In the Int. of: S.K.P., a Minor Appeal of: C.P. ( 2014 )

J-S30017-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.K.P., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: C.P., MOTHER
No. 2295 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered December 10, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-14-DP-2-2011
IN THE INTEREST OF: E.J.P., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: C.P., MOTHER
No. 2296 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered December 10, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-14-DP-3-2011
IN THE INTEREST OF: T.M.P., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: C.P., MOTHER
No. 2297 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered November 25, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-14-DP-4-2011
J-S30017-14
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2014
Appellant, C.P. (Mother), appeals from the November 25 and
December 10, 2013 orders terminating the dependency of her biological
sons, S.K.P., T.M.P., and E.J.P., and transferring their legal and physical
custody to Foster Mother, K.P., as their subsidized permanent legal
custodian (SPLC). After careful review, we affirm.
We summarized the relevant factual and procedural history of this
case within a prior memorandum filed on June 6, 2014. See In re S.K.P., -
-- A.3d ---, 2295 MDA 2013, (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum
at 2-10). Our June 6, 2014 memorandum granted Mother relief on her first
issue raised on appeal, i.e.
findings required by statute to support the appointment of a permanent legal
see also In re S.K.P., supra at 20.
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) opinion did not sufficiently
address the factors set forth in Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6375, concerning matters to be determined at
permanency hearings. In re S.K.P., supra. Therefore, we remanded this
matter to the trial court and directed it to file a supplemental Rule 1925(a)
opinion in accordance with Section 6351(f). Id. The trial court issued its
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supplemental opinion complied with our prior memorandum and addressed
the matters outlined in Section 6351(f). We now proceed to address
errors complained of on appeal.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review.
[I.] Has [Mother] been unconstitutionally deprived
of her right to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of her children?
[II.] Does the li
her sons to three hours per month of tightly
constitutional right to access to her children?
We review an order granting SPLC for an abuse of discretion.1 In re
K.J. reviewing such a decision,
____________________________________________
1
follows.
In 2001, Pennsylvania created a subsidy program,
SPLC, which provides financial support for families
willing to become permanent legal custodians
pursuant to [S]ection 6351(f.1)(3). SPLC transfers
legal custodian without requiring the termination of
parental rights. When deemed appropriate, the trial
court has the power to permit continued visitation by
for SPLC, the legal custodian must meet all of the
requirements for foster parenthood, submit to an
annual eligibility evaluation, and have the ability to
provide for the child without court supervision.
In re H.V., 37 A.3d 588, 589 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2012) (brackets omitted),
citing In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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we are bound by the facts as found by the trial court unless they are not
observe and rule on the c Id., citing
In re A.K., 906 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. 2006). Although bound by the
deductions, and conclusions therefrom; we must exercise our independent
Id.the record represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge
Id.unconstitutionally deprived of her right to make decisions concerning the
Id. Yet, the argument Mother
develops within her appellate brief is one of sufficiency. Id. at 20-21.
Specifically, Mother asserts Centre County Children and Youth Services
(CYS) failed to present clear and convincing evidence to support the SPLC
orders because the bulk of its testimony consisted of inadmissible hearsay.
Id.
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This Court recently articulated the differences between the evidentiary
burdens of proof applicable in SPLC and termination of parental rights
matters. In re S.H., 71 A.3d 973, 979-980 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 80 A.3d 778 (Pa. 2013). In S.H., we addressed whether an order
custody. Id. at 975. Concluding the legislature could not have intended for
such a prohibition, we reasoned as follows.
A trial court must utilize the highest civil
when addressing a petition to terminate parental
rights. When a trial court considers and grants a
[SPLC] order, it does not engage in this heightened
review process. Upon filing a SPLC petition, [CYS] is
required merely to prove that [neither] reunification
safety, protection and physical, mental and moral
welfare. Clearly, the procedural and substantive
safeguards utilized to protect the rights of parents in
termination cases are not applicable in [S]PLC cases.
Id. at 979-980 (citation and footnote omitted).
In the case sub judice
SPLC, not petitions
evidence. See id. Rather, CYS only needed to establish that neither
ited to [S.K.P., T.M.P.,
Id.
at 980.
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Herein, the trial court found CYS presented sufficient evidence to
al
Court Opinion, 7/3/14, at 10.
placement. [T]he children made their own strides, mentally, emotionally,
educationally, and socially, and have developed a very close relationship
Id.
occur until after th[e trial c]ourt ended reunification services and changed
i.e.
Id.
historically complied
Id.
ulfill their needs
for permanency and stability. Id. at 11. The trial court also noted that
SPLC would encourage S.K.P, T.M.P., and E.J.P. to visit with Mother and
their twin sisters. Id.
Upon review, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it entered the contested SPLC orders because sufficient evidence exists
to support such orders. The trial court held a two-
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SPLC petitions, at which time the following individuals testified: the director
of the family-based mental health program, Keystone Human Services; a
CYS caseworker; a graduate assistant and staff therapist at the Penn State
Additionally, ad litem (GAL) spoke to
the trial court. N.T., 11/22/13, at 58-61. As the trial court based its SPLC
orders on this testimony and the record supports its factual findings, we
conclude no abuse of discretion occurred. See K.P., supra.
Moreover, we note the alleged inadmissible hearsay testimony
citing N.T., 1/14/11
that testimony and/or the initial dependency finding of the trial court to be
waived since she failed to appeal that initial dependency decision to this
Court. See generally In re J.J., 69 A.3d 724 (Pa. Super. 2013)
adjudicating his four children
dependent); In re F.B., 927 A.2d 268, 272 (Pa. Super. 2007) (concluding
that the dismissal of a dependency petition is a final, appealable order
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)), appeal denied, 954 A.2d 577 (Pa. 2008).
Accordingly,
visitation schedule violates her constitutionally protected right to access her
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citing In re C.J., 729 A.2d 89, 94 (Pa. Super.
1999). Specifically, Mother argues that the trial court may not limit her
visitation to three hours a month unless these visits pose a grave threat to
her children and that CYS failed to present evidence establishing such a
threat. Id.vi See C.J., supra at 94-95, citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982), Green v. Sneeringer, 635 A.2d 1074 (Pa. Super. 1993).
clearly shows that parents are unfit to associate with their children should
Id. at 95, quoting Commonwealth
ex rel. Turner v. Strange, 115 A.2d 885, 886 (Pa. Super. 1955) (brackets
and internal quotation marks omitted).
[Yet, t]he standard against which visitation is
remains the goal of the family service plan, visitation
will not be denied or reduced unless it poses a grave
reunification of the
family, then visitation may be limited or denied if it
is in the best interests of the child or children.
In re C.B., 861 A.2d 287, 294 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted), appeal
denied ts standard, in this
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C.J., supra (internal quotation marks omitted).
the underlying matter because, at the time of the SPLC hearing, S.K.P.,
See id.from reunification to planned permanent living arrangement/long-term foster
care on March 27, 2012. Trial Court Permanency Review Orders, 3/27/12.
court did not need to apply the grave interest standard when it limited
itation. See C.B., supra. Rather, the trial court appropriately
considered the best interests of the children when awarding Mother three
hours of visits per month. See id.; Trial Court Opinion, 1/14/14, at 6
interests are met by visiting
2013 orders terminating the dependency of her biological sons, S.K.P.,
T.M.P., and E.J.P., and transferring their legal and physical custody to a
SPLC.
Orders affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/22/2014
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