In Re: Adoption of J.W., Appeal of: M.W. and L.B. ( 2014 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: J.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: M.W. AND L.B. No. 101 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered December 17, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 63-13-0933
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: J.W. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: M.W. AND L.B. No. 102 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered December 17, 2013,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 63-13-0144
BEFORE: PANELLA, JENKINS, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2014
M.W. (“Father”) and L.B. (“Mother”) appeal the orders entered on
December 17, 2013, which granted the Petitions filed by Washington County
Children and Youth Service (“CYS”) to involuntarily terminate Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights to their minor sons, Jd.W. (born in August of 2011),
and Jm.W. (born in February of 2013), pursuant to § 2511(a)(2) and (b) of
the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). We affirm.
Mother and her family have a history of involvement with CYS dating
back to 2001, dealing with issues of truancy, parenting deficiencies, and
sexual abuse. Mother had originally been adjudicated a dependent child on
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May 1, 2001, but the dependency was terminated on October 30, 2001.
Mother was again adjudicated dependent on May 1, 2007, but her
dependency was terminated on March 5, 2009. Finally, Mother was
adjudicated dependent on October 13, 2011, when Mother was 17 years old,
and Jd.W. was 2 months old. Jd.W. remained in Mother’s care while Mother
was a dependent child in foster care from the time of his birth in September
of 2011 until July 31, 2013, when Mother signed herself out of dependency.
Jm.W. was conceived during the time Father was ordered to have no
contact with Mother and was born in February of 2013, while Mother was in
foster care. Jm.W. also remained in Mother’s care until July 31, 2013. Both
Children have remained in foster care since Mother signed herself out of
dependency. At that time, Mother was informed by CYS that she could keep
the Children with her and transition into independent living, but Mother
chose to leave foster care and reside with Father. See Findings & Order,
12/17/2013, at 2-3.
Mother had been examined by Dr. Ronald Neeper, M.D., Ph.D. and Dr.
Chaudhary, M.D., and it was determined that she was incompetent to make
an informed decision to remove herself from dependency, did not have a
reasonable or rational understanding of the potential consequences, and,
due to her cognitive limitations, was unable to make mature decisions, have
adequate, mature self-control, and be a responsible adult. See id., at 3-4.
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Mother, a victim of sexual abuse as a child, has been diagnosed with
mild retardation and has an I.Q. of 60-63. Mother is preoccupied with
Father and does not appreciate the danger to her and the Children presented
by Father. Father’s undue influence on Mother and her mental retardation
affect Mother’s judgment, and Mother’s cognitive abilities limit her parenting
capabilities. Also, Mother lacks the ability to understand the needs of the
Children and to understand what is safe and unsafe. See id., at 4.
Mother was discharged from parenting classes provided by the Bair
Foundation. In classes, Mother demonstrated ineffective intervention and
poor execution of disciplinary skills, and could not receive instruction
effectively. Similarly, Mother also refused nurturing parenting classes from
Justice Works Youth Care, and does not have the ability to parent
independently or to prepare meals for the Children. See id.
Moreover, Mother has not demonstrated the ability to form an effective
parent-child relationship with the Children. Mother has little emotional
connection with the Children, has displayed a lack of empathy for the
Children, and is unable to react to the Children’s needs. See id., at 4-5.
Mother does have a bond with Jd.W.; however, Jd.W. looks to his
foster mother for parental guidance. It is noted that the Children do not
react adversely upon the conclusion of their visits with Mother. See id., at
5.
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At the time of Mother’s removal from the home of her parents and the
home of Father, Father was 52 years old, a registered sex offender, and had
been having a relationship with Mother since she was 15 years old—and
perhaps younger. Mother was removed by CYS when Father was overheard
threatening Mother with domestic violence.
Father was required to be registered as a sex offender under Megan’s
Law due to his conviction for the sexual assault of his nine-year-old
granddaughter and for his conviction for indecent assault of another minor.
Father’s completion of the Abel Assessment for Sexual Interest-2 (AASI-2)
indicates that Father falls into a deviant range for persistent sexual interest
in three of four categories, including pre-school and grade school age
females and pre-school age males. See id. The results of Father’s
completion of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory indicate that
Father is prone to anger and hostility, resentment and displaces blame on
others, that Father is suspicious and rigid in his social relationships, and that
he tends to misinterpret social situations and has a poor understanding of
social mores. See id., at 5-6.
Father is an untreated sex offender. He is a safety threat to the minor
Children. Father has not completed his court-ordered mental health
assessment, nor has he completed court-ordered sexual offenders’
treatment. He violated the court order restricting him from contact with
Mother, and impregnated Mother during the restriction. It is undisputed that
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Father has not provided any cards, gifts or letters for the Children, and has
not inquired about the Children through CYS. Father has regularly attended
supervised visits with the Children, and his behavior has been appropriate.
There is no evidence that Father has a bond with the Children. The trial
court prudently ruled that the termination of Father’s parental rights would
not be detrimental to the Children and would serve the Children’s best
interests. See id., at 6-7.
On February 6, 2013, CYS filed a Petition for Termination of Parental
Rights of Jd.W., seeking termination with respect to both Mother and Father.
CYS also filed a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights of Jm.W. on July
29, 2013, seeking termination of parental rights of both parents. A
termination hearing was scheduled for October 2, 2013, and was concluded
on December 3, 2013. Mother and Father did not present evidence or testify
at the hearing. Following the hearing, the trial court entered the orders
dated December 16, 2013, and entered on December 17, 2013, terminating
the parental rights of Mother and Father.
On January 15, 2014, Mother and Father filed timely notices of appeal.
Mother and Father filed concise statements of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) on that same date. This
Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated the appeals at 101 and 102 WDA
2014 on February 7, 2014.
On appeal, Mother and Father raise the following issues:
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1. Did the trial court err in finding that competent evidence
established the statutory grounds for termination of M.W.’s and
L.B.’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)?
2. Did the trial court err in finding that the Children’s best
interest were served by terminating M.W.’s and L.B.’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
Appellants’ briefs at 4.
Initially, we review the termination decrees according to the following
standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 614
Pa. 275, 284, 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)].
As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result
merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia
Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011);
Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 630,
634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying
an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at
28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could
support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency
and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
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determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).
Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of
parental rights are valid. See In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super.
2009).
Instantly, although the decrees terminated Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), the
trial court, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, analyzed the orders with respect only
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to § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). This Court must uphold the trial court’s
conclusion with regard to one subsection of section 2511(a) in order to
affirm the termination of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380,
384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Herein, we review the orders pursuant to
§ 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows.
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
Our examination of the record reveals that the trial court’s decision to
terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(2)
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and (b) is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and that there is no
abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
We have read the trial court’s Findings & Order filed on December 17,
2013 and its Opinion filed on March 5, 2014, and we are satisfied that the
trial court’s analysis is accurate and complete. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court orders on the basis of the thoughtful, concise, and well-written
opinions of the Honorable John F.DiSalle, that we adopt as our own.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/12/2014
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