Bartko, D. v. Bartko, D. ( 2014 )

J-A19010-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DEBORAH FORTE BARTKO, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DANIEL THOMAS BARTKO,
Appellant No. 1804 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Civil Division at No(s): 1761 OF 2010-D
DEBORAH FORTE BARTKO, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
DANIEL THOMAS BARTKO,
Appellee No. 2026 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Civil Division at No(s): 1761 OF 2010-D
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 02, 2014
Deborah Forte Bartko (Wife) and Daniel Thomas Bartko (Husband)
filed cross-appeals from the order entered on October 4, 2013, that
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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essentially duplicated the court’s July 26, 2013 order providing for the
equitable distribution of the parties marital property, and directing Husband
to pay Wife: (1) a portion of her attorney’s fees, (2) alimony for a four-year
period, and (3) $1,000 for unreimbursed medical expenses. Both parties
raise issues concerning these items. After review, we affirm.
The parties were married on July 24, 1987, and separated on July 7,
2010.1 Wife filed a complaint in divorce on September 2, 2010. A hearing
before a Master was held on February 6, 2013, which resolved issues
concerning the equitable distribution of the parties’ assets, including
Husband’s Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System (PSERS)
pension, valued at $333,706.00, Husband’s deferred compensation account,
valued at $15,536.00, the parties’ vehicles, and a bank account. The Master
explained his recommendation for the division of the bank account, stating:
First Commonwealth Checking and Savings Account. At the time
of separation, the above account contained $70,835.99. The
Wife removed $65,000.00 shortly after separation and returned
$60,000.00 to her attorney, Mark Sorice, which he is holding in
his trust account. Mr. Sorice is now holding $57,835.99 in his
trustee account after the payment of $3,000.00 towards Master’s
fees and Court Reporter’s costs. Additional Master’s fees in the
amount of $782.00 will be paid from the account by Mr. Sorice,
thereby leaving a balance of $57,053.00. From the net amount
held by Mr. Sorice in his trustee account, the Husband shall
receive $15,000.00 and the balance remaining in the account in
the approximate amount of $42,053.99 to the Wife.
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1
Since Wife’s two children from a previous marriage are both adults, as is
the parties’ son, no issues arose relating to the children in the context of the
divorce proceedings.
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Master’s Report, 12/6/13, at 9. With regard to the marital residence, the
Master noted that it was sold prior to the hearing with the proceeds divided
between the parties. Therefore, the Master did not consider the amount
derived from the sale as a marital asset available for distribution.
Additionally, we note that the Master analyzed the evidence presented
by the parties as it related to the eleven factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S. §
3502(a). Pertinent to the issues raised by the parties in this appeal, we set
forth the Master’s discussion relating to three of those specific factors as
follows:
5. Earnings and Earning Capacity
The Wife is unemployed. The Wife had been previously
employed as a bank teller, a cheerleading coach, and cared for
children. All of those jobs were minimum wage. After the
parties moved to Ligonier in about 1992, the Wife owned a florist
shop but she stated her earnings were irregular and she
ultimately closed the shop. The florist shop was sold and the
parties received about $5,000.00 from its sale which was used
for household expenses and medical bills. She has also worked
as a cashier for Giant Eagle and worked two summers at Idewild
in the gift shop cashier’s office and in Storybook Forest. Those
jobs were minimum wage jobs with no benefits. The Wife has no
IRA or 401k. The Wife hasn’t worked since 2010 when she
stated she went into a coma and was hospitalized and received
therapy for approximately one month.
Based on the Wife’s age and health, it is doubtful she will
be able to obtain employment for more than minimum wage
unless she received additional training and her health improves.
Upon cross-examination of the Wife, her Social Security
Disability questionnaire was admitted as Exhibit B. The
questionnaire indicated that she could follow directions and
handle money, she could pay bills and use a checkbook, could lift
up to ten pounds, can walk and stand for approximately six
hours of an eight[-]hour day. The Wife stated that she doesn’t
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remember giving answers to the questionnaire, but believes she
could not stand or walk for six hours a day at the present time.
She indicated that if she were able, she would like to go back to
work, but believes that her health prevents [her] from working.
The Husband is employed by PennDot as a Transportation
Construction Supervisor. In his job he oversees the building of
bridges and road repairs. He has been employed for twenty-four
years by PennDot. The Husband testified that his base salary is
between $52,000.00 and $54,000.00 per year. The Husband
refused to produce his W-2 for the year 2012. The Husband
pays Alimony Pendente Lite to the Wife in the amount of
$448.77 every two weeks, or $975.00 per month. The Husband
also has a pension plan and a deferred compensation plan and
has medical coverage which covers both the Husband and the
Wife.
. . .
13. Insurance
There was no testimony presented regarding life
insurance. The Wife has medical insurance through her
Husband’s employer, PennDot. The cost of the Wife’s medicines
average $88.59 per month in unreimbursed medical expenses.
Following the divorce, the Wife will lose her medical insurance
through her Husband’s employer. However, she may purchase
medical insurance from PennDot under COBRA for $541.00 per
month.
14. Cost of Living
The Wife testified extensively regarding her monthly cost
of living which was as follows:
Rent $ 575.00
Telephone $ 30.00
Cable $ 19.00
Water/Sewage $ 40.00
Garbage $ 18.00
Heat $ 200.00
Groceries $ 200.00
Total Monthly Cost of Living $1,082.00
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The Master notes the Wife did not list the expenses of
clothing, gasoline, recreation, medicine or doctor bills. The Wife
testified that with her alimony, $948.77 per month, she is unable
to meet her bills and must take money from her savings account
to pay the bills. The savings account was acquired after the sale
of the parties’ house and the proceeds from the sale of the
house were divided. The Husband presented no testimony
regarding his cost of living.
The Wife presented a claim for actual and projected
unreimbursed medical expenses from February 3, 2011 to date:
(a) Prescriptions – unreimbursed expense of $2,126.86
at $88.59 per month.
(b) Unreimbursed eye care in 2011 and 2013 of
$600.00.
(c) Unreimbursed cardiology expenses to date -
$100.00.
(d) Unreimbursed medical expenses at Excela Hospital -
$120.00.
If the Wife elects to purchase medical insurance through the
COBRA plan with PennDot, the cost will be $541.00 monthly.
Master’s Report, at 5-6, 7-8.
The Master also recommended the equal division of Husband’s pension
that was not yet in pay status. Wife’s attorney was directed to prepare a
QDRO so that at the time Husband retired, Wife would receive her share.2
Additionally, to cover a partial amount of Wife’s attorney’s fees, the Master
recommended that Husband pay $4,500.00 to Wife’s counsel. The Master
further recommended that Husband pay alimony to Wife for a four-year
period, the first two years at $1,000.00 per month and the third and fourth
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2
At the time of the hearing, Husband was 56 years old and was not eligible
to retire until he reached the age of 60 at a minimum. Wife was 61 at the
time of the hearing.
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years at $750.00 per month. Lastly, the Master recommended that Husband
pay $1,000.00 to Wife for unreimbursed medical expenses.
Both parties filed exceptions to the Master’s Report. After oral
argument and the submission of briefs, the court denied all exceptions,
determining that:
[t]he Master properly applied the enumerated factors outlined
for equitable distribution in 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 3502 and for alimony
in 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 3701 to the facts of the case that each party
presented. The Master reached an equitable result through
application of those provisions. In addition, the Master’s Report
adequately considered applicable case law and cited said case
law in support of his recommendations. … Therefore, this Court
relied on the recommendations outlined in the Master’s Report….
Trial Court Opinion, 12/6/13, at 3. Essentially, the court adopted the
Master’s Report as its own and issued a decree in divorce on October 4,
2013. Both parties filed appeals and timely submitted court ordered concise
statements of errors complained of pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Wife raises the following issues for our review:
A. Considering Wife’s advanced age, extremely poor health, lack
of economic capability and the existing [o]rder of [c]ourt dated
October 1, 2010, was it error for the Master and the lower
[c]ourt to deny payment in full for [W]ife’s unreimbursed
medical expenses?
B. Was it also error to deny [H]usband’s earning capacity and
[W]ife’s needs in the calculation of monthly award of alimony
and its duration?
C. Was it error for the [c]ourt, considering the [W]ife’s
advanced age, extremely poor health, economic disability, not to
divide the marital assets between the parties so as to provide for
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the reasonable and future medical needs of the [W]ife and
promote economic justice?
D. Was it also error for the [c]ourt considering the [W]ife’s
advanced age, extremely poor health, economic disability and
[H]usband’s ability to pay not to award the [W]ife cost, counsel
fees, and expenses in their entirety?
Wife’s Brief at 6.
Husband likewise raises four issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court committed an error o[f] law or abused
its discretion in directing Husband to pay to Wife $1,000.00 … for
un-reimbursed medical expenses, where the Husband had good
health insurance coverage and the Wife either went outside of
the coverage offered or elected “upgrades” on covered items of
care[?]
2. Whether the trial court committed an error o[f] law or abused
its discretion in awarding payment of attorney’s fees when Wife
has received prior to the Master’s hearing the majority of the
proceeds from the sale of the marital residence and is set to
receive 74% of the escrowed funds[?]
3. Whether the trial court committed an error o[f] law or abused
its discretion by awarding an additional 4 (four) years of alimony
when she has already received 3 (three) of Alimony Pendent[e]
Lite where the parties have been effectively separated for 10
(ten) years and Wife is eligible for Social Security Benefits in
February of 2014[?]
4. Whether the trial court committed an error o[f] law or abused
its discretion in awarding only 26% of the escrowed funds to
Husband without any explanation or justification as to the
rationale underlying that determination[?]
Husband’s Brief at 21.
Generally, to address the types of issues raised in this appeal, we are
guided by the following:
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Our standard of review in assessing the propriety of a marital
property distribution is whether the trial court abused its
discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow
proper legal procedure. An abuse of discretion is not found
lightly, but only upon a showing of clear and convincing
evidence.
McCoy v. McCoy, 888 A.2d 906, 908 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted).
When reviewing an award of equitable distribution, “we measure the
circumstances of the case against the objective of effectuating economic
justice between the parties and achieving a just determination of their
property rights.” Hayward v. Hayward, 868 A.2d 554, 559 (Pa. Super.
2005). Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the
evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse those
determinations so long as they are supported by the evidence. Sternlicht
v. Sternlicht, 822 A.2d 732, 742 (Pa. Super. 2003), aff’d, 876 A.2d 904(Pa. 2005). We are also aware that “a master’s report and recommendation,
although only advisory, is to be given the fullest consideration, particularly
on the question of credibility of witnesses, because the master has the
opportunity to observe and assess the behavior and demeanor of the
parties.” Moran v. Moran, 839 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing
Simeone v. Simeone, 551 A.2d 219, 225 (Pa. Super. 1988), aff’d, 581
A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990)).
The first issues raised by both Husband and Wife concern the payment
by Husband to Wife of a portion of her unreimbursed medical expenses.
Wife contends that pursuant to a court order, dated October 1, 2010,
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Husband was required to pay 100% of her unreimbursed medical expenses.3
She further asserts that she introduced documentation revealing that from
2011 through 2013 she expended a total of $3,495.02 for unreimbursed
medical expenses, including “prescriptions, eye care, cardiology, dental
work, blood work and glasses….” Wife’s Brief at 14. Wife also relies on a
decision issued by the Social Security Administration in which she alleges
she was found to be totally disabled and unable to work. Thus, she claims
that Husband should have been required to reimburse her in the amount of
$3,495.02, not merely the $1,000.00 as ordered by the court.
Husband responds to Wife’s argument contending that she failed to
pay the initial $250.00 per year that triggered Husband’s obligation under
the October 1, 2010 order. Husband also asserts that despite the “good
insurance coverage through Husband’s employer, … Wife continued to go
outside of the plan or purchase care that was not covered within the
insurance policy.” Husband’s Brief at 6. Husband further indicates that the
court’s requiring him to pay the $1,000.00 for unreimbursed medical
expenses was an abuse of discretion in that Wife sought “upgrades” and
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3
The trial court’s October 1, 2010 order states in pertinent part that:
9. Husband shall continue to provide Wife with medical
insurance coverage until further Order of Court. Until further
Order of Court, Husband shall be responsible for 100% of Wife’s
unreimbursed medical amounts after the first $250.00 per year.
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failed to resubmit medical expenses to Husband’s insurance carrier as she
was directed to do by a court order, dated February 3, 2011. Id. at 24.
Husband further indicates that the court did not determine whether Wife’s
extra medical expenses were reasonable and necessary.
The case cited by Husband, Kessler v. Helmick, 672 A.2d 1380 (Pa.
Super. 1996), aids this Court in the resolution of this issue, stating:
A court may require that an obligor pay a designated percentage
of a spouse's reasonable and necessary health care expenses.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4324. … Under section 4324, “both the question
of whether to require the obligor spouse to pay these expenses,
as well as the question of the proper percentage to assess, is
within the discretion of the trial court.” Lyons v. Lyons, 401
Pa. Super. 271, 284, 585 A.2d 42, 49 (1991).
Id. at 1385.
Here, the court was aware of the parties’ entire financial situation.
Under the circumstances presented, neither party has convinced us that the
court abused its discretion by ordering Husband to pay $1,000.00 to Wife for
unreimbursed medical expenses. Therefore, we conclude that both Wife’s
and Husband’s first issues do not afford either party any relief.
We next turn to Wife’s second issue and Husband’s third issue, both of
which concern the court’s award of four years of alimony to Wife. We
conduct our review of these issues according to the following standard:
The role of an appellate court in reviewing alimony
orders is limited; we review only to determine
whether there has been an error of law or abuse of
discretion by the trial court. Absent an abuse of
discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the
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support order, this Court will not interfere with the
broad discretion afforded the trial court.
Smith v. Smith, 904 A.2d 15, 20 (Pa. Super. 2006). Likewise:
The purpose of alimony is not to reward one party
and to punish the other, but rather to ensure that
the reasonable needs of the person who is unable to
support himself or herself through appropriate
employment, are met. In determining the nature,
amount, duration and manner of payment of
alimony, the court must consider all relevant factors,
including those statutorily prescribed for at 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 3701. Alimony is based upon reasonable
needs in accordance with the lifestyle and standard
of living established by the parties during the
marriage, as well as the payor's ability to pay.
Isralsky v. Isralsky, 824 A.2d 1178, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Dalrymple v. Kilishek, 920 A.2d 1275, 1278-79 (Pa. Super. 2007).
We also consider the Master’s discussion regarding the award of
alimony. After setting forth the law as it relates to alimony, the Master
stated his reasoning as follows:
The Master considered all 17 factors as set forth in Section
3701 of the Divorce Code in determining whether the Wife
should be awarded alimony. The parties resided together for
approximately 22 years when the Complaint was filed. The Wife
is 61 years old, being approximately 4 years older than the
Husband. The earliest the Wife may receive Social Security is
when she attains the age of 62. She is not eligible for Social
Security Disability payments or Supplemental Social Security
income since her assets exceed the limits to receive either
benefit. The Wife testified regarding various medical problems.
She stated that she would like to work if she were able, but does
not feel that she could work because of her health.
Once the divorce is granted, the Wife will lose her medical
insurance and will be required to obtain a policy of her own. The
Master gave great weight to the disparity of the earnings of the
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parties. The Husband earned approximately $54,000.00 a year,
while the Wife receives APL [alimony pendente lite] of
approximately $975.00 per month. Since the Wife will
eventually be receiving Social Security payments and her share
of the Husband’s pension, the Master does not believe that
permanent alimony is in order. However, it would be purely
speculative to determine at what age the Husband will retire.
The Master also gave great weight to Wife’s medical conditions.
Master’s Report, at 14-15.
Wife explains that she requested permanent alimony, due in part
because of the decision by the Social Security Administration that she was
totally disabled and cannot work. She claims that the amount of the APL
payments of $975.00 per month received from Husband was insufficient to
cover her monthly expenses and, therefore, with the additional costs to pay
for future medical insurance, she will be even less likely to be able to meet
her monthly expenses. Wife also references her age (61 at the time of the
hearing), the number of years until she is eligible for Medicare, as well as
the time period before she can access the money she will receive as her
portion of Husband’s PSERS pension. Essentially, Wife argues that she is
solely dependent on the alimony payment until she is eligible to receive
social security and her portion of husband’s pension.
Husband’s response to Wife’s argument regarding permanent alimony
centers on the fact that the Social Security Administration did not determine
that Wife was totally disabled. Rather, he contends that now that she is 62
years old, she is eligible to receive social security, albeit at a reduced rate,
and that she is capable of light duty work, i.e., she has an earning capacity.
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Additionally, Husband argues that the court’s alimony award was contrary to
the weight of the evidence and was excessive, because the Master found
that Wife is able to perform a minimum wage job. Husband also contends
that Wife should have been imputed with an earning capacity of
$1,666.56.00 per month, representing what she could earn at a minimum
wage job plus monthly social security benefits of $409.90. Thus, considering
Wife’s earning capacity and her present eligibility to begin social security
benefits, which Husband contends was not taken into account by the court,
Husband asserts the court abused its discretion by simply adopting the
Master’s recommendation.
Again, neither party has convinced us that the findings and conclusion
reached by the Master and their adoption by the court was in error. The
record supports the findings and it is apparent that the pertinent factors
listed in 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701 were considered. Therefore, we conclude that
the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony to Wife for the
four-year period.
We next turn to Wife’s fourth issue and Husband’s second issue. Both
parties contest the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Wife. We review
an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the following principles:
We will reverse a determination of counsel fees and
costs only for an abuse of discretion. The purpose of
an award of counsel fees is to promote fair
administration of justice by enabling the dependent
spouse to maintain or defend the divorce action
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without being placed at a financial disadvantage; the
parties must be “on par” with one another.
Counsel fees are awarded based on the facts of each
case after a review of all the relevant factors. These
factors include the payor's ability to pay, the
requesting party’s financial resources, the value of
the services rendered, and the property received in
equitable distribution.
Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 201 (Pa. Super. 2004),
quoting Anzalone [v. Anzalone, 835 A.2d 773,] 785-786 [(Pa.
Super. 2003)]. “Counsel fees are awarded only upon a showing
of need.” Teodorski at 201, quoting Harasym v. Harasym,
418 Pa. Super. 486, 614 A.2d 742, 747 (Pa. Super. 1992). “In
most cases, each party’s financial considerations will ultimately
dictate whether an award of counsel fees is appropriate.” Plitka
v. Plitka, 714 A.2d 1067, 1070 (Pa. Super. 1998). Also
pertinent to our review is that, “in determining whether the court
has abused its discretion, we do not usurp the court's duty as
fact finder.” Teodorski at 201, quoting Verdile v. Verdile, 370
Pa. Super. 475, 536 A.2d 1364, 1369 (Pa. Super. 1988).
Busse v. Busse, 921 A.2d 1248, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2007).
The Master set forth the factual basis for the award of attorney’s fees
and explained his reasoning for recommending that Husband pay to Wife
$4,500.00 toward her attorney’s fees, stating:
The Wife filed a claim for counsel fees. Mark Sorice,
attorney for the Wife, submitted a bill in the amount of
$14,756.00. Pursuant to Order of Court, the Husband paid
preliminary counsel fees to the Wife’s attorney in the amount of
$500.00. The Wife requested counsel fees because of the
vexatious and litigious nature of the proceedings to cover the
total cost of attorney’s fees incurred. The record indicates that
the Wife was required to attend four all-counts conferences and
a Motion for Enforcement of Martial [sic] Settlement Agreement
that the Court ruled was without merit, and most recently, a
Petition to Compel the [Husband] to Produce his W-2 which he
had willfully refused despite the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure. Mr. Sorice charges $200.00 per hour which the
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Master believes is reasonable and consistent with the billing of
attorneys performing domestic relations work in Westmoreland
County.
. . .
In making his decision on an award of counsel fees, the
Master considered the value of the marital property to be
awarded to the Wife, although the Wife will receive some cash in
the Master’s recommended distribution, most of her distribution
will [be] deferred until the Husband retires. The overriding
factor in the master’s recommendation for the award of counsel
fees is the disparity of income between the parties. The
Husband, although he did not submit his W-2 form, has a base
salary of slightly over $54,000.00 a year, not including overtime.
Therefore, the master will recommend an award of $500.00
counsel fees.
Master’s Report, at 12, 13. Again, the trial court acknowledged that the
Master properly applied the alimony factors found in 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701 and
adopted the Master’s recommendation.
Wife argues that Husband should have been ordered to pay all of her
attorney’s fees and the costs associated with this litigation due to Husband’s
vexatious conduct. She asserts that Husband has the ability to pay and
relies on the amount of Husband’s earnings and his refusal to advance any
sums for the costs of the Master’s hearing, which were paid from the marital
assets held in her attorney’s escrow account.
In response to Wife’s assertions, Husband first identifies a court order,
dated February 14, 2013, that noted the parties consented to the payment
to the Master of $3,000.00 from the marital funds held in the escrow
account. Recognizing a balance between need and ability to pay, Husband
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also claims that Wife overlooks the fact that she will receive a larger
percentage of the marital assets and that he is required to pay in addition to
his own attorney’s fees, $1,000.00 per month alimony, $1,000.00 of
unreimbursed medical expenses, and $4,500.00 of Wife’s attorney’s fees.
Husband also highlights the fact that Wife received $48,000.00 from the sale
of the marital residence, has been receiving an APL payments from him of
$975.00 per month for 39 months, was awarded $42,053.00 from the
escrowed funds, $5,000.00 from the parties’ checking account, and will
receive half of his pension. Thus, Husband claims that Wife has substantial
assets, i.e., is not in actual need, and should not have been awarded any
attorney’s fees. Moreover, Husband contends that the reliance on the
disparity of income, without more, is an insufficient basis upon which to
award counsel fees.
Again, we concur with the decision reached on the attorney’s fees
issue. The Master and the court were aware of the respective financial
positions of the parties and arrived at a reasonable solution. Therefore, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
$4,500.00 in attorney’s fees to Wife.
Lastly, we reach the parties’ claims directed at the division of the
marital property. Wife argues that the court abused its discretion by not
awarding her a larger percentage of the marital assets. Specifically, she
contends that the award to “[W]ife of 51% of the marital estate would be
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patently unfair considering the limited work history of the [W]ife, her non-
existent future earning capacity, the [W]ife’s age, poor physical condition as
well as the [H]usband’s younger age, good physical condition and good
earning capacity.” Wife’s brief at 20-21. Essentially, she claims that to
promote economic fairness she should have been awarded a larger
percentage of the marital assets.
Husband notes that in Wife’s argument she does not mention her
earning capacity and her eligibility to receive social security benefits. He
identifies the award to Wife of 76% of the escrowed funds, and also asserts
that the trial court did not “set forth the percentage of distribution for each
asset ordered as well as the reason for the distribution[,]” which he
contends is required pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 3506.4 Husband’s brief at 37.
Specifically, he acknowledges that the Master indicated that all pertinent
factors were considered, but he argues that the trial court “provided no
indication as to what factors it considered or even the weight of one factor
among many.” Id. Husband suggests that the proceeds from the sale of
the marital residence was divided 55% to Wife and 45% to Husband.
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4
Section 3506 of the Divorce Code provides:
In an order made under this chapter for the distribution of
property, the court shall set forth the percentage of distribution
for each marital asset or group of assets and the reason for the
distribution ordered.
23 Pa.C.S. § 3506 (emphasis added).
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However, it appears that Husband’s main point of contention is that no
reasons were articulated by the court for the distribution of the escrowed
funds as required by section 3506.
We disagree. Although we recognize that neither the Master nor the
court specified on a consistent basis the reasons for the distribution of each
marital asset, the Master’s reasoning is evident. For example, the Master
indicated that the award of counsel fees rested on the “disparity of income
between the parties.” Master’s Report at 13. This reasoning in addition to
Wife’s health issues and her compromised earning ability, plus Husband’s
ability to continue to earn a living, certainly appear to be a basis for the
distribution of the marital property. Our review of the record in this case
reveals that the evidence supports the determinations arrived at by the
Master and adopted by the trial court. Obviously, neither party is satisfied,
but we conclude that under the circumstances here, the court did not abuse
its discretion. Rather, its award effectuated economic justice between the
parties. Accordingly, we affirm the order from which the parties appealed.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
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Date: 9/2/2014
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