Janeway Truck v. Solid Waste Services ( 2016 )


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  • J-A11042-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    JANEWAY TRUCK AND TRAILER                   :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    RECOVERY, INC.                              :          PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    Appellant         :
    :
    v.                      :
    :
    SOLID WASTE SERVICES, INC. D/B/A            :
    J.P. MASCARO & SONS                         :
    :     No. 609 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order February 5, 2015
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division
    at No(s): 2014-25015
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, MUNDY, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:                          FILED APRIL 22, 2016
    Appellant, Janeway Truck and Trailer Recovery, Inc., appeals from the
    order of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas that sustained the
    preliminary objection of Appellee, Solid Waste Services, Inc. d/b/a J.P.
    Mascaro & Sons, and dismissed Appellant’s complaint with prejudice.
    Appellant claims the trial court erred by failing “to allow discovery, in which
    it would have been determined if [Appellee] regularly uses the [c]ourt[s] for
    refunds.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. We conclude Appellant’s failure to comply
    with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure requires the dismissal of
    this appeal.
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A11042-16
    According to Appellant, Appellee paid a bill for towing services
    Appellant rendered in 2011, “then sued [Appellant] for a refund in small
    claims court which [Appellant] appealed to the Court of Common Pleas in
    Montgomery County.”       Id.   A panel of arbitrators entered a judgment in
    favor of Appellant on July 25, 2013,1 and Appellee did not appeal the panel’s
    ruling.
    Appellant commenced the instant action for “abuse of process and
    wrongful action,” id., by filing a complaint on September 3, 2014. Appellee
    filed a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer on September 29,
    2014.     On October 19, 2014, Appellee filed an answer to the preliminary
    objection characterizing Appellee’s previous action against it as “an abuse of
    the system or as one court called it: extortion.”      Appellant’s Answer to
    Appellee’s Prelim. Objection, 10/19/14, at 1. On February 5, 2015, the trial
    court sustained Appellee’s preliminary objection in the form of demurrer and
    dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
    Appellant took this timely appeal and in response to the trial court’s
    order for a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, timely filed a two-page “Appeal
    Statement.”     Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement contained one paragraph
    reviewing the standards of review applicable to an order sustaining
    preliminary objection in the nature of demurrer and two paragraphs
    1
    Appellant did not indicate when it prevailed in Appellee’s action against it.
    However, it did not dispute Appellee’s recitation of the date of the
    arbitrators’ findings.
    -2-
    J-A11042-16
    summarizing the law that Pennsylvania is a “fact-pleading” jurisdiction.
    Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 3/25/15, at 1-2.          The final two
    paragraphs asserted error in the court’s ruling. Id. at 2. The trial court filed
    a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion.
    Appellant presents the following question for review:
    Did the [trial court] commit an error of law by granting
    [Appellee’s] Preliminary Objections when it did not allow
    discovery? Is such conduct also an abuse of discretion?
    Appellant’s Brief at 3.
    Preliminarily, we note Appellant’s statement of facts consists of three
    paragraphs spanning less than a page.          See Appellant’s Brief at 4.   His
    argument section consists of less than two pages and is a verbatim
    recitation of his Rule 1925(b) statement.          See id. at 5-7; see also
    Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement at 1-2.            Appellant has cited
    authorities related to the standard of review and Pennsylvania’s pleading
    requirements.       See Appellant’s Brief at 5.      However, his entire legal
    argument consists of two paragraphs, which we have reproduced for the
    purposes of the present appeal:
    It was an error of law to sustain [Appellee’s]
    preliminary objection. It is a misuse of the legal system to
    reduce bills. Had [Appellant] been allowed to conduct
    discovery it would have been show[n] that [Appellee]
    misuse[d] the legal system in other cases.
    The [trial] court was to[o] quick to sustain [Appellee’s]
    preliminary objections.
    Id. at 6.
    -3-
    J-A11042-16
    This Court has observed:
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) provides, in relevant part, that the
    argument [section of an appellant’s brief] shall be ‘followed
    by such discussion and citation of authorities as are
    deemed pertinent.’ Rule 2119 contains mandatory
    provisions regarding the contents of briefs. We have held
    consistently, ‘[a]rguments that are not appropriately
    developed are waived.’
    It is the appellant who has the burden of establishing [its]
    entitlement to relief by showing that the ruling of the trial
    court is erroneous under the evidence or the law. . . .
    Connor v. Crozer Keystone Health Sys., 
    832 A.2d 1112
    , 1118 (Pa.
    Super. 2003) (citation and emphases omitted).
    This Court is neither obliged, nor even particularly
    equipped, to develop an argument for a party. To do
    so places the Court in the conflicting roles of
    advocate and neutral arbiter. When an appellant
    fails to develop his issue in an argument and fails to
    cite any legal authority, the issue is waived.
    Moreover, “mere issue spotting without analysis or legal
    citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate
    review of a matter.”
    In re S.T.S., Jr., 
    76 A.3d 24
    , 42 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
    In light of the foregoing precepts, we are constrained to conclude that
    Appellant’s brief is substantively defective. See Connor, 
    832 A.2d at 1118
    .
    Further consideration of this matter would require this Court to develop
    Appellant’s attempts at “mere issue spotting” into a meaningful legal
    argument responsive to the trial court’s opinion. This we cannot do. See In
    re S.T.S., Jr., 
    76 A.3d at 42
    . Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.
    Appeal dismissed.
    -4-
    J-A11042-16
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/22/2016
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 609 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 4/22/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024