Com. v. Williams, R. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ROSHA CHARLES WILLIAMS
Appellant No. 1350 WDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order August 12, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0001615-2006
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MAY 18, 2016
Appellant, Rosha Charles Williams, appeals pro se from the order
entered on August 12, 2015, which dismissed his fourth petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546. We affirm.
In 2006, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with possession of a
controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving with a suspended
license.1 Appellant was found guilty of these charges and, on May 24, 2007,
Appellant was sentenced to serve an aggregate term of three to eight years
in prison. On August 4, 2010, an en banc panel of this Court affirmed
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1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30), and (32), and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a),
respectively.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellant’s judgment of sentence and, on March 29, 2011, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 2 A.3d 611 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc),
appeal denied, 19 A.3d 1051 (Pa. 2011).
On April 29, 2011, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition. Following the
appointment of counsel, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on
October 28, 2011. This Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order on May 17,
2012. Commonwealth v. Williams, 50 A.3d 244 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(unpublished memorandum).
In the ensuing years, Appellant filed multiple pro se papers in the
court of common pleas, along with (at least) two additional pro se PCRA
petitions. All of Appellant’s attempts for relief were denied.
On April 16, 2015, Appellant filed the current PCRA petition in the
court of common pleas. On April 29, 2015, the PCRA court provided
Appellant with notice that it intended to dismiss the PCRA petition, as it was
untimely and Appellant failed to plead any exception to the PCRA’s one-year
time-bar. PCRA Court Order, 4/29/15, at 1. The PCRA court finally
dismissed Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition on August 12, 2015. PCRA Court
Order, 8/12/15, at 1.
Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal from the PCRA court’s
August 12, 2015 order. We now affirm the dismissal of Appellant’s patently
untimely, serial PCRA petition.
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The PCRA contains a jurisdictional time-bar, which is subject to limited
statutory exceptions. This time-bar demands that “any PCRA petition,
including a second or subsequent petition, [] be filed within one year of the
date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final, unless [the]
petitioner pleads [and] proves that one of the [three] exceptions to the
timeliness requirement . . . is applicable.” Commonwealth v. McKeever,
947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Further,
since the time-bar implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of our courts,
we are required to first determine the timeliness of a petition before we are
able to consider any of the underlying claims. Commonwealth v. Yarris,
731 A.2d 581, 586 (Pa. 1999). Our Supreme Court has explained:
the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in
nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court is precluded from
considering untimely PCRA petitions. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000)
(stating that “given the fact that the PCRA's timeliness
requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, no
court may properly disregard or alter them in order to reach
the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA petition that is
filed in an untimely manner”); Commonwealth v. Fahy,
737 A.2d 214, 220 (Pa. 1999) (holding that where a
petitioner fails to satisfy the PCRA time requirements, this
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition). [The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has] also held that even where
the PCRA court does not address the applicability of the
PCRA timing mandate, th[e court would] consider the issue
sua sponte, as it is a threshold question implicating our
subject matter jurisdiction and ability to grant the requested
relief.
Commonwealth v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473, 475-476 (Pa. 2003).
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In the case at bar, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in
2011, when his time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court expired. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13(1). As Appellant did
not file his current petition until April 16, 2015, the current petition is
manifestly untimely and the burden thus fell upon Appellant to plead and
prove that one of the enumerated exceptions to the one-year time-bar
applied to his case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v.
Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2008) (to properly invoke a
statutory exception to the one-year time-bar, the PCRA demands that the
petitioner properly plead and prove all required elements of the relied-upon
exception).
Appellant did not properly plead any exception to the PCRA’s one-year
time-bar. Thus, Appellant’s petition is time-barred and our “courts are
without jurisdiction to offer [Appellant] any form of relief.” Commonwealth
v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2011). Therefore, we affirm the
PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition without a
hearing.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/18/2016
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