Com. v. Dykes, A ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
AARON DYKES
Appellant No. 3091 EDA 2012
Appeal from the Order September 12, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012380-2008
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2014
Aaron Dykes appeals from the order entered September 12, 2012, in
the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, denying his petition for the
expungement of his criminal record in the above-captioned case. On appeal,
Dykes contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition
for expungement. For the reasons set forth below, we agree and reverse.
The facts underlying this appeal were summarized by the trial court as
follows:
Appellant, Aaron Dykes, was arrested on August 7, 2008,
and charged with twenty-four (24) counts of fifteen (15)
different crimes:[1] Conspiracy to Commit Robbery and Inflict
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1
A review of the certified record reveals that Dykes was actually charged
with 26 counts.
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Serious Bodily Injury, Unlawful Restraint, Attempted Theft,
[Possession of an Instrument of Crime (PIC)] with Intent,
Terroristic Threats, Simple Assault, [Recklessly Endangering
Another Person (REAP)], False Imprisonment, Conspiracy to
Murder, Theft by Unlawful Taking, Receiving Stolen Property,
Carrying Firearms in Public, Attempted Murder, Carrying a
Firearm with a License, Person not to Possess or Use Firearms,
and Robbery with Intent to Inflict Serious Bodily Injury. At his
September 26, 2008, preliminary hearing, the Carrying Firearms
in Public, Attempted Murder, Carrying a Firearm without a
License, and Person not to Possess or Use Firearms charges were
dismissed for lack of evidence, and the remaining charges were
held for court. On October 17, 2008, the Robbery with Intent to
Inflict Serious Bodily Injury charge was changed to Robber[y]
with Threat of Immediate Serious Bodily Injury. On April 20,
2010, the Commonwealth decided to nolle prosse the remaining
charges, but [] Dykes failed to appear for a hearing and on June
2, 2010, the nolle prossed charges were reinstated and a bench
warrant was issued.
[] Dykes was arrested twice on unrelated charges in 2011,
and on October 6, 2011 the Commonwealth tried [] Dykes for
the reinstated nolle prossed charges for which the bench warrant
had been issued. [] Dykes was found not guilty or was acquitted
of all charges related to his 2008 arrest. On September 6, 2012,
[] Dykes was sentenced to probation for his 2011 arrests.
[] Dykes moved to expunge the records of his 2008 arrest
and charges. This Court held a Wexler[2] hearing on September
12, 2012, and found that none of the charges passed Wexler.
[Dykes] filed his timely Notice of Appeal on October 12, 2012,
and his 1925(b) Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal
was filed on November 2, 2012.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/18/2013, at 1-2 (footnotes and internal citation
omitted).
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2
Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1981).
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On appeal, Dykes argues the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his petitions for expungement. Specifically, he contends the trial
court failed to place the initial burden on the Commonwealth to justify the
retention of his non-conviction records with specific, compelling reasons, and
of his 2008 arrest records precluded the trial court from denying his
expungement petition. Finally, with regard to the criminal charges for which
he was acquitted, Dykes argues that he was entitled to expungement of
those charges as a matter of law pursuant to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Commonwealth v. D.M., 695 A.2d 770, 773 (Pa. 1997).
Preliminarily, we [t]he decision to grant or deny a petition
to expungement lies in the sound discretion of the trial court, who must
erest in
Commonwealth v. Wallace, ___ A.3d ___,
2014 WL 3579692, *6 (Pa. filed 7/21/2014), quoting Wexler, supra, 431
A.2d at 879.
In Commonwealth v. Moto, 23 A.3d 989 (Pa. 2011), our Supreme
Court set forth the relevant consi
petition for expungement of criminal records:
Judicial analysis and evaluation of a petition to expunge
depend upon the manner of disposition of the charges against
the petitioner. When an individual has been convicted of the
offenses charged, then expungement of criminal history records
may be granted only under very limited circumstances that are
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set forth by statute. 18 Pa.C.S. § 9122; Hunt v. Pennsylvania
State Police, 603 Pa. 156, 983 A.2d 627, 633 (2009). When a
petitioner has been tried and acquitted of the offenses charged,
Commonwealth v. D.M.,
548 Pa. 131, 695 A.2d 770, 772 73 (1997). When a
prosecution has been terminated without conviction or acquittal,
for reasons such as nolle prosse of the charges or the
alance the individual's right to be
free from the harm attendant to maintenance of the arrest
record against the Commonwealth's interest in preserving such
Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879
(Pa.1981); D.M., supra authority of
Wexler and the balancing test approved therein as the means of
deciding petitions to expunge the records of all arrests which are
To aid courts in applying the balancing test for expungement, we
also adopted in Wexler the following non-exhaustive list of
factors that the court should consider:
These factors include [1] the strength of the
reasons the Commonwealth gives for wishing to retain the
employment history, [4] the length of time that has
elapsed between the arrest and the petition to expunge,
and [5] the specific adverse consequences the petitioner
may endure should expunction be denied.
Wexler, supra at 879 (citation omitted).
We have emphasized that in applying the balancing test
and considering the above factors, the court must analyze the
particular, specific facts of the case before it. Id. at 880 81.
The mere assertion by the Commonwealth of a general interest
in maintaining accurate records of those accused of a crime does
clearing his or her record. Id. at 881 82.
In addition, Wexler explicitly placed the burden of proof
on the Commonwealth. The case against the Wexler appellants
had been nolle prossed after the Commonwealth had admitted
that it would be unable to sustain its burden of proof at trial.
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Wexler, supra at 880. Nonetheless, the trial court denied the
Superior Court affirmed. [The Supreme] Court reversed and
ordered expungement, concluding that the Commonwealth had
justify the retention of
Id. at 881. Importantly, in
general terms, we held that when the Commonwealth admits
that it is unable to bear its burden of proof beyond a reasonable
ar the burden of
Id. at
880.
Id. at 993-994.
Therefore, pursuant to Wexler, supra, and its progeny, the
non-conviction records when the charges were dismissed by the
Commonwealth before trial.
In his first issue, Dykes argues Wexler -step process
must meet its initial burden of providing specific, compelling reasons to
-conviction records. Only after the
Commonwealth has met its initial burden should the trial court engage in a
balancing test considering the Wexler factors. See id.
We do not agree that Wexler and its progeny require the
Commonwealth to overcome an initial hurdle before the trial court may
weigh the Wexler factors. It is clear that in a case in which the charges
against a defendant were dismissed before trial, the Commonwealth bears
the ultimate burden of justifying retention of his criminal records. Moreover,
this Court has explained:
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[The Wexler factors] serve as guidance to the court in
determining whether the Commonwealth has met its burden.
Those factors do not shift the burden of persuasion to the
petitioner. If the petitioner does not show great harm or
prejudice by retention of the records, such a showing may be
considered in a balancing test, but the ultimate burden of proof
and persuasion is upon the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. McKee, 516 A.2d 6, 9 (Pa. Super. 1986). The cases do
not, however, require the trial court to forgo consideration of the Wexler
factors when the Commonwealth initially fails to provide sufficient,
inal record.3 Rather,
as our Supreme Court stated in D.M., supra [a]ll the factors listed in
Wexler, and similar additional considerations, should be evaluated in
expunction cases which are terminated without conviction for reasons such
as nolle prosequi Id., 695 A.2d at 773 (emphasis supplied).
Therefore, we decline to create a two-part test, as suggested by Dykes,
requiring the Commonwealth to provide compelling reasons for the retention
-conviction record before permitting the trial court to
consider the Wexler factors.4
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3
Naturally, ho
reasons would weigh heavily in favor of expungement.
4
Wexler hearing would be unnecessary if
the Commonwealth did not initially respond to the expungement petition
with sufficient, compelling reasons justifying retention of the criminal
records.
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Dykes also argues that where, as here, the Commonwealth fails to
Wexler hearing supporting
Dykes Brief at 17. Further, he contends that pursuant to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Cou D.M., supra, he was entitled to expungement
of the charges of which he was acquitted as a matter of law. We will
consider these claims in reverse order.
In D.M., supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when a
petitioner has been a
D.M., 695 A.2d at 773. The
Court explained:
We hold, in agreement with the reasoning of the Superior Court,
that the Wexler balancing is unnecessary, indeed inappropriate,
when a petitioner has been tried and acquitted.
The problem is in attempting to apply the first factor of
Wexler
petitioner after a trial which resulted in a verdict of acquittal.
We regard it as improper to go behind a verdict of acquittal and
defendant enters a trial cloaked in the presumption of innocence
and when the fact-finder reaches a verdict of acquittal, there is
no justification to search for reasons to undermine the verdict.
Such a defendant has achieved the strongest vindication possible
under our criminal tradition, laws, and procedures; we hold that
he is entitled to expunction of the arrest record.
All the factors listed in Wexler, and similar additional
considerations, should be evaluated in expunction cases which
are terminated without conviction for reasons such as nolle
prosequi or ARD. In cases of acquittal, however, we hold that a
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petitioner is automatically entitled to the expungement of his
arrest record.[5]
Id. at 772-773 (footnote omitted). See also Moto, supra, 23 A.3d at 993.
Here, there is no dispute that Dykes was acquitted of 19 of the
charges he seeks to expunge from his 2008 arrest the trial court granted a
judgment of acquittal as to 15 counts, and Dykes was found not guilty of the
remaining four counts. See Disposition and Dismissal Form, 10/6/2011.
Pursuant to the mandate in D.M.
rest records. D.M., supra, 695 A.2d at 773.
sed
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5
We note that in Wallace, supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently
narrowed the mandate in D.M. not have the
right to petition for expungment while incarcerated
of the charges the petitioner sought to expunge in that case resulted in
acquittals. Wallace, supra, at *10 (emphasis supplied). In a concurring
opinion, Justice Castille cautioned against an expansive reading of D.M.,
particularly in light of the facts presented in D.M. Id. at *10-*11 (Castille,
J. Concurring Opinion) Indeed, D.M. involved a schoolteacher, with no prior
criminal record, who had been acquitted of misdemeanor indecent assault
and corruption of minors charges, while Wallace involved a defendant with
Id. at *11. Since,
however, it does not appear that Dykes is presently incarcerated, or was so
at the time he filed the expungement petition, the pronouncement in
Wallace does not affect our decision.
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charges of which he was acquitted.6
Although the Commonwealth concedes that the acquitted charges are
subject to expungement, it argues the trial court properly denied Dyk
petition for expungement of the charges for which he was not acquitted, but
were dismissed prior to trial. While the Commonwealth does not specify
those specific charges, our review of the certified record reveals that on
October 17, 2008, the Commonwealth withdrew five violations of the
Uniform Firearms Act and one count of attempted murder for lack of
evidence. See Trial Disposition and Dismissal Form, 10/6/2011.7 The
Commonwealth also withdrew one additional count of carrying a firearm in
public on October 6, 2011. These seven charges were subject to the
Wexler test. See Commonwealth v. Rodland, 871 A.2d 216, 221 (Pa.
Super. 2005) (holding that Wexler test applied to determine whether
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6
We also find that our disposition necessarily includes the two robbery
charges that were changed. Dykes was originally charged with two counts
of robbery under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(i) (inflicts serious bodily injury).
However, those charges were changed to two counts of robbery under
subsection (a)(ii) (threatens another with serious bodily injury), charges of
which he was found not guilty at trial.
7
Although the form does not indicate that the charges were dismissed for
brief, does note that that the charges were See
charges were dismissed due to lack of evidence. See
6/18/2013, at 2.
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petitioner was entitled to expungement of charges which were dismissed for
lack of evidence). However, in Rodland
ever, will charges dismissed for lack of evidence fail to qualify for
expungement under Wexler Id.
In the present case, the trial court provided the following rationale in
[In considering the Wexler factors, h]ere, the second factor is
.
Commonwealth v. A.M.R., 2005 PA Super. 398, 887 A.2d
1266, 1270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).[8] The third factor weighed
to grow with his two arrests in 2011. The fourth factor, length of
time since the arrest, also favored record maintenance; it had
Wexler hearing. The fifth factor most heavily favored record
maintenance; Mr. Dykes had open cases on his record, was on
probation, and was employed at the time of his Wexler hearing.
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8
A.M.R. is misplaced, as is evident from the
following passage:
With regard to the second factor, the [trial] court found the
Commonwealth wanted to retain the record so future employers
would be aware of Appellant's defective character. That this
Court finds no such defect is irrelevant. It is relevant,
however, that the Commonwealth made no such
argument at the expungement hearing.
A.M.R., supra, 887 A.2d at 1270 (Pa. Super. 2005) (emphasis supplied).
Therefore, this Court did not
under Wexler. Rather, we found that such an argument was waived since it
was not raised by the Commonwealth during the Wexler hearing.
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His current probation combined with other arrests and charges
on his record mean these 2008 charges alone add little, if any,
harm.[9] Clearly, Mr. Dykes is still able to successfully achieve
employment, i
maintenance of the record of his 2008 charges. With four
Trial Court Opinion, 6/18/2013, at 4-5.
However, the trial court did not discuss the first factor in the Wexler
particularly significant in the present case for two reasons. First, six of the
seven charges at issue were dismissed for lack of evidence. As noted above,
this Court in Rodland
for lack of evidence fail to qualify for expungement under Wexler
Rodland, supra, 871 A.2d at 221. Second, and most importantly, Dykes
was ultimately acquitted of the remaining charges, and, therefore, was
completely exonerated of the criminal incident from which those charges
arose.10 As our Supreme Court observed in D.M.:
A defendant enters a trial cloaked in the presumption of
innocence and when the fact-finder reaches a verdict of
acquittal, there is no justification to search for reasons to
undermine the verdict. Such a defendant has achieved the
strongest vindication possible under our criminal tradition, laws,
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9
This finding by the trial court is dubious, since one of the 2008 dismissed
charges was a count of attempted murder.
10
the alleged
2.
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and procedures; we hold that he is entitled to expunction of the
arrest record.
Id., 695 A.2d at 772-773.
Both the trial court and the Commonwealth, however, emphasize
- (1) a
guilty plea to two violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, and (2) a guilty
plea to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, and an
arrest for gun charges, which was later nolle prossed. See N.T., 9/12/2012,
-4. We conclude that his recent crimes do
not erase the fact that he was found not guilty of the August 7, 2008,
gunpoint robbery. Indeed, during the Wexler hearing, the Commonwealth
presented no evidence as to why the dismissed charges, i.e., violations of
the Uniform Firearms Act and attempted murder, should be treated
differently from the charges that resulted in acquittals. The only argument
the Commonwealth presented, which the trial court readily accepted, was
that d
D.M.
concern with maintaining the arrest records of a defendant who has been
exonerated, is of no relevance. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court
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charges that were dismissed prior to trial, but did not result in an acquittal.11
Commonwealth v. Dobson, 684 A.2d 1073 (Pa. Super. 1996), supports
arrest records on weapons charges, even though some of those arrests
resulted in acquittals. Id. at 1074. This Court affirmed on appeal
concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the Wexler
factors. In particular, the defendant was incarcerated on a nine to 26 year
prison sentence, and had a 25-year criminal record. This Court observed,
correct the harm which may arise
from an uncharacteristic act, not as a selective white-washing measure for
Id. at 1076.
However, the Commonwealth fails to acknowledge that Dobson was
decided before D.M.
Wexler balancing is unnecessary, indeed inappropriate, when a petitioner
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11
Compare Rodland, supra, 871 A.2d at 219 (holding that, when a
defendant is convicted of some charges and acquitted of others
trial court that expungement is impractical or impossible under the
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ement of his
D.M., supra, 695 A.2d at 772, 773. Further, pursuant to
Wallace, incarcerated petitioners,
such as the defendant in Dobson
expungment while inca Wallace, supra, at *10. Accordingly, the
precedential effect of the Dobson decision is dubious, at best.
Therefore, because we find the trial court abused its discretion in
7,
2008, arrest, we reverse the order of the trial court.
Order reversed. Case remanded with directions to expunge the record
as requested. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/21/2014
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