a search
warrant before searching the backpack. Under these
circumstances, where [Appellant] no longer had access to the
backpack at the time it was searched, the warrantless search of
the backpack could not be justified as a search pursuant to
arrest. Nor were exigent circumstances presented, or any other
exception to the warrant requirement demonstrated, by the
Commonwealth to justify the warrantless search of the
backpack. Consequently, the contents of the backpack should
have been suppressed.
Appellant’s Brief, at 9-10.
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In support of this claim, Appellant cites and discusses
Commonwealth v. Zock, 454 A.2d 35 (Pa. Super. 1982), Commonwealth
v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1993), and Commonwealth v. Taylor, 771
A.2d 1261 (Pa. 2001). The Commonwealth contends that each of these
cases is inapposite or readily distinguishable from the facts in this case. We
agree with the Commonwealth.
In Zock, police were serving an arrest warrant on William Jackson at
Jackson’s residence. Upon their arrival, they observed Zock “walking rapidly
into Jackson's residence.” Zock, 454 A.2d at 36. Another individual
answered the door, claimed to be in charge of the residence in Jackson’s
absence, and permitted police to enter in order to search for him. Once
inside, police discovered approximately twenty-two pounds of marijuana in
plain sight. Police then secured the premises while they awaited the arrival
of a search warrant.
Subsequently, police observed Zock running away from the house with
three suitcases that the police had seen in the room where the marijuana
was discovered. Police gave chase, but when they captured Zock, he no
longer had the suitcases in his possession. However, the suitcases were
later found in a building located along the path of Zock’s escape. The
suitcases were returned to Jackson’s residence, where they were opened
when the search warrant arrived, revealing several additional pounds of
marijuana.
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The trial court ultimately found that the suitcases had been seized
unlawfully, because they were outside the scope of the warrant, and because
no exigency existed. The Commonwealth appealed, arguing, inter alia, that
the suitcases were lawfully seized incident to Zock’s arrest. This Court
ostensibly rejected that argument, “in light of the general rule that luggage
lawfully seized during an arrest, and thereafter placed wholly within police
control can be searched only after a warrant is obtained.” Id. at 37 (citing
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)). However, the Zock Court
ultimately reversed the order granting suppression, accepting an alternative
argument that the suitcases were within the scope of the warrant obtained
to search Jackson’s house.
In the instant case, the Commonwealth argues that the Zock Court’s
apparent ruling on the search-incident-to-arrest issues was mere dicta,
given that it was not critical to the actual holding of the Court in reversing
suppression. We agree. As we noted in Commonwealth v. Firman, 789
A.2d 297 (Pa. Super. 2001):
“Dicta” is defined as “[o]pinions of a judge which do not embody
the resolution or determination of the specific case before the
court. Expressions in court's opinion which go beyond the facts
before [the] court and therefore are individual views of [the]
author of [the] opinion and [are] not binding in subsequent
cases as legal precedent.” Black's Law Dictionary 454 (6th ed.
1990).
Id. at 301 n.8.
Clearly, because the Zock decision ultimately reversed suppression,
the Court’s rejection of the Commonwealth’s search-incident-to-arrest
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argument did not result in binding precedent. Thus, we agree with the
Commonwealth that Zock is not controlling in this case.
Nevertheless, Zock is also factually inapposite given that Zock was not
arrested with the suitcases in his possession—they were found in a building,
and Zock was arrested outside that building. Moreover, the Ross decision,
the keystone of the Zock Court’s search-incident-to-arrest discussion,
concerned the scope of the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. In that regard, Appellant’s case falls into an entirely different
category of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, given that his backpack was
not seized as a result of a search of a vehicle; Appellant was wearing the
backpack at issue when arrested. Accordingly, we find Appellant’s reliance
on Zock is unpersuasive, dicta or not.
Next, in Martin, police observed Martin and another man passing a
satchel back and forth at a table in a restaurant in what appeared to be a
drug deal. Martin was stopped by police as he left the restaurant while
wearing that satchel. He was told to place the satchel on the ground, at
which point a drug dog was permitted to examine it. “The dog indicated to
its handler that the satchel contained drugs. Thereupon, one of the
detectives opened the satchel and found a small quantity of marijuana, an
address book, and $70,500 in consecutively numbered $100 bills. Martin
was then arrested.” Martin, 626 A.2d at 558-59. Martin was convicted
following the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence
uncovered by the search of his satchel. This Court affirmed, reasoning that:
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[T]he canine sniff was supported by “reasonable suspicion” that
a crime was in progress …. The court also held that the search
of the bag was lawful because the cumulative observations of
the detectives in the restaurant and the canine alert established
probable cause to believe that drugs would be found in the
satchel. The search was properly conducted without a warrant,
according to the trial court, because it was conducted incident to
a lawful arrest and exigent circumstances existed.
Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 559 (Pa. 1993) (explaining the
decision of the Superior Court).
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this Court’s
analysis, stating:
Because the search in this case involved Martin's person, we
believe that in addition to being lawfully in place at the time of
the search, the police must have probable cause to believe that
a canine search of a person will produce contraband or evidence
of a crime. Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity will not
suffice. Moreover, because the intrusion concerns the person,
we also hold that once the police have probable cause and a sniff
search has been conducted pursuant to that probable cause,
before any search, beyond that permitted by Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)[,] may be
conducted (patting down outer garments to check for weapons
upon reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be armed), the
police must secure a search warrant and they may detain the
suspect for a reasonable time while the warrant is sought.
Martin, 626 A.2d at 560-61 (footnotes omitted).
While favorable to Appellant’s claim at first glance, further inspection
and analysis demonstrates that Martin is inapplicable to the circumstances
before us. Martin clearly holds that a warrant is required when probable
cause exists for a search but no exigent circumstances justify dispensing
with that requirement. However, in Martin, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was operating under the presumption that, while there was probable
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cause to search Martin’s satchel, there was not (yet) probable cause to
justify his arrest. This is apparent when one reads the last line quoted from
Martin above, as there would be no need to “detain the suspect for a
reasonable time while the warrant is sought” if probable cause already
existed to arrest him. Id. at 61.
Here, however, Appellant does not dispute the legality of his arrest.
Instead, he asserts that, despite the lawfulness of his arrest, the police were
required to obtain a warrant to search the backpack he was wearing because
of an absence of exigent circumstances. However, as the United States
Supreme Court stated in DeFillippo, “The fact of a lawful arrest, standing
alone, authorizes a search.” DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 35. In other words,
exigency is not required to conduct a search incident to arrest.
A search incident to arrest is only circumscribed in physical terms, by
“the area within the arrestee's immediate control.” Talyor, 771 A.2d at
1271. While a Terry pat-down is similarly constrained, it is only justified
when police also possess a “reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot,
and that the suspect may be armed and dangerous.” Commonwealth v.
Mesa, 683 A.2d 643, 646 (Pa. Super. 1996) (emphasis added). By
contrast, a search conducted incident to arrest is justified based on the
arrest itself; officer safety and exigency are irrelevant to the justification for
the search of satchels, backpacks, purses, and similar containers found
within the immediate sphere of an arrestee’s control at the time of his or her
lawful arrest.
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Finally, in Taylor, police had secured a search warrant authorizing the
search of a convenience store based on complaints of drug activity
corroborated by surveillance and a controlled drug buy. After finding crack
cocaine behind the counter and detaining the owner,
two officers went down a set of stairs and into the basement of
the building. In the basement, the officers encountered Taylor,
sitting in a barber's chair and wearing a black plastic apron over
his torso. The police observed Mahone cutting Taylor's hair. The
basement contained one other barber's chair and some hair-
cutting equipment.
After the officers announced their presence, Officer Richard
Scott Adams (Officer Adams) noticed Taylor's hands moving
underneath the plastic apron. Fearing that Taylor could be
reaching for a weapon, Officer Adams removed the apron and
patted the exterior of Taylor's pocket. Officer Adams felt a hard
object and removed it from Taylor's pocket. The object was a
plastic prescription bottle, which appeared to contain crack
cocaine. After arresting Taylor and placing him in handcuffs,
Officer Adams searched Mahone. Officer Adams did not find
anything incriminating on Mahone. Then, Officer Adams
handcuffed Mahone, while Constable Gordon McIntyre (Constable
McIntyre) searched two coats, which were draped on a chair ten
feet from Taylor and Mahone. Constable McIntyre discovered
additional pieces of crack in Taylor's coat and several baggies
containing marijuana in Mahone's coat.
Taylor, 771 A.2d at 1264.
The Taylor Court first concluded that the basement barber shop was
not within the scope of the warrant secured for the search of the
convenience store but, nevertheless, the Court found that the police were
permitted to conduct a protective sweep of the basement barber shop on
officer safety grounds. The Court also held that the search of Taylor was
justified as a Terry pat-down. However, the Court found that the
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warrantless search of the coats was not justified as a search incident to
arrest because “the two coats … were not within Taylor's immediate control.”
Id. at 1272.
Taylor is clearly not analogous to the instant case. Appellant was
wearing the at-issue backpack when he was lawfully arrested. Taylor,
however, was not wearing either of the coats when he was arrested, nor
were they in an area within his immediate control.
In sum, we agree with the trial court and the Commonwealth that the
search of Appellant’s backpack was justified, as a search incident to his
arrest, because the backpack was within his immediate control at the time of
his lawful arrest. Appellant’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing, as
he has not cited any controlling authority establishing that additional
justification was required to permit such a search. Therefore, we hold that
the trial court’s ruling denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence
seized as a result of the warrantless search of his backpack is both
supported by the undisputed facts of record and free of legal error.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/3/2016
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