Com. v. Sechrist, R. ( 2014 )

J.A22042/14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
:
RICKY LEE SECHRIST, :
:
Appellant : No. 2221 MDA 2013
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 12, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Criminal Division No(s).: CP-38-CR-0001345-2010
BEFORE: PANELLA, SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED AUGUST 22, 2014
Appellant, Ricky Lee Sechrist, appeals from the order entered in the
Lebanon County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his first Post Conviction
Relief Act1
because he had filed a timely pro se motion for extension of time to file his
first PCRA petition. We hold the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction and thus, we
affirm.
On December 15, 2010, Appellant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of
sexual abuse of children and invasion of privacy. On April 20, 2011, the
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate sentence of eighteen months to
On April 19, 2012,2 Appellant filed a pro se motion for extension of
time to file a PCRA petition, alleging as follows:
And now comes [Appellant], pro se, and ask [sic] this
Honorable Court for an extension of time to file his first
post-conviction relief motion and aver the following in
support:
1. [Appellant] has found that there are problems with his
sentence and has been trying to obtain records to resolve
the problem since he has become aware of it.
2. [Appellant] needs additional time to gather additional
[sic] so that he can make a clear pleading with the court to
correct sentence and the miss [sic] information given to
him by the trial counsel.
3. [Appellant] intends to raise claims of in [sic] effective
assistance of counsel and need [sic] the time to get the
necessary information from the clerk of court and others.
4. The law library at [the prison] is in [sic] adequate in
resources and time there has been limited by the nature of
being incarcerated there.
5. [Appellant] asks for an additional 30 days to get the
information and file a P.C.R.A.
omitted).
On April 24, 2012, the court issued the following order:
2
See
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 911 A.2d 942, 944 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(discussing prisoner mailbox rule).
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[I]t appearing to the court that a pleading requesting post
conviction collateral relief has been filed by [Appellant,] it
is hereby ordered as follows:
for
amendment as follows, such amendment to be made on or
before June 21, 2012. [Appellant] shall indicate that [sic]
nature of his claims concerning his sentence and for
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Order, 4/24/12. The court also granted Appellant in forma pauperis status
and appointed counsel for Appellant. Id. The order was served on Appellant
and his appointed counsel. Id.pro se PCRA
petition. On July 6, 2012, the Commonwealth filed a respo
pro se
pro se
-Conviction Relief, 7/6/12, at ¶ 23. On July 23,
filed an amended PCRA petition, which alleged,
inter alia, that Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition on April 20, 2012.
7/23/13, at ¶ 4. On November 7, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a motion
pro se PCRA petition as untimely.
untimely. The record does not reflect that the PCRA court complied with
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The court docketed
December 12, 2013. On February 24, 2014, the court ordered Appellant to
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comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).3 The record does not reflect Appellant filed
a Rule 1925(b) statement.
Appellant raises the following issue:
Whether [P
PCRA] petition . . . as being untimely where [Appellant]
filed a motion within the statutory deadline time frame?
a motion for extension of time on April 19, 2012, which the court granted on
April 24, 2012. Id. at 11-
granted his request for an extension of time to file a PCRA petition by June
21, 2012. Id. at 12. Appellant notes he filed his pro se PCRA petition on
June 13, 2012.4 Id. Appellant is due no relief.
has required this Court to examine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain
the underlying PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214,
determination is supported by the evidence of record and free of legal er
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 824 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en
3
counsel on February 25, 2014.
4
As noted above, the court appointed counsel for Appellant on April 24,
2012. Appellant, however, filed a pro se PCRA petition on June 13, 2012.
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banc
year of the date the judgment becomes final . . . unless one of the
exceptions in § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies and the petition is filed within 60
Commonwealth v.
Copenhefer, 941 A.2d 646, 648 (Pa. 2007) (internal citations and footnote
omitted).
competency to adjudicate a controversy. These limitations
are mandatory and interpreted literally; thus, a court has
no authority to extend filing periods except as the statute
permits. Unlike a statute of limitations, a jurisdictional
time limitation is not subject to equitable principles such as
tolling except as provided by statute. Thus, the filing
period is only extended as permitted; in the case of the
PCRA, the time limitations are extended upon satisfaction
of the exceptions found in § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) and timely
filing pursuant to (b)(2). As it has been established that
the period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the
doctrine of equitable tolling, save to the extent the
doctrine is embraced by § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222 (citations omitted).
The three timeliness exceptions are:
(i) The failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or
laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
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or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Instantly, we review whether the PCRA court erred by holding
See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1),
as he
did not file a direct appeal with this Court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3);
Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Appellant thus had until Monday, May 21, 2012, to file his
first PCRA petition. See Copenhefer, 941 A.2d at 648.
Appellant, however, did not file a pro se PCRA petition until June 13,
2012, and his counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on July 23, 2012.
Appellant attempts to excuse his untimely petitions by referencing a motion
for extension of time, which the court allegedly granted. In Fahy, however,
See Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222.
allege and prove any of the timeliness exceptions. See id. (holding filing
period extended only upon satisfying one of three timeliness exceptions).
extension of time and thus lacked jurisdiction to consider Appel
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untimely filed PCRA petitions.5 See Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222. Having
discerned no error of law, we affirm the order below. See Wilson, 824 A.2d
at 333.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/22/2014
5
We do not address whether the PCRA court should have considered
pro se filing.
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