Com. v. Snyder, R. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S09006-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ROGER K. SNYDER,
    Appellant                No. 2962 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order August 29, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003847-1977
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, STABILE, and PLATT,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                       FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2017
    Appellant, Roger K. Snyder, appeals pro se from the order entered on
    August 29, 2016, that denied his fifth petition for collateral relief filed
    pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-
    9546. We affirm.
    The PCRA court provided the following background:
    1.    On June 21, 1978, a jury found petitioner guilty of murder
    in the first degree and related offenses. He was subsequently
    sentenced to imprisonment for life.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S09006-17
    2.    The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment
    of sentence on December 17, 1981.[1]
    3.    In 1983, petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus petition
    seeking post-conviction collateral relief.[2] The District Attorney
    at the time was Joseph A. Smyth, Jr. who later became a judge
    of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and who
    now serves as a Senior Judge of the Montgomery County Court
    of Common Pleas.
    4.    On August 3, 1986, petitioner filed a petition under the
    Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the predecessor to the Post-
    Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546). This court
    denied the petition and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
    affirmed that order. Petitioner filed a petition for allowance of
    appeal, but the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied it.
    5.     On December 19, 1996, petitioner filed a petition under
    the PCRA. Judge Smyth denied the petition, the Superior Court
    affirmed and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied
    petitioner’s petition for allowance of appeal.
    6.    Petitioner then filed an application styled as a petition for
    writ of habeas corpus on November 30, 2007. That petition
    raised a single claim: that Judge Smyth should have recused
    himself from deciding the 1996 PCRA petition because he was
    the District Attorney at the time petitioner litigated his 1983
    federal habeas corpus petition. This court treated the application
    as a PCRA petition and denied it as untimely. The Superior
    Court affirmed that decision on March 25, 2009. Petitioner did
    not seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    At the time of Appellant’s conviction, the Supreme Court had exclusive
    jurisdiction over appeals in cases of felonious homicide.               See
    Commonwealth v. Spotz, 
    896 A.2d 1191
    , 1218 n.30 (Pa. 2006)
    (discussing the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 17 P.S. §
    211.202(1), which was repealed by Act No. 137 of 1980 and codified at 42
    Pa.C.S. § 722).
    2
    Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied on February 9,
    1984.
    -2-
    J-S09006-17
    7.     Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction collateral
    relief, styled as a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus”
    (hereinafter “the petition”) on September 4, 2013, again
    claiming Judge Smyth should have recused himself from deciding
    the 1996 PCRA petition. The undersigned judge denied the
    petition, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed that order,
    and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied permission for
    allowance to appeal.
    8.    Petitioner then filed the instant application for post-
    conviction collateral relief on July 13, 2016.
    9.   In the instant PCRA petition, petitioner again claims Judge
    Smyth should have recused himself from deciding the 1996
    PCRA petition.
    10. The petition does not aver new evidence that would tend
    to establish petitioner’s innocence. Nor does the petition aver
    that government officials interfered with petitioner’s presentation
    of his claims; that the facts upon which the claim is based were
    unknown to petitioner; or that petitioner is asserting a
    constitutional right that has been recognized by the Supreme
    Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of
    Pennsylvania, and held to apply retroactively by the court that
    recognized it.
    Order, 7/25/16, at 1-3.3         The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on
    August 29, 2016, and Appellant filed this timely appeal.
    On appeal, Appellant presents one issue for this Court’s consideration:
    IS THE PETITIONER ENTITLED TO A NEW PCRA FILING
    PURSUANT TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION
    IN WILLIAMS V. PENNSYLVANIA, 
    2016 U.S. LEXIS 373
    AS THE
    COURT HELD THAT IT WAS A VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
    CLAUSE FOR A FORMER DISTRICT ATTORNEY TO RULE AS A
    SITTING JUDGE IN HIS CRIMINAL CASE?
    ____________________________________________
    3
    In its opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the PCRA court
    incorporated the July 25, 2016 order by reference. Opinion, 9/23/16, at
    unnumbered 1.
    -3-
    J-S09006-17
    Appellant’s Brief at 6 (verbatim).
    When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, this
    Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports the
    conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error.
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    139 A.3d 178
    , 185 (Pa. 2016). The PCRA
    court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for them in
    the certified record. Commonwealth v. Lippert, 
    85 A.3d 1095
    , 1100 (Pa.
    Super. 2014).
    Initially, we address whether this appeal is properly before us.    The
    PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. “As the timeliness of
    a PCRA petition is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and
    our scope of review is plenary.”     Commonwealth v. Callahan, 
    101 A.3d 118
    , 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Moreover, the timeliness of a
    PCRA petition is a jurisdictional threshold that may not be disregarded in
    order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is
    untimely.     Commonwealth v. Cintora, 
    69 A.3d 759
    , 762 (Pa. Super.
    2013). “We have repeatedly stated it is the [petitioner’s] burden to allege
    and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies.          See, e.g.,
    Commonwealth v. Beasley, 
    741 A.2d 1258
    , 1261 (Pa. 1999). Whether [a
    petitioner] has carried his burden is a threshold inquiry prior to considering
    the merits of any claim.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 
    65 A.3d 339
    , 346
    (Pa. 2013).
    -4-
    J-S09006-17
    In order to be considered timely, a first or subsequent PCRA petition
    must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of
    sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). As noted above, since his
    sentencing on May 11, 1979, Appellant has filed numerous petitions for
    collateral relief;4 the instant petition, his fifth, is time-barred absent the
    applicability   of   one    of   the    exceptions   enumerated   in   42   Pa.C.S.
    § 9545(b)(1).5
    ____________________________________________
    4
    The 1995 amendments to the PCRA provided that if the petitioner’s
    judgment of sentence became final before January 16, 1996, a PCRA petition
    could be filed within one year, or by January 16, 1997. However, this grace
    period does not apply to second or subsequent petitions, regardless of when
    the first petition was filed. Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 
    809 A.2d 396
    , 398
    (Pa. Super. 2002).
    5
    The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are as follows:
    (i)    the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
    interference by government officials with the presentation of the
    claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
    Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
    (ii)  the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
    to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
    exercise of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
    recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
    Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
    this section and has been held by that court to apply
    retroactively.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
    -5-
    J-S09006-17
    A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within sixty
    days of the date the claim could first have been presented.        42 Pa.C.S.
    § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the PCRA’s one-
    year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead and prove specific facts that
    demonstrate his claim was raised within the sixty-day time frame” under
    section 9545(b)(2).   Commonwealth v. Carr, 
    768 A.2d 1164
    , 1167 (Pa.
    Super. 2001).     “If the petition is determined to be untimely, and no
    exception has been pled and proven, the petition must be dismissed without
    a hearing because Pennsylvania courts are without jurisdiction to consider
    the merits of the petition.”   Commonwealth v. Perrin, 
    947 A.2d 1284
    ,
    1285 (Pa. Super. 2008).
    Here, Appellant claims that Williams v. Pennsylvania, ___U.S.___,
    
    136 S. Ct. 1899
    , 1907 (2016), created a new constitutional right, and
    therefore, an exception to the PCRA time-bar pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §
    9541(b)(1)(iii) is applicable. Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. We disagree.
    In Williams, the United States Supreme Court stated that “The
    involvement of multiple actors and the passage of time do not relieve the
    former prosecutor of the duty to withdraw in order to ensure the neutrality
    of the judicial process in determining the consequences that his or her own
    earlier, critical decision may have set in motion.” Williams, ___U.S. at ___,
    136 S.Ct. at 1907.     Appellant asserts that pursuant to Williams, Judge
    -6-
    J-S09006-17
    Smyth was obligated to recuse from considering Appellant’s 1996 PCRA
    petition.
    After review, it is undisputed that Judge Smyth served as an Assistant
    District Attorney and District Attorney when Appellant litigated collateral
    petitions, and that Judge Smyth later ruled on Appellant’s 1996 PCRA
    petition.    However, Appellant has not established that the holding in
    Williams has been held to apply retroactively pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §
    9545(b)(1)(iii). As such, Appellant’s fifth PCRA petition is untimely, and no
    exceptions are applicable.6
    In conclusion, because Appellant’s PCRA petition was untimely and no
    exceptions apply, the PCRA court correctly determined that it lacked
    jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s PCRA petition and properly
    dismissed it as untimely filed. 
    Perrin, 947 A.2d at 1285
    . Accordingly, we
    affirm the PCRA court’s order. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 
    90 A.3d 1
    , 8
    (Pa. Super. 2014).
    Order affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    6
    We note, however, that even if Williams applied, Appellant failed to
    articulate how or in what capacity Judge Smyth was involved with his case
    or that Judge Smyth made any “critical decision” at trial, on appeal, or in
    any collateral proceeding as a prosecutor. 
    Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1907
    .
    -7-
    J-S09006-17
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/28/2017
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Snyder, R. No. 2962 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 2/28/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/28/2017