Goggin Moving, Inc. v. Estate of Jane M. O'Brien ( 2014 )


Menu:
  • J-S59036-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION            SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    GOGGIN MOVING, INC.,                   :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant       :
    :
    v.                   :
    :
    THE ESTATE OF JANE MCCARTHY            :
    :
    PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, FRANK         :
    :
    :
    Appellee        :    No. 1012 EDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order Entered February 27, 2014,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County,
    Civil Division at No(s): 13-9406
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, LAZARUS, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:              FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2014
    Goggin Moving, Inc. (Goggin) appeals from the order entered on
    February 27, 2014, which denied its petition to enforce a settlement
    agreement. We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the background underlying this matter as
    follows.
    Goggin is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal
    office located at 2115 Belvedere Avenue, Havertown,
    Pennsylvania.   In October of 2004, Goggin entered into a
    2012 with her personal property
    facility and arrears due and owing for storage fees.   Probate
    e the
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S59036-14
    to reside.
    Enforce [a Settlement Agreement] filed on September 23, 2013.
    Goggin alleges that the parties established terms for a
    settlement agreement concerning the arrears allegedly owed to
    Goggin through several text messages, emails and telephone
    via
    text message on February 14, 2013. Goggin alleges that the
    [E]st
    The Estate filed Preliminary Objections on October 15,
    2013 arguing that Goggin improperly commenced the action by
    petition, that the [t]rial [c]ourt lacks jurisdiction over the matter
    and that the parties did not reach a settlement agreement.
    Preliminary Objections on November 4, 2013 arguing that the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow for
    preliminary objections to be filed in response to a petition, that it
    is permissible to commence an action by petition and that
    jurisdiction is proper in the [t]rial [c]ourt. The Estate filed an
    December 2,
    2013.
    2014 and, subsequently, issued the [order dated] February 24,
    nt to
    finding that the action was improperly commenced by petition
    and that the [t]rial [c]ourt lacks jurisdiction to distribute the
    assets of a decedent's estate.
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/21/2014, at 1-3 (citations omitted).
    Goggin timely filed a notice of appeal. The trial court directed Goggin
    to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Goggin subsequently filed a 1925(b)
    statement.    In its brief to this Court, Goggin asks us to consider the
    questions that follow.
    -2-
    J-S59036-14
    1) Do actions taken by a warehouseman under 13 Pa.C.S.
    § 7210, et seq.
    their [sic] warehouse to recover unpaid storage fees without any
    court involvement whatsoever, equate, or impliedly equate, to
    an
    settlement agreement via petition, as opposed to [] initiating a
    lawsuit for breach of contract, when (1) the settlement
    agreement was entered into to prevent the sale of the goods in
    the warehouse after the warehouseman began the sale process
    authorized by 13 Pa.C.S. § 7210, et seq. and (2) the
    warehouseman sold their [sic] warehouse after the settlement
    agreement was reached?
    2)    Can a warehouseman, who has not been fully paid in
    accordance with a contract to store goods in his warehouse and
    thus has the statutory right to sell those goods to obtain owed
    but unpaid storage fees under 13 Pa.C.S. § 7210, et seq. and
    who also agrees to accept a settlement offer to forgo his
    statutory right to sell the goods after beginning actions to
    enforce those rights, and then subsequently sells their [sic]
    warehouse, proceed via a Petition to Enforce Settlement, instead
    of instituting a civil action for breach of contract, to enforce that
    settlement?
    3) Must a warehouseman, who, pursuant to 13 Pa.C.S. § 7210,
    et seq. begins to sell goods stored in his warehouse to recover
    unpaid storage fees, file a lawsuit for breach of contract to
    enforce a subsequently accepted settlement offer?
    While Goggin purports to present three issues on appeal, he only
    -10.
    substantial amount of money for use of its storage facility.            Goggin
    m
    facility and that, pursuant to 13 Pa.C.S. §§ 7201-7210, it could enforce that
    -3-
    J-S59036-14
    paying an agreed upon amount of money.         Goggin asserts that it sold its
    storage facility and that, after it did so, the Estate reneged on its promise to
    pay Goggin. Thereafter, Goggin filed in the trial court its petition to enforce
    a settlement agreement.
    The trial court dismissed the petition, concluding, inter alia, that
    Goggin improperly attempted to commence an action by petition rather than
    by properly filing a writ of summons or a complaint.       Trial Court Opinion,
    5/21/2014, at 4-6.    Goggin takes the position that the court erred in this
    regard.   Goggin seems to believe that, because the alleged settlement
    agreement it reached with the Estate grew out of its statutory right to
    enforce its lien without court intervention, it was permitted to commence
    this action by filing a petition instead of a complaint. We disagree.
    Goggin seeks damages in the amount of money that the parties
    allegedly agreed the Estate would pay to Goggin. Thus, Goggin presents a
    breach of contract cause of action.        See Sullivan v. Chartwell Inv.
    Partners, LP, 
    873 A.2d 710
    , 716
    action involves (1) the existence of a contract, (2) a breach of a duty
    As this Court has explained,
    -4-
    J-S59036-14
    an action must be commenced as provided by the Pennsylvania
    Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise expressly provided by
    statute. The rules provide for
    filing with the prothonotary (1) a praecipe for a writ of
    summons[ or] (2) a complaint[.] Pa.R.C.P. 1007. The rules do
    not provide for commencement of an action by petition and rule.
    ction may be
    Floczak v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
    433 A.2d 885
    , 887 (Pa. Super.
    1981) (citation omitted).1
    No statute exists that would allow Goggin to commence a breach of
    contract action by filing a petition to enforce a settlement agreement.
    Rather, Goggin had to file a writ of summons or a complaint to begin such
    an action.     Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the
    petition.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/17/2014
    1
    At the time Floczak was decided, the Rules of Civil Procedure also allowed
    a party to file with the prothonotary an agreement for an amicable action.
    That option has been eliminated from Pa.R.C.P. 1007.
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1012 EDA 2014

Filed Date: 9/17/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024