Com. v. Dennis, M. ( 2014 )

J-S41044-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL DENNIS
Appellant No. 2961 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 1, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004749-2011
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DONOHUE, J., and MUNDY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED AUGUST 27, 2014
Appellant, Michael Dennis, appeals from the April 1, 2013 aggregate
found him guilty of six counts of possession with the intent to deliver
(PWID), two counts of criminal use of a communication facility, and one
count each of dealing in proceeds of unlawful activities/corrupt
organizations, and criminal conspiracy.1 After careful review, we vacate and
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1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7512, 5111(a), 911, and
903(a), respectively.
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remand for resentencing
of sentence.2
The trial court has summarized the relevant facts and procedural
history as follows.
From April of 2011, through May of 2011, the
Montgomery County Detective Bureau, along with
the Tredyffrin Township Police Department,
conducted a wiretap investigation and utilized video
surveillance, uncovering a large and sophisticated
cocaine distribution ring. The drug ring was centrally
Upper Gulph
his major role in the drug distribution organization.
On January 4, 2013, a hearing on pretrial
motions filed by Appellant and his two co-
defendants, Patrick Wedderburn and Karl Myers, was
conducted. Subsequently, on January 7, 2013, the
three-defendant jury trial commenced, at the
conclusion of which Appellant was found guilty of the
aforementioned charges.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/10/14 at 1-2 (internal citation omitted).
On March 25, 2013, the Commonwealth filed its notice, pursuant to 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 7508, of intent to seek the mandatory minimum sentence on
each of the six counts of PWID. On April 1, 2013, the trial court sentenced
3
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2
-defendants, Patrick Wedderburn and Karl Myers,
have appeals pending at 1372 EDA 2013 and 3243 EDA 2013, respectively.
3
Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant as follows. On count 1,
corrupt organizations, 1-2 years; count 3, PWID, 4-8 years concurrent to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Thereafter, on April 10, 2013, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion
to reconsider sentence. On September 4, 2013, the trial court denied
-sentence motion. On October 3, 2013, Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal.4
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review.
[1.] Did the trial court commit legal error when it
imposed a mandatory minimum sentence
under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508 on [Appellant]
where a jury did not make a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt regarding the amount of
offense(s), and where that statute is
unconstitutional?
[2.] Did the trial court commit legal error when it
imposed a maximum sentence in excess of ten
years under 35 P.S. § 780-115, for PWID
cocaine, where [Appellant] was never
convicted of PWID or an equivalent offense
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
count 1; count 5, dealing in proceeds of unlawful activities, 1-2 years
concurrent to count 3; count 6, PWID, 7-14 years consecutive to count 3;
count 7, PWID, 7-14 years consecutive to count 6; count 10 PWID, 7-14
years concurrent to count 3; count 11, criminal use of a communication
facility, 1-2 years concurrent to count 3; count 13, PWID, 7-14 years
concurrent to count 3; count 14, criminal use of a communication facility, 1-
2 years concurrent to count 3; count 16, PWID, 7-14 years concurrent to
count 3; and finally count 17 criminal conspiracy, 6-12 years concurrent to
count 3. On each of the six PWID counts the trial court imposed the
mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to Section 7508. We note that the
instant matte
remand to correct said error.
4
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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prior to the commission of the offenses for
which he was sentenced in this case in
viola
Commonwealth v. Camperson, 650 A.2d 65
(Pa. Super. 1994)?
[3.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it
after the prosecutor introduced evidence that
mail addressed to [Appellant] at a business
was recovered from that business along with
1.8 kilograms of cocaine despite the fact that
said evidence was never disclosed to
[Appellant] prior to its introduction into
evidence?
[4.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion where:
(a) it held in abeyance and then denied
prejudicial and irrelevant use of an
PWID, conspiracy and corrupt
organization case which stated that
[Appellant] and other alleged co-
conspirators were involved in an
conversation was about a news item
which the co-conspirators were in no way
involved and where the slide was left up
ore than 10
extended use of that exhibit during
closing arguments?
[5.] With respect to the sentence imposed upon
[]Appellant by the trial court, did that court
abuse its discretion by imposing an aggregate
sentence of not less than 18 years, nor more
than 36 years, of incarceration upon the 37
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year-old []Appellant who had never been
convicted of a felony offense where:
(a) the trial court imposed sentences
which are unreasonable under the
circumstances of the case and outside
the sentencing guidelines; and,
(b) the trial court imposed sentences
which are within the sentencing
guidelines but the application of the
guidelines is clearly unreasonable under
the circumstances of the case?
-6.
In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the sentences on counts 3, 6,
7, 10, 13 and 16, imposing a mandatory minimum pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 7508 for each count of PWID, without submitting the question of the
weight of the cocaine to the jury for a finding of fact, renders his sentence
illegal in accordance with the United States Supreme Court decision in
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). Id. at 19. Appellant
Alleyne, this Court explained that Alleyne holds
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Munday, 78 A.3d
661, 665 (Pa. Super. 2013), citing Alleyne, supra at 2163. Appellant
further argues that this Court in Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108
(Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, --- A.3d ---, 1033 MAL 2013
(Pa. 2014) an example of a statute that was
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rendered unconstitutional by Alleyne -20.
Watley held that Alleyne is retroactively
applicable to cases on direct appeal, [therefore] Alleyne (as interpreted by
this Court in Munday and Watley
Id. at 20. As a result, Appellant argues the sentences on counts 3, 6, 7, 10,
13, and 16, imposed pursuant to Section 7508, are illegal and must be
vacated.5 Id.
Alleyne
convicted on January 7, 2013, and sentenced on April 1, 2013. Appellant
then filed a timely post-sentence motion on April 10, 2013. While
-sentence motion was pending before the trial court, the
United States Supreme Court decided Alleyne on June 17, 2013. The trial
court did not address Alleyne
post-sentence motion. Accordingly, the first opportunity for Appellant to
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5
also challenges the con
brief, however, reveals that Appellant fails to develop this claim,
constraining his argument to the legality of his sentence imposed.
-20. Accordingly, we decline to address
constitutional argument. See Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736,
ppellant has cited no legal
authorities nor developed any meaningful analysis, [this Court will] find
[such an] issue waived for see
also Watley, supra
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raise a claim that his sentence was illegal pursuant to Alleyne was on direct
appeal.
ssues not raised in the lower court are waived
and cannot be raised for the f
However, this Court has held that a legality of sentence claim is a non-
waivable claim. Commonwealth v. Tanner, 61 A.3d 1043, 1046 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (stating that challenges to an illegal sentence can never be
waived and may be reviewed sua sponte
Further the Watley
precedent, an Alleyne claim can present a legality of sentence issue, we
Watley, supra at 118.
sentencing scheme as that raised in Watley
claim is properly before us.6
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6
The Watley Court was faced with a challenge to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9712.1,
whereas in the instant matter Appellant challenges the mandatory minimum
applied pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508. Nevertheless, the Watley Court
noted the effect of Alleyne on mandatory minimum sentencing statutes in
Pennsylvania.
The Alleyne decision, therefore, renders those
Pennsylvania mandatory minimum sentencing
statutes that do not pertain to prior convictions
constitutionally infirm insofar as they permit a judge
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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to Alleyne. In Alleyne, the Court overruled Harris v. United States, 536
minimum is an element [of the crime] that must be submitted to the
jury Alleyne, supra at 2155 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted). As Appellant notes, this Court in Munday faced a similar issue to
holding in Alleyne, and that said factor must be found beyond a reasonable
doubt by a jury. Munday, supra at 664. The Munday Court held the
The Alleyne majority reasoned that while
Harris limited Apprendi to facts increasing the
statutory maximum, the principle applied in
Apprendi applies with equal force to facts increasing
the mandatory minimum. This is because it is
impossible to dissociate the floor of a sentencing
range from the penalty affixed to the crime, and it is
impossible to dispute that facts increasing the legally
prescribed floor aggravate the punishment. Thus,
this reality demonstrates that the core crime and the
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
based on a preponderance of the evidence standard.4
4
See e.g., 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712(c); 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9712.1(c); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9713(c); 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9718(c); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9719(b); 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 7508(b); 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317(b).
Watley, supra at 117 (emphasis added).
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fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence
together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each
element of which must be submitted to the jury.
Id. at 666-667 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, the Munday
Alleyne undeniably
nce is under
consideration based upon judicial factfinding of a sentencing factor, that
sentencing factor is, in reality, an element of a distinct and aggravated crime
Id. at 666
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, Appellant argues the jury did not find beyond a reasonable
doubt that he possessed the necessary amount of drugs pursuant to Section
7508 to impose a mandatory minimum sentence, but rather, the trial court
conc -20.
Section 7508, which reads in pertinent part, as follows.
§ 7508. Drug trafficking sentencing and
penalties
(a) General rule.--Notwithstanding any other
provisions of this or any other act to the contrary,
the following provisions shall apply:
(3) A person who is convicted of violating section
13(a)(14), (30) or (37) of The Controlled Substance,
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Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act where the controlled
substance is coca leaves or is any salt, compound,
derivative or preparation of coca leaves or is any
salt, compound, derivative or preparation which is
chemically equivalent or identical with any of these
substances or is any mixture containing any of these
substances except decocainized coca leaves or
extracts of coca leaves which (extracts) do not
contain cocaine or ecgonine shall, upon conviction,
be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment and a fine as set forth in this
subsection:
(iii) when the aggregate weight of the
compound or mixture of the substance
involved is at least 100 grams; four years in
prison and a fine of $25,000 or such larger
amount as is sufficient to exhaust the assets
utilized in and the proceeds from the illegal
activity; however, if at the time of sentencing
the defendant has been convicted of another
drug trafficking offense: seven years in prison
and $50,000 or such larger amount as is
sufficient to exhaust the assets utilized in and
the proceeds from the illegal activity.
(b) Proof of sentencing.--Provisions of this section
shall not be an element of the crime. Notice of the
applicability of this section to the defendant shall not
be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice
this section shall be provided after conviction and
before sentencing. The applicability of this section
shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall
consider evidence presented at trial, shall afford the
Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to
present necessary additional evidence and shall
determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if
this section is applicable.
(c) Mandatory sentencing.--There shall be no
authority in any court to impose on an offender to
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which this section is applicable a lesser sentence
than provided for herein or to place the offender on
probation, parole or work release or to suspend
sentence. Nothing in this section shall prevent the
sentencing court from imposing a sentence greater
than provided herein. Sentencing guidelines
promulgated by the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing shall not supersede the mandatory
sentences provided herein. Disposition under section
17 or 18 of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device
and Cosmetic Act shall not be available to a
defendant to which this section applies.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508.
The trial court herein, proceeded in sentencing Appellant under the
statute as applicable on the date of sentencing, and concluded on the record
that it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant possessed in excess
of 100 grams of cocaine, specifically, 1,800 grams of cocaine, on the dates
pertaining to each of the counts of PWID. N.T., 4/1/13, at 16. Now, on
appeal, the trial court, relying on Watley, reasons in its Rule 1925(a)
opinion that based on the conclusions of the jury and the evidence presented
at trial, the jury essentially found beyond a reasonable doubt the elements
necessary to impose the mandatory minimum. Trial Court Opinion, 1/10/14,
at 13. Specifically, the trial court reasoned as follows.
The conclusions of the jury can be read to include
that each of the possession with intent to deliver
charges involved cocaine in the amount of at least a
quarter-pound, i.e. 125 grams. The testimony was
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testimony of Michael Reynolds told the jury that this
language refers to $4,600.00 worth of cocaine, which
is equivalent to four and-a-half ounces or 125
grams. Additionally, the jury observed the video
surveillance in which Appellant was seen on multiple
occasions with a black bag. A similar black bag was
,
Preston York. According to NMS lab report the black
bag contained 125 grams of cocaine. Finally, at the
barbershop itself, over four pounds of cocaine was
PWID convictions. Therefore, when the jury
convicted Appellant of the six PWID charges beyond
a reasonable doubt it did so based on evidence that
the cocaine involved was 125 grams or more, the
facts necessary to subject Appellant to the
mandatory minimum.
Id. at 13-14.
Upon review, we cannot ag
jury did not make any findings of fact regarding the amount of cocaine
Appellant possessed as to the six counts of PWID. Rather, defense counsel
stipulated at trial that as to count 16 of PWID, the weight of the drugs
recovered was 1,800 grams of cocaine.7 N.T., 4/1/13, at 4. On the
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7
We note that because Appellant conceded the fact required for the
mandatory minimum, any Alleyne error in this case was rendered harmless.
See United States v. Hunt, 656 F.3d 906, 913 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that
an Apprendi
mandatory minimum was properly imposed at sentencing. Nevertheless,
be
of sentence and remand for resentencing on all counts.
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remaining five counts, no drugs were recovered, depriving Appellant of the
right to have a jury conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed
in excess of 100 grams of cocaine necessary to impose a mandatory
minimum sentence pursuant to Section 7508(a)(3)(iii). Accordingly, based
on Alleyne
judgment of sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing.8
presented in his appellate brief. In both issues Appellant avers the trial
court erred in denying his motion to grant a mistrial. In reviewing
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 719 A.2d 778, 787 (Pa. Super.
1998) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal
denied, 739 A.2d 1056 (Pa. 1999).
In criminal trials, declaration of a mistrial serves to
eliminate the negative effect wrought upon a
defendant when prejudicial elements are injected
into the case or otherwise discovered at trial. By
nullifying the tainted process of the former trial and
allowing a new trial to convene, declaration of a
mistrial
designed to end in just judgments. Accordingly, the
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8
In light of our disposition in issue one we need not a
sentencing claims raised in issues two and five.
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trial court is vested with discretion to grant a mistrial
whenever the alleged prejudicial event may
reasonably be said to deprive the defendant of a fair
and impartial trial. In making its determination, the
court must discern whether misconduct or prejudicial
degree of any resulting prejud
Commonwealth v. Judy, 978 A.2d 1015, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation
when an incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive
See Johnson, supra.
In issue three, Appellant avers the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a mistrial when the Commonwealth introduced
Id.
Discovery is governed by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573.
As the trial court aptly notes, Rule 573(E) sets for the remedy for failure to
comply with the discovery rules.
Rule 573. Pretrial Discovery and Inspection
(E) Remedy. If at any time during the course of the
proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court
that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the
court may order such party to permit discovery or
inspection, may grant a continuance, or may
prohibit such party from introducing evidence
not disclosed, other than testimony of the
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defendant, or it may enter such other order as it
deems just under the circumstances.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(E) (emphasis added).
In the instant matter, the trial court summarized the discovery
violation as follows.
On the first day of trial, the Commonwealth
called Detective Michael Carsello of the Tredyffrin
Township Police Department to testify about the
items recovered pursuant to a search warrant
executed at A & L barber shop on May 18, 2011.
Commonwealth elicited testimony about
correspondence from Aetna Health Insurance
addressed to Appellant. The Commonwealth sought
to introduce the correspondence as Exhibit C-18. At
that juncture, defense counsel objected, stating that
the evidence was not provided in discovery. Th[e
trial c]ourt reserved ruling on the objection until the
next break. In the interim, the Commonwealth
moved on to the next item found during the search.
moved into evidence, to the exclusion of Exhibit C-
18, which would be dealt with at the conclusion of
At that juncture, a recess was taken and the
jury was led out of the courtroom. Defense counsel
reiterated that he never received the item in
discovery. The Commonwealth responded that it did
make the item available to defense counsel by way
of discovery letters and emails inviting defense
counsel to view all of the evidence seized during the
search of the barber shop. The Commonwealth
argued that at no time did defense counsel make an
appointment to view any of the documents or video
or any of the items seized pursuant to the search,
therefore, since the Commonwealth made these
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items available to the defense the correspondence
may be properly admitted into evidence. Defense
counsel countered that the property receipt from the
barbershop, Exhibit C-12, does not list the
correspondence addressed to Appellant from Aetna
as having been seized during the search.
umentation of
apartment lease and pay receipts and inmate letter
sent from the Department of Corrections to Anthony
the property receipt there would be no way of
defense counsel knowing that he should look at the
exhibit as having anything to do with his client,
Appellant. Therefore, th[e trial c]ourt did not admit
Exhibit C-18 into evidence. Th[e trial c]ourt asked
defense counsel whether he wanted it formally
stricken in front of the jury. However, before
counsel answered that question, counsel requested a
mistrial, which was denied. It is this denial of the
mistrial that counsel now appeals. Subsequently,
counsel did request that the evidence be stricken
and an instruction be given that the jury may not
consider such evidence. Th[e trial c]ourt agreed to
that.
The jury was brought back into the courtroom,
and th[e trial c]ourt instructed the jury that Exhibit
C-18 is not admissible and will not be admitted into
evidence. The jury was instructed not to consider it
and any testimony about it in any way during
deliberations.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/10/14, at 3-4 (citations to notes of testimony
omitted).
Therefore, in accordance with Rule 573(E) the trial court properly
excluded the mail from being entered into evidence. Further, the trial court
issued a cautionary instruction to the jury stating the jury was not to
consider the evidence or any testimony regarding it during deliberations.
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Commonwealth v. Philistin, 53 A.3d 1, 18 (Pa.
Super. 2012), citing Commonwealth v. Miller, 819 A.2d 504, 513 (Pa.
2002) (h
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 827 (2003). Accordingly, we
request for a mistrial. Johnson, supra.
Finally, in his fourth issue, Appellant avers the trial court erred in
visual aid during closing arguments that contained irrelevant, misleading,
and highly inflammatory and prejudi
the screen for the jury to view for more than 12 minutes, referenced a
conversation about someone being murdered, and did not relate to any of
the crimes committed by any of the co-defendants. Id. at 28.
Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
objection, lodged after the jury was excused, was as follows.
[The Court]: You want some instruction on the
murder, is that the issue?
[Defense Counsel]:
front of the jury.
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My objection is that it was up there for 12
minutes. It was comparatively long compared to
the other - -
[The Court]: My question is, do you want an
instruction on murder? They earlier referred to the
instruction that one of the slides had the word,
something about someone being murdered, and I
can say that has nothing to do with any of the
participants in this case and leave it at that.
But I defer to you. How much do you want?
Or nothing?
[Defense Counsel]:
bell can be un-rung because it was up there for
so long.
On behalf of my client, to preserve the record,
N.T., 1/10/13, at 8-9 (emphasis added).
solely to the amount of time the slide remained on the screen. On appeal,
Appellant has not set forth any argument or pertinent case law to support
his contention that a mistrial should be granted based on the amount of time
evidence, that was admitted at trial, was displayed to the jury during
closing. Our Supreme Court has held, that we will not consider an argument
where an appellant fails to cite to any legal authority or otherwise develop
the issue. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009),
cert. denied, Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 131 S. Ct. 250 (2010).
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defense counsel was afforded an opportunity to have the trial court give the
jury a cautionary instruction on the contents of the slide but declined to
either defendant was in any way involved in a murder, just that they had a
counsel rejected th[e trial c]o
Id.
arguments pertaining to the guilt phase of his trial. However, we are
trial court for resentencing in accordance with Alleyne.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Bowes concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/27/2014
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