Com. v. Ward, W. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
WILLIAM J. WARD, :
:
Appellant : No. 3454 EDA 2013
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 15, 2013,
Court of Common Pleas, Lehigh County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-39-CR-0003343-2011
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and MUNDY, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED JULY 29, 2014
November 15, 2013 by the Court of Common Pleas, Lehigh County,
dismissing his amended petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction
-46. For the reasons set forth
herein, we affirm.
On June 17, 2011, Crysta
Bethlehem Police Department to report that her friend and co-worker, Trisha
at 27. Van Gorden stated that it was unusual for the Victim to not come to
work and further provided that the Victim told her to call the police if she did
not show up to work because Ward had threatened to kill her. Id. at 27-28.
The Bethlehem Police Department dispatched two officers, Officer Trevezo
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and Officer Rodr Id. at
29.
The officers did not receive an answer when they knocked on the
Id. at 29. Officer Rodriguez found an open
window and looked inside. Id. Ward charged at him while swinging an
unidentified object. Id. at 30. Officer Rodriguez retreated from the window.
N.T., 10/8/12, at 30.
Id. The
officers then established a perimeter around the house and contacted the
Id. at 30-31. The
ERT entered the house after an extended stand-off. Id. at 31. Upon the
with pepper spray. Id. The ERT took Ward into custody following extensive
efforts to apprehend him, including shooting him with less than lethal bean
bag rounds, employing gas canisters, and tasering him. Id. at 31-32.
10/8/12, at 32. Police offi
dismembered body in the trash bags. Id.
charged with criminal homicide, eight counts of aggravated assault, four
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PCRA Court Opinion, 11/15/13, at 3.
On October 8, 2012, Ward pled guilty but mentally ill to the charge of
murder in the first degree. N.T., 10/8/12, at 7, 18. Ward waived a pre-
sentence investigation report and elected to be sentenced that day. Id. at
47. The trial court sentenced Ward on the same date to life imprisonment
without parole. Id. at 67.
On March 20, 2013, Ward filed a pro se PCRA petition. N.T., 8/13/13,
at 4. Attorney Robert Long was appointed on March 26, 2013 and filed an
amended PCRA petition on May 24, 2013, raising two claims: (1) that trial
counsel, Attorney Earl Supplee, provided ineffective assistance of counsel,
which unlawfully induced him to plead guilty, and (2) that his guilty plea was
unlawfully induced because it was not made knowingly, intelligently, or
voluntarily, due to his mental illness. PCRA Court Opinion, 11/15/13, at 8.
On August 8, 2013, an evidentiary hearing was held on the amended PCRA
amended PCRA petition, finding no merit to his allegations. Id. at 8. Ward
timely filed a notice of appeal on December 9, 2013.
On appeal, Ward raises two issues for our determination:
1. Did the [PCRA] court err in failing to find trial
counsel ineffective for the following reasons:
A. Failing to discuss psychiatric reports with [Ward]
prior to his plea;
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B. Failing to introduce psychiatric evidence to show
that [Ward] lacked the intent required for a
murder in the first degree conviction or plea;
C. Advising [Ward] to plead guilty to murder in the
first degree when he lacked the intent required for
a murder in the first degree conviction or plea.
2. Did the PCRA Court err by failing to find that
induced for the above stated reasons?
Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the
record supports the PCRA court's findings of fact, and whether the PCRA
court's determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31
A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877
A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 42 A.3d 1059 (2012)). A
PCRA petitioner must establish the claim by a preponderance of the
evidence. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 925 A.2d 167, 169 (2007).
Credibility determinations made by the PCRA court are binding on this Court
where there is support in the record for the determination.
Commonwealth v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
For his first issue on appeal, Ward claims that Attorney Supplee
evidence to show that [Ward] lacked the intent required for murder in the
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first degree conviction or plea and advising [Ward] to plead guilty to murder
in the first degree when he lacked the intent required for a murder in the
The test for ineffectiveness of counsel requires the petitioner to meet a
three-
reasonable strategic basis for proceeding as he did; and (3) the petitioner
Commonwealth v. Clark, 961
A.2d 80, 85 (2008). Failure to meet any one of the three prongs is fatal to
Id.
With respect to the second prong of this test, our Supreme Court has
held:
constitutionally effective if he chose a particular
course of conduct that had some reasonable basis
matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, a
finding that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable
basis is not warranted unless it can be concluded
that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for
success substantially greater than the course actually
pursued.
Commonwealth v. Charleston, __ A.3d __, 2014 WL 2557575, at *5 (Pa.
Super. June 6, 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311-
12 (Pa. 2014)).
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At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Supplee provided extensive testimony
regarding the strategy he and Ward agreed upon. Attorney Supplee testified
that he met with Ward 10 to 11 times during the course of his
representation, and discussed possible defenses with Ward. N.T., 8/13/13,
at 39-41. Attorney Supplee and Ward initially determined that an insanity
defense would be the most likely defense to succeed. Id. As a result,
Attorney Supplee employed Dr. Gordon, a psychologist, and Dr. Rushing, a
psychiatrist, to examine Ward and provide reports. Id. at 41-43. Attorney
Supplee testified that he discussed each report with Ward and that in his
opinion, Ward understood what he was talking about when he discussed the
reports with him. Id. at 43-44. Attorney Supplee testified that each of the
reports supported an insanity defense. Id. at 56. However, Attorney
Supplee advised Ward to plead guilty but mentally ill to murder in the first
degree, rather than go to trial and introduce evidence that Ward lacked the
necessary intent for murder in the first degree for the following reasons.
First, Attorney Supplee testified that there was a possibility that the
disease of the mind that rendered him incapable of knowing the nature and
Id. at 23.
This report did not support an insanity defense. N.T., 8/13/13, at 56.
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reports. Id. at 45, 47. There were no indications of psychosis or mental
health issues that were beneficial to an insanity defense in those reports.
Id.
mental health from 1999 until 2011 when he killed the Victim. Id. at 48-49.
These reports and analyses did not contain any information that would have
supported his insanity defense. Id.
concern regarding the psychological reports, the Commonwealth provided a
reciprocal witness list that included 30 witnesses. Id. at 45. Attorney
Supplee expressed concern that the witnesses would rebut an insanity
defense. N.T., 8/13/13, at 48.
Second, in addition to potential problems with the psychological
reports, Attorney Supplee testified that he advised Ward to plead guilty but
mentally ill because of his concerns about going to trial. Included among his
concerns was the possibility that the jury could presume specific intent to kill
in this instance because Ward used a deadly weapon on a vital portion of the
Id.
of the potential that these actions wou
Id. at 52-
53.
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According to Attorney Supplee, Ward also had concerns about going to
trial. Ward conveyed to Attorney Supplee that he did not want to go to trial.
Id. -live
Id.
have the guilty but mentally ill designation as opposed to just straight guilty
Id. at 47, 62.
upon his discussions with Ward and consideration of the factors discussed
above, Attorney Supplee determined that it would be best for Ward to plead
guilty but mentally ill to murder in the first degree.
Finally, Attorney Supplee testified that he discussed other potential
defenses with Ward, including a diminished third degree defense. Id. at 46.
charges, which could potentially lead to an additional 25 to 50 years of
imprisonment to run consecutive to the sentence on third degree murder.
Id. at 46, 64. This would be akin to a life sentence. Id. at 64. Thus,
instead of risking a conviction on first degree murder with no mental health,
in addition to the aggravated assault charges, Attorney Supplee did not
recommend pursuing this defense and instead, advised Ward to plead guilty
but mentally ill. Id. at 46, 60.
The PCRA court determined that Attorney Supplee provided competent
advice to Ward and that Ward voluntarily entered the guilty but mentally ill
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plea. PCRA Court Opinion, 11/15/13, at 9. The record supports the PCRA
proceeding as he did and therefore provided effective assistance to Ward.
As a result, Ward has not satisfied the second prong of the ineffectiveness of
counsel test. Failure to meet any prong of the ineffectiveness of counsel test
is fatal to a claim of ineffectiveness. Clark, 961 A.2d at 85. Therefore, it is
unnecessary to address the remaining two prongs. We affirm the PCRA
of relief based on a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.
For his second issue on appeal, Ward alleges that his guilty plea was
ineffectiveness. Given our disposition that Attorney Supplee provided
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/29/2014
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