Com. v. Smith, K. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S51004-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    KEVIN EUGENE SMITH,
    Appellant                  No. 391 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 29, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0001353-2012, CP-54-CR-0001354-
    2012
    BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                         FILED AUGUST 13, 2014
    Kevin Eugene Smith appeals from the judgment of sentence of three
    and one-half to seven years incarceration imposed by the trial court after a
    jury found him guilty of two counts each of robbery, theft by unlawful
    taking, and receiving stolen property.    Counsel has filed a petition to
    withdraw from representation and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
    
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa.
    2009). We grant
    The Commonwealth arrested and charged Appellant with the robbery
    of two separate banks on June 6, 2012 and June 29, 2012.              Video
    surveillance captured both incidents. Bank employees from both institutions
    appeared at the State Police Barracks on August 23, 2012 to view a
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    photographic array.     The eyewitnesses were separated from one another
    when they were shown the array. In addition, after viewing the array, the
    witnesses were not permitted to speak with other eyewitness who had not
    yet seen the lineup.
    All of the eyewitnesses except one positively identified Appellant as the
    culprit. Appellant filed a motion to suppress based on an unduly suggestive
    photographic procedure and sought to preclude the witnesses involved from
    identifying him at trial. Specifically, he alleged that his picture had a darker
    background than the other photographs and was disproportionality larger
    than the remaining pictures.      He also averred that police informed the
    witnesses that the person involved in the robberies was included in the
    array.
    The court conducted a suppression hearing.         Therein, State Police
    Trooper John Sleboda, Jr. testified that he created an eight photograph array
    based on pictures selected at random via a program called JNET.             The
    pictures depicted African American males with facial hair between six foot
    and six foot two and a minimum weight of 210 pounds.          Trooper Sleboda
    showed the array to one witness, but thereafter another officer conducted
    the array interviews.   The person whom Trooper Sleboda interviewed was
    Rosann Madenford, a teller at one of the banks. She identified Appellant as
    the assailant within seconds of viewing the array.           According to Ms.
    Madenford, the robbery took approximately two to three minutes and
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    Appellant stood in front of her for twenty seconds.         She described the
    assailant as wearing black jeans, a New York baseball hat, sunglasses, and a
    black sweatshirt.     She testified that she did not discuss her identification
    with any other witness.
    not know which photograph depicted the suspect, conducted the interviews.
    Donna Bernasz, who worked at the same bank as Ms. Madenford, identified
    Appellant and provided that she observed his face for approximately ten to
    fifteen seconds after he demanded a teller put money into a bag.           Ms.
    lineup, but did state that the culprit had more facial hair on the date of the
    robbery. She described the robber as a tall black man with a scruffy beard,
    wearing black jeans, a black sweatshirts, and a baseball hat with a New York
    emblem on it.
    A third eyewitness, Heather Klinger, worked at the second bank. She
    selected Appellant from the array within two minutes, definitively identifying
    Appellant.   According to her, she saw Appellant for about four minutes
    during the robbery and that he wore gloves, sunglasses, a hat, and a long-
    -worker, Carol McSurdy, similarly described the
    robber as wearing a black baseball hat, sunglasses, a long-sleeve shirt and
    gloves. She selected Appellant from the lineup and had no doubt regarding
    the identification.
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    The manager at the second bank, Candace Schade also identified
    Appellant.    Her description of the robber matched that of her co-workers.
    She detailed that the robber wore a New York baseball hat, sunglasses,
    gloves, a long-sleeve green shirt, and jeans that were sagging so that she
    could see he was wearing navy blue underwear.
    The court found that the array was not suggestive, concluding that the
    photographs were the same size and, although there was slight coloration
    d
    proceeded to a jury trial.             The jury found Appellant guilty of the
    aforementioned charges.1 The court sentenced Appellant on May 29, 2013.
    Appellant initially failed to timely file a direct appeal.   However, he
    timely filed a post-conviction relief petition on November 18, 2013. Therein,
    he sought reinstatement of his direct appeal rights. The court conducted a
    otion.
    Appellant filed the instant appeal on February 28, 2014, two days after the
    ordinary thirty day period for filing an appeal.        See Pa.Crim.P. 908(E);
    nunc pro tunc, the judge, pursuant to
    paragraph (E), also must advise the defendant that a new notice of appeal
    ____________________________________________
    1
    -in-chief, a
    charge of dealing in proceeds of unlawful activity.
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    must be filed within 30 days of the order reinstating the direct appeal
    rights the appropriate period for filing his appeal. This Court issued an order
    on March 27, 2014, directing Appellant to address the timeliness of his
    notice of appeal.
    accompanying Anders brief, contending that there are no non-frivolous
    issues to be reviewed. In the Anders brief, counsel sets forth as the issue
    Anders brief at 3.
    As we do not address the merits of issues raised on appeal without
    withdraw at the outset.     Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 
    83 A.3d 1030
    (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc).     The procedural requirements for withdrawal
    require counsel to: 1) petition for leave to withdraw and state that, after
    making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has concluded
    that the appeal is frivolous; 2) provide a copy of the Anders brief to the
    defendant; and 3) inform the defendant that he has the right to retain
    private counsel or raise, pro se, additional arguments that the defendant
    
    Id.
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    J-S51004-14
    review of the record and concluded that there are no non-frivolous issues.
    Counsel notified Appellant that he was withdrawing and furnished Appellant
    with copies of both the petition to withdraw and Anders brief. Additionally,
    counsel informed Appellant of his right to retain new counsel or proceed pro
    se to raise any issues he believes this Court should consider. Thus, counsel
    has satisfied the procedural requirements of Anders.
    Counsel having complied with the procedural dictates of Anders, we
    next consider whethe                   Anders brief meets the substantive
    requirements of Santiago. Under Santiago, an Anders brief must:
    (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
    citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
    counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
    counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
    counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
    Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
    case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
    conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Santiago, supra at 361.
    Counsel provided a history of the facts and procedural background of
    appeal is frivolous, and provides case law indicating why he has concluded
    that the appeal is wholly frivolous.    Hence, counsel has complied with the
    requirements of Anders/Santiago.
    Preliminarily, we must discuss whether Appellant timely filed this
    appeal where his notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the
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    trial court reinstated his direct appeal rights.   Prior to the July 27, 2012
    amendment to Rule 908, which became effective September 1, 2012, there
    was no specific requirement that a PCRA court delineate the period for filing
    case, however, was not taken under advisement.        Nevertheless, the court
    did not inform Appellant in its order of the time in which to file his appeal.
    In Commonwealth v. Meehan, 
    628 A.2d 1151
     (Pa.Super. 1993), this
    where the court denied relief, as grounds for disregarding an untimely notice
    of appeal based on a breakdown in the judicial system.         We will apply
    Meehan
    We now proceed to examine the issue forwarded by counsel in his
    Anders brief. In evaluating a suppression ruling, we consider the evidence
    of the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below, and any evidence of
    the defendant that is uncontradicted when examined in the context of the
    suppression record.         Commonwealth v. Sanders, 
    42 A.3d 325
    , 330
    (Pa.Super. 2012).2        This Court is bound by the factual findings of the
    ____________________________________________
    2
    In In re L.J., 
    79 A.3d 1073
     (Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court applied
    prospectively a new rule regarding the scope of review in suppression
    suppression matters includes the suppression hearing record, but not
    evidence elicited at trial. Here, the suppression hearing commenced prior to
    L.J.
    -7-
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    suppression court where the record supports those findings and may only
    reverse when the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. 
    Id.
    Suppression of a pre-trial identification is warranted to prevent
    improper police conduct.    Commonwealth v. Lark, 
    91 A.3d 165
    , 168-
    169 (Pa.Super. 2014). Suggestiveness is but one factor in determining the
    admissibility of a pre-trial identification and the court must consider the
    totality of the circumstances in rendering a suppression ruling. 
    Id. at 168
    .
    Identi
    Commonwealth       v.   Fulmore, 
    25 A.3d 340
    ,   346 (Pa.Super.   2011).
    Photographs used in line-ups are not unduly suggestive if the suspect's
    picture does not stand out more than the others, and the people depicted all
    
    Id.
    Here, we agree that Appellant
    from the remaining photographs.         The suppression court found the
    eyewitnesses testimony credible regarding the nature of the lineup showing
    and that police did not suggest to them who they should identify.
    Furthermore, after our own independent
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    review of the record and governing law, we find that there are no preserved
    non-frivolous issues that exist.3
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.            Petition of Mark A. Barket, Esq. to
    withdraw granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/13/2014
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Appellant filed a motion to sever these two cases, which was denied. He
    did not raise this issue in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal.
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