Com. v. Brozik, G. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S16026-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    GARY LYNN BROZIK                           :
    :
    Appellant                :   No. 1107 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order July 5, 2016
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001398-2010
    BEFORE:      MOULTON, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.:                                  FILED MAY 25, 2017
    Appellant, Gary Lynn Brozik, pro se appeals from the order entered
    July 5, 2016, denying as untimely his serial petition for collateral relief filed
    under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We
    affirm.
    In April 2011, Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm
    prohibited.1 In May 2011, Appellant was sentenced to four to ten years of
    imprisonment.2        Appellant did not file a direct appeal.          Accordingly,
    Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on June 15, 2011.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1).
    2
    As part of the plea agreement, several other charges against Appellant
    were nolle prossed.
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S16026-17
    In May 2012, Appellant pro se filed his first PCRA petition, asserting
    trial counsel was ineffective by failing to inform Appellant of defenses and
    mitigating factors.      Court-appointed counsel filed an amended PCRA on
    Appellant’s behalf. Following a hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s
    petition as meritless in February 2014. This Court affirmed that decision in
    December 2014.         Commonwealth v. Brozik, 
    116 A.3d 705
     (Pa. Super.
    2014) (unpublished memorandum).                The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    denied allocatur in July 2015.
    In June 2016, Appellant pro se filed the instant petition, styled as a
    “motion to open/void judgment error coram nobis.”3 According to Appellant,
    a violation of his Miranda4 rights rendered his sentence illegal. The court
    treated Appellant’s filing as a PCRA and issued a notice of intent to dismiss
    pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, to which Appellant timely objected.        In July
    2016, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. Appellant
    timely appealed and filed a court-ordered 1925(b) statement.           The PCRA
    court issued a statement in lieu of an opinion.
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    ____________________________________________
    3
    A petition for writ of error coram nobis “is generally available to challenge
    the validity of a judgment based on facts not before the court when the
    judgment was entered.” Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 
    285 A.2d 465
    , 467
    (Pa. 1971).
    4
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    86 S.Ct. 1602
     (1966).
    -2-
    J-S16026-17
    1. Whether the court erred in not finding that Appellant raised
    the arresting officer’s (admitted) Miranda violation through
    the original filing?
    2. Whether the court erred in not finding that Appellant’s open
    court testimony raised and preserved the Miranda issue?
    3. Whether the court erred in not addressing the Miranda
    [oversight] through Appellant’s motion to open / void
    judgment error coram nobis?
    4. Whether the court erred in not finding that public defender
    Thomas Shaffer’s representation fell below a reasonable level
    of competence by not acting immediately as arresting officer
    admitted the Miranda violation either by oral or suppression
    motion?
    Appellant’s Brief at 3 (some formatting added).
    Appellant’s mislabeled petition should be considered under the PCRA.
    The PCRA expressly states that it “shall be the sole means of obtaining
    collateral relief and encompasses … coram nobis.” 42 Pa.S.C. § 9542. As
    this Court has previously observed:
    Under the plain words of the statute, if the underlying
    substantive claim is one that could potentially be remedied under
    the PCRA, that claim is exclusive to the PCRA. It is only where
    the PCRA does not encompass a claim that other collateral
    procedures are available.
    Commonwealth v. Pagan, 
    864 A.2d 1231
    , 1233 (Pa. Super. 2004)
    (internal citations omitted).   A petitioner cannot escape the timeliness
    requirements of the PCRA by mislabeling his petition. See Commonwealth
    v. Taylor, 
    65 A.3d 462
    , 466 (Pa. Super. 2013); Commonwealth v.
    Mercado, 
    826 A.2d 897
    , 899 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 
    832 A.2d 436
     (Pa. 2003) (stating petition for habeas corpus relief must first satisfy
    -3-
    J-S16026-17
    jurisdictional PCRA timeliness requirements).    Here, Appellant’s underlying
    substantive claim concerns the legality of his sentence, which is cognizable
    under the PCRA. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Voss, 
    838 A.2d 795
     (Pa.
    Super. 2003).
    This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a petition
    under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported
    by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v.
    Ragan, 
    923 A.2d 1169
    , 1170 (Pa. 2007).          We afford the court’s factual
    findings deference unless there is no support for them in the certified record.
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    48 A.3d 1275
    , 1277 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing
    Commonwealth v. Anderson, 
    995 A.2d 1184
    , 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
    As an additional prefatory matter, we address the timeliness of
    Appellant’s petition, as it implicates our jurisdiction and may not be altered
    or disregarded in order to address the merits of his claim.               See
    Commonwealth v. Bennett, 
    930 A.2d 1264
    , 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the
    PCRA, any petition for relief, including second and subsequent petitions,
    must be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment of sentence
    becomes final. 
    Id.
     There are three statutory exceptions:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
    interference by government officials with the presentation of the
    claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
    Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
    to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
    exercise of due diligence; or
    -4-
    J-S16026-17
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
    recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
    this section and has been held by that court to apply
    retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).         Any petition attempting to invoke these
    exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have
    been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); see Commonwealth v.
    Gamboa-Taylor, 
    753 A.2d 780
    , 783 (Pa. 2000).
    Appellant’s petition is untimely.5 Accordingly, Appellant must establish
    jurisdiction by pleading and proving an exception to the timeliness
    requirement. See Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1267. However, Appellant neither
    pleads nor proves an exception to the time bar. Rather, he seeks relief from
    an alleged error he concedes existed prior to his guilty plea. See Motion to
    Open/Void Judgment Error Coram Nobis, 6/10/2016.
    Appellant’s petition is untimely, and he has failed to establish an
    exception to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA.          Consequently, the
    PCRA court was without jurisdiction to review the merits of Appellant’s
    claims and properly dismissed his petition. See Ragan, 932 A.2d at 1170.
    ____________________________________________
    5
    Appellant’s petition is patently untimely. Appellant’s judgment of sentence
    became final on June 15, 2011, thirty days after his opportunity to file a
    direct appeal expired.      See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (a judgment of
    sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of
    the time for seeking the review). Appellant’s current petition, filed June 10,
    2016, was filed over five years late. See Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1267.
    -5-
    J-S16026-17
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/25/2017
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Brozik, G. No. 1107 WDA 2016

Filed Date: 5/25/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/25/2017