Com. v. White, M. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
MYLES WHITE, :
:
Appellant : No. 3102 EDA 2013
Appeal from the PCRA Order October 15, 2013,
Court of Common Pleas, Monroe County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-45-CR-0000529-2009
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and MUNDY, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED AUGUST 29, 2014
court entered in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas denying his
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 9546. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On March 26, 2009, a criminal complaint was filed against White charging
him with one count of criminal homicide and two counts of criminal
conspiracy1 in connection with his involvement in a robbery and death that
occurred in the parking lot of a hotel on January 15, 2009. The
Commonwealth filed a notice of joinder pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(b)(1)
-defendant, Ralph
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a), 903.
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Maldonado. On August 20, 2009, White, through court appointed counsel,
filed a motion to sever the trial from his co-defendant. A hearing was held
on the motion on September 28, 2009 and a briefing schedule was set.
Before any briefs were filed, White filed a motion to withdraw the motion to
sever on October 8, 2009, which was granted the next day.
The Commonwealth filed a motion to schedule conference on
December 8, 2009, and a pretrial conference was scheduled for January 4,
2010. On January 8, 2010, White, through counsel, filed a motion to
continue trial, noting that there was no date set for the trial to begin, but
-defendant, Mr.
Maldonado, filed a pretrial motion on January 29, 2010, and a hearing on the
motion was held February 10, 2010. By order of court dated February 16,
2010, a new trial date was scheduled for June 3, 2010 for both Mr.
Maldonado and White.
On June 1, 2010, White pled guilty to murder in the third degree
pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c). On the same day, White was sentenced
to a period of incarceration of not less than 15 years and not more than 30
years. White filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence on June 9, 2010,
which was denied on June 25, 2010 after a hearing.
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White filed an appeal to this Court raising claims challenging the
voluntariness of his guilty plea, the effective assistance of counsel, and the
discretionary aspects of his sentence. Commonwealth v. White,
1420 EDA 2011 (Pa. Super. June 19, 2012) (unpublished memorandum).
This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on June 19, 2012. After
exhausting his rights on direct appeal, White filed a document on April 25,
ion to Proceed in forma pauperis
construed as a pro se
motion to proceed in forma pauperis and appointed PCRA counsel on May 8,
2013. White, through PCRA counsel, filed an amended PCRA petition on July
2013 and denied by order of court on October 15, 2013. This timely appeal
follows.
White raises two issues for our review:
1. Was trial counsel ineffective in failing to advise
Defendant that he had and for failing to file a motion
stating a valid Rule 600 Claim to dismiss the case
2. Did [White] enter a plea knowingly and
voluntarily where he expressed concern about
whether or not he had the requisite intent to have
committed Murder in the Third Degree?
Our standard of review for the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
examining whether the court's determination is supported by the evidence of
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record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Wright, 935 A.2d 542,
544 (Pa. Super. 2007). This Court grants great deference to the findings of
the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings.
Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa. Super. 2007). The PCRA
court's credibility determinations are binding on this Court where there is
record support for those determinations. Commonwealth v. R. Johnson,
966 A.2d 523, 539 (Pa. 2009). Furthermore, we note that to be eligible for
relief un
prove ineffective assistance of counsel which caused an involuntary or
Commonwealth v. Young, 695 A.2d 414, 416
(Pa. Super. 1997).
In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, White must
demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2)
of counsel caused him prejudice. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d
203, 213 (Pa. 2001). Failure to address any prong of the test will defeat an
ineffectiveness claim. Commonwealth v. Williams, 899 A.2d 1060, 1063
(Pa. 2006).
In his first issue, White contends that he was not effectively
identify and advise him of
underlying claim, the alleged Rule 600 violation, is of arguable merit
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because the PCRA court improperly attributed non-excludable time against
him for -15.
The PCRA court found no merit to this claim.2 After a careful
examination of the record, we agree.
To determine whether dismissal is required under
Rule 600, a court must first calculate the mechanical
run date, which is 365 days after the complaint was
filed. Rule 600(C) addresses situations where time
can be excluded from the computation of the
deadline. Case law also provides that a court must
usable
the defendant or his counsel. Excusable delay is
delay that occurs as a result of circumstances
beyond the Commonwealth's control and despite its
due diligence. ... The only occasion requiring
dismissal is when the Commonwealth fails to
commence trial within 365 days of the filing of the
written complaint, taking into account all excludable
time and excusable delay.
Commonwealth v. Colon, 87 A.3d 352, 358 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
As stated above, in an attempt to establish that there is merit to this
claim, White argues that the trial court erred in finding two specific periods
of time excludable or excusable delay for Rule 600 purposes. See
rief at 12-14. The particular instances upon which White bases
2
We note that the in the course of discussing this issue in its opinion, the
PCRA court also concluded that this claim was not cognizable under the
PCRA. PCRA Court Opinion, 10/15/13 at 11. However, pursuant to this
ruling in Commonwealth v. Prout, 814 A.2d 693, 696 (Pa. Super.
2002), a Rule 600 claim couched in terms of ineffectiveness of counsel is
cognizable under the PCRA.
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this claim are the delays caused by the filing of his motion to sever and his
motion for a continuance. Despite the fact that these delays were caused by
his filings, White argues that they should not be excludable because the
Commonwealth acted unreasonably and without due diligence in responding
to these motions. See id. However, even if White were correct and these
periods of time should not have been ruled as excludable or excusable, we
In Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 A.2d 1244, 1260 (Pa. Super
2005), this Court held that delays imposed by a co-defendant are excludable
time for other co-defendants in the same matter for Rule 600 calculations.
As noted above, the criminal complaint was filed against White on March 26,
2009, making his mechanical run date March 26, 2010. Mr. Maldonado filed
an omnibus pre-trial motion on January 29, 2010, and at that time trial was
scheduled to take place on March 9, 2010. PCRA Court Opinion, 10/15/13 at
June 3, 2010, delaying trial by 86 days. All of this time was excludable
under Rule 600 for both Mr. Maldonado and White. See Kimbrough, 872
A.2d at 1260.
The continuance necessitated by the pre-trial motion filed by Mr.
2010 to June 20, 2010. Therefore, in order for White to have a meritorious
Rule 600 claim, he would have had to been brought to trial after June 20,
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2010. White entered his guilty plea on June 1, 2010, which is soundly within
the 365 day requirement. See Commonwealth v. Graham, 576 A.2d 371,
374 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding that for Rule 600 purposes trial commences
on the date the defendant enters a guilty plea). Accordingly, we agree with
merit. As previously stated, the failure to prove one prong of the test
defeats an ineffectiveness claim, so no further inquiry into this issue is
necessary. The PCRA court's findings are clearly supported by the record, as
our independent review confirms, and its decision is free of legal error.
Therefore, White is entitled to no relief on this claim.
guilty plea was unknowingly or involuntarily made due to his lack of
understanding of the requisite mens rea for third degree murder.
rief at 17. We note that White raised this claim on direct appeal
and this Court found that because White did not raise a challenge to the
validity of his plea at any point in the trial court, he had waived the issue.
See White, 1420 EDA 2011 (Pa. Super. June 19, 2012) (unpublished
memorandum).
This Court has held that the failure to petition to withdraw a plea in
the trial court will bar consideration of an attack on one's plea in collateral
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proceedings.3 Young, 695 A.2d at 421 n.4; Commonwealth v. McGriff,
638 A.2d 1032, 1035 (Pa. Super. 1994). Furthermore, Section 9544(b) of
but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in
a prior state post-
Therefore, as White failed to raise this issue before the trial court, he cannot
under this subchapter, the petitioner must
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/29/2014
3
This Court recognized an exception to this rule when a challenge to the
voluntariness of the plea is couched in terms of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Young, 695 A.2d at 421 n.3.
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