Commonwealth v. Smith ( 2014 )

J-A17003-14
2014 Pa. Super. 165
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMAR SMITH
Appellant No. 663 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 31, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003587-2012
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and STABILE, J.
OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 06, 2014
Appellant, Jamar Smith, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his
bench trial conviction for aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another
person and possession of an instrument of crime.1 We affirm.
The trial court opinion sets forth the relevant facts and procedural
history of this appeal as follows:
At a waiver trial, the Commonwealth presented the
testimony of Complainant, James Kedra, Philadelphia
Police Officer, Robert Bakos, and Northeast Detective,
Robert Schill. Additionally, they admitted into evidence
photos, medical records, bloody clothing and a box cutter,
and a 911 audiotape, which captured a portion of the
incident between Appellant and [Mr. Kedra].
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a), 2705, and 907(a), respectively.
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On February 29, 2012, at approximately 11:15 p.m., an
altercation occurred on the 3400 block of Aldine Street, on
the corner of Aldine and Leon, in the city and county of
Philadelphia. [Mr. Kedra] believed Appellant was following
him in his vehicle. Both men parked their vehicles;
Mr. Kedra later moved his vehicle to be further away from
Appellant. At the same time that Mr. Kedra left his
vehicle, Appellant also left his, and a conversation between
the two men ensued. Although Mr. Kedra wanted to avoid
Appellant, the two were forced to cross paths because of
the position of their cars, and Mr. Kedra wanted to make
sure that Appellant was not behind him while walking. Mr.
Kedra asked Appellant why he had been following him,
whereupon Appellant took a fighting stance, only to then
strike Mr. Kedra in his forehead and lip. Mr. Kedra saw an
object in Appellant's hand, and believing that Appellant
was going to stab him, Mr. Kedra used his arm to try and
prevent any contact; the altercation was pushed closer to
a nearby fence. The two then spun into a car, as Mr.
Kedra tried to get Appellant off of him. Despite Mr.
Kedra] was stabbed several times with a box cutter. Mr.
Kedra sustained injuries to his forehead and lip, had a
piece taken out of his ear, and had stab wounds in the
back of his head and in his back. The fight was brief and
only lasted for a few minutes, however, Appellant
apparently had threatened to kill Mr. Kedra during the
friends, arrived at the scene in the midst of the altercation.
men and called the police to the scene. Officers Quinn and
Bakos were on duty at 3400 Aldine Street and responded
to a person with a weapon. As the officers approached,
Officer Balms observed several unidentified males,
blood. Officer Bakos inquired as to what had occurred,
placed Appellant in the police car, and found the box cutter
that Appellant admitted to having used to stab Mr. Kedra.
Mr. Kedra was then taken to the hospital to be treated for
multiple lacerations to his face, including his head, mouth
area, puncture wounds to the back and a stab wound to
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the chest. Appellant was arrested by Officer Bakos and
secured in the back seat of the police car. During trial,
Appellant made out a vague claim of self-defense and that
he was not the initial aggressor, however, these claims
were [ultimately] found not credible by this court.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed December 16, 2013, at 2-4) (internal citations to
probation on January 31, 2013. Appellant did not file any post-sentence
motions. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on February 27, 2013, and
a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) on March 1, 2013.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY APPLYING THE WRONG
BURDEN OF PROOF IN THIS SELF-DEFENSE CASE WHEN IT
ASSESSED THE EVIDENCE AND REACHED ITS VERDICT
FINDING [APPELLANT] GUILTY OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT,
RECKLESSLY ENDANGERING ANOTHER PERSON, AND
POSSESSION OF AN INSTRUMENT OF CRIME?
WAS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
TO DISPROVE SELF-DEFENSE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT CLEARLY
USING
A BOX CUTTER TO PROTECT HIMSELF WAS
UNREASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES?
In his first issue, Appellant argues he has no obligation to prove his
claim of self-defense. Rather, the law requires him to provide only some
evidence of self-defense, and the Commonwealth must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the claim lacks merit. Appellant contends the court
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erroneously shifted the burden of proof to Appellant when the court
evaluated his claim of self-defense. Appellant points to his timely objection
during closing arguments when this error occurred, but insists the court did
evidence of the probable error, where the court omits explanation of why it
-defense claim. Appellant concludes the trial court erred as a
matter of law in evaluating the evidence, and this Court should vacate the
judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial. We disagree.
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code governs self-defense in relevant part as
follows:
§ 505. Use of force in self-protection
(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the
The use of force upon or toward another person
is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
himself against the use of unlawful force by such other
person on the present occasion.
(b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of
force.
* * *
(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under
this section unless the actor believes that such force
is necessary to protect himself against death, serious
bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse
compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable if:
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(i) the actor, with the intent of causing death
or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of
force against himself in the same encounter; or
(ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the
necessity of using such force with complete
safety by
* * *
(2.3) An actor who is not engaged in a criminal
activity, who is not in illegal possession of a firearm
and who is attacked in any place where the actor
would have a duty to retreat under paragraph (2)(ii)
has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his
ground and use force, including deadly force, if:
(i) the actor has a right to be in the place
where he was attacked;
(ii) the actor believes it is immediately
necessary to do so to protect himself against
death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or
sexual intercourse by force or threat; and
(iii) the person against whom the force is used
displays or otherwise uses:
(A) a firearm or replica of a firearm as
defined in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712 (relating
to sentences for offenses committed with
firearms); or
(B) any other weapon readily or
apparently capable of lethal use.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a)-(b) (emphasis added).2 According to our Supreme
____________________________________________
2
Section 505 was amended, effective August 29, 2011, to add
Pennsylvania
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Court, the justified use of deadly force requires:
a) the actor was free from fault in provoking or continuing
the difficulty which resulted in the use of deadly force; b)
the actor must have reasonably believed that he was in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, and that
there was a necessity to use such force in order to save
himself or others therefrom; and c) the actor did not
violate any duty to retreat or to avoid the danger.
Commonwealth v. Harris, 542 Pa. 134, 137, 665 A.2d 1172, 1174 (1995).
-defense claim.
Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 219, 224, 766 A.2d 342, 345 (2001).
The Supreme Court explained the evidentiary burdens as follows:
While there is no burden on a defendant to prove the [self-
defense] claim, before that defense is properly at issue at
trial, there must be some evidence, from whatever source
to justify a finding of self-defense. If there is any evidence
that will support the claim, then the issue is properly
before the fact finder.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948
A.2d 818, 824 (Pa.Super. 2008) (stating same standard). If the defendant
-defense under Section 505 of the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code, the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable
-
Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1229-30 (Pa.Super.
2005).
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
incident (February 29, 2012). Therefore, the 2011 amendment to Section
505 applies to this case.
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The Commonwealth sustains this burden if it establishes at
least one of the following: 1) the accused did not
reasonably believe that he was in danger of death or
serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or
continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to
retreat and the retreat was possible with complete safety.
Commonwealth v. Hammond, 953 A.2d 544, 559 (Pa.Super. 2008),
appeal denied, 600 Pa. 743, 964 A.2d 894 (2009) (quoting McClendon,
supra at 1230). The Commonwealth must establish only one of these three
elements beyond a reasonable doubt to insulate its case from a self-defense
challenge to the evidence. Commonwealth v. Burns, 765 A.2d 1144,
1149 (Pa.Super. 2000), appeal denied, 566 Pa. 657, 782 A.2d 542 (2001).
The Commonwealth can negate a self-defense claim if it proves the
defendant did not reasonably believe he was in imminent danger of death or
great bodily injury and it was necessary to use deadly force to save himself
from that danger. Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 618 Pa. 262, ___, 55
A.3d 1108, 1124 (2012).
The requirement of reasonable belief encompasses two
aspects, one subjective and one objective. First, the
defendant must have acted out of an honest, bona fide
belief that he was in imminent danger, which involves
tate of mind.
himself with deadly force, if it existed, must be reasonable
in light of the facts as they appeared to the defendant, a
consideration that involves an objective analysis.
Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 617 Pa. 527, 551, 53 A.3d 738, 752 (2012).
As the Mouzon
viewed in isolation with [the victim] as the sole physical aggressor and [the
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defendant] acting in responsive self-defense. [T]his would be an incomplete
and inaccurate view of the circumstances for self- Id. at
549, 53 A.3d at 751. To claim self-defense, the defendant must be free
from fault in provoking or escalating the altercation that led to the offense,
before the defendant can be excused from using deadly force. Id.
(emphasis added). Likewise, the Commonwealth can negate a self-defense
to protect against death or serious bodily Commonwealth v.
Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 599 (Pa.Super. 2012) (en banc).
-
defense, the Commonwealth must still disprove the asserted justification and
affirmative proof that the denied fact existed so as to
testimony is no substitute for the proof the Commonwealth
was required to provide to disprove the self-defense claim.
Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 731 (Pa.Super. 2003)
(quoting Torres, supra). If there are other witnesses, however, who
Commonwealth
v. Gonzales, 609 A.2d 1368, 1370 (Pa.Super. 1992). The complainant can
serve as a witness to the incident to refute a self-defense claim. Reynolds,
supra. See also Commonwealth v. Hall, 574 Pa. 233, 242, 830 A.2d
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537, 542-
accidental was ineffective because there was adequate circumstantial
evidence to prove he pointed gun in direction of victim and discharged it).
-defense
arising from any source beyond a reasonable doubt, a [fact-finder] is not
required to believe t
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 824 (Pa.Super. 2008).
A number of factors, including whether complainant was armed, any
actual physical contact, size and strength disparities between the parties,
prior dealings between the parties, threatening or menacing actions on the
part of complainant, and general circumstances surrounding the incident, are
that the use of deadly force was necessary to protect against death or
serious bodily injuries. See Commonwealth v. Soto, 657 A.2d 40
(Pa.Super. 1995) (concurring opinion by Olszewski, J.) (collecting cases for
this general proposition). No single factor is dispositive. Id. Furthermore,
a physically larger person who grabs a smaller person does not automatically
invite the smaller person to use deadly force in response. Commonwealth
v. Hill, 629 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super. 1993).
Finally, a trial court, acting as the finder of fact, is presumed to know
the law, ignore prejudicial statements, and disregard inadmissible evidence.
Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571 (Pa.Super. 2003).
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In the instant case, the trial court reasoned:
Although Appellant contends that the trial court erred in
placing upon him the burden of proving self-defense, the
burden did not shift from the Commonwealth throughout
the trial. Once the issue of self-defense had been vaguely
raised by Appellant, the Commonwealth sustained its
burden of proof by demonstrating beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant did not reasonably believe that he
was in danger of death or serious bodily injury and that his
response was improper. Even if Appellant feared Mr.
Kedra, t
after he claimed Mr. Kedra had pushed him, was
unwarranted and unreasonable.
character evidence, this does not negate the fact that the
court ultim
to be completely inappropriate and that the use of a
deadly weapon in the altercation was unreasonable. Based
upon all of the evidence, the court concluded that
[Appellant] could not have reasonably believed that he was
in imminent danger of serious bodily injury, in order to
justify the use of a box cutter, where there was no threat
of deadly force. Therefore, the Commonwealth satisfied its
burden by establishing that the accused did not reasonably
believe that he was in danger of death or serious bodily
injury.
trier of fact, decided the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant unreasonably escalated the altercation when he attacked Mr.
Kedra with a box cutter. This finding is consistent with the proper burdens
of claiming and disproving self-defense. Drawing all reasonable inferences
from the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
we conclude the trial court applied the correct standards and there was no
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Commonwealth v.
Eberle, 474 Pa. 548, 379 A.2d 90 (1977) is misplaced. See id. (stating
mere threat of imminent attack from larger, drunken, and violent individual
can justify use of deadly force; pattern of destructive or abusive behavior
could justify use of deadly force for purposes of self-defense against larger
person in drunken rage). Here, we see no evidence that Mr. Kedra was in a
drunken rage, or that he had a history of abusing Appellant, such that
Appellant reasonably felt justified in using a response that escalated the
encounter. Finally, we observe that the trial court sitting as trier of fact is
presumed to know the law and correctly apply the burden of proof. See
Dent, supra. Nothing in this record indicates the contrary. Accordingly,
In his second issue, Appellant asserts the Commonwealth failed to
disprove Appellant acted in self-defense. Specifically, Appellant claims that
as a 130-pound, 18-year-old high school student, he reasonably feared
serious bodily injury when a 215-pound, 28-year-old man (who had been
drinking) unexpectedly accosted Appellant as he returned home after work,
late at night. Appellant maintains the court mischaracterized the incident as
violent encounters on the street during the late hours of the night.
Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to prove Appellant did not
reasonably believe he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
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harm as a matter of law, given the disparity in weight between Appellant
and the complainant and the time of night. Appellant concludes this Court
should vacate the convictions/sentence and discharge him. We disagree.
following principles:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Barnswell Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super.
2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super.
2003)).
stated:
In this case, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
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to convict Appellant of possession of an instrument of
crime and recklessly endangering another person.
Although both sides presented evidence, the testimony of
Mr. Kedra, Officer Bakos, and Detective Schill was found to
be credible and believable. Although all versions
presented by the witnesses were fairly consistent, this
court found the evidence presented by the Commonwealth
to be dispositive. Even though the court did believe the
character evidence presented by Appellant, this does not
change the fact that there was sufficient evidence to find
that Appellant had not acted reasonably in this situation
and had escalated a physical altercation into deadly
contention has previously been addressed here, where his
actions were found to be unjustified for the situation.
Viewing the facts of this case in the light most favorable to
the [Commonwealth], the conviction should be upheld.
This [c]ourt made a determination of fact and there is
nothing in the record to warrant overturning that
determination.
(Trial Court Opinion at 6-
decision, and we see no reason to disturb it. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/6/2014
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