Com. v. Buckner, D. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S46036-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,            :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :            PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee              :
    :
    v.                          :
    :
    DONNELL L. BUCKNER,                      :
    :
    Appellant             :          No. 1184 MDA 2013
    Appeal from the PCRA Order entered on June 17, 2013
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County,
    Criminal Division, No. CP-40-CR-0001492-2009
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                      FILED AUGUST 20, 2014
    filed pursuant to the Post Convi                          See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    §§ 9541-
    Counsel.
    In March 2009, Buckner shot and killed his estranged wife. Buckner
    was 34 years old at the time of the murder. On June 28, 2010, Buckner was
    found guilty of first-degree murder1 and sentenced to life in prison without
    the possibility of parole. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and
    the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied allowance of appeal.            See
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
    J-S46036-14
    Commonwealth v. Buckner, 
    32 A.3d 839
    (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished
    memorandum), appeal denied, 
    40 A.3d 119
    (Pa. 2012).
    Buckner filed a timely PCRA Petition, pro se, on August 30, 2012,
    seeking relief from his judgment of sentence pursuant to Miller v.
    Alabama, 
    131 S. Ct. 2455
    (2012).2        The PCRA court appointed Buckner
    counsel, who filed a Motion Seeking Appointment of An Expert (
    psychological review of Buckner and assist in developing his claim that
    mandatory life without parole is unconstitutional under an expansive reading
    of Miller. The PCRA court h
    to Appoint Expert and subsequently denied the Motion.          After another
    file a
    Attorney Buttner was appointed to represent Buckner for the present appeal.
    Counsel.    Where counsel seeks to withdraw on collateral appeal, the
    procedure     outlined   in   Turner/Finley3   must    be    followed.      In
    2
    The Miller Court held that mandatory life sentences, without the possibility
    of parole, for juveniles were unconstitutional. See 
    Miller, 131 S. Ct. at 2464
    .
    3
    See Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
    (Pa. 1988);
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
    -2-
    J-S46036-14
    Commonwealth v. Pitts, 
    981 A.2d 875
    (Pa. 2009), our Supreme Court
    explained that independent review by competent counsel is required before
    withdrawal is permitted.       
    Id. at 876
    n.1.    Such review requires the
    following:
    1)         -
    extent of his review;
    2)            -
    petitioner wished to have reviewed;
    3)                                         -
    4) The PCRA court conducting its own independent review of the
    record; and
    5) The PCRA court agreeing with counsel that the petition was
    [without merit].
    
    Id. (citation and
    brackets omitted).
    Further, we have held that the Supreme Court in Pitts did not
    expressly overrule the additional requirement imposed by this Court in
    Commonwealth v. Friend, 
    896 A.2d 607
    , 615 (Pa. Super. 2006), stating
    that [] counsel seeking to withdraw [must] contemporaneously
    forward to the petitioner a copy of the application to withdraw
    -
    statement advising the PCRA petitioner that, in the event the
    trial court grants the application of counsel to withdraw, the
    petitioner has the right to proceed pro se, or with the assistance
    of privately retained counsel.
    Commonwealth v. Widgins, 
    29 A.3d 816
    , 818 (Pa. Super. 2011).
    Here, Attorney Buttner filed a Turner/Finley        -                a
    Petition to Withdraw. Attorney Buttner described the extent of his review,
    -3-
    J-S46036-14
    identified the issue that Buckner sought to raise, and explained why that
    issue lacks merit.    In addition, Attorney Buttner provided Buckner with
    notice of his intention to seek permission to withdraw from representation, a
    -
    representation.   Thus, we conclude that Attorney Buttner has substantially
    complied with the requirements necessary to withdraw as counsel.               See
    Commonwealth v. Karanicolas, 
    836 A.2d 940
    , 947 (Pa. Super. 2003)
    (holding that substantial compliance with requirements to withdraw as
    counsel will satisfy the Turner/Finley criteria).
    hether it
    is without merit. On appeal, Buckner raises the following question for our
    review:
    Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err and/or abuse its discretion in failing to
    appoint an expert to assist [Buckner] in developing his claim that
    mandatory      life  without    the   possibility  of    parole     is
    unconstitutional, under the Eighth Amendment of the United
    States Constitution and its Pennsylvania counterpart and under
    an exp[a]nsive reading of Miller v. Alabama, in that [Buckner]
    suffered from various psychological disorders at the time of the
    commission of the offense for which he was convicted?
    Turner/Finley Brief at 5. 4
    [denying] a petition under the PCRA is whether the
    determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of
    not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the
    certified record. Moreover, a PCRA court may decline to hold a
    4
    We note that Buckner has filed neither a pro se brief nor retained alternate
    counsel for this appeal.
    -4-
    J-S46036-14
    hearing on the petition if the PCRA court determines that
    support in either the record or from other evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 
    17 A.3d 417
    , 420 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
    omitted).
    Buckner contends that the PCRA court erred in denying his Motion to
    Appoint Expert because an expansive reading of Miller would apply to his
    case     and   make   his   life   sentence   without   the   possibility   of   parole
    unconstitutional. Turner/Finley Brief at 14-15.
    First, Miller does not apply to
    adults; it pertains only to those who were juveniles at the time of the crime.
    See 
    Miller, 131 S. Ct. at 2464
    (specifically referencing juveniles as the
    intended subjects of the ruling); see also Commonwealth v. Lawson, 
    90 A.3d 1
    , 7 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that Miller does not apply to crimes
    committed as an adult). Because Buckner was 34 at the time of the crime,
    Miller
    Expert should have been granted so that he could prove                      application
    is without merit.
    Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Miller does not
    apply retroactively. See Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 
    81 A.3d 1
    , 8-9,
    11 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, Cunningham v. Pennsylvania, 2014 U.S.
    LEXIS 4082 (U.S. June 9, 2014). Therefore, even if Miller had applied to
    Buckner, despite his age, his claim that the PCRA court erred in denying his
    -5-
    J-S46036-14
    Motion to Appoint Expert still fails. Thus, Buckner is not entitled to relief,
    and the PCRA court properly denied the Motion to Appoint Expert and the
    PCRA Petition.
    Based upon the foregoing, Attorney Buttner is entitled to withdraw
    pursuant to the precepts of Turner/Finley, and we affirm the Order of the
    PCRA court.
    Petition to Withdraw as Counsel granted. Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/20/2014
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1184 MDA 2013

Filed Date: 8/20/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024