Com. v. Hibshman, H. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
HEATH I. HIBSHMAN, : No. 1203 MDA 2015
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, January 28, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Criminal Division at No. CP-38-CR-0000049-2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 15, 2016
Heath I. Hibshman (“Appellant”) appeals the judgment of sentence of
the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County that sentenced him to a term
of 4 to 23 months in the Lebanon County Correctional Facility, fined him
$100, and ordered him to make restitution to Jeffrey Kalina (“Kalina”) in the
amount of $220 for theft by unlawful taking or disposition.1
Appellant worked at a rooming house known as the 9 th Street Personal
Care Facility (“Facility”). Timothy Schaeffer (“Schaeffer”) and Kalina gave
money to Appellant to store for them for safekeeping. Schaeffer gave
Appellant $85, and Kalina gave him $320. Although Appellant returned a
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).
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portion of the money, he did not return all of it. When Kalina asked for the
money, it was not returned to him. David Sanders (“Sanders”), the owner
of the Facility, investigated. Appellant admitted to him that he had taken
the money and asked for time to pay it back. When Appellant did not return
the money, Sanders contacted the Lebanon City Police Department.
Patrolman First Class Officer Patrick John McKinney, Jr. (“Officer McKinney”)
investigated. Appellant was charged with theft by unlawful taking.
On December 4, 2014, the trial court conducted a trial in the matter.
Kalina testified that he gave Appellant $320, which was the proceeds of a
social security rent rebate check, for safekeeping to put in a locked cabinet
at the Facility. (Notes of testimony, 12/4/14 at 5-6.) On four separate
occasions, Kalina requested and received $20 from the $320. When he did
so, he observed Appellant take the money out of the locked cabinet. In the
beginning of September 2013, Kalina asked Appellant for $20 but was told
he would have to go to the York Street Personal Care Facility (“York”) to get
it. (Id. at 6-7.) Kalina called York and inquired whether his money was
there. Adrian Lancer, an employee of York, told him that it was not. (Id. at
7-8.)2
Sanders testified that he operated both the Facility and York. (Id. at
16.) Sanders explained that Appellant essentially managed the Facility, that
2
The parties stipulated that Schaeffer gave money to Hibshman to put in the
locked cabinet at the Facility. They did not stipulate as to the amount. (Id.
at 15-16.)
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Schaeffer had “severe mental retardation,” and that Kalina had mental and
physical issues. (Id. at 17-18.) Kalina contacted him in September 2013
and asked if Sanders had any of his money in a safe at York. When Sanders
investigated at the Facility, he found two empty envelopes inside the locked
medicine cabinet. One envelope had Kalina’s name on it and one had
Schaeffer’s. Amounts were deducted on the outside of the envelopes.
According to Sanders, the amount listed on one envelope was $240 and the
amount listed on the other was $85. (Id. at 18-19.) When Sanders
confronted Appellant about the missing funds, Appellant replied, “I’ll pay it
back.” (Id. at 22.) According to Sanders, Appellant acknowledged taking
the money and volunteered to pay it back in a week. (Id. at 23.) When
questioned as to why he allowed Appellant time to pay the money back,
Sanders answered, “Well he just got out of jail.” (Id.)
At that point, Appellant’s counsel moved for a mistrial because of the
testimony concerning Appellant’s prior jail time. The Commonwealth’s
attorney informed the trial court that she had specifically instructed Sanders
not to mention Appellant’s incarceration when he testified. (Id. at 24.) The
trial court denied the motion for a mistrial. (Id. at 26.)
When the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial court issued this
instruction:
Ladies and gentlemen, immediately before the recess
the witness was asked a question about why he did
something. And not in response to that question, he
referenced something about the fact that [Appellant]
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may have been incarcerated previously. That was
improper. And as I understand it, the prosecutor
advised the witness not to make any such
statements and the witness did so anyway. I think
he forgot about the prosecutor’s admonition.
It is not relevant whether a Defendant has any
type of prior criminal record. The reality is he is
charged today with Theft. The reality is that you
must make a decision today about whether he
committed that Theft. Whether or not he did
something in the past is not any evidence of whether
he committed this Theft, it’s not. And I don’t think
any of us would like to have our present conduct
judged based upon something that may have
happened years ago. Especially since in this
particular case we don’t know what it was. It could
have been an unpaid parking ticket for all we know.
It was improper for you to hear that
[Appellant] was in prison previously. You cannot
consider that. It is not any evidence at all in this
case. It is not anything you can consider with
respect to [Appellant’s] believability. It is not
something that is anyway part of this case. And I
am instructing you to ignore what was blurted out. I
am instructing you to forget about it. And I am
specifically instructing you not to consider it and not
to allow your fellow jurors to even mention it in your
deliberations. If any one of your fellow jurors
mentions it during deliberations, report it to me. I’m
instructing each of you not to mention it or not to
think about it or not even to consider it.
Here’s the reality, I’ll say it again. [Appellant]
is charged with Theft as a result of something that
occurred in September of 2013. You took an oath to
decide whether [Appellant] is guilty or not guilty of
that Theft. And the decision that you have to make
must be based upon the facts and circumstances
that occurred in September of 2013 at or near the
time the alleged Theft occurred. That’s what your
oath requires you to do. I’m going to be holding you
to that oath.
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Id. at 28-29.
Sanders testified that Appellant did not pay the money back as
promised. Sanders did not authorize Appellant to take the money. Further,
neither Kalina nor Schaeffer did either. (Id. at 32.) Sanders paid Kalina
and Schaeffer the amounts taken by Appellant. (Id. at 53.)
Officer McKinney testified that he responded to a report of a theft and
met with Sanders at the Facility on September 30, 2013. Officer McKinney
contacted Appellant who admitted to taking the money and said he would
pay it back. Officer McKinney waited to charge Appellant with theft by
unlawful taking until November 2013, in order to give Appellant a chance to
pay the money back. (Id. at 65-68.)
The jury returned a guilty verdict. When the trial court questioned
whether the jurors considered the fact that Appellant had previously been in
jail during their deliberations, no juror raised his or her hand to say they
had. (Id. at 85.) The trial court sentenced Appellant to pay the costs of
prosecution, pay a fine of $100, pay restitution to Kalina in the amount of
$220, and to serve 4 to 23 months3 in the Lebanon County Correctional
Facility.
In his post-sentence motions, Appellant moved for acquittal on the
basis that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
3
The trial court granted Hibshman’s application for parole on May 14, 2015.
Hibshman was to be paroled on May 28, 2015.
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beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty. Appellant also moved for a
new trial on the bases that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for
a mistrial, because of Sanders’ testimony that he was previously
incarcerated, and that the jury’s verdict of guilty was against the weight of
the evidence, because the jury placed too great a weight on the testimony of
the Commonwealth’s witnesses.
On June 1, 2015, the trial court denied the post-trial motions. The
trial court explained with respect to the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence:
In this case, the evidence linking [Appellant] to the
theft of money from Timothy Schaeffer and
Jeffrey Kalina was extensive. [Appellant] had access
to the funds that ended up missing. The
Commonwealth also established that when
[Appellant’s] boss confronted [Appellant] with the
fact that money was missing[,] [Appellant] admitted
that he had taken the money and stated, “I will pay
it back.” (N.T. 23, 30, 31). Moreover, when
Officer McKinney investigated the theft and spoke
with [Appellant], [Appellant] admitted that he had
taken the money. (N.T. 67). Given the above, we
have a hard time perceiving how [Appellant] can
even claim that the jury’s verdict was not founded on
sufficient evidence or that it was against the weight
of the evidence.
Trial court opinion, 6/16/15 at 10.
With respect to the mistrial issue, the trial court stated:
In this case, witness Sanders’ reference to
[Appellant’s] incarceration was not intentionally
elicited by the Commonwealth. It was fleeting. The
Commonwealth did not attempt to exploit the
information. No details about [Appellant’s] prior
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crime were communicated to the jury. Almost
immediately thereafter, the Court instructed the jury
that they could not consider that incarceration in any
way. Given the totality of the situation, this Court
did not err by denying [Appellant’s] Motion for
Mistrial.
Id. at 14.
Appellant raises the following issues for this Court’s review:
I. Did the Commonwealth fail to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that [Appellant] was the
person who took the money, or alternatively
that [Appellant] did not have authorization to
use the money?
II. Did the jury place too great a weight on the
testimony presented by the Commonwealth’s
witnesses that [Appellant] took the money
and/or did not have authorization to use the
money?
III. Did the Trial Court err by denying [Appellant’s]
motion for a mistrial because the testimony of
David Sanders that he allowed [Appellant] time
to pay the money back because [Appellant]
just got out of jail was highly prejudicial and
the limiting instruction provided by the Trial
Court did not adequately eliminate the
prejudice caused by David Sander’s [sic]
testimony?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
Initially, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was
the person who took the money and/or that Appellant did not have
authorization to use the money.
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A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is
a question of law. Commonwealth v. Widmer,
560 Pa. 308, 319, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (2000). In
that case, our Supreme Court set forth the
sufficiency of the evidence standard:
Evidence will be deemed sufficient to
support the verdict when it establishes
each material element of the crime
charged and the commission thereof by
the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 533 Pa.
412, 625 A.2d 1167 (1993). Where the
evidence offered to support the verdict is
in contradiction to the physical facts, in
contravention to human experience and
the laws of nature, then the evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law.
Commonwealth v. Santana, 460 Pa.
482, 333 A.2d 876 (1975). When
reviewing a sufficiency claim the court is
required to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner
giving the prosecution the benefit of all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from
the evidence. Commonwealth v.
Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630(1991).
Id. at 319, 744 A.2d at 751.
Commonwealth v. Morgan, 913 A.2d 906, 910 (Pa.Super. 2006).
A person is guilty of theft by unlawful taking or disposition if “he
unlawfully takes, or exercises control over movable property of another with
the intent to deprive him thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence that he stole the money because Sanders also had access to the
locked cabinet where the money was kept, so Sanders could have taken the
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money. Also, Appellant argues that he had authority to use the money
because it was common practice to use the residents’ money to purchase
household necessities for the boarding house.
Appellant ignores the fact that while Sanders may have had access to
the money, Sanders testified that Appellant admitted to Sanders that he
took the money when Sanders confronted him about it. Similarly, Appellant
admitted to Officer McKinney that he took the money when Officer McKinney
questioned him. With respect to whether Appellant was authorized to use
the money to buy household items, Sanders testified that he did not have
authorization.
The testimony of Sanders and Officer McKinney, that Appellant told
them that he took the money, coupled with the testimony of Sanders, that
Appellant was not authorized to do so, provided sufficient evidence for the
conviction.
Appellant next contends that the jury placed too great a weight on the
Commonwealth’s witnesses, such that he is entitled to a new trial.
[T]he weight of the evidence is
exclusively for the finder of fact who is
free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence and to determine the credibility
of the witnesses. An appellate court
cannot substitute its judgment for that of
the finder of fact . . . thus, we may only
reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so
contrary to the evidence as to shock
one’s sense of justice. Moreover, where
the trial court has ruled on the weight
claim below, an appellate court’s role is
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not to consider the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence, . . . rather,
appellate review is limited to whether the
trial court palpably abused its discretion
in ruling on the weight claim.
Commonwealth v. Kim, 888 A.2d 847, 851
(Pa.Super. 2005) (citations and quotations omitted).
A motion for a new trial based on a challenge to the
weight of the evidence concedes the evidence was
sufficient to support the verdict. Commonwealth v.
Davis, 799 A.2d 860, 865 (Pa.Super. 2002).
Commonwealth v. Jarowecki, 923 A.2d 425, 433 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Appellant argues that the jury placed too much weight on the
testimony of Sanders given that Sanders had access to the locked cabinet
and did not report to the police that the money was missing for three weeks.
We agree with the trial court that the jury’s decision does not shock
the conscience. Kalina testified that he gave the money to Appellant to hold
for him and that Appellant failed to return it when asked. Sanders and
Officer McKinney both testified that Appellant admitted that he took the
money. The jury found Kalina, Sanders, and Officer McKinney credible. The
trial court did not err when it determined Appellant was not entitled to a new
trial because the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Appellant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when
it denied his motion for a mistrial when Sanders testified that he allowed
Appellant time to pay the money back because Appellant had recently gotten
out of jail.
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The standard governing our review of a trial court’s
refusal to grant a request for a mistrial has been
previously well summarized by this Court:
The decision to declare a mistrial is
within the sound discretion of the court
and will not be reversed absent a
“flagrant abuse of discretion.”
Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420
Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 997
(1992); Commonwealth v. Gonzales,
415 Pa.Super. 564, 570, 609 A.2d 1368,
1370-71 (1992). A mistrial is an
“extreme remedy . . . [that] . . . must
be granted only when an incident is of
such a nature that its unavoidable effect
is to deprive defendant of a fair trial.”
Commonwealth v. Vazquez, 421
Pa.Super. 184, 617 A.2d 786, 787-88
(1992) (citing Commonwealth v.
Chestnut, 511 Pa. 169, 512 A.2d 603(1986), and Commonwealth v.
Brinkley, 505 Pa. 442, 480 A.2d 980(1984)). A trial court may remove taint
caused by improper testimony through
curative instructions. Commonwealth
v. Savage, 529 Pa. 108, 602 A.2d 309,
312-13; Commonwealth v.
Richardson, 496 Pa. 521, 437 A.2d
1162 (1981). Courts must consider all
surrounding circumstances before
finding that curative instructions were
insufficient and the extreme remedy of a
mistrial is required. Richardson, 496
Pa. at 526-527, 437 A.2d at 1165. The
circumstances which the court must
consider include whether the improper
remark was intentionally elicited by the
Commonwealth, whether the answer
was responsive to the question posed,
whether the Commonwealth exploited
the reference, and whether the curative
instruction was appropriate. Id.- 11 -
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Commonwealth v. Stilley, 455 Pa.Super. 543, 689
A.2d 242, 250 (1997).
Commonwealth v. Bracey, 831 A.2d 678, 682-683 (Pa.Super. 2003),
appeal denied, 844 A.2d 551 (Pa. 2004).
Appellant asserts that Sanders’ testimony, that he allowed Appellant
time to pay the money back because Appellant “just got out of jail,”
warranted a new trial. (Notes of testimony, 12/4/14 at 23.) Although the
trial court gave a curative instruction to the jury, Appellant argues that this
instruction was insufficient to cure the taint of the testimony.
The prosecutor told the trial court that when she asked Sanders the
same question during pre-trial preparation, he did not mention anything
about Appellant’s incarceration and that she instructed Sanders not to
mention anything concerning the incarceration. The trial court gave the jury
a lengthy instruction that informed it that whether or not Appellant
committed a crime in the past was not evidence as to whether he committed
the theft for which he was on trial. The trial court emphatically told the jury
that it was not permitted to consider that testimony. After the jury returned
the verdict, the trial court checked to make sure whether anyone mentioned
Appellant’s prior incarceration during the jury’s deliberations. No one had.
We are satisfied that the trial court correctly determined that the
Commonwealth did not intentionally elicit this testimony and that the trial
court’s curative instruction cured any possible taint. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/15/2016
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