Com. v. Satterthwaite, J. ( 2014 )

J-S55009-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES E. SATTERTHWAITE,
Appellant No. 1943 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 31, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0704341-2003
BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN, and OTT, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2014
James E. Satterthwaite appeals from the judgment of sentence of
eighteen to thirty-six years incarceration after the court found him guilty of
third-degree murder and carrying a firearm on a public street. We affirm.
Appellant shot and killed Norman Vincent Simon on March 24, 2002, at
approximately 2:00 a.m. Police arrested Appellant four days later and
charged him with murder, conspiracy, carrying firearms without a license,
carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia, and possession of an
instrument of crime. Appellant proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found
Appellant guilty of third-degree murder and carrying a firearm on a public
street in Philadelphia. The court sentenced Appellant to eighteen to thirty-
six years incarceration on the third-degree murder charge and a concurrent
nine months to eighteen months incarceration for the firearms violation.
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Appellant appealed and this Court affirmed. Commonwealth v.
Satterthwaite, 883 A.2d 694 (Pa.Super. 2005) (unpublished
memorandum). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of
appeal on December 28, 2005. Commonwealth v. Satterthwaite, 892
A.2d 823 (Pa. 2005).
Subsequently, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition alleging that trial
eyewitness. The PCRA court awarded Appellant a new trial, and the
Commonwealth appealed. A panel of this Court affirmed the grant of a new
trial, Commonwealth v. Satterthwaite, 15 A.3d 519 (Pa.Super. 2010)
(unpublished memorandum), and our Supreme Court denied allowance of
appeal. Commonwealth v. Satterthwaite 24 A.3d 864 (Pa. 2011).
Accordingly, Appellant proceeded to a new trial.
Willie May Tramel testified that she observed the victim, Appellant, and
another individual she knew as Roman at an afterhours club. Ms. Tramel
indicated that the victim appeared angry with Appellant regarding a dispute
seat, Roman in the front passenger seat, and the victim in the back. As she
was walking toward another speakeasy to purchase drugs, she heard four or
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five shots. According to Ms. Tramel, she saw the victim fall out of the car.
The victim was bleeding and unresponsive. Several days after the shooting,
Ms. Tramel provided police with a statement and identified photographs of
the victim, Roman, and Appellant.
Noel Towles also testified. Mr. Towles was incarcerated and had
ctim.
However, he maintained at the second trial that police forced him to provide
that statement by threatening to arrest him. Mr. Towles had also indicated
that the victim and Appellant were arguing over drugs and the use of the
ally, the victim had allowed Appellant to use his vehicle
in exchange for drugs and money. The Commonwealth introduced
Mr. Towles prior testimony that Appellant had shot the victim.
Another witness, Lesa Ellis, who also was a drug user at the time of
the incident, testified that she saw Appellant, the victim, and Roman inside a
car on the day in question. She continued that, shortly after seeing the
individuals, she heard gunfire while on the phone with her sister. When she
went outside, she saw the victim lying on the ground and both Appellant and
Roman were gone.
The court found Appellant guilty of third-degree murder and carrying a
firearm on a public street in Philadelphia. Thereafter, it sentenced Appellant
to eighteen to thirty-six years incarceration for the murder charge and a
concurrent term of two and one-half to five years imprisonment on the
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firearm count. Appellant filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which the
court denied. This timely appeal ensued. The court directed Appellant to file
and serve a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal. Appellant complied, and the trial court authored its decision. The
matter is now ready for our review. Appellant presents two issues for this
.
A.
conviction for third-degree murder because the
Commonwealth failed to disprove that the killing was not
committed in the heat of passion where the evidence showed
and the Commonwealth argued that Appellant killed the
victim while Appellant was in a rage?
B. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion by failing to
Appellant had completed several self-improvement courses
while incarcerated, in violation of the sentencing code?
We review the sufficiency of the evidence by considering the entire
record and all of the evidence admitted at trial. Commonwealth v.
Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 113 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc). We view such
evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict
winner, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the
Commonwealth. Id. When evidence exists to allow the fact-finder to
determine beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crimes charged,
the sufficiency claim will fail. Id.
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need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the
fact-
Id. In addition, the Commonwealth can prove its case by circumstantial
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a
matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
not
-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of
the fact- Id.
Appellant argues that the evidence shows that he killed the victim in
the heat of passion and that he should have been convicted of voluntary
manslaughter. In his view, the Commonwealth failed to establish malice.
He avers that sufficient provocation for voluntary manslaughter may exist
where the cumulative events leading up to the killing cause a sudden and
intense passion. In support, Appellant relies on Commonwealth v.
Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795 (Pa.Super. 2003), and Commonwealth v.
Whitfield, 380 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1977).
In Sullivan, the defendant was actually convicted of voluntary
manslaughter and we upheld that conviction. Sullivan thus offers no
guidance on whether evidence is sufficient for third-degree murder.
Whitfield, however, did involve a third-degree murder conviction. There,
Whitfield alleged that, at most, she should have been convicted of voluntary
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manslaughter. Our Supreme Court rejected that argument on the grounds
that she did not establish legal provocation. Specifically, the Whitfield
Court found that the defendant only had trivial arguments with the victim. 1
Hence, that case does not compel reversal herein.
We add that the trial court in its opinion noted that Appellant did not
argue at trial that he committed the killing in the heat of passion. Rather,
was believed,
he acted in imperfect self-defense and that at most he was guilty of
involuntary manslaughter.2
should have been found guilty of voluntary manslaughter waived. Moreover,
for the reasons outlined by the trial court, at pages four through six of its
-degree
murder conviction.
sentence. To adequately preserve a discretionary sentencing claim, the
defendant must present the issue in either a post-sentence motion or raise
the claim during the sentencing proceedings. Commonwealth v.
Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc). Further, the
defendant mus -ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
____________________________________________
1
The Commonwealth has failed to file a timely brief in this matter.
2
Current counsel did not represent Appellant at trial.
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Id. Importantly,
here is no absolute right to appeal when challenging the discretionary
Id ppeal is permitted only after this Court
determines that there is a substantial question that the sentence was not
Id.
Appellant preserved his issue in his post-sentencing motion, 1925(b)
concise statement, and included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement within his
brief. Therein, he asserts, that the sentencing court failed to consider the
factors delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), and did not take into account his
rehabilitative needs. Appellant maintains that he had prior record score of
zero, and he successfully completed education and vocational training while
he was previously incarcerated for this case. According to Appellant, the
needs. Thus, he submits that he has presented a substantial question for
our review.
the sentence was not appropriate under the sentencing guidelines. See
Commonwealth v. Felmlee, 828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa.Super. 2003).
However, we find that he is not entitled to relief. Appellant relies on
Commonwealth v. Caraballo, 848 A.2d 1018 (Pa.Super. 2004), vacated,
933 A.2d 650 (Pa. 2007), in support of the merits of his position. In this
regard, Appellant argues that it is insufficient for a sentencing court to
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review the presentence report and state that the crime was horrendous.
considered all of the information presented was insufficient. According to
Appellant, the sentencing court did not place its reasons for its sentence on
the record. Appellant continues that he presented numerous mitigating
factors; specifically that he achieved his GED and received additional
educational and vocationa
view, the court did not consider these facts, his sentence must be vacated.
We consider the merits of a discretionary sentencing challenge under
an abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 38 A.3d 846,
858 (Pa.Super. 2011). Our review is also dictated by the statutory
mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and (d). Commonwealth v. Macias,
968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa.Super. 2009). Section 9781(c) provides in relevant
part:
(c) Determination on appeal. The appellate court shall vacate
the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with
instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the
sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing
guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing
guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
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In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence
imposed by the sentencing court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).
Concomitantly, in considering the record we examine:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
defendant, including any presentence investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d); Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263,
1274 (Pa.Super. 2013). Furthermore, we are aware that pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S. § 9721(b):
the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence
imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the
protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to
the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and
the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The court shall also
consider any guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted
by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and taking effect
under section 2155 (relating to publication of guidelines for
sentencing, resentencing and parole and recommitment ranges
following revocation). In every case in which the court imposes a
sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, modifies a sentence,
resentences an offender following revocation of probation,
county intermediate punishment or State intermediate
punishment or resentences following remand, the court shall
make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the
time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the
sentence imposed.
We begin by pointing out that the Caraballo decision relied on by
Appellant was vacated by our Supreme Court in light of Commonwealth v.
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Walls, 926 A.2d 957 (Pa. 2007). Thus, that decision has no precedential
value. Additionally, in Caraballo the sentencing court imposed a sentence
well outside the aggravated range for the crimes charged. Here, the
sentencing court imposed a guideline range sentence.3 Only where the
sentence is clearly unreasonable will we vacate. Cf. Walls, supra; 42
Pa.C.S. § 9771(c)(2).
court had the aid of a presentence investigation and is presumed to have
considered that report. Dodge, supra. The court noted that it considered
Further, in its opinion, the sentencing court set forth that it considered
infractions while incarcerated outweighed any efforts he expended in
Appellant is not entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
____________________________________________
3
The guideline range for third-degree murder includes the statutory
as below that
range.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/15/2014
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA NO. CP-SI-CR-0704341-2003
VS.
JAMES E. SA TTERTHWAITE
F~LED
MAR Ii 7 2014
OPINjON Criminal Appaals Unit
First Judicial Districj· t:;f PA
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant, James E. Satterthwaite, was charged with, inter alia, murder, criminal·
conspiracy, carrying firearms without a license, carrying as firearm on a public street, and
possessing an instrument of crime, generally. These charges were lodged against defendant as a
result of all incident that occurrd on March 24, 2002, during which appellant shot and killed
Norman Simon during an argument.
Appellant was first tried in tried in July of 2004, before the Honorable Katherine Streeter
.
Lewis and was convicted of third-degree murder and carrying as firearm on a public street.
Appellani, who thereafter received.a state sentence of inca.-ceration, filed a direct appeal to the
Superior Court, which on July 13, 3005, issued a memorandum and order affirming the judgment
of sentence. Commonwealth v. Satterthwaite, 2758 EDA ·2004. A petition for allowance of
appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on December 28, 2005, l~ 415 EAL
2005.
1
~xn-'! BI T A>
;
After his petition for allowance of appeal was denied, defendant filed a timely petition
pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act. 42 l'a.C.S. § 9541 el seq. Said petition wa~ a~signcd
to the Honorable Benjamin Lerner, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas for disposition. Judge
Lerner granted the petition on February 6, 2009, and awarded defendant a new trial. The
Commonwealth unsuccessfully appealed to the Superior .Court, which, on October 7, 2009,
affirmed Judge Lerner's order. Commonwealth v. Satterthwaite, 679 EDA 2009. A subsequent
petition filed by the Commonwealth was denied by the Supreme Court on July 27, 2011. (582
EAL 2010).
The matter was then assigned to this Court for trial. After defendant waived his right to a
jury trial, his trial commenced on January 22, 2013. At the conclusion of the trial, this Court
convicted defendant of third-degree murder and carrying a firearm on a public street Sentencing
was deferred \ll1til May 31, 2013, on which date this Comt imposed conCUITent sentences of
eighteen to thirty-six years' and two and one-half to five years' incarceration on the third-degree
murder and weapons offenses respectively.
Following the imposition of sentence, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of
sentence. On June 25, 2013, this COllrt denied that motion after which defendant filed a notice of
appeal as well as a requested Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
FACTS
On March 2,1, 20()2, al approxin"lldy 2:00 a.m., ddC!ndalll, Ih~ viclim, and ·s"I11C(ln~
named Roman were together when defendant and the victim began arguing about defendant'S
use ofMr. Simon's car. Mr. Noel Towles was standing at \he comer of Hoops and Fallon Streets
in Philadelphia and witnessed the argument. Towles knew defendant and the victim and
2
indicated that defendant "rented" the victim's car and used it to sell drugs. As defendant and the
victim argued, Towles heard defendant tell the victim that be was not going to give the victim
any morc drugs and that be was not going to use the victim's car anymore.
The argument between the two men soon became physical and defendant and the victim
exchanged shoves. Defendant then withdrew a firearm trom his pants pocket and fired five
shots, two of which struck the victim killing him.' Defendant then fled the scene of the incident
in a vehicle.
DISCUSSION
In his 1925(b) statement, defendant first asserts that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his conviction of Third-Degree Murder. Specifically, defendant asserts that the
Commonwealth failed to disprove that the killing was not committed in the heat of passion
because even the prosecutor conceded during his closing speech that defendant acted in a fit of
rage when he shot the victim. (N.T. 1/28/1 3, 23).
In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, the court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner - in this case, the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v.
Boczkowski, 846 A.2d 75, 80 (Pa. 2004). Both direct and circumstantial evidence, along with all
reasonable inferences arising therefrom from which the finder of fact could properly have based
its verdict, must be accepted as true and sufficient to support tbe challenged conviction.
Commonwealth v. Perez, 931 A.2d 703, 706-7 (pa. Super. 2007); Commonwealth v. Johnson,
1 At the second trial, Mr. Towles repeatedly disavowed his previous testimony as well as whal
was conlained in his statement to police. Previously, Towles identified defendant as the man he
saw arguing with the victim and the person who shot him. While on direct examination, Mr.
Towles claimed that his earlier statements and testimony were products of police coercion.
When confronted with his prior statement and testimony by the District Attorney, Mr. Towles
stated that "if that's what was written, then that's what I told them" (Nrr p. 74 1/22/20\3).
3
719 A.2d 788 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal denied. The finder.offact may believe all, part, or none
of the evidence regarding the question of whether reasonable doubt existed, and the facts and
circumstances need not be incompatible with the defendant's innocence. Commonwealth v.
Derr, 841 A.2d. 558,559 (Pa. Super. 2004). An appellate court may only award a new trial if the
evidence was so unreliable and contradictory that it would be incapable of supporting a guilty
verdict. Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167, 1167 (Pa. 1993).
"Third-degree murder is estab]jsh~d when a killing is committed wilh malice
aforethought, but without specific intent." 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), (c); Commonwealth v. Solano,
906 A.2d i 180, 1]90 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). Malice is the distinguishing factor between
murder and manslaughter and consists of a "wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty,
recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of so~ial duty, although a particular person
,
may not be intended to.be injured." Commonwealth v. Young, 431 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. 1981).
Malice may be found to exist not only in an intentional killing, but also where the perpetrator
"consciously disregarded an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions might cause
death or serious bodily harm." Id. (citation omitted).
When a person kills another either under the mistaken belief that deadly force was
necessary to save his iife or under "a sudden and internal passion resulting from serious
provocation" by the victim, the killing is without malice lind the crime committed is voluntary
manslaughter. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503 2; Commonweallh ~. While, 424 A2d 1296, 1297 (Pa.
2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) GENERAL RULE. -- A person who kills an individual without lawful justification
commits voluntary manslaughter ifat the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion rt!sulling
from serious provocation by: .
4
1981) ("Voluntary manslaughter is killing committed with(lut malice, in the heat of passion or
under unreasonable belief that it was justified.").
A person is guilty of "heat of passion" voluntary 'manslaughter "if at the time of the
killing [he or she] reacted under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation
by the victim." Commonwealth v. Ragan, 743 A.2d 390, 396 (Pa. 1999). "'Heat of passion'
includes emotions such as anger, rage, sudden resentment or terror which renders the mind
incapable of reason." Commonwealth v. Mason, 741 A.2<:1 708, 713 (Pa. 1999). An objective
standard is applied to determine whether the provocation was sufficient to support the defense of
"heat of passion" voluntary manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1066 (Pa.
2001). "'111<:: ultimate te~t for adequate provocation l'fIllains whethel' a reasonllbJc man,
confronted with this series of events, became impassion~d to the extent that his mind was
incapable of cool reflection." Commonwealth v. Thomton,431 A.2d 248, 252 (Pa. 1981). The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has indicated that both passion and provocation must be
established. and that "if there be provocation without passion, or passion without a sufficient
cause of provocation, or there be time to cool, and reason has resumed its sway, the killing will
be murder." Commonwealth v. Hutchinson. 25 A.3d 277, 315 (Pa. 2011). (quoting
Commonwealth v. Bamoskv. 258 A.2d 512, 515 (Pa. 1969)).
(I) the individual kilted; or
(:.) ilJlo(ll~r Wll\t,ll III': Hutchinson, supra, the Supreme Court found 'that evidence showing that the victim
and Hutchinson were arguing when the murder occun'ed was insufficient to establish adequate
provocation to reduce murder to' manslaughter even where tllere were other factors present. In
addition, the fact that defendant may have been angry with the victim on account of the dispute
over the use of the victim's car and that the two men were arguing and the victim may have
pushed defendant is not the type of anger society recognizes as sufficient to reduce murder to
manslaughter. See Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 416 A.2d 560 (Pa. Super. 1979) (holding that
fact that victim punched defendant insufficient to dispel conclusion that defendant acted with
malice). Accordingly, it is suggested that reliefbe denied with respect to this claim. 3
Defendant next asserts that this Court committed an abuse of discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence. In addition, defendant alleges that this Court failed to consider defendant's
rehabilitative needs as well as his efforts in improving himself while incarcerated.
Whe:u scatencing an individual convicted of a crime. a Court must consider the protection
of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on
the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 18 Pa.C.S. § 9721 (b). Here, the
sentence imposed on the defendant's third-degree murder conviction was within the standard
range of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, so the Superior Court is required to affirm unless
, It is noted that defendant did not argue allriallhat lhe killing was co~milted in the heat of passion and other than
the argument presenled by lhe prosecutor, there was no evidence upon which such a claim could be predicated.
6
it finds that the guidelines were clearly applied unreasona,bly. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c);3 see also
Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957 (Pa. 2007). The standard of review is whether the
sentencing comt abused its discretion, which requires more than an error in judgment; the record
must show that "the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will." Commonwealth v. Smith, 673 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1996). A
sentencing court may commit an abuse of discretion if it considers improper factors when
determir>jng the s~ntence. Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing
Commonwealth v. Archer, 722 A.2d 203 (Pa. Super. 1998)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has subsequently stated, though, that if the sentencing court relies on an improper factor but also
,
offers other, proper reasons for its sentencing decision, it should be affinned. Smith, 673 A.2d at
896-97.
R(.:'gardil1g ']('ft'ned .:11"t a s;,;;]ifi.::ant sentence was warrinted givcn that defendant shot the
unanned victim after a minor dispute and that while incarcerated, defendant had numerous
infractions thereby demonstrating that he had difficulty in following the rules. (N.T. 5/31113,11-
12). Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that defendant's excessive sentencing claim be
denied.
Regarding defendant's claim that this Court did not consider his rehabilitative needs, as
noted in the discussion of the previous issue, this Court considered numerous factors, incitlding
appellant's actions and behavior while incarcerated. Where the sentencing comt had the benefit
of a pre-sentence investigation report, the law presumes that the court was aware of and weighed
relevant infomlation regarding a defendant's chara,cter and any mitigating factors.
Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A. 2d. 362 (Pa. Super. 2005).
[n addition, in this Court's view, the fact that defendant had numerous infractions while
incarcerated outweighed any efforts he expended in rehabilitating himself. Having considered
all relevant factors, this Court complied with the law and, defendant's claim should be deemed
4Defendant had a prior record score of zero. 1n calculating the applicable guidelines ranges this Court noted that Ihe
offense gravity for third-degree murder is fourteen, and that the deadly weapon used enhancement applied. ~ 204
Pa. Code § 303.15.
8
lacking in merit. Commonwealth v. Zurburg, 937 A.2d 1131, 1136 CPa. Super. 2007) (holding
that claim that sentencing court erred by not considering defendant's rehabilitative needs was
without merit because court considered all relevant factors in deciding upon a sentence).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's assertions of error should be dismissed for lack of
merit and the judgment of sentence should be affimled.
By the Court,
Date:J!dq
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