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J-S50031-14 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. BRYON GEORGE TURTON, Appellant No. 313 WDA 2014 Appeal from the PCRA Order entered January 27, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012460-1994. BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and ALLEN, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2014 petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief -46. PCRA counsel has also filed a petition to withdraw. We affirm. The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: On October 5, 1994, police charged Appellant, then nineteen years old, with one count of criminal homicide involving the strangulation death of his girlfriend. On January 31, 1996, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder. On March 28, 1996, the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court. In an unpublished memorandum filed on December 15, 1997, we affirmed J-S50031-14 counsel to address an ineffective assistance claim raised by Appellant in his appeal. Commonwealth v. Turton, ___ A.2d ___ (Pa. Super. 1997) (unpublished). Upon remand, the trial court appointed new counsel, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on December 8, 1998. By order entered February 15, 2001, the trial court denied Appellant relief. Appellant once again filed a timely appeal to this Court. In an unpublished memorandum filed on April 27, 2004, we affirmed the trial court. Commonwealth v. Turton,
852 A.2d 1256(Pa. Super. 2004). On October 20, 2004, our Suprem allocatur. Commonwealth v. Turton,
862 A.2d 1255(Pa. 2004). On August 21, 2012, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel, and on October 2, 2013, PCRA counsel filed an amended petition. The PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent response. By order entered January 27, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed y untimely, and because Appellant failed to establish the applicability of an exception to the time bar. This appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. -2- J-S50031-14 iled an Anders1 brief and a petition to withdraw. Compliance with Anders applies to counsel who seeks to withdraw from representation on direct appeal. Anders imposes stricter requirements than those imposed when counsel seeks to withdraw during the post-conviction process pursuant to the dictates of Commonwealth v. Turner,
544 A.2d 927(Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley,
550 A.2d 213(Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). See Commonwealth v. Fusselman,
866 A.2d 1109, 1111 n.3 (Pa. Super. wishes to raise have no merit under a Turner/Finley analysis. Our Supreme Court has summarized: These cases establish the procedure for withdrawal of court-appointed counsel in collateral attacks on criminal convictions. Independent review of the record by competent counsel is required before withdrawal is permitted. Such independent review requires proof of: 1) - sel detailing the nature and extent of his [or her] review; 2) - the petitioner wished to have reviewed; 3) - meritless; 4) The PCRA court conducting its own independent review of the record; and ____________________________________________ 1 Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738(1967). -3- J-S50031-14 5) The PCRA court agreeing with counsel that the petition was meritless. Commonwealth v. Pitts,
981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1, (Pa. 2009) (citations nsel has complied with the mandates of Turner and Finley, as summarized in
Pitts, supra. Thus, we must PCRA petition was untimely filed, and Appellant cannot establish an exception to t petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Halley,
870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Pa. 2005). The PCRA findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Carr,
768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2001). Moreover, a PCRA court may decline to hold a hear claim is patently frivolous and is without a trace of support in either the record or from other evidence. Commonwealth v. Jordan,
772 A.2d 1011(Pa. Super. 2001). The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Albrecht,
994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted). Thus, if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither an appellate court nor -4- J-S50031-14 the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the petition. Id out jurisdiction, raised in an untimely petition.
Id. Generally, apetition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, an exception to the time for filing the petition. Commonwealth v. Gamboa- Taylor,
753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Under these exceptions been interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; or (2) there exists after-discovered facts or evidence; or (3) a new Commonwealth v. Fowler,
930 A.2d 586, 591 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). A PCRA petition
Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d at 783. See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Moreover, exceptions to the time restrictions of the PCRA must be pled in the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton,
936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also Pa.R.A. raised before the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first -5- J-S50031-14 Because Appellant did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the l of ninety thereafter, on January 18, 2005. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition over seven years later. As a result, his PCRA petition is patently untimely unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. See Commonwealth v. Beasley,
741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa. 1999). Appellant has failed to prove the applicability of any of the exceptions under the exception of subsection 9545(b)(1)(iii) because the United States Supreme Court recognized a new constitutional right in Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455(2012). In Miller, the high court held that mandatory
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. Appellant asserts that the Miller decision should be applied retroactively to his life sentence. Initially, we note that the Miller holding is inapposite because Appellant was not a juvenile when he killed his girlfriend. Moreover, even had Appellant been a juvenile at the time, our Supreme Court has determined that the Miller decision should not be applied retroactively. See -6- J-S50031-14 generally, Commonwealth v. Cunningham,
81 A.3d 1(Pa. 2013). Thus, to Section 9545(b)(iii). Alternatively, Appellant attempts to establish an exception to the Miller present counsel, however, this same evidence was referenced in the United Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551(2005) and Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48(2010). At best, Appellant Commonwealth v. Marshall,
947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008); see also Commonwealth v. Lark,
746 A.2d 585, 588 n.4 (explaining that matters of In sum, Appe to meet his burden of proof with regard to any exception to the timeliness -conviction reli withdraw. Petition to withdraw granted. Order affirmed. -7- J-S50031-14 Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 8/12/2014 -8-
Document Info
Docket Number: 313 WDA 2014
Filed Date: 8/12/2014
Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 12/13/2024