Interest of: M.C.M., A Minor, Appeal of: B.M. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.C.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: B.M., NATURAL FATHER :
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: No. 33 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order December 4, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000103-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: B.M., NATURAL FATHER :
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: No. 34 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order December 4, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000104-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.C.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.M., BIRTH MOTHER :
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: No. 35 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered December 1, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000103-2017
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IN THE INTEREST OF: M.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: S.M., BIRTH MOTHER :
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: No. 36 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order December 1, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000104-2017
BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JULY 17, 2018
B.M. (“Father”) and S.M. (“Mother”) appeal from the orders entered
December 4, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, that
granted the petitions of the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and
Families (“CYF”), to involuntarily terminate their parental rights to two
daughters, M.C.M. and M.M.1 After careful review, we affirm.
M.C.M. was born in May 2010. M.M. was born in October 2013. CYF
became involved with M.C.M. and M.M. in the fall of 2014. N.T., 12/1/17, at
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 On January 11, 2018, this Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated Mother’s
two appeals with regard to the termination of her parental rights to M.C.M.
and M.M. The order also consolidated Father’s two appeals with regard to the
termination of his parental rights to the children, and listed his appeals to be
decided consecutively with Mother’s appeals. The trial court discussed all of
the appeals in a single opinion entered March 6, 2018. We shall likewise
review these matters in a single memorandum for ease of disposition.
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53. CYF received two referrals. Id. One indicated that a caretaker burned
M.M. The other asserted that M.C.M. and M.M. were left home alone. Id.
CYF closed both of the 2014 referrals at the intake level. Id. Subsequently,
CYF received a referral in February 2016 alleging that Father was incarcerated,
and Mother was caring for M.C.M. and M.M. Id. at 52. The referral claimed
Mother used heroin, Suboxone and crack. Id. As a result, M.C.M. was often
outdoors by herself, and the home had needles within reach of M.C.M. and
M.M. Id. The CYF investigation confirmed Mother’s use of Suboxone and
heroin. Id. at 53. CYF also confirmed Father was attending inpatient drug
and alcohol treatment. Id. at 54.
CYF met with Mother, M.C.M., and M.M. on multiple occasions. Id.
Mother requested assistance obtaining substance abuse and mental health
treatment. Id. CYF implemented a safety plan developed with Mother on
March 24, 2016. Id. at 55. When CYF met with Mother on March 24, 2016,
Mother admitted daily or near daily substance abuse. Id. CYF referred Mother
to Mercy Behavioral Health for mental health treatment. Id. at 55. CYF also
located a bed for Mother at Family Links, an inpatient drug and alcohol
treatment center where Mother could have M.C.M. and M.M. with her. Id.
Because of the age of the children, the safety plan required Mother to have
daily phone contact with CYF. Id. at 55-56. Mother did not maintain contact
with CYF. Id. at 56. CYF conducted two unannounced home visits. Id. When
CYF conducted the visits, the caregiver for M.C.M. and M.M. was an individual
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Mother had identified as unsafe to be around M.C.M. and M.M. Id. As a result,
CYF obtained an order for emergency protective custody of M.C.M. and M.M.
on March 31, 2016. Id. On May 18, 2016, the orphans’ court adjudicated
M.C.M. and M.M. dependent. Id. at 58-59. The order required Mother and
Father to undergo drug and alcohol treatment, submit weekly random urine
screens, attend parenting classes, attend domestic violence classes, and
obtain appropriate housing. The order permitted liberal supervised visitation.
On June 21, 2017, CYF filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother’s
and Father’s parental rights to M.C.M. and M.M. The trial court conducted the
hearing on the petitions on December 1, 2017. CYF presented the testimony
of clinical psychologist Dr. Neil Rosenblum, CYF supervisor Erin Snyder, and
caseworker Marci Bolger. Father and Mother both testified on their own
behalves. M.C.M. and M.M., represented by Eli Zlokas, Esquire, did not call
any witnesses, but did cross-examine Dr. Rosenblum, Ms. Snyder, and
Father.2 By separate orders dated December 1, 2017, and entered December
4, 2017, the trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Mother
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2 On September 6, 2017, in separate orders relating to M.C.M. and M.M., the
trial court appointed Attorney Zlokas to “represent the child’s legal interests.”
Orders of Court, 9/6/17. At the hearing, Attorney Zlokas informed the court
he “did have an opportunity to view the children and interview the children in
their foster home. That happened on November 12th, Your Honor.” N.T.,
12/1/17, at 185. He also argued to the court “[t]hese adults have made their
choice. These children have made their choice, Your Honor. They want to stay
where they’re at. Adoption serves their needs.” Id. at 186.
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and Father to M.C.M. and M.M.3 The trial court involuntarily terminated
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),
and (b). The trial court involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).
Thereafter, on January 3, 2018, Mother and Father filed notices of
appeal, along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).4
Father raises the following issues for review:
1. Is the [t]rial [c]ourt’s finding a grounds for [i]nvoluntary
[t]ermination of [a]ppellant’s [p]arental [r]ights under 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), § 2511(a)(5) and § 2511(a)(8) proven
by a showing of clear and convincing evidence?
2. Is the [t]rial [c]ourt’s finding that [t]ermination of [p]arental
[r]ights serves the developmental, physical and emotional
needs and welfare of M.C.M. and M.M.] proved by clear and
convincing evidence as required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
Father’s brief at 8.
Mother raises the following issue for review:
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3 The trial court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of unknown
father of M.C.M. The unknown father has not filed an appeal and is not a party
to the instant appeal.
4 Father’s notice of appeal, with respect to the order involuntarily terminating
his parental rights to M.M., is not included in the certified record for the docket
involving M.M. However, Father’s notice of appeal, captioned with both the
dockets for M.C.M. and M.M., is included in the certified record at the docket
involving M.C.M. Accordingly, Father’s appeal of the order involuntarily
terminating his parental rights to M.M. is properly before this Court pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(4).
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1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the children
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
Mother’s brief at 8.
We review these claims mindful of our well-settled standard of review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). This Court may
affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights
with regard to any one subsection of § 2511(a) as well as § 2511(b). See In
re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). With respect to
Mother, she solely contests the trial court’s finding of sufficient grounds as to
§ 2511(b). With regard to Father, we will focus our analysis on § 2511(a)(2),
and (b), which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
....
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
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efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Our Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under § 2511(a)(2) as follows:
As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for
termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.” . . .
This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for termination
under § 2511(a)(2):
A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made
lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can
seldom be more difficult than when termination is based upon
parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in enacting the
1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of
performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who
refuses to perform the duties.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).
This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent
efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002). A parent’s
vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the
necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous. Id. at 340.
In addressing § 2511(a), the trial court concluded:
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Evidence and testimony presented at the TPR hearing
demonstrated that Father’s extensive criminal history and his
repeated periods of imprisonment, together with his ongoing
substance abuse, has precluded him from being able to
adequately provide for the care of his children. CYF presented
credible evidence and testimony that following the children’s
removal from parental care, CYF provided Father with various
services to assist him in improving his ability to parent, and to
address his drug and alcohol problems, with limited success.
Following Father’s most recent release from imprisonment, Father
received drug and alcohol inpatient treatment. However, as
recently as August, 2017, Father incurred new criminal charges
for alcohol-related incidents, indicating a continued inability to
successfully manage his substance abuse in a manner that would
permit him to provide the children with stable and appropriate
parental care. Additionally, following his release from prison,
Father was unable to secure and maintain housing appropriate for
visits with the children, and made little progress towards creating
a stable home environment for the children. Furthermore,
although this [c]ourt granted Father visitation with the children,
Father attended only 27 of 79 scheduled visits. The inconsistency
of his visits has interfered with the ability of the children to
develop a consistent and stable bond with Father, and further
evidences a failure by Father to become a reliable parental figure
and demonstrate that he has made parenting of his children a
priority. In addition, CYF presented credible testimony that Father
has difficulty maintaining stable employment, further impeding his
ability to provide for the needs of his children.
This [c]ourt is cognizant of Father’s positive qualities,
including the fact that Father accepts responsibility for his
shortcomings, in particular his substance abuse problems and the
unhealthy family environment that he created for his children. In
addition, this [c]ourt is aware that Father has a good relationship
with the children with whom he is patient and loving. However,
Father has difficulty maintaining his relationship with the children
because of his repeated criminal conduct resulting in
incarceration. Moreover, Father’s substance abuse which
contributed to the removal of the children from parental care,
continues to interfere with his ability to care and provide for them,
and Father himself admitted to a history of ongoing drug and
alcohol abuse which he has been unable to successfully address.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/6/18, at unnumbered 4-5.
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Father asserts “[t]he primary reason for removal of [M.C.M. and M.M.]
from their parents’ care were the Drug and Alcohol issues of both parents.”
Father’s brief at 15. Father argues that he completed two inpatient drug and
alcohol treatments successfully and followed up with outpatient treatment.
Id. at 16. He also contends that his drug screens were negative. Id. at 16-
17. Father also points to alleged inconsistencies with regard to housing and
visitation. Id. at 18-19. While Father acknowledges that he did not
participate in domestic violence or mental health programs, he asserts that
he did engage in an in-home parenting program. Id. at 17-18. Accordingly,
Father contends that CYF failed to meet its burden pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(a)(2).
Our review of the certified record supports the trial court’s finding of
sufficient grounds for termination under § 2511(a)(2). Father received a
referral to Arsenal for parenting services, but did not provide any
documentation that he completed the program, although Father did discuss
parenting with an in-home provider on several occasions. Id. at 84. Father
did not participate in mental health programming. Id. at 87. Father attended
an initial appointment for a domestic violence program. Id. at 88. He did not
return. Id. Father attended 27 of 79 scheduled visits. Id at 90. Further,
while Father asserts that he successfully completed inpatient and outpatient
drug and alcohol treatment, the record does not support his successful
completion of treatment. The testimony at trial indicated Father
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unsuccessfully completed outpatient drug and alcohol programming. Id. at
86. Father testified that his primary drug of choice is alcohol. Id. at 158. At
the time of the hearing, Father acknowledged a pending driving under the
influence charge. Id. at 147. The exhibits offered by CYF, and admitted into
evidence, show this charge arose out of an August 2017 traffic stop. See
Exhibit CYF 4. When questioned on his relapse, Father testified he “just
couldn’t deal with my daughters being gone. The first three days - - three
days after I got out, I had my first visit and I just lost it.” N.T., 12/1/17, at
155-56. Father acknowledged drinking as recently as the week before the
termination hearing. Id. at 159.
Dr. Rosenblum performed a series of evaluations with regard to Father,
M.C.M., M.M. and the foster parents.5 Dr. Rosenblum testified that Father
acknowledged that alcohol had been a continuing problem for him for quite
some time. Id. at 12. With regard to treatment, Father did not deny that he
did not follow through regularly with drug and alcohol treatment. Id. at 13-
14. Further, Father “estimated that he’s been in the Allegheny County Jail 12
times” and has a “very long and extensive history of criminal activity.” Id. at
10. At the time of the hearing, Father acknowledged being imprisoned most
recently from January 2017 to May 2017. Id. at 147, 150. Father recognized
“that there was a lot of chaos.” Id. at 15. Dr. Rosenblum testified M.C.M.
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5 Mother did not appear for her appointment with Dr. Rosenblum.
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knew “that [Mother and Father] would drink and smoke and fight one
another.” Id. at 20. M.C.M. recalled “her dad would say bad words and be
mean to her mom and hit her, and that the police would come to the house
and that she recalled that her dad got arrested.” Id. at 17. M.C.M. indicated
to Dr. Rosenblum “she did not feel safe when she lived with her mother and
her father.” Id.
At the time of the evaluation in September of 2017, Father did not have
employment. Id. at 11. At the hearing, Father testified he worked at a
grocery store. Id. at 152. Further, he did not have housing. Id. at 11.
Instead, he lived with his grandmother and hoped to relocate to Sewickley.
Id. at 11-12. CYF assessed Father’s housing and found it inappropriate for
visits. Id. at 84.
As this Court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while
a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s
need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope
for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super.
2006). The record substantiates the conclusion that Father’s repeated and
continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has caused M.C.M. and M.M.
to be without essential parental control or subsistence necessary for their
physical and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d
1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003). Moreover, Father cannot or will not remedy
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this situation. See id. Accordingly, the certified record supports the trial
court’s finding that CYF established the statutory grounds to terminate
Father’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2).
Having found that grounds exist to terminate parental rights under
§ 2511(a), we assess the orphans’ court’s assessment of the children’s needs
and welfare pursuant to § 2511(b). This Court has stated that the focus in
terminating parental rights under § 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the
child pursuant to § 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999,
1008 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of
termination under § 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows.
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791
(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [533 Pa. 115, 121, 620 A.2d
481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of
the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the
emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost
attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal
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citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and
make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances . . . where
direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not
necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d
753, 762 (Pa.Super. 2008).
A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this analysis:
concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply
because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only
dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the
dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be
reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,
after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through
the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent . . . Nor
are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the
parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to
establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological
aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the
development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional
health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs
of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary
termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where
placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A]
parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child
is converted, upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s
right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a
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permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856
(Pa.Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
The trial court found termination under § 2511(b) appropriate, writing:
Upon careful review of the evidence and testimony presented at
the TPR hearing, this [c]ourt concluded that termination of Mother
and Father’s parental rights best serves the children’s physical and
emotional needs and welfare. Mother and Father’s parental
deficits, criminal conduct, and ongoing substance abuse has
detrimentally affected the children, and continues to do so. Dr.
Rosenblum, a licensed psychologist who conducted an evaluation
of M.C.M., testified that M.C.M. reported to him that her parents
did not take care of her, and that her mother “drank alcohol all of
the time” which “made her act funny.” N.T., 12/1/16, at 17. She
reported that her Father would say “bad words and be mean” to
Mother and “hit her”, and that police sometimes came to the
home. Id. She stated that she did not feel safe when she lived
with Mother and Father. With respect to M.C.M.’s, mental health,
Dr. Rosenblum opined that she suffers from nervousness and
anxiety resulting from her upbringing with her parents, and has
been affected by past traumatic experiences including exposure
to her parents’ substance abuse, domestic violence, and
incarceration.
At the time of the TPR hearing, M.C.M. had been in the same foster
home for a year and a half, and strongly stated to Dr. Rosenblum
that she felt safe there. According to Dr. Rosenblum, M.C.M.
evidenced that she received love, attention and stability from her
foster parents, from which she was benefitting. Dr. Rosenblum
reported that while M.C.M. cares about her parents, it was her
foster parents who provided her with emotional stability and
security. With regard to her relationship with Father, M.C.M.
reported that her father informed her that he would like her to
return home, but she stated firmly to Dr. Rosenblum that she
wants to stay at the foster home where she feels safe. Dr.
Rosenblum reported that M.C.M. is emotionally connected to
foster parents. Additionally, Dr. Rosenblum testified credibly that
Mother and Father’s inability to “stabilize their lives” has created
“anxiety and uncertainty” for the children and prevented them
from achieving “security” that would allow then to move their lives
forward in a positive direction. N.T., 12/1/17 at 38-39.
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Following an interactional evaluation with foster parents and both
children, Dr. Rosenblum reported that the children received love
and attention from their foster parents with whom both children
were relaxed and affectionate, and that the children feel very
much at home with and are attached to their foster parents. The
foster parents did report to Dr. Rosenblum that because of the
inconsistency of visitation with Mother and Father, the children
experience confusion as to what to expect from their parents, and
it impairs their ability to feel stable and secure.
It appears from the foregoing that the effects of Mother and
Father’s continued substance abuse and criminal activity, along
with their limited contact with the children, has [affected] and
continues to detrimentally affect the children. The children have
developed a meaningful and affectionate relationship with their
foster parents, who provide for the emotional, physical, and
mental health needs, and with whom the children have a stable
and loving familial relationship. While Dr. Rosenblum reported
that M.C.M. would likely have some difficulty not seeing her
parents again, and has affection for them, termination of the
parental relationship would not cause irreparable harm. With
respect to M.M., Dr. Rosenblum testified that she does not appear
connected to her parents or to retain attachment to them as
parental figures, indicating that termination would not
detrimentally affect her.
Although Father and Mother clearly love their children, their
behaviors have caused the children considerable trauma. The
uncertainty and upheaval caused by Mother and Father’s
intermittent entry and departure from the children’s lives due to
repeated incarcerations and substance abuse has caused the
children anxiety, contributes to an ongoing lack of stability in the
children’s lives, and interferes with the development of a healthy
parent-child relationship. The inconsistent visitation by Mother
and Father, coupled with their repeated inability to provide the
children with a stable environment has negatively affected both
M.M. and M.C.M. Moreover, Mother admitted to ongoing problems
with substance abuse and her recent incarceration, as well as
Father’s most recent charges for driving under the influence in
August 2017 evidence continued failure by both Mother and Father
to prioritize parenting, and provide stable, consistent care and
support for the children.
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Evidence and testimony presented at the TPR hearing indicates
that both children will continue to benefit from the stable,
supportive environment of their foster home. The children have
bonded with their foster parents on whom the children rely and
look to as parents, who provide the children with love and
affection and who are able to meet their needs. Although the
children, particularly M.C.M., may experience sadness at the loss
of their parents, termination of parental rights would provide them
with future stability and the opportunity to develop and thrive in
a stable, loving environment in which their needs are being met
in a manner that Father and Mother have not and continue to be
unable to provide.
After careful review of the testimony and evidence this [c]ourt
concludes that CYF established by clear and convincing evidence
that grounds existed for termination of Mother and Father’s
parental rights and that termination of their parental rights best
served the needs and welfare of the children.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/6/2018, at unnumbered 6-9.
Mother and Father raise interrelated issues with regard to the trial
court’s termination of their parental rights pursuant to § 2511(b). Father
asserts, “the [c]ourt erred in its finding that [CYF] proved by clear and
convincing evidence that Termination of [Father’s] Parental Rights best meets
the needs and welfare of the Child as set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).”
Father’s brief at 27. Further, Father highlights that M.C.M. and M.M. were
happy to see him, his bond with M.C.M., and the fact that his interactions with
the children were gentle, patient, and affectionate. Id. at 22. Father also
asserts that M.C.M. and M.M. had difficulty separating from him after the
evaluation. Id.
Mother identifies testimony “that at least the older child, M.[C.]M., may
need some additional therapy to help understand that she may never again
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have contact with Mother or Father.” Mother’s brief at 17. Accordingly,
Mother argues “[t]he needs and welfare of the children, at least M.[C.]M., are
best served by Mother and Father retaining their parental rights so future
contact can be assured and the detrimental impact of termination avoided.”
Id. Mother acknowledges “[t]here was evidence establishing Mother’s
minimal contact with her children while in foster care, however Mother never
stopped loving her children and continues to want what is best for them.” Id.
Mother concludes that she “believes [M.C.M. and M.M.] will be best served by
ultimate placement with Father and that there is no benefit to terminating
Mother’s parental rights if Father’s remain intact.” Id. at 18.
Contrary to Mother’s and Father’s assertions, the certified record
corroborates the trial court’s analysis pursuant to § 2511(b). M.C.M. and M.M.
have resided in the same foster home since April 2016. N.T., 12/1/17, at 62.
The foster home is a pre-adoptive resource. Id. The foster parents, C.M. and
C.M. (“Foster Parents”), have M.C.M. and M.M. involved in a lot of activities.
Id. at 96. Further, the children call Foster Parents mom and dad. Id.
On direct examination, Mother’s counsel questioned Mother regarding
whether she believed M.C.M. and M.M. would be better served by Mother
remaining in their lives or without her. Mother responded, “[r]ight now, I
would say without me.” Id. at 169. Mother expressed hope to have the
children back with her “[w]hen I’m better. I’m not - - when I’m better.” Id.
At the time of the hearing, Mother acknowledged being incarcerated for at
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least the next nine months. Id. at 165. Between March 2016 and May 2017,
Mother visited M.C.M. and M.M. twice. Id. at 77. Further, the court entered
aggravated circumstances orders on July 5, 2017 for her failure to maintain
substantial and continuing contact for six months. Aggravated Circumstances
Orders, 7/5/17. Mother did not obtain appropriate housing, did not maintain
contact with CYF, did not engage in parenting services, continued to abuse
drugs, failed to address her mental health issues, and did not undergo
domestic violence counseling. N.T., 12/1/17, at 77-82.
Father testified, “I love my kids dearly and I don’t deserve to not have
them.” Id. at 153. Father believed he attended every visit since his release
from jail except for one. Id. at 149-50. Ms. Snyder testified that two days
before the termination hearing Father attended a visit and called the
caseworker “the devil.” Id. at 101. This upset M.C.M. and she stopped
interacting with Father and he did not attempt to re-engage her. Id.
In performing his evaluation, Dr. Rosenblum interviewed M.C.M. She
told him “her parents didn’t take care of her.” Id. at 16. M.C.M. described
her mom as nice but indicated that Mother would “drink alcohol all the time,
and it made her act funny.” Id. at 17. M.C.M. also discussed the domestic
violence that she was exposed to, indicating that “her dad would say bad
words and be mean to her mom and hit her, and that the police would come
to the house and that she recalled that her dad got arrested.” Id. M.C.M.
reported “she did not feel safe when she lived with her mother and her father.”
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Id. M.C.M. preferred to stay with Foster Parents, because “they’re nice to her
and don’t say bad words and treat her well.” Id. at 17-18. M.C.M. informed
Dr. Rosenblum “she is happy where she is and this is where she wants to
stay.” Id. at 18. M.C.M. is very connected with Foster Parents. Id. at 45.
They are the people who make M.C.M. feel happy, and from whom she gets
love and attention. Id. at 20. Dr. Rosenblum believed that M.C.M. has a
primary attachment to Foster Parents. Id. Dr. Rosenblum testified that Foster
Parents have made M.C.M. feel safe and provide her with the security and
stability that M.C.M. did not experience when living with Mother and Father.
Id. at 20-21.
While Dr. Rosenblum did not doubt that Father cared about his
daughters, he observed that M.M. did not want to connect or interact with
Father very much. Id. at 21-22. Dr. Rosenblum testified that M.C.M. and
M.M. went through a year-and-a-half where they had very minimal contact
with Mother and intermittent contact with Father. Id. at 24. Both M.C.M. and
M.M. transferred their attachments to Foster Parents. Id. Dr. Rosenblum
opined that both M.C.M. and M.M. have “moved on and connected to a new
family and a new direction in their life.” Id. at 25. Dr. Rosenblum believed
M.C.M. has some bond with Father but was not sure that M.M. had such a
bond. Id. at 29. Dr. Rosenblum opined M.C.M. may need some additional
therapy due to the fact she may not have contact with her birth parents, but
he did not believe that it would cause M.C.M. major trauma. Id. at 25. Dr.
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Rosenblum believed termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights would
not cause irreparable harm or psychological damage that could not be
addressed. Id. at 26.
Thus, as confirmed by the record, termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights serves M.C.M.’s and M.M.’s developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare and was proper pursuant to § 2511(b). While
Mother and Father may profess to love their children, a parent’s own feelings
of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental
rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. At the time of the hearing, M.C.M. and
M.M. resided with Foster Parents for almost two years and are thriving. They
are entitled to permanency and stability. As we stated, a child’s life “simply
cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to
handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s
basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super.
2004) (citation omitted). Accordingly, based upon our review of the record,
we find no abuse of discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately
terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.
Orders affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/17/2018
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