Com. v. Corcoran, K. ( 2016 )

J-S15035-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KEVIN CORCORAN,
Appellant No. 441 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 6, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0007842-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 29, 2016
Appellant, Kevin Corcoran, appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his jury conviction of obstructing the administration of law
or other governmental function.1 Appellant, a former Philadelphia Police
Officer,2 challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.
We affirm.
The trial court aptly summarized the facts of this case as follows:
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101.
2
Appellant had been a member of the Philadelphia Police Department for ten
years when the incident from which this case stems occurred. (See N.T.
Trial, 11/13/14, at 10). He was fired from the department as a result of his
arrest in this case. (See id. at 30).
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On March 31, 2013, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Thomas
Stenberg, Roderick King, Brian Jackson and Sara Tice were
crossing Lombard Street at the 1300 block in the City and
County of Philadelphia when witness Thomas Stenberg noticed a
marked Philadelphia Police SUV make [a] left turn [at a red
light]. Mr. Stenberg testified that he said to the group of people
that it was an illegal turn. The group of four continued to walk
southbound on 13th street when the Police SUV approached
them. Appellant . . . immediately got out of the SUV. Thomas
Stenberg, Roderick King, Brian Jackson and Sara Tice testified
that from observing Appellant’s body language, it was apparent
that he was angry and he began to “aggressively approach”
them. Appellant kept asking if Mr. Stenberg “had a fucking
problem with his driving” and grabbed Mr. Stenberg’s jacket.
(N.T. Trial, 11/12/14, at 37). At this time, Appellant noticed two
of the witnesses, Brian Jackson and Roderick King, were
recording the incident with their cell phones and he immediately
struck the phone out of Brian Jackson’s hand. Mr. Stenberg
testified that Appellant then approached and grabbed Roderick
King by his jacket, eventually knocking his cell phone out of his
hand. Mr. Stenberg and Mr. King testified that [Appellant]
pushed Mr. King against the SUV, placed handcuffs on him and
put him in the back of the SUV. Appellant then drove away. At
no point did Appellant ask for Mr. King’s identification, whether
he had any weapons or tell Mr. King what he was under arrest
for. Mr. Stenberg testified that no one made any threats
towards Appellant. Additionally, Mr. King testified that he did
not attempt to resist arrest.
Following the moments immediately after Appellant drove
off with Mr. King in the car, the three remaining witnesses
attempted to call the police multiple times. Brian Jackson
testified that he was able to find the number to Internal Affairs
and called. They were told that a supervisor would be sent out
shortly. The three witnesses testified that at no point did
another police officer come to the scene to address their
concerns.
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While in Appellant’s police vehicle,[3] and in an attempt to
diffuse the situation, Mr. King tried to talk to [Appellant],
explaining that he was an Iraq War veteran. Appellant was
silent until he asked Mr. King if he “wanted to go back to his
fucking friends,” whereupon Mr. King said that he did. (Id. at
84). Appellant then asked Mr. King if he knew where Appellant
picked him up. Mr. King is from Florida and not very familiar
with the area and therefore did not know the exact location at
which he was taken into custody. Appellant was able to navigate
his way back to where Mr. King’s three friends were waiting.
Approximately 16-17 minutes after Mr. King was initially
handcuffed and placed into the Police SUV, he was released at
13th and Rodman Streets.
Lt. Malaki Jones testified that according to Police records,
Appellant was assigned to patrol the 17th Police District in the
police service area number 2. The 17th [P]olice [D]istrict borders
the 3rd Police District. . . . Lieutenant Jones also testified that
Appellant was in possession of a patrol log and that the purpose
of the patrol log is to keep an account of the officer’s activity
during his eight-hour shift. Additionally, a device called the
Mobile Data Terminal is used by police officers to search for
active warrants using personal information such as first and last
name and date of birth. Any search done using the Mobile Data
[T]erminal is recorded on the Message Scan Details report.
Officers use identifying information from the Mobile Data
[T]erminal in their patrol log. The patrol log includes a space to
indicate that other materials required for vehicle or pedestrian
stops were also prepared. These materials are known as a
Philadelphia Complaint or Incident Report, commonly referred to
as a 7548 or a Philadelphia Police Department Vehicle or
Pedestrian Investigation Report, commonly referred to as a
7548A. A 7548 is typically filed even if the person stopped does
not formally get arrested.
Lieutenant Jones testified that during the investigation into
this incident, he discovered that Appellant was patrolling alone
on the evening on March[] 30th. Lieutenant Jones testified that
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3
Mr. King repeatedly asked Appellant what he was under arrest for while in
the SUV; Appellant eventually stated public intoxication. (See N.T. Trial,
11/12/14, at 81).
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even though Appellant was patrolling alone on the evening of the
incident, Appellant entered information recording responses to
five radio calls that he and his partner made during the evening
of March 30th in the patrol log. Lieutenant Jones testified that
the area of 13th and Rodman, where the incident took place, is in
the 3rd Police District, and not in the 17th Police District, where
Appellant should have been patrolling. Lieutenant Jones also
testified that while there were entries for March 30th on the
Message Scan Details Report, there were no entries indicating
[Appellant] used the Mobile Data Terminal on March 31 st,
therefore no record of the name Roderick King was listed.
Effectively, Appellant never completed a 7548 or 7548A.
Lieutenant Jones then testified that there were multiple 911 calls
recorded on the Computer Assisted Dispatch report around the
time of 2:19 a.m. lasting until about 2:28 a.m. which specifically
included a complaint against the police at 13th and Rodman
Street.
Appellant . . . testified that the pedestrian stop with
Roderick King was not recorded in his patrol log because he was
too busy towards the end of the night. The evidence showed
that the last entry in [Appellant’s] patrol log was on March 31 st
at 1:20 a.m. Appellant testified that Roderick King refused to
give him his name or date of birth and that is why he never
searched his name using the Mobile Data Terminal. At no point
did Appellant call for backup although he testified that he felt
threatened by the individuals during the pedestrian stop. After
Appellant dropped Mr. King off at 13th and Rodman, he forgot to
ask for his name in order to record the stop in his patrol log.
Appellant testified that he wrote his partner’s name on the patrol
log out of habit even though he was not present during the shift.
(Trial Court Opinion, 8/05/15, at unnumbered pages 1-5) (footnote,
emphasis, and most record citations omitted; record citation formatting
provided).
On November 14, 2014, a jury found Appellant guilty of the above-
stated offense. On February 6, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
a term of not less than one day nor more than six months’ incarceration,
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with immediate parole to house arrest for six months, followed by one year
of probation. This timely appeal followed.4
Appellant raises one question for our review: “Was the evidence
presented by the Commonwealth at trial sufficient as a matter of law to
convict him of obstructing the administration of law?” (Appellant’s Brief, at
2) (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Appellant argues that he did not
intentionally breach his official duties as a police officer and that the incident
transpired as a result of the disorderly behavior of Mr. King and his friends.
(See id. at 10-11). Appellant maintains that, instead of following through
with a citation to Mr. King, he decided to give him a break because he was a
veteran. (See id.). Appellant also contends that the record is devoid of
evidence that he intentionally failed to prepare appropriate paperwork, and
that his testimony reflects that he was very busy during his shift and “forgot
to get [Mr. King’s] name.” (N.T. Trial, 11/13/14, at 51; see also id. at 37;
Appellant’s Brief, at 11-12). This issue does not merit relief.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
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4
Pursuant to the trial court’s order, Appellant filed a timely concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal on March 24, 2015. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court entered an opinion on August 5, 2015. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Giordano, 121 A.3d 998, 1002-03 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citations omitted).
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the offense of obstructing the
administration of law or other governmental function, in pertinent part, as
follows:
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if
he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration
of law or other governmental function by force, violence,
physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any
other unlawful act[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101. Thus, “[i]n order to establish that Appellant obstructed
the administration of law under section 5101, the Commonwealth must
establish that: (1) the defendant had the intent to obstruct the
administration of law; and (2) the defendant used force or violence,
breached an official duty or committed an unlawful act.” Commonwealth
v. Goodman, 676 A.2d 234, 235 (Pa. 1996) (case citation omitted).
In evaluating § 5101 convictions, our courts have
explained that § 5101 is substantially based upon the Model
Penal Code section 242.1. As stated in the comment to section
242.1 of the Model Penal Code “[t]his provision is designed to
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cover a broad range of behavior that impedes or defeats the
operation of government.”
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 60 A.3d 165, 175 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 70 A.3d 811 (Pa. 2013) (case citations omitted).
In the instant case, the trial court found that the evidence clearly
supported the jury’s conclusion that Appellant, by failing to perform his
official duties as a police officer, intentionally obstructed the administration
of justice. (See Trial Ct. Op., at unnumbered page 7). After review of the
record, we agree.
Specifically, the record reflects that, immediately upon exiting his
police vehicle, Appellant aggressively approached Mr. Stenberg and his
friends and asked if Stenberg “had any fucking problem with his driving.”
(N.T. Trial, 11/12/14, at 37; see id. at 36). In violation of a police directive
relating to videotaping,5 he knocked Mr. Jackson’s and Mr. King’s cell phones
out of their hands to prevent them from recording the encounter. (See id.
at 38-39). Appellant did not ask anyone in the group for identification or if
they were carrying weapons, did not run their names through the police
system to check for active warrants, and did not call for backup. (See id. at
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5
Philadelphia Police Directive 145 provides that “Police personnel shall not
threaten, intimidate or otherwise discourage an individual from
photographing, videotaping or audibly recording police personnel while
conducting official business in any public space.” (N.T. Trial, 11/12/14, at
177; see also Commonwealth’s Brief, at 13). Lt. Jones explained that, in
addition to following the law, police officers must comply with department
directives when performing their official duties. (See N.T. Trial, 11/12/14,
at 173-74).
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37-40, 77, 117, 135, 153, 171; see also N.T. Trial, 11/13/14, at 44, 49).
Only after Appellant handcuffed Mr. King and drove away in the SUV did he
advise King that he was under arrest for public intoxication. (See N.T. Trial,
11/12/14, at 76, 81). However, Appellant did not transport Mr. King to a
police station. (See id. at 82). Instead, Appellant parked the SUV in a dark
alley before returning Mr. King to his friends approximately sixteen minutes
after he initially drove away. (See id. at 82-84, 86-87).
Although Lt. Jones testified that police procedure requires officers to
keep accurate accounts of their activities during their shifts on patrol logs
and to file investigation reports to keep a record of the individuals they stop,
Appellant admitted that he did not fill out any paperwork, whatsoever,
indicating that he had any contact with Mr. King. (See N.T. Trial, 11/12/14,
at 159-60, 167-68; see also N.T. Trial, 11/13/14, at 29, 37, 51-52).
Appellant made no record of his arrest of Mr. King in his patrol log; he did
not file a report; and he did not notify police radio that he had handcuffed
and detained Mr. King. Additionally, despite the fact that Appellant was
patrolling by himself during his shift, he wrote his partner’s name on his
patrol log. (See N.T. Trial, 11/12/14, at 162-63, 169; see also N.T. Trial,
11/13/14, at 52-53). Thus, the record supports the inference that Appellant
intentionally attempted to conceal the encounter with Mr. King.
Based on the foregoing, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for obstructing the
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administration of law by breach of official duty. See Giordano, supra at
1002; Goodman, supra at 235. The jury did not find Appellant’s version of
events and his testimony that he “forgot” to ask for Mr. King’s name to
document the encounter credible, and it was “free to believe all, part or
none of the evidence.” Giordano, supra at 1003. Accordingly, Appellant’s
sole issue on appeal does not merit relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/29/2016
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