In the Interest of: J.R., Appeal of J.R. ( 2016 )

J-A03039-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.R., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: J.R. : No. 3300 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Dispositional Order October 22, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-JV-0000799-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED March 21, 2016
Appellant, J.R., appeals from the dispositional order entered in the
Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas, following his adjudication of
delinquency for stalking and indecent assault.1 We affirm.
The juvenile court fully and correctly set forth the relevant facts of this
case as follows:
In September 2014, while in physical education class at
the Roberto Clemente Charter School, located in the City
of Allentown, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, S.C., a thirteen
year old female, felt the [j]uvenile, [Appellant], use two
hands to grab her buttocks. She had not given him
permission to do so.
On a separate day following the incident in gym class,
while walking in the hallway at Robert Clemente, S.C.
again felt [Appellant] grab her buttocks using one hand.
She did not give [Appellant] permission to do so. The next
day, S.C. wrote [Appellant] a classroom note, asking him
why he had grabbed her buttocks. [Appellant] wrote her
back, stating that he had grabbed her buttocks because he
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2709.1(a)(1) and 3126(a)(1), respectively.
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wished to scare her. S.C. reported the incidents to the
school counselor.
(Juvenile Court Opinion, filed March 11, 2015, at 2-3). On October 22,
2014, the court conducted a hearing and adjudicated Appellant delinquent
for the offenses of stalking and indecent assault. That same day, the court
entered a dispositional order placing Appellant on probation for an indefinite
period. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 21, 2014. On
November 25, 2014, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). After the court
granted an extension, Appellant timely complied.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TIME OF
THE ADJUDICATION HEARING WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE
THAT APPELLANT INTENDED TO PLACE ANOTHER PERSON
IN REASONABLE FEAR OF BODILY INJURY AND/OR THAT
APPELLANT INTENDED TO CAUSE SUBSTANTIAL
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TO ANOTHER PERSON?
WHETHER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE TIME OF
THE ADJUDICATION HEARING WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE
THAT APPELLANT’S CONTACT WITH THE COMPLAINANT
WAS FOR THE PURPOSE OF AROUSING SEXUAL DESIRE IN
HIM OR THE COMPLAINANT?
(Appellant’s Brief at 8).
In his first issue, Appellant argues it is unclear whether S.C.’s note
(and Appellant’s response to it) referred to both incidents where Appellant
grabbed S.C.’s buttocks. Appellant contends the evidence does not indicate
how far apart the two incidents occurred. Appellant asserts the
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Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to prove Appellant engaged in a
“course of conduct” under the stalking statute. Appellant further claims each
act occurred in a crowded, public setting. Appellant concedes he said he
grabbed S.C. to “scare” her but claims that concession failed to show
Appellant intended to place S.C. in fear of bodily injury or to cause her
substantial emotional distress. Appellant concludes the evidence was
insufficient to support his adjudication of delinquency for stalking. We
disagree.
The following principles of review apply to a challenge to the
sufficiency of evidence:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005)
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(quoting Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super.
2003)).
The Crimes Code defines the offense of stalking in relevant part as
follows:
§ 2709.1. Stalking
(a) Offense defined.—A person commits the crime of
stalking when the person either:
(1) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly
commits acts toward another person, including
following the person without proper authority, under
circumstances which demonstrate either an intent to
place such other person in reasonable fear of bodily
injury or to cause substantial emotional distress to
such other person[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1(a)(1). A “course of conduct” is “[a] pattern of actions
composed of more than one act over a period of time, however short,
evidencing a continuity of conduct.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1(f). “Course of
conduct is established by proof of two related but separate events.”
Commonwealth v. Leach, 729 A.2d 608, 611 (Pa.Super. 1999).
“Emotional distress” is defined as “[a] temporary or permanent state of
mental anguish.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1(f). An intent to cause substantial
emotional distress “may be inferred from the words or actions of the
defendant in light of all attendant circumstances.” Commonwealth v.
D’Collanfield, 805 A.2d 1244, 1249 (Pa.Super. 2002).
Instantly, Appellant grabbed S.C.’s buttocks during gym class and then
again in the school hallway at a later date, each time without S.C.’s consent.
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S.C. did not testify to the exact dates of each incident but it is evident from
her testimony that the two incidents occurred close in time.2 Appellant
committed the same act on each occasion. Thus, the Commonwealth
produced sufficient evidence that Appellant engaged in a course of conduct
under the stalking statute. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1(f); Leach, supra.Further, Appellant admitted to S.C. he intended to scare her, and Appellant’s
repeated acts of grabbing an intimate part of S.C.’s body perturbed her to
the point that she reported Appellant’s behavior to a school counselor.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,
the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s delinquency adjudication
for stalking. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1(a)(1); D’Collanfield, supra.
In his second issue, Appellant argues his acts were not clearly sexual
in nature. Appellant contends the act of grabbing another person’s buttocks
could be intended to annoy, tease, alarm, scare, or even congratulate
another person, especially when the actor is a teenage boy. Appellant
asserts he grabbed S.C.’s buttocks on both occasions in a crowded school
environment, not while they were alone or engaged in any intimate conduct.
Appellant claims he did not hold onto S.C.’s buttocks for a substantial
amount of time in either instance, and there was no other evidence that
Appellant committed the acts for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in
himself or S.C. Appellant concludes the evidence was insufficient to support
2
S.C. testified that the first incident occurred in September 2014. The
Commonwealth filed the delinquency petition on October 10, 2014.
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his delinquency adjudication for indecent assault. We disagree.
The Crimes Code defines the crime of indecent assault in relevant part
as follows:
§ 3126. Indecent assault
(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of indecent
assault if the person has indecent contact with the
complainant, causes the complainant to have indecent
contact with the person or intentionally causes the
complainant to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine
or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the
person or the complainant and:
(1) the person does so without the complainant’s
consent[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1). “Indecent contact” is defined as “[a]ny touching
of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of
arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.
See Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (holding evidence was sufficient
to convict defendant of indecent assault where defendant wrapped his arms
around victim and inserted his tongue into victim’s mouth because act would
not occur outside of context of sexual or intimate situation);
Commonwealth v. Capers, 489 A.2d 879 (Pa.Super. 1985) (affirming
defendant’s conviction for indecent assault where evidence supported
conclusion that defendant’s conduct was motivated, at least in part, by
intent to arouse or gratify sexual desire in himself or victim).
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Instantly, Appellant grabbed S.C.’s buttocks without her consent on
two separate occasions. Each time Appellant touched S.C., he specifically
targeted and held onto an intimate part of her body. The evidence allowed a
reasonable inference that Appellant repeatedly groped the same intimate
area of S.C.’s body to do more than just startle her. Viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to
conclude that Appellant had indecent contact with S.C. because he was
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to arouse or gratify sexual desire in
himself or S.C. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101; Evans, supra; Capers, supra.Therefore, Appellant’s delinquency adjudication for indecent assault was
supported by sufficient evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
Dispositional order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/21/2016
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