In the Interest of: L.G., Appeal of: T.G. ( 2021 )


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  • J-A25020-21
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: L.G., A MINOR :       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
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    APPEAL OF: T.G., MOTHER           :            No. 711 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the Order Entered May 22, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000008-2019
    IN THE INTEREST OF: N.G., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
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    APPEAL OF: T.G., MOTHER               :        No. 712 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the Order Dated May 22, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000192-2020
    IN THE INTEREST OF: L.G., A MINOR :       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :            PENNSYLVANIA
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    APPEAL OF: T.G., MOTHER           :            No. 713 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 9, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000193-2020
    J-A25020-21
    IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
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    APPEAL OF: T.G., MOTHER                    :       No. 714 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the Order Entered June 9, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000194-2020
    BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                            FILED: NOVEMBER 19, 2021
    Appellant, T.G. (“Mother”), appeals from the orders entered in the
    Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court Division, granting
    the petitions of Appellee, the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and
    Families (“CYF”), for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to her
    minor children, L.G., N.G., L.G., and K.S. (“Children”).1 We affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of these appeals are as follows.
    Mother has six children, two of whom are older than eighteen and not subject
    to the current proceedings. CYF first became involved with the family in 2003,
    and it received fourteen (14) referrals prior to this case being accepted for
    services in 2016. (See N.T. Hearing, 4/9/21, at 17). CYF addressed domestic
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 Because two of the children have the same initials, we will refer to them as
    L.G. and L.N.G.
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    violence against Mother and Children by M.G., Mother’s husband and the
    father of L.G., N.G., and L.N.G. (Id. at 10-11). At the time of the termination
    proceedings, M.G. was awaiting trial on charges of sexually abusing N.G. (Id.
    at 12, 14).
    CYF removed N.G. from Mother’s care in April 2017, when Mother
    refused to pick up N.G. following his discharge from a mental health facility.
    (Id.) At the time, Mother stated that she was unable to address N.G.’s mental
    health needs. (Id.) CYF removed L.G. on January 30, 2018, after Mother’s
    inability to address L.G.’s mental health needs resulted in the child’s
    commitment to a mental health facility. (Id.)
    CYF first removed L.N.G. and K.S. on August 30, 2018.         (Id.)   The
    removal occurred due to domestic violence in the home. (Id. at 16). CYF
    returned L.N.G. and K.S. to Mother’s care in March 2019, after Mother
    complied with certain CYF services. (Id.) Nevertheless, CYF again removed
    L.N.G. and K.S. in August 2019.     At that time, CYF learned that Mother’s
    boyfriend, C.F., was living in the family home and set fire to the garage. (Id.
    at 24, 27). C.F. watched the children when Mother was not present, and he
    participated in “some sort of altercation” with N.G. (Id. at 25).
    Mother subsequently failed to comply with her court-ordered family
    service plan goals. Specifically, Mother refused to sign releases for CYF to
    obtain proof of compliance with mental health services. (Id. at 45). Mother
    also refused to utilize recommended services including intensive outpatient
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    treatment for drug and alcohol abuse. (Id. at 43-44).
    On December 1, 2020, CYF filed petitions for involuntary termination of
    Mother’s parental rights to Children.          The court conducted a termination
    hearing on April 9, 2021.        At the hearing, the court heard testimony from
    Stacey Policicchio, the CYF caseworker, Dr. Patricia Pepe, a licensed
    psychologist, and Mother.          In orders entered May 22, 2021, the court
    terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children.2 On June 17, 2021, Mother
    timely filed separate notices of appeal and concise statements of errors at
    each underlying docket number.            This Court consolidated the appeals sua
    sponte on July 14, 2021.
    Mother now raises one issue for our review:
    Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter
    of law in concluding that termination of … Mother’s parental
    rights would serve the needs and welfare of the Children
    pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
    (Mother’s Brief at 12).
    Appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the
    following principles:
    In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our
    standard of review is limited to determining whether the
    order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence,
    and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to
    the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.”
    ____________________________________________
    2 The court also involuntarily terminated M.G.’s parental rights, and he is not
    a party to the current appeal.
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    In re. Z.P., 
    994 A.2d 1108
    , 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 
    972 A.2d 5
    , 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)).
    Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
    insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
    decision, the decree must stand. … We must employ
    a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order
    to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
    supported by competent evidence.
    In re B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    , 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en
    banc), appeal denied, 
    581 Pa. 668
    , 
    863 A.2d 1141
     (2004)
    (internal citations omitted).
    Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder
    of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of
    witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be
    resolved by [the] finder of fact. The burden of proof
    is on the party seeking termination to establish by
    clear and convincing evidence the existence of
    grounds for doing so.
    In re Adoption of A.C.H., 
    803 A.2d 224
    , 228 (Pa.Super.
    2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
    standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony
    that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable
    the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
    hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re
    J.D.W.M., 
    810 A.2d 688
    , 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may
    uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for
    the result reached. In re C.S., 
    761 A.2d 1197
    , 1201
    (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings are
    supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the
    court’s decision, even if the record could support an opposite
    result. In re R.L.T.M., 
    860 A.2d 190
    , 191[-92] (Pa.Super.
    2004).
    In re Z.P., 
    supra at 1115-16
     (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 
    936 A.2d 1128
    , 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 
    597 Pa. 718
    , 
    951 A.2d 1165
    (2008)).
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    CYF filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental
    rights on the following grounds:
    § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
    (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to
    a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
    following grounds:
    *     *   *
    (2) The repeated and continued incapacity,
    abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the
    child to be without essential parental care, control or
    subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
    being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
    abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
    remedied by the parent.
    *     *   *
    (5) The child has been removed from the care of
    the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
    with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
    child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
    remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
    time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
    the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which
    led to the removal or placement of the child within a
    reasonable period of time and termination of the parental
    rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
    child.
    *     *   *
    (8) The child has been removed from the care of
    the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
    with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
    the date of removal or placement, the conditions which
    led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
    exist and termination of parental rights would best serve
    the needs and welfare of the child.
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    *     *   *
    (b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating
    the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
    developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
    of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
    solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
    inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
    medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
    With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
    (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
    the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
    are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), (b). “Parental rights may be involuntarily
    terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along
    with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., 
    supra at 1117
    .3
    On appeal, Mother argues that CYF failed to provide clear and convincing
    evidence that termination would meet the needs and welfare of Children under
    Section 2511(b). Mother argues that the court erred in examining her own
    faults and missteps, and she emphasizes that Section 2511(b) concerns “the
    welfare of the child and not the fault of the parent.” (Mother’s Brief at 21)
    (emphasis in original). Mother claims that the court should have considered
    the emotional effect that termination of the bond between Mother and Children
    would create. Based upon the foregoing, Mother concludes that the Orphans’
    ____________________________________________
    3Mother concedes that grounds for termination existed pursuant to Section
    2511(a)(2). (See Mother’s Brief at 18-19).
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    Court erroneously terminated her parental rights. We disagree.
    Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination
    will meet the child’s needs and welfare.    In re C.P., 
    901 A.2d 516
    , 520
    (Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability
    are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The
    court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying
    close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.”
    
    Id.
     (internal citations omitted). “In this context, the court must take into
    account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and whether
    termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.”
    In re Z.P., 
    supra at 1121
    .
    “The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
    certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide
    for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements
    within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be
    considered unfit and have … her rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 
    787 A.2d 1007
    , 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001).
    There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
    Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
    a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
    support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
    met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
    child.   Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental
    obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
    performance.
    This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
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    obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
    genuine effort to maintain communication and association
    with the child.
    Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
    requires that a parent exert [herself] to take and maintain
    a place of importance in the child’s life.
    Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with
    good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every
    problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship
    to the best of…her ability, even in difficult circumstances. A
    parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the
    parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable
    firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
    maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights
    are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
    convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
    while others provide the child with his or her physical and
    emotional needs.
    In re B., N.M., 
    856 A.2d 847
    , 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 
    582 Pa. 718
    , 
    872 A.2d 1200
     (2005) (internal citations omitted).
    Instantly, the court evaluated Children’s circumstances following their
    removal from Mother’s care. N.G. was removed from Mother’s care over four
    (4) years ago, and he has not returned to Mother’s home ever since. (See
    N.T. Hearing at 15). N.G. was the victim of abuse by his father, and he has
    required several psychiatric hospitalizations. (Id. at 64, 89). In September
    2018, N.G. was placed at a group home. (Id. at 64). Dr. Pepe testified that
    N.G. has experienced stability for significant periods when active in therapy
    and not in contact with Mother. (Id. at 108-109).
    Although N.G. has expressed that he misses Mother and would like to
    return home, Dr. Pepe explained that N.G.’s preference has been “variable”
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    and “reactive.”4 (Id. at 157). Dr. Pepe noted that N.G. expresses fear of
    “losing his family” and is “extremely afraid” of his father’s upcoming criminal
    trial. (Id. at 104, 115). Further, Dr. Pepe explained that N.G. has doubts
    about his chances for adoption, noting that he experiences PTSD, physical
    aggression, and suicidal ideations. (Id. at 65, 116). N.G.’s attachment issues
    with Mother are ongoing, and “at time he feels rejected by her.” (Id. at 102).
    In light of this information, the court determined that “the relationship
    between [N.G] and … Mother is unhealthy and has the potential to further
    perpetuate [N.G.’s] trauma.” (Orphan’s Court Opinion, filed July 26, 2021, at
    22).
    L.G. has been in ten (10) placements since her initial removal and has
    experienced five (5) psychiatric hospitalizations. (See N.T. Hearing at 65).
    Dr. Pepe testified that L.G. has developed maladaptive personality traits by
    attempting to placate Mother. (Id. at 99). Like N.G., L.G. has made “a lot of
    progress” since being taken out of Mother’s care. (Id. at 79). Ms. Policicchio
    testified that L.G. has not been hospitalized recently, and L.G. has not
    displayed severe behavioral issues in her foster home.        (Id.)   The court
    emphasized that L.G. has an “unhealthy relationship with [M]other,” and L.G.
    does not desire to return to Mother’s care. (Orphan’s Court Opinion at 23).
    L.N.G. and K.S. have lived together in a total of five (5) foster homes,
    ____________________________________________
    4We note that counsel for N.G. has filed an appellate brief arguing for reversal
    of the order terminating Mother’s parental rights to N.G. only.
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    residing with their current foster mother in a pre-adoptive home since August
    2019. (See N.T. Hearing at 67). L.N.G. was previously diagnosed with PTSD,
    and K.S. was diagnosed with an adjustment disorder. (Id. at 68). Dr. Pepe
    testified that L.N.G. and K.S. have made “very positive progress behaviorally
    and developmentally” and that they have formed “primary attachment” with
    their foster mother. (Id. at 143). Thus, the court concluded that “[n]either
    [L.N.G.] or [K.S.] have a necessary or beneficial bond with [M]other.”
    (Orphan’s Court Opinion at 24).
    In light of the evidence presented by CYF, the Orphans’ Court concluded
    that Mother’s failure to address her own mental health and addiction issues
    prevented her from taking care of Children’s needs:
    Mother’s mental health concerns have prevented her from
    being able to effectively parent any of her children and most
    notably, to provide them with the safety and stability that
    they require. She does not have a necessary or beneficial
    bond with any of the children. The dependency court has
    given Mother multiple opportunities to reunify with her
    children.    Each return home was short lived, and
    reunification was never successful. Each new placement
    brought new challenges and has had catastrophic effects on
    the children’s development. Nearly all of the children have
    pervasive and significant mental health concerns; all of
    which have been directly impacted by their multiple
    placements and continued relationship with their Mother.
    For those reasons and the reasons above, the court finds
    that the benefits of termination far outweigh the negative
    impact that it may have on the children and that termination
    of Mother’s parental rights best suits the children’s needs
    and welfare.
    (Orphans’ Court Opinion at 24-25). Our review of the record supports the
    court’s determination.   See In re Z.P., 
    supra.
        We emphasize Dr. Pepe’s
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    conclusions that Children exhibit more of a primary bond toward their older
    siblings than with Mother. (See CYF Exhibit 1 at 19).
    Here, Mother has repeatedly failed to address Children’s extensive
    mental health issues, refusing to take Children back into her home after their
    psychiatric hospitalizations.   (See N.T. Hearing at 15, 102).    Mother also
    exhibits denial of her own mental health issues and has been dishonest about
    her alcohol use. (Id. at 89-90, 134). Finally, Mother continues to make poor
    decisions, choosing relationships “with men with questionable attributes and
    alcohol abuse resulting [in] not providing her children with essential care and
    parental attention.” (See CYF Exhibit 1 at 14).
    Terminating Mother’s parental rights would not destroy existing,
    necessary, and beneficial relationships for Children. See In re Z.P., 
    supra.
    Based upon the foregoing, the record supports the court’s conclusion that clear
    and convincing evidence supported termination for Mother’s parental rights
    under Section 2511(b). 
    Id.
     Consequently, we affirm the orders terminating
    Mother’s parental rights to Children.
    Orders affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/19/2021
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