Com. v. Schrauger, J. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
JORDAN ALEXANDER SCHRAUGER, : No. 1475 MDA 2017
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, August 14, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No. CP-06-CR-0002888-2016
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 03, 2018
Jordan Alexander Schrauger appeals from the August 14, 2017
judgment of sentence of 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment imposed plus 5 years’
probation following his convictions in a jury trial of aggravated assault,
simple assault, false imprisonment, recklessly endangering another person,
and harassment.1 The Court of Common Pleas of Berks County determined
that the simple assault, recklessly endangering another person, and
harassment merged into the aggravated assault conviction. After careful
review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts, as follows:
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), 2903, 2705, and 2709(a)(1),
respectively.
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On June 5, 2016, Elizabeth Beaulac had an
altercation with her fiancé, [appellant], who
physically assaulted her. They were out drinking and
when they got home, [appellant] wanted to have sex
with Ms. Beaulac. She said no. [Appellant] slapped
her with an open hand across the back of the head.
While Ms. Beaulac was trying to get away from
[appellant], he grabbed her hair and pulled her back
onto the bed. He then kept her confined to the
bedroom for up to a half an hour [sic], during which
time Ms. Beaulac asked him to let her go.
[Appellant] eventually relented and let her out of the
bedroom. When she got into the living room, she
tried to leave the apartment, but [appellant] stopped
her and put his hands over her face and nose until
she was unable to breathe. He released her but he
then punched her about six times in the right eye
causing a laceration under her eye, a lump, and a
contusion. At some point[,] he stopped and called
911. [Appellant] then fled the apartment. When the
police arrived, Ms. Beaulac gave a short account of
what happened to Officer Hoppes and then she was
taken to the hospital by her father.
Trial court opinion, 11/16/17 at 2.
At sentencing, appellant moved for extraordinary relief and sought
acquittal for aggravated assault. The trial court denied the motion and
sentenced appellant. On August 24, 2017, appellant filed a post-sentence
motion that the trial court denied on August 28, 2017. Appellant filed a
notice of appeal on September 21, 2017. On October 24, 2017, the trial
court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied with the order
on November 9, 2017. On November 20, 2017, the trial court filed its
opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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Appellant raises the following issues for this court’s review:
A. Whether the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support a guilty verdict on the
F-1 Aggravated Assault charge, where the
Commonwealth, when proceeding on the
theory that [a]ppellant attempted to cause
serious bodily injury to Elizabeth Beaulac,
failed to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that [a]ppellant engaged in conduct that
constituted a substantial step toward causing
serious bodily injury and that [a]ppellant had
specific intent to cause serious bodily injury to
Ms. Beaulac[?]
B. Whether the [trial] [c]ourt erred by not
granting a new trial on the basis that the guilty
verdict F-1 Aggravated Assault charge was
contrary to the weight of the evidence
presented at trial, where Ms. Beaulac’s
testimony was inconsistent and incredible, as
she testified to several significant aspects of
the incident at the time of trial, but failed to
report them when speaking to the police, and
she also testified that she was hit with a closed
fist at least 6 times, with most blows to the
right eye, but the injuries were limited to a
laceration under her eye and bruising[?]
Appellant’s brief at 7.
Appellant’s first issue challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence
presented by the Commonwealth.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
we view all evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict
winner, to see whether there is sufficient evidence to
enable [the fact-finder] to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard is
equally applicable to cases where the evidence is
circumstantial rather than direct so long as the
combination of the evidence links the accused to a
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crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although a
conviction must be based on “more than mere
suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need not
establish guilt to a mathematical certainty.”
Moreover, when reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence, the Court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the fact finder; if the record
contains support for the convictions, they may not
be disturbed.
Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78 A.3d 644, 649 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 89 A.3d 661 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
Moreover, when applying the above test, the
entire record must be evaluated and all evidence
actually received must be considered. Finally, the
finder of fact, while passing upon the credibility of
the witnesses and the weight of the evidence
produced, is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943-944 (Pa.Super. 2011)
(citations omitted), appeal dismissed, 54 A.3d 22 (Pa. 2012).
The Crimes Code defines aggravated assault as when a person
“attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).
Serious bodily injury is defined as “bodily injury which creates a substantial
risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.
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The parties and the trial court all agree that Elizabeth Beaulac
(“Beaulac”) did not suffer serious bodily injuries. A lack of serious injuries
sustained by a victim, however, does not necessarily preclude the
Commonwealth from charging a defendant with aggravated assault and
being able to present sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. “Where
the injury actually inflicted did not constitute serious bodily injury, the
charge of aggravated assault can be supported only if the evidence supports
a finding that the blow delivered was accompanied by the intent to inflict
serious bodily injury.” Commonwealth v. Alexander, 383 A.2d 887, 889
(Pa. 1978); see also Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 948
(Pa.Super. 2012) (“Where the victim does not suffer serious bodily injury,
the charge of aggravated assault can be supported only if the evidence
supports a finding of an attempt to cause such injury.”).2
In order to determine intent, the Alexander court established a
totality of the circumstances test. Some of the factors that may be
considered include (1) whether there was a disparity in size and strength
between the defendant and the victim; (2) whether the defendant would
have escalated the attack had he or she not been otherwise restrained;
(3) whether the defendant was in possession of a weapon; and (4) whether
2 “A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific
crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the
commission of that crime.” Alexander, 383 A.2d at 889, quoting
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).
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the defendant made any statements indicative of his or her intent to “inflict
further injury upon the victim.” Alexander, 383 A.2d at 889; see also
Commonwealth v. Matthew, 909 A.2d 1254, 1259 (Pa. 2006) (reaffirming
the Alexander test);
In order to determine whether appellant acted with the intent to inflict
serious bodily injury upon the victim, we shall consider the circumstances of
the attack. First, the evidence of record established that appellant was
much larger than Beaulac. Beaulac testified that appellant was “a lot bigger
than me.” (Notes of testimony, 8/8/17 at 54).3 Appellant escalated the
attack because he initially used force by pushing Beaulac back on a bed to
keep her from leaving the room they occupied, later he moved on to
suffocating and punching Beaulac. (Id. at 52-56). In fact, when appellant
covered Beaulac’s nose and mouth so that she could not breathe, Beaulac
“thought that was it.” (Id. at 54.) Appellant did not stop the onslaught until
Beaulac was bleeding profusely and said, “You broke my face; what did you
do?” (Id. at 56.)
After considering the totality of the circumstances, we determine that
the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support appellant’s
conviction of aggravated assault.
3In the Police Criminal Complaint, appellant is listed at 5 feet 11 inches and
240 pounds.
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Appellant next contends that the guilty verdict on the aggravated
assault charge was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
[T]he weight of the evidence is
exclusively for the finder of fact who is
free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence and to determine the credibility
of the witnesses. An appellate court
cannot substitute its judgment for that of
the finder of fact . . . thus, we may only
reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so
contrary to the evidence as to shock
one’s sense of justice. Moreover, where
the trial court has ruled on the weight
claim below, an appellate court’s role is
not to consider the underlying question
of whether the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence . . . rather,
appellate review is limited to whether the
trial court palpably abused its discretion
in ruling on the weight claim.
Commonwealth v. Kim, 888 A.2d 847, 851
(Pa.Super. 2005) (citations and quotations omitted).
A motion for a new trial based on a challenge to the
weight of the evidence concedes the evidence was
sufficient to support the verdict. Commonwealth v.
Davis, 799 A.2d 860, 865 (Pa.Super. 2002).
Commonwealth v. Jarowecki, 923 A.2d 425, 433 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Here, appellant argues that the verdict was contrary to the weight of
the evidence because Beaulac’s testimony was inconsistent and incredible as
she testified to several significant aspects of the incident at the time of trial
but failed to report them when speaking to the police and she also testified
that she was hit with a closed fist at least six times, with most blows to the
right eye, but the injuries were limited to a laceration and bruising.
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Appellant invites us to assess witness credibility and reweigh the
evidence to convince us to reach a different result than the jury reached.
We decline to do so. The jury, as fact-finder, had the duty to determine the
credibility of the testimony and the evidence at trial. Commonwealth v.
Talbert, 129 A.3d at 536 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal denied, 138 A.3d 4(Pa. 2016). Appellate courts cannot and do not substitute their judgment for
that of the fact-finder.
Our review of the record supports our conclusion that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in denying appellant’s weight claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/3/2018
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