Com. v. Gentilquore, D. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S48012-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION            SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,           : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :      PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee,             :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    DARREN RICHARD GENTILQUORE,             :
    :
    Appellant             : No. 1860 MDA 2013
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 21, 2006,
    Court of Common Pleas, Susquehanna County,
    Criminal Division at No. CP-58-CR-0000183-2006
    BEFORE: DONOHUE, JENKINS and PLATT*, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.:                   FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2014
    Appellant, Darren Richard Gentilquore
    the judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas, Susquehanna
    County, following a conviction on the following charges: two counts of
    criminal attempt to commit homicide, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501(a), 901(a), two
    counts of aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1), and two counts of
    aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4). For the reasons that follow,
    we affirm.
    A summary of the relevant facts and procedural history is as follows.
    , a resident of New Jersey, purchased
    property. Shaun and Gentilquore became friends. On May 26, 2006, Shaun
    long
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S48012-14
    Memorial Day Weekend.
    invited the Bigelows to come to his property to sit around the fire.    N.T.,
    11/13/06, at 208.    A
    Id. Gentilquore
    began to follow the Bigelows on his ATV. Id. at 209-10. While on the trail
    uore ran his ATV
    Id. at 210-11. Gentilquore
    agreed to pay for the damage, resolving the situation without any incident.
    Id. at 211-12.
    The Bigelows, Gentilquore, McCormick, Jim Velcheck, and two of
    McCormick
    Id. at 213-14.    Later in the evening, Gentilquore started a fight with
    -
    property and Gentilquore obliged. Id. at 255. Shortly after Gentilquore left,
    gunshots were fired. Id. at 256-
    an
    stop shooting because it was scaring the kids.    Id. at 217.   There was a
    pause in the shooting, but shortly thereafter, gunshots began again. Id. at
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    218-19. Ryan decided he was g
    him to stop. Id. at 219-20.
    Id. at 220.   Gentilquore did not
    respond to Ryan. Ryan told Gentilquore to co
    Id. at 224. Gentilquore did not respond so
    to get Shaun. Id. at 232. Ryan believed that Shaun would be able to get
    Gentilquore to stop shooting the gun since they were friends. Id.
    property. Shaun arrived first and quietly knocked on the door.
    Id.
    because he was angry and as retaliation for Gentilquore hitting his ATV
    earlier in the evening. Id. at 236. Ryan p
    front door to his house and bang on the door. N.T., 11/15/06, at 62-63.
    Gentilquore came to the front door with a gun.          Id. at 63-64; N.T.,
    Id. at 237. Ryan approached the door, at
    which time, Gentilquore told him to get off his property or else he was going
    Id. at 239. Ryan told Gentilquore if he did not come
    outside and face him wit
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    threatened to burn his house down. N.T., 11/13/06, at 224; N.T., 11/15/06,
    at 64-65.
    Gentilquore proceeded to stick the barrel of the gun out of the storm
    door and poked Ryan with the gun.           Id. at 240.      Ryan then called
    Id. at 241. Gentilquore pulled the trigger, shooting Ryan
    in the abdomen at point blank range.             Shaun began screaming at
    Id. at 92. Gentilquore turned towards Shaun and shot
    him in the abdomen. Id.
    Gentilquore was charged with two counts of criminal attempt to
    commit homicide and four counts of aggravated assault. A jury convicted
    Gentilquore on all charges on November 15, 2006. On December 21, 2006,
    the trial court sentenced Gentilquore to 20-40 years of incarceration on
    count one of criminal attempt to commit homicide and 20-40 years of
    incarceration on the second count of criminal attempt to commit homicide,
    to run consecutive to the first count. N.T., 12/21/06, at 38-39. The four
    counts of aggravated assault merged with counts one and two and therefore,
    Gentilquore was not sentenced on those charges. Id. at 3, 40.
    On January 2, 2007, Gentilquore filed a petition for reconsideration of
    sentence, which the trial court denied on January 10, 2007.         Gentilquore
    filed a direct appeal to this Court challenging the discretionary aspects of his
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    sentenc
    the discretionary aspects of his sentence waived and affirmed his judgment
    of sentence.
    While Gentilquore waited for disposition of his direct appeal, he filed a
    pro se PCRA petition.    This pro se PCRA petition was held in abeyance
    disposition, affirming his judgment of sentence, Gentilquore filed a series of
    amended PCRA petitions, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel by both
    the PCRA court on July 12, 2010. Gentilquore appealed.
    This Court vacated the PCRA c
    proceedings after concluding that the PCRA court violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
    a hearing.     On March 21, 2012, the PCRA court provided notice to
    Gentilquore of its intention to dismiss his PCRA petition pursuant to
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Gentilquore filed another amended PCRA petition on May
    2, 2012. The PCRA court entered an order on July 9, 2012, dismissing the
    May 2, 2012 PCRA petition. Gentilqu
    this Court.
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    appeal nunc pro tunc                                             include a Pa.R.A.P.
    Commonwealth v. Gentilquore, 1461 MDA 2012, at 7 (Pa. Super.
    September 12, 2013) (unpublished memorandum).                   On September 18,
    2013, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas issued an order
    nunc pro tunc.
    Gentilquore timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court. On direct appeal,
    Gentilquore raises the following issues for our review1:
    1.       Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in, over the objection of
    counsel, allowing the admission of prior wrongs to
    prove the state of mind of [Gentilquore] about his
    property and identity w[h]ere the admission did not
    fit within an exception to Pa.R.E. 404(b) and, even if
    it had, the probative value did not outweigh the
    unfair prejudice?
    2.       Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err, over the objection of [t]rial
    [c]ounsel, allowing the cumulative testimony from
    witnesses unconnected with the victims to testify
    that [Gentilquore] would shoot on his property lat[e]
    at night which was not only irrelevant to the present
    right to a fair trial?
    3.       Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in, over the objection of
    [t]rial [c]ounsel, allow the admission and publication
    of color photographs of the Bigelows to the jury
    thereby inflaming the passions of the jury and
    depriving [Gentilquore] of a fair trial?
    1
    Gentilquore was not ordered to file a 1925(b) statement. The trial court
    did not file a 1925(a) opinion in this matter. However, the
    addresses all of the issues that Gentilquore raises in his appeal. We further
    disposition.
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    4.    Should [Gentilquore] be granted a new trial as a
    result of the amendment to 18 Pa.C.S.A. section
    505(2.1) better known as the Castle Doctrine?
    For his first issue on appeal, Gentilquore claims that the trial court
    -35, 38-40. At trial,
    after Gentilquore objected to the admission of their testimony to establish
    prior bad acts, such as shooting firearms on his property and making
    terroristic threats, the trial court made a ruling that the evidence was
    admissible to prove motive, intent, state of mind, and identity as to the
    shooter. N.T., 11/13/06, at 4.
    We begin with our well-settled standard of review:
    The admission of evidence is a matter vested within
    the sound discretion of the trial court, and such a
    decision shall be reversed only upon a showing that
    the trial court abused its discretion. In determining
    whether evidence should be admitted, the trial court
    must weigh the relevant and probative value of the
    evidence against the prejudicial impact of that
    evidence. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to
    establish a material fact in the case or tends to
    support a reasonable inference regarding a material
    fact. Although a court may find that evidence is
    relevant, the court may nevertheless conclude that
    such evidence is inadmissible on account of its
    prejudicial impact.
    Commonwealth v. Page, 
    965 A.2d 1212
    , 1219 (Pa. Super. 2009).
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    Rule 404(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provides that
    of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
    for other limited purposes, including, but not limited to, establishing motive,
    opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of
    mistake or accident, common scheme or design, modus operandi, and the
    Commonwealth v.
    Kinard, __ A.3d __, 
    2014 WL 848273
    , at *3 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing
    Commonwealth v. Brookins, 
    10 A.3d 1251
    , 1256 (Pa. Super. 2010),
    appeal denied, 
    22 A.3d 1033
     (Pa. 2011)).       The trial court may admit the
    evidence for these limited purposes if the probative value of the evidence
    outweighs its potential prejudicial effect. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2).
    Gentilquore threatened the lives of her and her dogs if they ever entered his
    -62.
    ructions to the
    relate to the identity, state of mind, and motive and/or intent of Gentilquore.
    Id. at 176.
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    Gentilquore argues that the trial court erred under Rule 404(b)(1) in
    fear and did not want to kill the Bigelows, but felt it was necessary to protect
    himself and his family, as he was afraid that Ryan would burn his house
    down and kill him. N.T., 11/13/06, at 68. He further testified that he shot
    from the hip and shot low because he did not want to kill Ryan. Id. at 69-
    Id. at 71. Shaun then appeared, however, and knocked out the
    was about to lift his leg to walk through the door. Id. at 71. Gentilquore
    and that he was terrified at that moment. Id. at 72. In sum, Gentilquore
    simply entering onto his property, but, rather shot them at his front door
    after the Bigelows had been acting in a threatening manner which is
    Id. at 33.
    court indicated that it permitted the introduction of the Vis testimony based
    upon its relevance to show motive, intent, state of mind, and identity under
    order for evidence of prior bad acts to be admissible as evidence of motive,
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    the prior bad acts must give sufficient ground to believe that the crime
    currently being considered grew out of or was in any way caused by the
    Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    900 A.2d 936
    , 940 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Melendez-
    Rodriguez, 
    856 A.2d 1278
    , 1283 (Pa. Super. 2004)). In this case, there is
    reat directed at Vis.
    With respect to intent or state of mind, the Commonwealth did not
    elicit any testimony regarding when the Vis threat occurred. Moreover, the
    incidents   with   Vis   and   the   Bigelows   share   no   factually   similarities
    whatsoever.    Vis testified that Gentilquore threatened her after he had a
    near collision with a friend of hers on the road, N.T., 11/13/06, at 162, while
    property, outside of his front door, with Ryan banging on the door and
    between the two incidents that would enable the jury to determine
    was acting in self-defense when he shot the Bigelows.
    demonstrated that Gentilquore was an aggressive landowner, and therefore
    had a propensity to engage in aggressive or violent behavior towards
    trespass
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    that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
    Supreme Court has succinctly stated that
    (t)he purpose of this rule is to prevent the conviction
    of an accused for one crime by the use of evidence
    that he has committed other unrelated crimes, and
    to preclude the inference that because he has
    committed other crimes he was more likely to
    commit that crime for which he is being tried.
    The presumed effect of such evidence is to
    predispose the minds of the jurors to believe the
    accused guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of
    the presumption of innocence.
    Kinard,   
    2014 WL 848273
    ,    at   *3    (emphasis    added)    (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Spruill, 
    391 A.2d 1048
    , 1049 (Pa. 1978)). Accordingly,
    aggressive landowner, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting
    2
    Nevertheless, in Commonwealth v. Stafford, 
    749 A.2d 489
     (Pa.
    Super. 2000), this Court held:
    Not all improper references to prior bad acts will
    e passing
    2
    Gentilquore cites to Commonwealth v. Seiders, 
    614 A.2d 689
     (Pa.
    Seiders reveals that our Supreme Court held that prior crimes may not be
    introduced as evidence of intent in cases where intent is not at issue.
    Seiders, 614 A.2d at 691. Unlike Seiders, the ultimate issue presented to
    the jury in this case was whether Gentilquore shot the Bigelows in self-
    defense. Thus, Seiders is inapplicable to this case.
    - 11 -
    J-S48012-14
    references to criminal activity will not require
    reversal unless the record indicates that prejudice
    present when the properly admitted evidence of guilt
    is so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the
    error is so insignificant by comparison that it is clear
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not
    Id. at 496-
    adopted in Pennsylvania, reflects the reality that the accused is entitled to a
    Commonwealth v. Hetzel, 
    822 A.2d 747
    ,
    759 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Drummond, 
    775 A.2d 849
    , 853 (Pa. Super. 2001)). After our review of the record, we conclude
    to the verdict in light of the overwhelming evidence properly admitted at
    trial, and therefore, constitutes harmless error.
    In this case, the ultimate issue presented to the jury was whether
    Gentilquore shot the Bigelows in self-defense.          Self-defense rights are
    governed by 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505. Section 505 provides, in relevant part:
    (a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the
    person. The use of force upon or toward another
    person is justifiable when the actor believes that
    such force is immediately necessary for the purpose
    of protecting himself against the use of unlawful
    force by such other person on the present occasion.
    (b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use
    of force.
    ***
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    (2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable
    under this section unless the actor believes
    that such force is necessary to protect himself
    against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping
    or sexual intercourse compelled by force or
    threat; nor is it justifiable if:
    (i) the actor, with the intent of causing
    death or serious bodily injury, provoked
    the use of force against himself in the
    same encounter; or
    (ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the
    necessity of using such force with
    complete safety by retreating, except the
    actor is not obliged to retreat from his
    dwelling or place of work, unless he was
    the initial aggressor or is assailed in his
    place of work by another person whose
    place of work the actor knows it to be.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505.3
    -defense,   the
    Commonwealth bears the burden of disproving the self-defense claim
    Commonwealth v. Chine, 
    40 A.3d 1239
    ,
    1243 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Houser, 
    18 A.3d 1128
    ,
    1135 (Pa. 2011)). This Court has held that
    The Commonwealth sustains this burden if it
    establishes at least one of the following: 1) the
    accused did not reasonably believe that he was in
    danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the
    accused provoked or continued the use of force; or
    3
    Section   505   was   amended,   effective   August   29, 2011, adding
    -(2.6). As will
    be discussed infra, these additions do not apply to this case as the incident
    occurred in May 2006.
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    3) the accused had a duty to retreat and the retreat
    was possible with complete safety.
    Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    2014 WL 3844118
    , at *3 (Pa. Super. Aug. 6,
    2014) (citing Commonwealth v. Hammond, 
    953 A.2d 544
    , 559 (Pa.
    Super. 2008), appeal denied
    Commonwealth can negate a self-defense claim by proving the defendant
    Smith,   
    2014 WL 3844118
    ,   at   *4   (citing
    Commonwealth v. Truong, 
    36 A.3d 592
    , 599 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en
    banc)).
    Although Gentilquore claimed that he acted in self-defense when he
    shot the Bigelows, no evidence introduced at trial established that
    Gentilquore was justified in using deadly force to protect himself. First, no
    testimony established that either of the Bigelows were armed during the
    confrontation with Gentilquore. While Gentilquore argued that he feared for
    house down, Gentilquore never testified that Ryan had a weapon, a blow
    torch, a can of gasoline, a Molotov cocktail, or any fire-starting device on
    him. Id. at 127, 162. Gentilquore also admitted that he did not see a gun
    the incident, also testified that he did not see any weapons in either of Ryan
    11/14/06, at 119.
    - 14 -
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    In Commonwealth v. Witherspoon, 
    730 A.2d 496
     (Pa. Super.
    deadly weapon against a rela                                 not a justifiable
    level of force. Id. at 499 (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court echoed
    this position in Commonwealth v. Rivera, 
    983 A.2d 1211
     (Pa. 2009),
    Id. at 1221. As a result,
    unjustifiable, and the result of this case could not be impacted by the
    Moreover, the evidence establishes that Gentilquore was not justified
    in using deadly force to protect himself in light of the evidence showing that
    the Bigelows
    reasonable person would not have believed he was in imminent danger of
    death or serious bodily injury.   In this case, the Bigelows never entered
    at all times.    Gentilquore admitted that he remained in his house and
    ignored Ryan the first time he came to his property, and that Ryan left a few
    minutes later.    N.T., 11/15/06, at 54-56.     Although Ryan admitted to
    banging on Gentilquo
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    J-S48012-14
    and Shaun testified that they never attempted to gain entry to the house.
    N.T., 11/13/06, at 95-96, 229-30.       Furthermore, Gentilquore provided his
    version of the events as they unfolded, testifying that as Ryan stood outside
    pussy and then I - -                                            -69, 121-24.
    Given this evidence, we conclude that there was overwhelming
    evidence to negate                                           -defense and to
    convict him of criminal attempt to commit homicide and aggravated assault,
    cordingly, Gentilquore is
    not entitled to relief on this issue on appeal.
    With respect to the testimony of Hogle and Beaudry, we conclude that
    the trial court did not err or commit abuse of discretion in admitting this
    evidence.    Hogle testified that Gentilquore often shot firearms on his
    property late at night and that he called the police on the night in question
    -84.
    ening
    or early morning hours after Gentilquore moved to the area and that he
    heard gunshots and yelling on the night in question. N.T., 11/14/06, at 6-8.
    explain why [Gentilquore] shot the Bigelows, and was, in fact, irrelevant to
    proving the identity of the shooter, since [Gentilquore] admitted that he shot
    - 16 -
    J-S48012-14
    the Bigelow[s] and, also, never denied that he shot his firearm on his
    admission that he shot the Bigelows, we agree that identity was not at issue.
    However, we fail to see how testimony that Gentilquore shot firearms on his
    bad acts
    In Commonwealth v. Luster, 
    71 A.3d 1029
     (Pa. Super. 2013), the
    appellant was charged with murdering a woman he was romantically
    involved with. 
    Id. at 1035-37
    . At trial, an individual who lived in the same
    apartment building as the victim testified that he often heard the appellant
    and the victim arguing.   
    Id. at 1049-50
    .    The appellant objected to this
    testimony as irrelevant and on appeal, asserted that the testimony was
    evidence of prior bad acts and
    
    Id. at 1050
    .
    This Court determined that the testimony could not be characterized as
    
    Id.
    In this case, Gentilquore asserted that the testimony portrayed him as
    depriving [him] of t
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    J-S48012-14
    relevant character issue leading to an inference of propensity. Gentilquore
    never argued at trial or on appeal that the testimony tended to convey to
    the jury that because he shot firearms on his property at night, he
    demonstrated a propensity to shoot people.       Rule 404(b) only prohibits
    order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
    accordance with the character
    this case, if anything, the testimony that Gentilquore shot firearms on his
    property was neutral in this aspect as it established that he shot firearms on
    his property on a multitude of occasions without harming anyone.
    testimony of Hogle and Beaudry.
    For his second issue on appeal, Gentilquore argues that the trial court
    the Bigelows, as well as others who had direct contact with [him] that
    Id. at 39.    Gentilquor
    etched into the minds of the jurors the picture of [Gentilquore] disturbing
    Id. As a result, Gentilquore argues that the cumulative evidence deprived
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    J-S48012-14
    Id. at 40.
    As this Court has hel
    Commonwealth v. Walsh, 
    36 A.3d 613
    , 621 (Pa. Super.
    2012) (citing Pa.R.C.P. 223(1); Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    694 A.2d 1086
    ,
    constituted reversible error, such rulings must not only have been erroneous
    Collins v.
    Cooper, 
    746 A.2d 615
    , 619 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citing Romeo v. Manuel,
    
    703 A.2d 530
    , 532 (Pa. Super 1997) (citations omitted)).
    in the following discussion:
    guy
    fires his gun on his property.     He has numerous
    witnesses to testify to it.
    Attorney Legg: It will take five minutes, Your Honor.
    The Court: Is this your last witness as to that issue?
    Attorney Legg: As to the unconnected threat,
    correct. I mean, I have people from New Jersey that
    will testify that Mr. Gentilquore was at their camp,
    left their camp, the gun fire started.
    The Court: On that night?
    Attorney Legg: On that night      well, as well as the
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    J-S48012-14
    The Court:     Well,   I   think    we   can   offer   him.
    Overruled.
    N.T., 11/14/06, at 3.
    The trial court held that although the evidence presented was
    cumulative, the cumulative evidence did not prejudice Gentilquore, stating,
    mony to the same fact so undermined
    the truth determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
    cumulative evidence not been presented, the result of the proceeding would
    
    Id.
     After a review of the record, we agree.
    court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a
    danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
    issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
    l evidence of the same character as existing evidence and that
    Commonwealth v.
    G.D.M., Sr.
    Dictionary, Seventh Edition, at 577).
    In this case,
    property was substantially similar to the testimony provided by ten other
    witnesses, including seven who were connected with the events of the
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    J-S48012-14
    evening and Gentilquore himself.       Beaudry did not offer any additional
    evidence to strengthen or bolster the testimony, but simply provided that
    testimony was cumulative.
    However, Gentilquore failed to establish how the admission of
    Be
    that
    Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it
    prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a
    decision based upon something other than the legal
    propositions relevant to the case
    Commonwealth v. Folely, 
    38 A.3d 882
    , 891 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing
    Commonwealth v. Page, 
    965 A.2d 1212
    , 1220 (Pa. Super. 2009)).
    We note that Gentilquore specifically challenged the admission of
    evening.     However, Gentilquore failed to distinguish the testimony of
    Beaudry from the testimony of the witnesses connected with the events of
    the evening.    Thus, although the evidence was cumulative, there is no
    to the verdict. As a result, pursuant to our standard of review, we conclude
    that the t
    For his third issue on appeal, Gentilquore argues that the trial court
    erred in allowing the admission and publication of color photographs of the
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    J-S48012-14
    Bigelows   to   the   jury   thereby   inflaming   the   passions   of   the   jury.
    have no other effect but to prejudice the minds of the jury by causing the
    members of the jury panel to be improperly and unfairly influenced by
    Id. at 37.
    The standard of law for admitting photographs is well settled.           Our
    Supreme Court has held that
    [t]he admissibility of photographs falls within the
    discretion of the trial court and only an abuse of that
    discretion will constitute reversible error. The test
    for determining whether photographs are admissible
    involves a two-
    decide whether a photograph is inflammatory by its
    very nature.        If the photograph is deemed
    inflammatory, the court must determine whether the
    essential evidentiary value of the photograph
    outweighs the likelihood that the photograph will
    improperly inflame the minds and passions of the
    Commonwealth v. Lowry, 
    55 A.3d 743
    , 753 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal
    citations omitted) (citing Commonwealth v. Malloy, 
    856 A.2d 767
    , 776
    (Pa. 2004)).
    In this case, the photographs of the Bigelows were, by their very
    natu
    wounds, the wounds as they healed, and Shaun on a ventilator.                  N.T.,
    11/13/06, at 97-98, 249-
    inflammatory nature of the photographs, the trial court was required to
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    J-S48012-14
    determine whether the essential evidentiary value of the photographs
    outweighed the likelihood that the photographs would improperly inflame the
    minds and passions of the jury.
    At trial, Gentilquore argued that the colored photographs had no
    probative value because the Bigelows could adequately describe their
    injuries in detail and their doctors and medical records could detail how the
    injuries affected them.   Id. at 98.   Thus, Gentilquore asserted that the
    purpose of the colored photographs was to show blood and to inflame the
    jury. Id. at 98-99. Conversely, the Commonwealth argued that they were
    offering the photographs to prove serious bodily injury. Id. at 99. The trial
    relevant to prove
    essential evidentiary value that their need clearly outweighed the likelihood
    7/9/12, at 18.
    We agree that the photographs possessed evidentiary value to prove
    Bigelows sustained serious bodily injury eliminated the probative value of
    the photographs.   See id. at 251-
    inflammatory photograph is merely cumulative of other evidence, it will not
    Commonwealth v. Wright, 
    961 A.2d 119
    , 138
    (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    864 A.2d 460
     (Pa.
    - 23 -
    J-S48012-14
    2004)).   Thus, the trial court erred in admitting the color photographs to
    prove serious bodily injury.
    For the same reasons as set forth hereinabove with respect to the Vis
    admitting the color photographs was harmless, as the properly admitted
    evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that the error did not prejudice
    Gentilquore, or the prejudicial effect of the error was de minimis.
    Gentilquore admitted that he shot the Bigelows, and no evidence at trial
    established any justification to use deadly force to protect himself or any
    basis for a reasonable person to believe he was in imminent danger of death
    or serious bodily injury when he did so.        In short, Gentilquore shot the
    Bigelows, and not in self-defense. As a result, the erroneous admission of
    the color photographs was so insignificant by comparison to the properly
    admitted evidence of guilt that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    error could not have contributed to the verdict.
    For his fourth issue on appeal, Gentilquore argues that he should be
    granted a new trial as a result of the amendments to the self-defense
    Brief at 40. The Pennsylvania legislature expanded
    self-defense rights by amending section 505 on June 28, 2011, which
    became effective on August 29, 2011.         Gentilquore asserts that the 2011
    amendments should be applied retroactively to this case. Id. at 41.
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    J-S48012-14
    Section 505(b)(2.1) provides:
    Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2.2), an
    actor is presumed to have a reasonable belief that
    deadly force is immediately necessary to protect
    himself against death, serious bodily injury,
    kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force
    or threat if both of the following conditions exist:
    (i) The person against whom the force is used
    is in the process of unlawfully and forcefully
    entered and is present within, a dwelling,
    residence or occupied vehicle; or the person
    against whom the force is used is or is
    attempting to unlawfully and forcefully remove
    dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle.
    (ii) The actor knows or has reason to believe
    that the unlawful and forceful entry or act is
    occurring or has occurred.
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(b)(2.1).
    Commonwealth v.
    Thomas, 
    51 A.3d 255
    , 260 (Pa. Super. 2012).                 Section 1926 of the
    retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the General
    retroactive    effect   of   statutes.      However,   as   this   Court   held   in
    Commonwealth v. Estman
    provides [] that legislation concerning purely procedural matters, not
    substantive matters, may be applied to litigation existing at the time of
    - 25 -
    J-S48012-14
    Id. at 1212.
    (citing                                                       , 
    715 A.2d 384
    procedural laws are those that address methods by which rights are
    Estman, 868 A.2d at 1212 (citing Commonwealth v. Morris,
    
    771 A.2d 721
    , 738 (Pa. 2001)).
    In this case, Gentilquore constructed two arguments for retroactive
    argument is based upon the
    specifically recognized that the amendment to section 505 was derived from
    ancient common law doctrine, law that already existed, it manifestly
    expressed its intent that the Amendments to section 505 be applied
    mere fact that it relates to antecedent events, or draws upon antecedent
    provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its
    Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
    7 A.3d 868
    , 871 (Pa. Super.
    2010) (citing In the Interest of K.A.P., Jr., 
    916 A.2d 1152
    , 1159 (Pa.
    Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted)).    In this instance, there is no
    indication in the statute that the legislature intended section 505(b)(2.1) to
    apply retroactively. Accordingly, absent the clear and manifest intention of
    - 26 -
    J-S48012-14
    retroactively. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1926.
    are substantive in nature, and therefore, must be applied retroactively. Id.
    at 42.    This argument is self-defeating.        Estman established that only
    legislation   concerning   purely    procedural     matters   may   be   applied
    retroactively.   Estman, 868 A.2d at 1212.            As previously stated, the
    amendments to section 505(b)(2.1) expanded self-defense rights. Thus, the
    amendments to section 505(b)(2.1) necessarily create, define, and regulate
    self-defense rights and are thereby substantive in nature.       As substantive
    hat he should be
    granted a new trial as a result of these amendments is denied.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Jenkins, J. joins the Memorandum.
    Platt, J. concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/9/2014
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