Com. v. Petrill, R. ( 2021 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROBERT ALFRED PETRILL :
:
Appellant : No. 1326 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 3, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-65-CR-0003650-2017
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED: December 7, 2021
Robert Alfred Petrill (“Petrill”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to eight counts of indecent assault and two
counts of corruption of minors.1 We affirm.
Petrill was charged with the above-mentioned offenses following
reported sexual contact with two minors. On August 3, 2020, Petrill entered
a negotiated guilty plea2 to all of the charges. The trial court sentenced Petrill,
____________________________________________
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(1) (without consent), (a)(2) (forcible
compulsion), (a)(6) (complainant with mental disability), (a)(8) (complainant
less than 16 years of age); 6301(a)(1)(ii).
2 The written Guilty Plea Petition identifies the plea as a general guilty plea.
See Guilty Plea Petition, 8/3/20, at 3. Indeed, at the start of the hearing, the
parties discussed a general guilty plea. See N.T. (Guilty Plea), 8/3/20, at 2-
15. However, the parties took a break during the hearing to negotiate a
sentence. See id. at 15, 19.
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pursuant to the plea agreement, to an aggregate term of 6½ to 14 years in
prison, followed by 15 years of probation. The trial court ordered Petrill to
undergo an evaluation pursuant to the Sexual Offender Registration and
Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.42,3 and comply
with registration requirements. The trial court also directed Petrill to comply
with sex offender conditions, and to have no contact with the victims, the
victims’ family members, or any minor children.
On August 21, 2020, Petrill sought permission to file a post-sentence
motion, nunc pro tunc, and a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. The trial court
granted Petrill permission to file his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, nunc pro
tunc. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Petrill’s Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea. Petrill subsequently filed a timely Notice of Appeal, and a court-
ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of errors complained of on
appeal.
Petrill now raises the following issue for our review: “Did the trial court
abuse [its] discretion in determining that [Petrill] entered a knowing and
voluntary guilty plea in this case, free of undue influence, confusion and
pressure?” Brief for Appellant at 5.
Petrill claims that he was hesitant to enter a guilty plea, and entered a
plea after having only 19 minutes to discuss and review the Written Guilty
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3 Petrill additionally completed a SORNA colloquy. The remaining SORNA
proceedings were bifurcated.
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Plea Colloquy with defense counsel. Id. at 10. According to Petrill, “[a]t one
point during the court’s colloquy…, he began to ask a question but was
silenced by defense counsel.” Id. Petrill points to his testimony from the
Motion to Withdraw hearing, during which he indicated that he felt pressured
to enter the plea, and confused about whether entering a plea was in his best
interest. Id. at 10-13. Additionally, Petrill argues that, at the time of the
guilty plea, he was taking medication for depression, bipolar disorder and
anxiety, and that the medication affected his ability to enter a knowing and
voluntary plea. Id. at 14 & n.2.
It is well[ ]settled that the decision whether to permit a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion
of the trial court. Although no absolute right to withdraw a guilty
plea exists in Pennsylvania, the standard applied differs depending
on whether the defendant seeks to withdraw the plea before or
after sentencing. When a defendant seeks to withdraw a plea
after sentencing, he must demonstrate prejudice on the order of
manifest injustice. … [A] defendant may withdraw his guilty plea
after sentencing only where necessary to correct manifest
injustice. Thus, post-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject
to higher scrutiny[,] since the courts strive to discourage the entry
of guilty pleas as sentence-testing devices.
Manifest injustice occurs when the plea is not tendered
knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly. In
determining whether a plea is valid, the court must examine the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea. Pennsylvania
law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was aware of
what he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of proving
otherwise.
Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 664-65 (Pa. Super. 2017) (footnote,
citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Bedell,
954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that, “to be valid, a guilty
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plea must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered.” (citation
omitted)).
In order to ensure that a plea is knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
entered, the trial court must, at a minimum, ask the defendant the following
questions:
(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to
which he or she is pleading guilty or nolo contendere?
(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
(3) Does the defendant understand that he or she has the right to
trial by jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he or she is presumed
innocent until found guilty?
(5) Is he defendant aware of the permissible range or sentences
and/or fines for the offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the
terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts
such agreement?
Hart, 174 A.3d at 667 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 590 cmt.) (emphasis omitted).
“The guilty plea colloquy must affirmatively demonstrate that the defendant
understood what the plea connoted and its consequences.” Bedell, 954 A.2d
at 1212 (citation omitted).
Further,
[t]he longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a defendant
may not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he lied while
under oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the lies. A
person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he
makes in open court while under oath and may not later assert
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grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements
he made at his plea colloquy.
Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citation omitted).
The trial court concluded, and the record confirms, that Petrill entered a
knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/28/20,
at 4-6. Petrill completed a full written Guilty Plea Petition with his counsel,
which the trial court supplemented with an oral colloquy. See
Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 108 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating
that a written colloquy that is made part of the record during plea proceedings
may be supplemented by on-the-record oral examination). In the Guilty Plea
Petition, which included a full written colloquy, Petrill acknowledged that he
had reviewed the nature of the charges with his counsel; he understood that
he had a right to a trial by jury and that he was presumed innocent until found
guilty; he was aware of the permissible ranges of sentences and maximum
possible sentences for the offenses charged; he was satisfied with the advice
of counsel; and he understood that the trial court was not bound by the terms
of the plea agreement. Guilty Plea Petition, 8/3/20, at 1-3. Petrill also stated
that he was pleading guilty because it was “in [his] best interests.” Id. at 4.
Additionally, during the oral colloquy, Petrill confirmed that he had sufficient
time to review the Guilty Plea Petition with his counsel; he understood his trial
and appellate rights; and he could read, write and understand the English
language. N.T. (Guilty Plea), 8/3/20, at 25-26. The trial court subsequently
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reviewed with Petrill each of the charged offenses, including the maximum
penalties and fines for each. See id. at 26-32. The trial court asked Petrill
whether any threats or promises had been made to induce his guilty plea, and
Petrill replied that he had not been threatened, and that pleading guilty was
in his best interest. Id. at 32.
Regarding his mental health concerns, Petrill specifically indicated that
his mental health was satisfactory at that time. Guilty Plea Petition, 8/3/20,
at 4. Petrill also identified medications he was taking at that time, but did not
indicate that those medications in any way interfere with his ability to
understand the proceedings. Id. Further, during the oral colloquy, the trial
court specifically asked Petrill whether he was under the influence of any drugs
or alcohol that would affect his ability to understand the proceedings, and
Petrill replied in the negative. N.T. (Guilty Plea), 8/3/20, at 26. Though Petrill
now asserts that he was confused, and under the influence of medications at
the time of the plea proceedings, he is bound by the statements he made
during the hearing. See Yeomans, supra. Based upon the foregoing, we
conclude that Petrill’s guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
entered.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
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Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/7/2021
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