Lukus, C. v. Lepre, G., Jr. ( 2016 )


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  • J-A09020-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    CHRISTINE LUKUS                                  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    GERALD S. LEPRE, JR.
    Appellant                No. 1690 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order Entered September 16, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2011-DR-16
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.:                                 FILED MAY 23, 2016
    Appellant Gerald S. Lepre, Jr. (“Father”) appeals from the order of the
    Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County terminating the child
    support owed by him as of June 12, 2014, rather than in January 2014, and
    ordering that Father be responsible for payment of outstanding court costs
    related to the petition. We affirm.
    Following the appeal of a prior court of common pleas order, this Court
    provided the following factual and procedural background:
    D.L.S. (“Mother”) and Father are the biological parents of
    M.L. (“Child”). [Christine Lukus (“Grandmother”)] is
    Father’s mother. On December 27, 2006, Mother obtained
    primary physical custody of Child. Thereafter, Mother and
    Child’s relationship deteriorated. In 2010, Mother allowed
    Child to reside with Grandmother and Grandmother’s
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A09020-15
    husband at their Susquehanna County home, where she
    remains.1
    1
    In January 2011, Father filed a petition for
    modification, seeking primary physical custody of
    Child. On July 16, 2012, the court denied Father’s
    petition. Significantly, the court determined the best
    interests of Child mandated that Mother maintain
    primary physical custody. The court also announced
    its approval of Mother’s decision to enter into a
    temporary arrangement with Grandmother, allowing
    Grandmother to provide for Child’s custodial needs.
    On March 6, 2013, this Court affirmed the order
    granting primary physical custody to Mother. See
    G.S.L., Jr. v. D.L.S., No. 1486 MDA 2012,
    unpublished memorandum at 9 (Pa.Super. filed
    March 6, 2013).
    Memorandum, C.L. v. G.S.L., Jr., 769 MDA 2012, 1578 MDA 2012
    (Pa.Super. filed Apr. 24, 2013). In 2011, Grandmother filed a complaint for
    support     against    Father.        The      trial   court   adopted   the   master’s
    recommendation that Father pay child support for Daughter to Grandmother.
    This Court affirmed. 
    Id. On February
    6, 2014, Father filed a petition to terminate child support,
    alleging Daughter reached the age of 18 in January 2014, and, therefore,
    Father should no longer be obligated to pay child support. Brief In Support
    of Petition for Review, filed Feb. 6, 2014.1
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Grandmother filed a petition to modify the existing support order, which
    she withdrew at the September 16, 2015 hearing. N.T., 9/16/2015, at 2.
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    J-A09020-15
    On September 16, 2015, the trial court ordered that the child support
    obligation was terminated effective June 12, 2014 and ordered that Father
    pay any outstanding court costs related to his petition.2
    On September 25, 2015, Father filed a timely notice of appeal. The
    trial court did not order, and Father did not file, a concise statement of
    reasons relied on for appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule 1925(b).      The
    trial court did not issue a 1925(a) opinion.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    The Brief of the Susquehanna County Domestic Relations Department
    explains the delay in this case as follows:
    In the instant matter, it is imperative that this Honorable
    Court be aware that the pendency of the Petition to
    terminate Support in excess of one and one-half (1.5)
    years was a result of certain circumstances, specifically a
    scheduling order on the Petition had to be forwarded to a
    specially presiding judge due to numerous recusals by
    prior judges, and by the time the scheduling order was
    received, the date scheduled had passed and the matter
    had to be rescheduled to a future date. By the time that
    order was received there was pending a second federal
    civil rights lawsuit filed by Appellant against numerous
    defendants, including but not limited to undersigned
    counsel, the Susquehanna County Domestic Relations
    Department and employees of the Department, and
    Appellee, with underlying issues as to administration of the
    child support matter and determinations of the Court. As
    such, there was no action taken in the matter pending
    resolution of the federal civil rights lawsuit. Upon the
    dismissal of the federal civil rights matter as to the
    defendants      including    undersigned    counsel,     the
    Susquehanna and employees of the Department, and
    receiving an appropriately dated scheduling order, the
    Appellant’s Petition was promptly heard.
    Appellee’s Brief at 3 n.1.
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    Appellant raises the following claims on appeal:
    I. Whether the court below committed an error of law,
    abused its discretion or violated constitutional rights when
    it determined an adult was entitled to child support on and
    past the adult[’]s eighteenth (18th) birthday?
    II. Whether the court below committed an error of law,
    abused its discretion or violated constitutional rights when
    it failed to refund any overpayments in child support?
    Appellant’s Brief at 5.
    Father’s first issue maintains the trial court erred when it terminated
    the child support effective on Child’s graduation from high school, rather
    than from her eighteenth birthday.
    This Court’s standard of review of orders addressing child support is as
    follows:
    [T]his Court may only reverse the trial court’s
    determination where the order cannot be sustained on any
    valid ground. We will not interfere with the broad
    discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the
    discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support
    order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
    judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides
    or misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised is shown
    by the record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the
    product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion
    has been abused.
    Mackay v. Mackay, 
    984 A.2d 529
    , 533 (Pa.Super.2009) (quoting Samii v.
    Samii, 
    847 A.2d 691
    , 694 (Pa.Super.2004)).
    Although Child attained the age of 18 in January 2014, she did not
    graduate from high school until June 12, 2014.
    Pennsylvania law provides that “[p]arents are liable for support of their
    children who are unemancipated and 18 years of age or younger.” 23
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    Pa.C.S. § 4321(2).    Further, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
    provide that “the domestic relations section shall administratively terminate
    the child support charging order without further proceedings on the last to
    occur of the date the last child reaches eighteen (18) or graduates from high
    school.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.19(e)(4).
    Appellant maintains that the trial court erred when it terminated the
    support obligation on the date of graduation, because the statute does not
    require payment of child support following the child’s 18th birthday,
    regardless of whether he or she has graduated from high school. Appellant’s
    Brief at 9-10. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, has found that
    a child is entitled to support until he or she graduates from high school.
    Blue v. Blue, 
    616 A.2d 628
    , 633 (Pa.1992) (“notwithstanding a child
    reaching majority at age 18, a parental duty of support is owed until a child
    reaches 18 or graduates from high school, whichever event occurs later.”).
    In Blue, the Court found:
    A basic education as guaranteed by our Commonwealth
    constitution must be available to all Commonwealth
    citizens. In many instances, high school students reach
    their 18th birthday prior to graduation from high school. It
    would make no sense to terminate a support order while a
    child is attending high school. The rigors of high school are
    difficult enough without worrying about how a child is
    going to support himself for the remaining days of his high
    school education. Therefore, notwithstanding a child
    reaching majority at age 18, a parental duty of support is
    owed until a child reaches 18 or graduates from high
    school, whichever event occurs later. This will ensure that
    children have a minimum education in order to prepare
    them for the challenges of life.
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    J-A09020-15 616 A.2d at 632-33
    .3
    Further, this Court has found that a child attending high school is not
    emancipated,      without     additional       evidence   to   support   a   finding    of
    emancipation.      Castaldi      v.    Castaldi-Veloric,       
    993 A.2d 903
    ,      911
    (Pa.Super.2010) (18-year-old daughter not emancipated where she had not
    graduated high school, and there was no evidence she lived separately from
    Mother, had the ability to support herself, or expressed a desire to live
    independently of Mother); Robinson-Austin v. Robinson-Austin, 
    921 A.2d 1246
    , 1247-48 (Pa.Super.2007) (fact that child still attended high
    school was sufficient to establish he was incapable of supporting himself).
    The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding that Father’s
    obligation to pay child support ceased upon Child’s graduation from high
    school, not upon her eighteenth birthday.
    Father next maintains that the court erred, abused its discretion, or
    violated his constitutional rights when it failed to refund any overpayments
    of child support. Appellant’s Brief at 10.
    The   Domestic      Relations    Department        maintains   that   during    the
    pendency of Father’s petition, it held support payments in abeyance.                    If
    ____________________________________________
    3
    The Court in Blue addressed a son’s request for support payments from his
    father for his college 
    education. 616 A.2d at 629
    . The Court found the
    father did not have an obligation to pay for his son’s post-secondary school
    expenses, which it found the father did not owe because the Pennsylvania
    state legislature had not yet enacted a statute addressing whether there was
    a support obligation for post-secondary expenses. 
    Id. at 632.
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    Father has not been refunded any support paid following Child’s June 12,
    2014 graduation date, he is entitled to a refund. The Department shall remit
    any overpayments, beyond the June 12, 2014, date to Appellant.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/23/2016
    -7-