N.L.H. v. T.M.J. ( 2017 )

J-A11034-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
N.L.H. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
T.M.J. :
:
Appellant : No. 1355 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County
Civil Division at No(s): 07-DR-536
BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 23, 2017
Appellant T.M.J. (hereinafter “Mother”) appeals the Order entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County on July 18, 2016, requiring her
to pay Appellee N.L.H. (hereinafter “Father”) a monthly support payment in
the amount of $1,368.36 for the parties’ three children. Following a careful
review, we vacate and remand.
The trial court aptly set forth the facts and procedural history herein as
follows:
Father first filed a Complaint for Support on October 1,
2007. The initial support order for the parties was entered on
November 15, 2007. Mother was ordered to pay $1,368.36 per
month for the support of the parties' three children.
On September 25, 2015, Father filed a Petition for
Modification of an Existing Support Order due to changes to the
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A11034-17
parties’ circumstances. Father alleged that Mother was making
more money than she had been making when the Order was
originally entered, and he stated that the parties’ daughter spent
the majority of her time with Father. A conference was
scheduled for November 2, 2015.
The parties met with the Conference Officer separately,
due to scheduling conflicts, and both were accompanied by their
respective counsel. The Conference Officer found that Father
owned his own home remodeling business and that his earnings
had steadily increased since 2012. The Conference Officer found
that Mother worked as a doctor for Summit Physician Services
and Penn State University. Her gross income from Summit was
$165,000 plus bonuses. The Conference Officer used Mother's
tax return to calculate her additional income from Penn State, as
she did not provide any other proof of this income. The
Conference Officer found that Father could not receive support
for the parties' daughter because the daughter only spent
weekends with Father. Mother requested that Father be held to a
higher income of $80,000 but this was denied because Father's
income documentation spanning several prior years did not
support this. In addition, Father would require additional
education to re-enter the computer programing field. The
Conference Officer also found that the parties' daughter would
be emancipated on June 1, 2016, upon her graduation from high
school.
An Allocated Order of Court was entered on December 15,
2015. The Court determined Mother's monthly net income to be
$13,311.26 and Father's monthly net income to be $3,932.79.
Mother was ordered to pay $1,176.00 per month for the parties'
two sons and $2,597.03 in arrears. On January 5, 2016, Mother
filed a Demand for Hearing De Novo and raised the following
issues:
1. Mother should receive an offset for having majority
custody of all three (3) children;
2. Mother should receive an offset due to the
extraordinary medical expenses of the children;
3. Mother should receive a larger offset for her school
loans;
4. The Hearing Officer may have erred in calculating
Father's income.
This matter was scheduled for a hearing on February 10,
2016. On January 19, 2016, Mother filed a Petition for Special
Hearing. In her Petition, Mother averred that, due to the
complexity of the matter, the hearing should be specially set for
-2-
J-A11034-17
a two-hour time period and the hearing should not be set for at
least forty-five days in order to allow Mother ample time to
complete discovery. The De Novo Hearing was rescheduled for
March 14, 2016 by Order of Court dated January 26, 2016. On
February 4, 2016, Mother filed a Petition to Pursue Discovery in
a Support Case Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.9. On February 5,
2016, this Court granted Mother's request and ordered that
Mother may use the discovery rules available in civil actions as
set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. On March
9, 2016, Mother filed a Motion for Continuance in order to allow
for the exchange of discovery which was granted by Order of
Court on March 10, 2016. The De Novo Hearing was rescheduled
for May 25, 2016.
At the scheduled Complex De Novo Hearing on May 25,
2016, the Court had a discussion with counsel, after which the
Court decided to continue the matter until June 28, 2016. The
Court found that there were several outstanding discovery
requests and it ordered the parties to turn over documents that
had previously been withheld by June 17, 2016. Additionally, the
Court ordered that counsel for the parties may submit legal
memoranda regarding the issues raised in the de novo appeal.
The Complex De Novo Hearing was ultimately held on June
28, 2016, after which the Court took this matter under
advisement. An Order of Court was entered on July 18, 2016.
The Court denied the Mother's request for an offset for having
majority custody of the parties' daughter and equally shared
custody of the parties' two sons. The Court denied Mother's
request for a modification of her income based on her having left
one of her jobs, as her separation from her employment with
Penn State was voluntary. The Court found that Mother's student
loans are not an "unusual fixed obligation" pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
1910.16-5 and denied Mother's request for a downward
deviation for the loans, concluding that $830 per month in loans
was a manageable portion of her income. The Court found that
that Father had gross earnings of $50,117 in 2015 and ordered
that this figure would be used to calculate his income for support
purposes.
In its July 18, 2016 Order of Court, this Court directed the
Domestic Relations Office to issue a two-tiered order. Tier 1, in
the amount of $863.00 per month, was effective from
September 25, 2016 until June 1, 2016, when the parties' oldest
child became emancipated. Tier 2 became effective as of June 2,
2016, and was in the amount of $1,355.00 per month. On July
20, 2016, this Court entered an Order stating its findings that
-3-
J-A11034-17
Father's monthly net income is $3,987.87 and Mother's monthly
net income is $11,472.03 and ordering Mother to pay support for
the parties' two sons to Father in the amount of $1,490.001 per
month. Arrears were set at $1,184.50.
On August 18, 2016, Mother timely filed her Notice of
Appeal of the July 18, 2016 Order of Court. Mother timely filed
her Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on September 7, 2016.
Trial Court Opinion, filed October 12, 2016 at 1-4.
In her brief, Mother presents the following Statement of the
Questions Involved:
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
discretion in determining Mother owed support to father for
the period of time when the parties’ daughter lived solely
with her and the parties equally shared custody of the
other two (2) minor children, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No.
1910.16-4(d)?
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
discretion in relying upon Colonna v. Colonna, 581 Pa. 1,
855 A.2d 648 (Pa 2004) when the court was not provided
with any evidence of [Father’s] need for economic support
for the two (2) children who spent only 50% of the time
with [Father]?
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
discretion in calculating Mother’s income to include the
income from a second job when Mother’s primary job is
full-time and her income is more than sufficient to provide
support for the children?
4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
discretion in requiring Mother to work a second job when
she is already employed full-time?
Brief for Appellant at 1 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). As
Mother’s first two issues and the latter two also overlap, we will
conduct a two part analysis for ease of discussion.
-4-
J-A11034-17
This Court’s standard of review in a child support case is well-
settled:
When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse
the trial court's determination where the order cannot be
sustained on any valid ground. We will not interfere with the
broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the
discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order.
An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in
reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law,
or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either
manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill will, discretion has been abused. In addition, we note
that the duty to support one's child is absolute, and the purpose
of child support is to promote the child's best interests.
Silver v. Pinskey, 981 A.2d 284, 291 (Pa.Super. 2009) (en banc) (quoting
Mencer v. Ruch, 928 A.2d 294, 297 (Pa.Super. 2007)). Additionally, “[t]he
fact-finder is entitled to weigh the evidence presented and assess its
credibility[.]” Samii v. Samii, 847 A.2d 691, 697 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting
Green v. Green, 783 A.2d 788, 790 (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal denied, 569
Pa. 707, 805 A.2d 524 (2002)).
In most cases, child support is awarded pursuant to a statewide
guideline as follows:
§ 4322. Support guideline
(a) Statewide guideline.—Child and spousal support shall be
awarded pursuant to a Statewide guideline as established by
general rule by the Supreme Court, so that persons similarly
situated shall be treated similarly. The guideline shall be based
upon the reasonable needs of the child or spouse seeking
support and the ability of the obligor to provide support. In
determining the reasonable needs of the child or spouse seeking
support and the ability of the obligor to provide support, the
guideline shall place primary emphasis on the net incomes and
earning capacities of the parties, with allowable deviations for
-5-
J-A11034-17
unusual needs, extraordinary expenses and other factors, such
as the parties' assets, as warrant special attention. The guideline
so developed shall be reviewed at least once every four years.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4322(a). Well-established law makes clear both parents are
responsible for the support of their children. Samii, supra at 696 (citation
omitted). A parent's ability to provide child support is based upon the
parent's earning capacity rather than his or her actual earnings. Id. In
addition, Pa.R.C.P. 1910.3(b) states that the trier of fact is not to consider
who filed the support action or modification when making its determination
which party is the obligee or the obligor therein.
Herein, Mother initially contends that in light of Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-
4(d), the trial court erred in its determination that Mother owed support to
Father because at the time Father filed his petition to modify the parties’
existing child support order, their oldest child lived solely with Mother and
the parties shared physical custody of their other two children. Mother
further avers the trial court erred in relying upon our Supreme Court’s
decision in Colonna v. Colonna 581 Pa. 1, 855 A.2d 648 (2004) when
fashioning its support order.
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.3(b)(1) provides that “[i]n general, the party who has
primary custody of the children shall be the obligee of a child support order.”
Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.3(b)(1). However, Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-4(d)(2) states
that where, as herein, the custody schedule varies, support obligations
should be calculated as follows:
-6-
J-A11034-17
(2) Varied Partial or Shared Custodial Schedules. When the
parties have more than one child and each child spends either
(a) different amounts of partial or shared custodial time with the
party with the higher income or (b) different amounts of partial
custodial time with the party with the lower income, the trier of
fact shall add the percentage of time each child spends with that
party and divide by the number of children to determine the
party’s percentage of custodial time. If the average percentage
of custodial time the children spend with the party is 40% or
more, the provisions of subdivision (c) apply.
Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-4(d)(2).
In applying the aforesaid provision, the trial court correctly calculated
Mother’s physical custody time with the children for the relevant time period
as follows:
[E]ach of the parties’ two sons spends 50% of his time with each
parent. The parties’ daughter spends 100% of her time with
Mother. Tr. At 12. Thus, this amounts to a 66.7% average of
the time spend [sic] with the obligor2, a clear majority of the
total time the children spend with the parties.
___
2
50% + 50%+ 100%= 200%; 200%/3=66.7%.
Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/12/16, at 166-67. Notwithstanding, the trial
court rejected Mother’s argument that as the parent with the majority of
custodial time she did not owe a duty of support to Father. In doing so, the
court reasoned that Colonna, supra, identified an exception to Pa.R.C.P.
No. 1910.16-4(d) which applies to the within matter. We disagree.
In Colonna, our Supreme Court, in a split decision, concluded “that a
parent with primary custody may be ordered to pay child support to a
-7-
J-A11034-17
parent with partial custody.” Colonna, supra, 581 Pa. at 9, 855 A.2d at
648, 652 (emphasis added).1 The Court stated its belief that where the
incomes of parents differ significantly, a trial court abuses its discretion
when it fails to determine whether a deviation from the support guidelines is
appropriate. Under such circumstances, the Court directed trial courts to
consider:
(1) unusual needs and unusual fixed obligation;
(2) other support obligations of the parties;
(3) other income in the household;
(4) ages of the children;
(5) assets of the parties;
(6) medical expenses not covered by insurance;
(7) standard of living of the parties and their children;
***
(9) other relevant and appropriate factors, including the best
interests of the child or children.
Colonna, supra 581 Pa. at 8, 855 A.2d at 652. The Court went on to state
that
[i]n a case such as the instant matter, the trial court
should inquire whether the non-custodial parent has sufficient
assets to provide the children with appropriate housing and
amenities during his or her period of partial custody. We
specifically note that the term “appropriate” does not mean
____________________________________________
1
Justice Newman authored the Majority which then Justice Saylor joined.
Justice Nigro concurred with the Majority that the obligor parent may also be
the custodial parent in a child support case but cautioned the trial court
against basing its decision to deviate on a presumption a child will prefer a
relationship with the parent who can provide the child with greater material
possessions. Chief Justice Cappy authored a dissent which then Justice
Castille joined wherein he indicated his belief that a custodial parent should
not be obligated to pay child support to the noncustodial parent. Justice
Lamb did not participate in the decision.
-8-
J-A11034-17
equal to the environment the children enjoy while in the
custodial parent's care, nor does it mean “merely adequate.” The
determination of appropriateness is left to the discretion of the
trial court, upon consideration of all relevant
circumstances.
Id. (emphasis added).
In the matter sub judice, contrary to considering the aforementioned
factors, the trial court commented on the dearth of evidence in this regard
as follows:
In the instant case, there was little testimony as to Father’s
ability to provide the children with appropriate housing and
amenities. However, Father did state that he is able to meet his
expenses “not every month, most months”, Tr. At 12, and that
he pays for his son J.E.H.’s prescriptions sometimes and for his
son A.M.H.’s contacts. Additionally, he provides food and
clothing and “whatever they need”. Tr. At 12. While this
testimony was brief, the [c]ourt finds it persuasive that Father
was unable to meet his monthly expenses every month when he
was receiving child support in addition to his income.
Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/12/16, at 6-7. In reliance upon Colonna, the
trial court went on to baldly conclude that because Mother’s income is
almost three times greater than Father’s “the benefit of a support order to
supplement Father’s income is in the best interest of the children.” Id. at 7.
In light of the foregoing, we find the trial court abused its discretion in
deviating from the support guidelines without first making specific findings
as to whether Father as the noncustodial parent had sufficient assets to
provide the children with appropriate housing and amenities pursuant to the
factors set forth in Colonna. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's order
-9-
J-A11034-17
and remand for an evidentiary hearing to enable the trial court to inquire as
to all relevant factors set forth in Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5(b) relating to
deviation from the support guidelines as our Supreme Court directed in
Colonna. Upon consideration thereof, the trial court shall make a
determination as to whether a deviation from the support guidelines was
proper such that Mother owes child support to Father.
In her final two issues, Mother contends the trial court erred when it
included income from her second job in its calculation of her income.
Appellant explains that as a full-time physician she is required to work sixty
(60) hours per week, and she chose to relinquish her additional, part-time
job as the director of the clinic at the Penn State Mont Alto Campus in 2015
in order to spend more time with her children. Mother stresses that her job
as a physician in itself “is the functional equivalent of one full time and one
part time job,” and trial court’s order “has the effect of requiring Mother to
work above and beyond a sixty (60) hour work week to earn minimally more
money that won’t necessarily benefit the children more than spending time
with their mother.” Brief for Appellant at 11-13.
At the outset, we note that, generally, there will be no effect on one’s
support obligation where he or she voluntarily assumes a lower paying job.
Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-2(d)(1). Although a person's actual earnings usually
reflect her earning capacity, where there is a divergence, the obligation is
determined more by earning capacity than actual earnings. Woskob v.
- 10 -
J-A11034-17
Woskob, 843 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2004). Earning capacity is the
amount that one realistically could earn under the circumstances, not the
amount which he or she theoretically could earn. Gephart v. Gephart, 764
A.2d 613, 615 (Pa.Super. 2000). “Age, education, training, health, work
experience, earnings history and child care responsibilities are factors which
shall be considered in determining earning capacity.” Pa.R.C.P.1910.16–
2(d)(4). Importantly, the trial court must conduct a full inquiry before
making a factual determination about a party's earning capacity. See
Haselrig v. Haselrig, 840 A.2d 338 (Pa.Super. 2003). If a party has
willfully failed to maintain appropriate employment, the trier of fact “may
impute to that party an income equal to the party's earning capacity.”
Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-2(d)(4).
While the trial court herein acknowledged Mother had testified that she
left her “second job” with Penn State due to her desire to have more time at
home with her children, it found that she had not presented adequate
evidence of an attempt to mitigate the loss in income or that her voluntary
termination if her part-time employment was not done in an effort to reduce
her support obligation. Without support from the record or elaboration, the
court expressed its belief that “the timing of Mother’s voluntary termination
of her second income source [was] suspicious in light of Husband’s Petition
for Modification of an Existing Support Order.” Trial Court Opinion, filed
10/12/06, at 8.
- 11 -
J-A11034-17
Mother explained that as a full-time physician at Summit Physician
Services, she is required to work sixty (60) hours per week. N.T. 9/9/16, at
23-24. In 2015, Mother received a base salary of $192,743 and an
additional $27,743 in incentive bonus payments for working beyond her
sixty hour week. Mother already had accumulated incentive bonus earnings
at the time of the hearing in an amount of $1,798.06 and intended to
accumulate more in the latter part of the year. Id. at 27. She earned just
$9,070 in 2015 for her work at Penn State. Id. at 25.
In deciding whether the trial court erred in its determination that
Mother should be imputed with income she had been receiving from her
second, part-time job, we are guided by our prior decision in Haselrig,
supra. Therein, this Court was presented with the unique issue of whether
an obligor should be imputed with income from a second full-time job he
recently left. Significantly, we observed that “[t]heoretically, any person
who is obligated to support a spouse and children could work sixteen hour
days, with eight hours left in which to sleep. But the question is whether it is
realistic and reasonable to do so.” Id. at 340. We ultimately concluded
that
the law in Pennsylvania clearly requires the trial court [to]
conduct a full inquiry before making a factual determination of
an obligor's true earning capacity. We bear in mind that the late
Honorable Vincent A. Cirillo, former President Judge of the
Superior Court, astutely pointed out in his dissent in Akers[v.
Akers 540 A.2d 269 (Pa.Super. 1988)], “A person's ability to
pay support should be calculated only from his or her earning
capacity at one full-time job.... The court could not order
- 12 -
J-A11034-17
[Husband] to work a second job initially and it should not be able
to force him to continue that employment once he had decided
that the second job no longer profits him, financially or
otherwise.” Akers, supra at 272.
Id. at 341. Finding the record to be devoid of any inquiry into the
necessary, relevant factors to establish the obligor’s realistic earning
capacity, this Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for a full
evidentiary hearing to enable the trial court to determine his earning
capacity. Id.
At the time of the hearing, Mother had been employed with Summit
Physician Services for eight years and routinely received additional salary for
hours spent above and beyond the sixty-hour full-time requirement. This
work history is distinguishable from the type of situation to which the trial
court alluded in its opinion wherein one relinquishes lucrative employment in
an attempt to avoid a support obligation.
Indeed, without making a full inquiry at the hearing as to Mother’s full
earning capacity or considering the demanding hourly requirements of
Mother’s full-time job, the trial court baldly asserted that the timing of her
termination of her second income source was “suspicious.” In addition, it
dismissed as incredible her desire to spend more time with her children as
the reason behind her decision to relinquish her part-time employment,
which comprised a minimal part of her annual income, and instead found she
did so in an effort to reduce her support obligation. Trial Court Opinion, filed
10/12/16, at 8.
- 13 -
J-A11034-17
As such, we find the trial court’s failure to make a finding as to
Mother’s true earning capacity and determination that Mother needed to
present evidence of an attempt to mitigate the loss of her part-time income
was an abuse of discretion. We direct the trial court to make such findings
upon remand and consider the same when fashioning any support obligation
of the parties.
Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/23/2017
- 14 -