Com. v. Young, T. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
TAYMAR YOUNG
Appellant No. 628 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 18, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No: CP-02-CR-0004513-2014
BEFORE: STABILE, DUBOW, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 19, 2016
Appellant Taymar Young appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (“trial court”),
following a jury trial that resulted in him being convicted of robbery—serious
bodily injury—and conspiracy to commit robbery.1 Upon review, we affirm.
The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. As
summarized by the trial court:
On January 13, 2014, Keyshawn Alford, an eleventh grader
at Westinghouse High School, was walking home from school
with Jamier Lane, his good friend and football teammate. As the
two (2) young men exited the front door of the school, Jamier
noticed a suspicious group of four (4) men standing across the
street. The group caught his attention because they were not
dressed in school uniforms, and they did not look like they
belonged in the area. Their presence made Jamier nervous, and
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§3701(a)(1)(ii) and 903(a)(1), respectively.
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he told Keyshawn that they should wait a few minutes to see if
the group would leave. The two (2) young men waited for the
group to walk down Murtland Avenue and up Hermitage Street
before they started walking quickly along the same route.
Although the group was initially walking in front of them,
Keyshawn and Jamier eventually caught up with the group,
passing it when they were near Hermitage Street.
By the time the boys arrived at Kedron Street, Keyshawn
and Jamier had separated somewhat, with Keyshawn walking a
few yards ahead of Jamier. Keyshawn began to feel as though
he was in danger because “it was too quiet.” He turned around
and saw [Appellant], and Shaquille West, his co-[d]efendant,
standing behind him. Although he did not know his name at the
time, Keyshawn recognized Mr. West as someone who had dated
his friend. [Appellant] pushed Keyshawn and asked him, “What
do you got ?” Keyshawn stated that he did not have anything,
pointed to something in the street in an attempt to distract the
men, and then ran.
The [c]o-[d]efendant, Mr. West, chased Keyshawn down
the street, caught up to him, and tackled him. After the tackle,
Keyshawn was able to regain his footing, but Mr. West was still
able to drag him over to some bushes and hold on to him.
[Appellant] then reappeared and began punching Keyshawn in
the head and face. As Keyshawn was trying to defend himself,
he heard [Appellant] say “give me a joint,” which Keyshawn
understood to mean that [Appellant] wanted Mr. West to give
him a gun. [Appellant] took possession of a black firearm and
pointed it at Keyshawn’s stomach, informing Keyshawn that the
gun was, in fact, loaded. At that point, Keyshawn believed that
a police cruiser happened by the area because Mr. West turned
to [Appellant] and said “come on, hurry up.” [Appellant] put the
gun away and started walking away with his [c]o-[d]efendant.
As [Appellant and the co-d]efendant[] were leaving,
[Appellant] in this case handed the firearm to his co-
[d]efendant, Mr. West. Mr. West turned around, waved the gun
at Keyshawn, and said, “If you tell anybody, I got something for
you.” Keyshawn waited until [Appellant] and [c]o-[d]efendant
walked away before he and Jamier went to his grandmother’s
house. Keyshawn was later treated at UPMC Children’s Hospital
of Pittsburgh for a mild concussion and some minor scrapes and
bruises.
Keyshawn subsequently located Mr. West’s Facebook page,
immediately recognizing him as one of the people that robbed
him and pointed a gun at him. He was able to find Mr. West on
Facebook because they shared mutual friends. Once he
accessed Mr. West’s Facebook page, he scrolled through Mr.
West’s list of Facebook friends and located [Appellant], whom he
immediately recognized from the robbery.
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Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/15, at 3-6. Appellant subsequently was charged
with robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. Claiming that he was
sixteen years old, on April 11, 2014, Appellant filed a decertification motion,
seeking a transfer to the juvenile court. Following a decertification hearing,
the trial court denied the transfer motion on September 5, 2014.
Thereafter, Appellant’s case proceeded to a jury trial, following which
Appellant was found guilty of the above-mentioned offenses. The trial court
sentenced Appellant to, inter alia, 48 to 96 months’ incarceration. Appellant
timely appealed to this Court. Following Appellant’s filing of a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) statement, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
On appeal, Appellant raises only two issues for our review:
1. Whether the juvenile decertification process is
unconstitutional as it does not allow for the minor child to
have a jury conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the
juvenile should be subjected to an adult penalty beyond the
juvenile statutory maximum penalty in violation of the minor
child’s Sixth Amendment rights[.]
2. Whether placing the burden of proof on a juvenile defendant
in a decertification process violates both the juvenile’s
procedural and substantive due process rights[.]
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Initially, we note that an appellant bears a heavy burden to prove a
statute unconstitutional. “[A] statute is presumed to be constitutional and
will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and plainly
violates the Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Cotto, 753 A.2d 217, 219
(Pa. 2000). Additionally, “there is no constitutional guarantee to special
treatment for juvenile offenders. Any right to treatment as a juvenile is
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derived from statutory law and is defined by the legislature.” In Interest
of J.F., 714 A.2d 467, 470 (Pa. Super. 1998).
The legislature, through the Juvenile Act, placed adjudication of
delinquent acts when the defendant is a child automatically within the
jurisdiction of juvenile court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a). However, Section
6302 of the Juvenile Act excludes robbery from the definition of a delinquent
act where, as in this case, a deadly weapon was used in the commission of
the offense. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 “Delinquent Act” (2)(ii)(D); see also
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701 (relating to robbery). Prosecution for an offense
excluded from the definition of a delinquent act commences in criminal court
rather than in juvenile court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a); see also
Commonwealth v. Ramos, 920 A.2d 1253, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(“[W]hen the crime involved is one excluded from the Juvenile Act’s
definition of a delinquent crime, the charge is automatically within the
jurisdiction of the criminal court and jurisdiction is presumptively proper.”),
appeal denied, 932 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 2007).
When a criminal court has jurisdiction over a crime committed by a
juvenile pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a), the juvenile may request that
her case be decertified, i.e., removed to the jurisdiction of juvenile court.
Commonwealth v. Sanders, 814 A.2d 1248, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2003)
appeal denied, 827 A.2d 430 (Pa. 2003). This process has been upheld as
constitutional by this Court and our Supreme Court. See Cotto, 753 A.2d at
217, 222 (holding as constitutional the 1995 Amendments to the Juvenile
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Act which vest original jurisdiction in the criminal courts for specified violent
felonies and grant the decision-maker discretion in determining whether to
transfer a direct file case to juvenile court); see also Commonwealth v.
Aziz, 724 A.2d 371, 374 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“We find that the amendments
to the Act, which cause juveniles accused of the enumerated offenses to
appear first in criminal court, are not arbitrary and instead are rationally
related to the statute’s objectives.”), appeal denied, 759 A.2d 919 (Pa.
2000).
Appellant first argues that the decertification process is
unconstitutional as violating the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution because a judge, rather than a jury, decides decertification.
Appellant bases this claim on our United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) which, in his words,
“conclude[es] that a sentencing factor that has the potential to enhance the
punishment triggers Sixth Amendment protections. . . .” Appellant’s Brief at
11. Essentially, Appellant argues that the denial of decertification is a factor
that could enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum allowed for a
juvenile, and therefore, under Apprendi, only a jury may deny
decertification. Id. at 17.
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi concerned a
statute that authorized a judge to increase the maximum sentence after a
jury’s verdict based on the judge’s finding, by a preponderance of the
evidence, of the fact that the crime was racially motivated. Apprendi, 120
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S.Ct. at 2348. We previously summarized the rule established by Apprendi
and its progeny as follows:
In the watershed Apprendi case, the Supreme Court held that
any fact except a prior conviction that increases the range of
punishment beyond the statutory maximum penalty for that
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to the jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court further
defined the term statutory maximum in Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403(2004). According to the Blakely Court, the statutory maximum
is the maximum sentence a court can impose based solely on
the facts reflected by the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant during his guilty plea.
Commonwealth v. Stokes, 38 A.3d 846, 858-59 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Appellant’s reliance on Apprendi is misplaced. Decertification is a
legislatively established procedure whereby a judge must consider a
juvenile’s amenability to treatment within the juvenile system as delineated
by statutorily defined factors. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(a)(4)(iii). Decertification
is not a fact that increases the maximum penalty that may be imposed as
already determined by a jury’s verdict or an accused’s guilty plea. Indeed, a
judge does not make any findings of fact regarding elements of the crimes
charged during the decertification process. Further, there is no jury involved
in this process. Apprendi, therefore, is factually and legally distinguishable
from the instant case. As such, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first
issue.
Appellant next argues that placing the burden of proof on a juvenile
defendant in the decertification process violates both the juvenile’s
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procedural and substantive due process rights. In Cotto, our Supreme
Court addressed and rejected this issue and held as follows.
[T]he legislature has determined in its judgment that, in certain
instances, violent felonies in addition to murder are sufficiently
serious to merit vesting original jurisdiction in the criminal
courts, while affording the defendant an opportunity to show
that his is the exceptional case warranting juvenile treatment.
....
. . . [T]he legislature’s informed determination that juveniles
fifteen years of age and older who commit such offenses are not
initially amenable to rehabilitation under the Juvenile Act, unless
they prove otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence, is
equally reasonable. There is nothing in the Constitution to
prevent the legislature from making such a judgment.
Cotto, 753 A.2d at 223-24.
Appellant acknowledges that Cotto is controlling on this issue, but
asks us to reconsider our Supreme Court’s holding. Appellant’s Brief at 22.
This Court, however, has a “duty and obligation to follow the decisional law
of [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania].” Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 734
A.2d 840, 844 n.6 (Pa. 1999). Because Cotto considered and resolved
Appellant’s second issue, we are bound by our Supreme Court’s holding in
Cotto, and Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.2
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2
To the extent that Appellant relies on Roper, Graham, and Miller to
support his argument that “juveniles are constitutionally distinct from
adults,” and therefore it is unconstitutional to shift the burden of proof in
decertification onto juvenile defendants, these cases are easily
distinguishable from the one sub judice as the foregoing only address
juvenile sentencing. Appellant’s Brief at 21; Commonwealth v. Batts, 125
A.3d 33, 37 (Pa. Super. 2015). None of these cases pertain to the juvenile
decertification process.
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Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that Appellant is entitled
to relief on appeal.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/19/2016
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