Com. v. Harris, M. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
MICHAEL J. HARRIS, :
:
Appellee : No. 1867 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Order Entered May 23, 2013,
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division, at No. CP-51-CR-0009270-2012.
BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 04, 2014
appeals from the order entered on May 23, 2013, that quashed five of the
six criminal charges filed against Appellee, Michael J. Harris, prior to trial.1
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The trial court set forth the factual history of this matter as follows:
On July 20, 2012 at 8 pm, Philadelphia Police Officer
Marvin Ruley observed [Appellee], standing with Darryl G[]ass at
the north eight hundred block of 43rd Street in Philadelphia. N.T.
8 6/2012 at 4-5. [Appellee] and Mr. G[]ass engaged in brief
transactions with two individuals while standing next to a black
[J]eep. Id. at 6. One of these individuals, Helen White, was
subsequently stopped, and four packets of what was allegedly
cocaine were found on her person. Id. At or around 8:15pm,
1
minal charges prior to trial is appealable by the
Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 590 n.3 (Pa.
1991); Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2005).
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[Appellee] was observed getting into a gold Chrysler [Cir]rus and
driving away Id. at 7. [Appellee] was subsequently stopped, and
$254 was recovered from his person. Mr. Gass was also stopped,
and no contraband was found on his person. Id. at 7-8. Officers
then approached the black [J]eep, where they found a purple
container, containing nineteen red tinted packets, on the
windshield. Officers were able to see a similar packet on the floor
of the [J]eep through the window. Id. at 8. They then secured a
search warrant, and recovered one red tinted packet of crack
cocaine, one clear bag containing fifty red packets of crack
cocaine, and a .32 caliber Smith & Wesson handgun from inside
the vehicle. Id. at 8-9, 20.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/22/13, at 1-2.
The Commonwealth charged Appellee with one count each of
possession of co
not to be carried without a license, possession of a controlled substance,
carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia, possession of an instrument of
elon, and one count of conspiracy
to commit PWID. On September 26, 2012, the Commonwealth withdrew the
conspiracy to commit PWID charge, and the balance of the charges were
bound over for court.
On December 26, 2012, Appellee filed a motion to quash the
remaining six charges. In an order filed on May 23, 2013, the trial court
of a firearm by a felon.
The Commonwealth filed a timely appeal and on appeal raises the
following issue for this Court:
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Did the lower court err in quashing charges where the evidence
was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of firearms
violations and possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver?
The decision to grant a motion to quash criminal charges is within the
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed on appeal only where there
has been an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Weigle, 949 A.2d
899, 902 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon
facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing
and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an
error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill
will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is
abused.
Commonwealth v. McCullough, 86 A.3d 896, 898 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the
Commonwealth established a prima facie case. Commonwealth v.
Patrick, 933 A.2d 1043, 1045 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). The
Commonwealth is required to establish sufficient probable cause to show
that the defendant committed the offense, and the evidence should be such
that if presented at trial, and accepted as true, the judge would be
warranted in allowing the case to go to the jury. Id.
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When deciding whether a prima facie case was established, we
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and we are to consider all reasonable inferences
based on that evidence which could support a guilty verdict. The
standard ... does not require that the Commonwealth prove the
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). The prima facie case standard
requires evidence of each element of the crime charged, and weight and
credibility of the evidence are not factors at this stage of proceedings. Id.
(citing Commonwealth v. Marti, 779 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Pa. Super. 2001)).
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at this stage. McCullough, 86 A.3d at 899
(citing Commonwealth v. Landis, 48 A.3d 432, 444 (Pa. Super. 2012)).
While the record in this matter discloses that Appellee was not
arrested in actual physical possession of the firearm or cocaine, actual
physical possession is not required for conviction. A person may be
convicted of a possessory offense if the Commonwealth establishes
constructive possession.
Constructive possession is an inference arising from a set of
facts that possession of the contraband was more likely than not.
have held that constructive
possession may be established by the totality of the
circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 426, 430 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2004)).
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Constructive possession can be proven by circumstantial evidence and the
Commonwealth v. Clark, 746 A.2d 1128,
1136 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Haskins, 677 A.2d
328, 330 (Pa. Super. 1996)).
Here, the Commonwealth was required to establish sufficient probable
cause that Appellee committed the following criminal acts:
Prohibited acts; penalties
(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the
Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:
***
(16) Knowingly or intentionally possessing a
controlled or counterfeit substance by a person not
registered under this act, or a practitioner not
registered or licensed by the appropriate State
board, unless the substance was obtained directly
from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription order or
order of a practitioner, or except as otherwise
authorized by this act.
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
Prohibited acts; penalties
(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the
Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:
***
(30) Except as authorized by this act, the
manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to
manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a
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person not registered under this act, or a practitioner
not registered or licensed by the appropriate State
board, or knowingly creating, delivering or
possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit
controlled substance.
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
Possessing instruments of crime
(a) Criminal instruments generally.--A person commits a
misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument
of crime with intent to employ it criminally.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907.
Firearms not to be carried without a license
(a) Offense defined.--
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person
who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person
who carries a firearm concealed on or about his
person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of
business, without a valid and lawfully issued license
under this chapter commits a felony of the third
degree.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).
Carrying firearms on public streets or public property in
Philadelphia
No person shall carry a firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time
upon the public streets or upon any public property in a city of
the first class unless:
(1) such person is licensed to carry a firearm; or
(2) such person is exempt from licensing under
section 6106(b) of this title (relating to firearms not
to be carried without a license).
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108.
In the instant case, the record reflects that Officer Marvin Ruley
testified that he saw Appellee engage in multiple exchanges of small items
for U.S. currency while he was standing next to a Jeep Cherokee. N.T.,
8/6/12, at 5-9. One of the people who made such an exchange with
Appellee, Helen White, was immediately apprehended and found in
possession of four red-tinted packets of suspected crack cocaine. Id. at 6.
During these exchanges, Appellee and his cohort, Mr. Gass, were positioned
next to, in front of, or behind the Jeep. Id. at 5-9. When Appellee was
apprehended, he was found in possession of $254.00 but no narcotics. Id.
at 7-8. However, when officers approached the Jeep next to which Appellee
had been standing while he engaged in the aforementioned hand to hand
exchanges, they saw a purple plastic container. Id. at 8. This purple
container, which looked like a chewing gum container, was wrapped in black
tape. Id. at 8, 16. The container was not inside the Jeep, but rather it was
sitting outside the vehicle on the windshield next to the wiper blades. Id. at
16. Inside this container were nineteen red-tinted packets of suspected
crack cocaine, similar to those found on Helen White. Id. at 6, 8. The
discovery of this cache of suspected crack cocaine led the officers to obtain a
search warrant for the Jeep, and as mentioned above, more suspected crack
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cocaine, which was also wrapped in red-tinted plastic, was discovered inside
the Jeep along with a firearm. Id. at 20.
Officer Paul Perez testified that in securing the search warrant for the
Jeep, he learned that it was registered in the name of Michael Harris, which
Appellee was the owner of the Jeep or whether his son, Michael Harris Jr.,
was the owner. Id. Regardless, what is clear is that the Jeep was not
owned by an unknown third party. The dispute over ownership does not
support dismissal of the charges because, even if the Jeep was owned by
control. Thus, a dispute over ownership of the Jeep was not a basis for
dismissal of the charges at the preliminary hearing stage of the proceedings.
After reviewing the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as we must, we conclude that
there was sufficient probable cause to show that Appellee committed the
aforementioned possessory offenses, such that, if presented at trial, and
accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in allowing the case to go to
the jury. Patrick, 933 A.2d at 1045. To view the evidence otherwise would
be to view it in the light most favorable to Appellee. That would cause this
Court to accept that it was nothing more than coincidence that a container of
suspected crack cocaine, packaged identically to the packets found on Helen
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White and inside the Jeep, was simply sitting on the windshield of a vehicle
next to which Appellee was exchanging money for small objects. Based on
our standard of review, we cannot reach that conclusion.
Accordingly, we are constrained to reverse the order dismissing the
charges against Appellee, and we remand for further proceedings. We offer
no opinion as to whether the Commonwealth will ultimately be able to prove
the charges against Appellee beyond a reasonable doubt as that is not the
standard to be applied at this juncture. McCullough, 86 A.3d at 899.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/4/2014
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