Com. v. Williams, T. ( 2014 )

J-A22012-13
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
TYRONE LAMONT WILLIAMS
Appellant No. 1682 MDA 2012
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 23, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004623-2010
BEFORE: GANTMAN, J., ALLEN, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2014
Appellant, Tyrone Lamont Williams, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, following
his jury trial convictions for first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and
1
We affirm.
The trial court opinion fully and correctly set forth the relevant facts of
this case as follows:
killed on May 5, 2009 at approximately 1:10 a.m. Officer
and Crescent Streets in Harrisburg City to investigate a
report of shots fired. The area is known for high crime and
drug traffic. Officer Miller found [Victim] lying on the
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a); 903; 2705, respectively.
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sidewalk in front of the McFarland Building apartments, on
his back, with a gunshot wound to the chest. [Officer]
Miller stated that [Victim] was dressed in all black
including black gloves, and a .40 caliber handgun was on
the ground to the left of him. Officer Miller described the
scene as initially chaotic as several individuals were in the
immediate area. [Victim] was loaded into an ambulance
for purposes of transport to the hospital for treatment
While in the ambulance, the EMS personnel had to cut off
caused a bag to fall out of the pants to the floor. Officer
Cook suspected that the bag contained crack cocaine, so
he gave it to Officer Miller who subsequently provided it to
the forensic officer. After arriving at the hospital
emergency room, the ER physician pronounced [Victim]
dead at 1:35 a.m.
The subs
body
was 8.2 grams of crack cocaine. She also tested a
substance suspected to be cocaine which had been
Blascovich determined that the substance in the second
baggie was crack cocaine weighing 65/100ths of a gram.
Dr. Wayne Ross, a forensic pathologist for the Dauphin
of [Victim]. Upon examination of the body, he discovered
wound. Upon further examination, Dr. Ross determined
th
rib on the left side, broke the rib, and went through the
liver, heart and lungs. Dr. Ross stated that he found a
bullet in blood that was in the lung. Dr. Ross concluded
that, as there was no soot or residue on the outside of
body was going front
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within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the
chest and the manner of death was homicide. Upon
evaluation of the position in which [Victim] was found and
opinion that when [Victim] was shot he was pulling his
body backwards in some manner, lying on the ground or
the shooter was pulling backward and running.
[to] set up a deal to purchase an ounce of crack cocaine.
Mr. Burgess had known [Victim] for several months as he
ler. [Mr.] Burgess
contacted another drug dealer he knew, an individual
his truck and [Victim] went out to consummate the drug
deal. When
meaning less than the ounce he had agreed upon. To
remedy the situation, [Mr.] Burgess called Duke who
e
drugs.
house. Mr. Burgess described him as being dressed in all
black including his pants, shirt and gloves, and acting
uncomfortable or skittish. Duke did not show up when
expected, so [Victim] left. Later, when Duke arrived at
th
and Derry Streets to make
ellphone
number to Duke so the two of them could handle the
house the second time that day, Appellant, [whom] [Mr.]
unexpectedly arrived first, a minute or two before Duke.
The police first learned that Appellant was at [Mr.]
-defendant,] Ronald Burton,
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who is also
Appellant from previously buying drugs from him and,
when [Appellant] would sell to [Mr.] Burgess, he would
that Appellant had been stopped by police for a traffic
violation, in a black Ford Expedition SUV, in May 2010.
and walked toward the corner of Sylvan Terrace. Mr.
Burgess testified that after they left, his girlfriend returned
home and they imm
approximately ten (10) minutes of Appellant and Duke
leaving, they heard several gunshots fired, one after
another. From a police photo array, Mr. Burgess identified
Ronald Burton as the person he knew as Duke.
On the night of the murder, two individuals, Greta
Hummel Avenue and Mulberry Street. Both of them
testified that they saw two individuals dressed in black
with hoods on[,] get out of a dark colored SUV and walk
quickly through the alley towards Mulberry Street. Mr.
Lynch did not see them carrying guns, but Ms. McAllister
did. Mr. Lynch stated he recognized one of the men as an
bought cocaine. Mr. Lynch testified that he heard the man
a parked car and a light pole at the end of the alley. [Mr.]
same time he saw another man walking on the opposite
side of Mulberry Street. Mr. Lynch said that once the man
on the opposite side of Mulberry [Street] was out of his
sight, the two men in the alley where he was located ran
toward the man across the street. Both Ms. McAllister and
Mr. Lynch were headed in the other direction, still in the
alley, toward Hummel [Avenue], when shots rang out. Mr.
Lynch stated that at least 10 shots, of two different caliber
bullets, were fired. Ms. McAllister and Mr. Lynch testified
that, after the shots were fired, the men ran back down
the alley, toward Hummel Avenue and got back into the
dark colored SUV. Later, while being interviewed by
De
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as Ronald Burton.
At the murder scene, HBP forensic investigator Karen Lyda
casings on the south side of Mulberry Street, grouped
found. An additional grouping of five (5) spent .45 caliber
shell casings was found at the same intersection, across
Crescent Street. Officer Lyda also recovered a live .40
caliber bullet and a .40 caliber shell casing. Other
evidence obtained at the scene included a mutilated bullet
jacket, a cellphone and a left sneaker. Officer Lyda later
learned from other investigating officers that a casing was
jammed in the recovered .40 caliber hand gun and there
were 3 unfired cartridges in the magazine.
the [PSP], Bureau of Forensic Sciences processed the
firearms evidence submitted by the HBP and presented
expert testimony on firearm and tool mark examination.
The HBP provided Cpl. Garret with a Beretta
semiautomatic .40 caliber pistol, a magazine with three (3)
undischarged Remington .40 caliber cartridges, one (1)
discharged mutilated bullet jacket, one (1) discharged
Remington .40 caliber Smith and Wesson cartridge and
five (5) discharged Winchester .45 automatic cartridge
cases. After examination and forensic testing of these
items, Cpl. Garrett concluded that the five (5) discharged
.45 cartridges were all discharged from the same gun, but
were definitely not discharged from the .40 caliber Beretta
handgun found by [Victim] at the crime scene.
On August 10, 2009, a 2000 gold Cadillac Deville was
stopped by police while Appellant was operating the
vehicle. In furtherance of the investigation, on August 13,
HBP was asked to obtain and execute a search warrant for
the vehicle operated by Appellant. Det. Shoeman had
been informed that Ronald Burton had been seen in that
particular vehicle. Lead investigator Detective Ryan Neal
on photo identification by [Mr.] Lynch and [Mr.] Burgess.
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During the search, plastic bags of clothing and toiletry
items were found in the trunk of the car along with a green
plastic storage tote. In the green storage tote, Detective
Shoeman found documents belonging to Ronald Burton.
The documents which were recovered were a 2008 W-2
income reporting form, a letter and a PPL electric utility bill
all in the name of Ronald Burton.
recovered at the scene of the murder and, in the address
book, found a number that he confirmed had belonged to
Ronald Burton/Duke. By way of search warrant, Det. Neal
phone number for May 4 and May 5, 2009. From the
records, Det. Neal reviewed the particular cellphone
numbers and call history that belonged to Duke/[Mr.]
Burton and [Mr.] Burgess/Pepsi. Upon review of the
records for the interactions between [Mr.] Burton, [Mr.]
Burgess and [Victim] on the night of the murder, Det. Neal
determined that multiple calls were made from [Mr.]
evening, but they eventually ceased as [Mr.] Burgess gave
remainder of the night, all of the calls placed were
between [Victim] and Duke. The last phone call on
5th, when call activity ceased until approximately 7:00 a.m.
Det. Neal also interviewed Appellant in connection with the
shooting of [Victim]. Between the first interview, which
was recorded by audio and second interview, which was
not recorded, he changed his story. Appellant initially said
dropped him off and picked him up then spent several
hours at the Hollywood casino. His second version of
events had him dropping off [Mr.] Burton with another
man named Roni, going back to his own house to shower
and smoke marijuana before picking up [Mr.] Burton and
going to the casino.
Detective Donald Heffner of the HBP assisted Det. Neal by
data records for May 4 and May 5, 2009. More
particularly, he reviewed the cell tower data to determine
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a 13.8 mile radius, during the timeframe surrounding the
murder. Det. Heffner analyzed the data and mapped the
cell tower utilization locations and determined that all of
the calls made from his phone, around 1:00 a.m. on May
5, 2009, hit cell towers within .5 miles to 2 miles of the
at the Hollywood Casino. The purpose of the card is to
s gaming history for reporting and
promotional purposes. The record which Trooper Kohl
analyzed was dated May 12, 2010. Trooper Kohl testified
use his card during a particular visit, the last three uses of
18, 2009[,] and April 16, 2009.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed May 19, 2014, at 2-10) (internal citations and
footnotes omitted).
Procedurally, police arrested Appellant on May 7, 2010 in connection
Miranda2
warnings, and Appellant made a statement to police. The Commonwealth
charged Appellant with criminal homicide, criminal conspiracy, persons not
to possess firearms, firearms not to be carried without a license, and REAP.
On April 26, 2011, Appellant filed a motion to suppress his statement. The
motion on June 20, 2011. Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on January 23,
2012. On January 27, 2012, the jury convicted Appellant of first-degree
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2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
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murder, criminal conspiracy, and REAP.3 The court sentenced Appellant on
April 23, 2012, to life imprisonment for his first-degree murder conviction,
twenty
conviction, and twelve (12) to twenty-
his REAP conviction; the court imposed all sentences concurrently. On May
2, 2012, Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions, which the court
denied on August 27, 2012. On September 24, 2012, Appellant timely filed
a notice of appeal.
On October 17, 2012, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),
which Appellant timely filed on November 5, 2012, challenging, inter alia,
the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of his suppression motion.
Nevertheless, on December 18, 2012, the court issued a Rule 1925(a)
opinion, stating Appellant waived all issues for appellate review because he
December 9, 2013, this Court, having determined the relevant transcripts
were made part of the certified record, remanded the case for issuance of a
-suppression
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3
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth withdrew the firearms not to be carried
without a license charge; the court severed the persons not to possess
firearms charge.
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directed the suppression court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of
law regarding its suppression ruling.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
DID THE COMMONWEALTH PRESENT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO FIND APPELLANT GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE
MURDER, CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY, AND [REAP] BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT?
WAS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO FIND APPELLANT
GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER, CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY, AND [REAP] ON THE BASIS THAT
APPELLANT AND RONALD BURTON, HIS CODEFENDANT,
WERE ACCOMPLICES?
DID THE COURT ERR, IN RULINGS BOTH PRETRIAL AND
INCULPATORY RECORDED STATEMENT TO THE POLICE ON
THE BASIS THAT THE STATEMENT WAS TAKEN AT A TIME
WHEN APPELLANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE AND, THEREFORE, WAS
UNABLE TO GIVE A KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER
OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER MIRANDA AND/OR
GIVE A KNOWING, VOLUNTARY, AND FREE STATEMENT TO
THE POLICE?
DID THE COURT ERR BY REFUSING TO SUPPRESS AND/OR
STATEMENT WHICH PERMITTED THE JURY TO HEAR
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS WHEN
THOSE PORTIONS OF HIS STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE
BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THE TRIAL UNDER PA. RULE[S] OF
VALUE OF THE INCLUSION OF THOSE STATEMENTS DID
NOT OUTWEIGH THE DANGER OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE TO
APPELLANT, CONFUSION OF THE ISSUES, OR MISLEADING
THE JURY?
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After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Richard A.
court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of those
questions. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed May 19, 2014, at 10-17) (finding:
(1) evidence established Appellant was with his co-defendant, Mr. Burton,
before and after murder, at time when Mr. Burton was supposed to meet
Victi
Victim by cell phone multiple times around and up to time of shooting;
eyewitnesses placed Mr. Burton and another man in alley heading in
direction of crime scene, with guns, arriving and fleeing scene in dark
colored SUV; evidence showed Appellant generally operates black SUV;
strong circumstantial evidence indicated Appellant was second man whom
eyewitnesses observed in alley in pursuit of Victim immediately before shots
were fired; Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain
-
with Mr. Burton amounted to agreement to commit or aid in unlawful act
; further,
Commonwealth presented evidence that at least ten shots were fired at
scene of crime on city street nearby residential apartment building, sufficient
(2) circumstantial evidence
established Appellant was with Mr. Burton at crime scene on night in
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question, and was one of two men eyewitnesses observed pursue Victim
before shots were fired; perpetrators ran from crime scene after shooting
and fled in dark colored SUV, which is type of vehicle Appellant generally
operates; jury reasonably inferred Appellant drove with Mr. Burton to crime
scene and pursued Victim with Mr. Burton; Victim was shot in vital organ
to sufficiency of evidence based on theory of accomplice liability fails).
marijuana shortly before police apprehended him. Appellant argues his use
of marijuana impaired his cognitive functions at the time he gave a
statement to police. Appellant maintains the Commonwealth must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant had enough cognitive
awareness to understand his Miranda warnings and choose to waive his
rights. Appellant asserts the Commonwealth failed to meet this burden
because Detective Heffner did not ask Appellant whether he had consumed
drugs until a majority of the interview had already occurred. Appellant
emphasizes Detective Neal admitted at the suppression hearing that
marijuana impedes the ability to make decisions. Appellant concludes his
consumption of marijuana rendered involuntary his waiver of Miranda rights
and subsequent statement to police, and this Court should have suppressed
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sure that the record forwarded to an appellate court contains those
documents necessary to allow a complete and judicious assessment of the
Commonwealth v. Wint, 730 A.2d 965, 967
facts that have been duly certifie
Commonwealth v. Powell, 598 Pa. 224, 251-52, 956 A.2d 406, 423
(2008) (holding appellant waived challenge to admissibility of autopsy
photograph where he failed to include photograph at issue in certified
record). See also Commonwealth v. Spotti, 2014 WL 2535265
(Pa.Super. June 5, 2014) (en banc) (explaining this Court may not review
that which appellant, despite bearing burden to do so, has failed to remit
within certified record; appellant waived challenge to sufficiency of evidence
regarding whether victim sustained serious bodily injury where he failed to
Instantly, Appellant failed to ensure the statement at issue was
included in the certified record. The notes of testimony from the
statement to police, which the record indicates was lengthy. Nevertheless,
Appellant
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hamper our review of this suppression issue. Without the actual statement
suppression hearing transcript, and
waived on appeal.
findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom are free from error. Our scope of review is
limited; we may consider only the evidence of the
prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense
as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the
record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings
of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and
may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal
conclusions based upon the facts.
Commonwealth v. Cruz, 71 A.3d 998, 1002-03 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal
denied, ___ Pa. ___, 81 A.3d 75 (2013).
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 615 Pa. 354, 376, 42 A.3d 1017, 1029 (2012), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1795, 185 L. Ed. 2d 818 (2013). To meet this burden,
Id.
Importantly:
[T]he fact that an accused [is intoxicated] does not
automatically invalidate his subsequent incriminating
statements. The test is whether he had sufficient mental
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capacity at the time of giving his statements to know what
he was saying and to have voluntarily intended to say it.
Recent imbibing or the existence of a hangover does not
make [a statement] inadmissible, but only goes to the
weight to be accorded to it.
The Commonwealth is required to show voluntariness only
by a preponderance of the credible evidence.
Commonwealth v. Milligan, 693 A.2d 1313, 1316-17 (Pa.Super. 1997)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 447 Pa. 457, 460-61, 291 A.2d 103,
sufficient, in and of itself
Commonwealth v. Culberson, 467 Pa. 424, 427, 358 A.2d 416, 417
accused was allegedly under the influence of drugs or narcotics at the time
o Id.
marijuana before questioning did not render his waiver of Miranda rights
involuntary; evidence at suppression hearing showed appellant appeared
normal, alert, and responsive to questions, and gave confession voluntarily).
Instantly, the suppression court reasoned:
We are satisfied that the record proves that, although he
admitted to smoking marijuana that day, [Appellant]
possessed sufficient cognitive awareness to effectively
waive his Miranda rights. Detective Neal testified at the
suppression hearing that [Appellant] stated that he
smoked marijuana beginning at 10:30 a.m. on the day of
the arrest. Detective Neal testified that [Appellant] did not
appear to be under the influence during the interview.
[Appellant] exhibited his ability to comprehend the
questions and the significance of his answers by correcting
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statements made by Detective Neal, and by carefully
phrasing responses in an effort to avoid self-incrimination.
Accordingly, we properly found that [Appellant] voluntarily
waived his Miranda rights such that no basis existed for
suppression of his statement.
(Suppression Court Opinion, filed June 19, 2014, at 4) (internal citations
omitted).
Further, Detective Neal testified at the suppression hearing that he
read Appellant his Miranda rights twice before Appellant waived his rights
and gave a statement. Detective Neal stated Appellant had no difficulty
understanding the Miranda warnings, he knew exactly what the police
wanted to talk to him about before questioning began, and he did not appear
to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs during questioning. In fact,
Detective Neal said Appellant was calm and cooperative and gave specific
answers to the questions asked. Additionally, Detective Neal explained
Appellant stopped and corrected some of the facts, which demonstrated
Appellant understood the situation. The Commonwealth established by a
preponderance of the evidence that Appellant had sufficient mental capacity
at the time of his statement to know what he was saying and voluntarily
statement to police was involuntary. See Culberson, supra; Milligan,
supra. Thus, the court proper
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In his fourth issue, Appellant explains he made certain admissions in
his statement to police: (a) Appellant carries a revolver; (b) he robbed drug
dealers in the past; and (c) Appellant set up robberies in the past to help his
co-defendant, Mr. Burton. Appellant argues these specific portions of his
statement were irrelevant to the present case because the Commonwealth
had not charged him with robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, or felony
murder. Appellant suggests his admission to carrying a revolver is also
irrelevant because the casings recovered from the crime scene cannot be
ejected from a revolver, which essentially ruled out use of a revolver during
the murder. Appellant maintains admission of these specific portions of his
statement was improper, as they showed nothing but a propensity to
commit crimes, and other bad acts. Appellant contends the court should
have suppressed these comments, because the danger of unfair prejudice
far outweighed the probative value of their admission. Appellant concludes
the court erred in failing to suppress the challenged portions of his
statement. We cannot agree.
Instantly, Appellant failed to include in the certified record a copy of
his statement to police. In our December 9, 2013 remand order, this Court
Therefore, Appellant was on notice that the absence of his statement could
admitted as an exhibit at both the suppression hearing and at trial, but the
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statement was not read into evidence at either proceeding. As a result, we
are unable to verify the sup
Appellant refers generally to the portions of his testimony he sought to
exclude, but we simply cannot review those statements in their proper
statement to police in the certified record precludes a complete and judicious
See
Powell, supra; Spotti, supra; Wint, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/12/2014
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