Com. v. Newman, R. ( 2014 )


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  • J-S54021-14
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    RICHARD STEVEN NEWMAN
    Appellant                No. 519 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the PCRA Order March 12, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001895-2008
    CP-36-CR-0001896-2008
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:                       FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2014
    Appellant, Richard Steven Newman, appeals from the March 12, 2014
    order dismissing his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction
    Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Contemporaneously with this
    appeal, counsel has requested leave to withdraw in accordance with
    Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
    (Pa. 1988), Commonwealth v.
    Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
    (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc), and their progeny. After
    careful review, we grant counsel leave to withdraw and affirm the order of
    the PCRA court.1
    ____________________________________________
    1
    The Commonwealth has indicated it will not be filing an appellate brief in
    this matter.
    J-S54021-14
    On February 26, 2010, Appellant pled guilty but mentally ill to
    stalking2 at CP-36-CR-0001895-2008, and one count each of burglary and
    criminal attempt       homicide,3 at CP-36-CR-0001896-2008. The PCRA court
    summarized the remaining facts and procedural history of this case as
    follows.
    Following a hearing on the record, the [trial
    c]ourt made a finding that [Appellant] was mentally
    ill pursuant to the Crimes Code definition and that he
    did not meet the definition of legal insanity. After
    conducting a colloquy with [Appellant], the [trial
    c]ourt accepted the guilty pleas. [Appellant] waived
    his right to a presentence investigation and
    immediately stood for sentencing. [On February 26,
    2010, Appellant] received consecutive sentences on
    each count, resulting in an aggregate sentence of not
    imprisonment].
    [Appellant] did not file a post-sentence motion
    or Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of
    Pennsylvania. [Appellant] timely filed his [pro se]
    PCRA petition on January 18, 2011 and present
    counsel[, Vincent J. Quinn, Esquire (Attorney
    Quinn)], was appointed [on January 26, 2011]. [On
    November 2, 2012, Attorney Quinn] filed an
    Amended PCRA [petition] alleging that trial counsel[,
    Richard E. Meanix, Esquire (Attorney Meanix),] was
    ineffective for advising [Appellant] to waive his right
    to a presentence investigation and for failing to
    present Sandra McCloskey as a witness at
    sentencing. The waiver issue was denied without a
    hearing and the [PCRA c]ourt submitted a notice
    ____________________________________________
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1.
    3
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502 and 901.
    -2-
    J-S54021-14
    pursuant to Pa.Crim.P 907 of its intent to dismiss
    without a hearing. A PCRA hearing was scheduled to
    develop the second issue.        [Attorney Quinn]
    attempted to file a Second Amended PCRA [petition]
    alleging that [Attorney Meanix] was ineffective for
    sentencing; the [PCRA c]ourt denied that request
    because the sentencing transcript indicated that
    sentencing.
    An evidentiary hearing was held on January
    22, 2014. At the hearing, the defense presented
    three witnesses, [Attorney] Meanix, [Appellant], and
    Sandra McCloskey. Attorney Meanix testified that he
    met with [Appellant] prior to sentencing and they
    discussed calling Ms. McCloskey as a witness; both
    desired that she testify at sentencing.     Attorney
    Meanix attempted to contact Ms. McCloskey through
    contact within the family for character witnesses.
    Attorney Meanix testified that he only spoke to Ms.
    McCloskey on the day after sentencing.          She
    informed him that she knew sentencing had been the
    prior day, but as there was the possibility of bad
    weather, she had assumed it would be rescheduled
    and did not attend. Attorney Meanix also testified
    that after [Ap
    Michael, stood up and said that if they testified, their
    testimony would be the same.
    [Appellant] testified that he had no contact
    with Ms. McCloskey and that he did not discuss
    contacting her with his son Jamie.          Sandra
    McCloskey testified that she knew [Appellant] as a
    volunteer through her organization. Ms. McCloskey
    testified that [Appellant] was always dependable,
    consistent, pleasant, and overall a steady, good
    v
    arrest, she knew him for about three years and
    would have testified on his behalf and as to his
    character at sentencing, but she was never asked.
    Upon questioning by the [PCRA c]ourt, Ms.
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    J-S54021-14
    McCloskey testified that she submitted a character
    letter on behalf of [Appellant] for his sentencing for
    stalking in Chester County in 2007. Th[e PCRA
    c]ourt noted that it was aware of this character letter
    particular case.
    PCRA Court Opinion, 3/12/14, at 1-3.
    Following the evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court entered an order
    2014.     On March 21, 2014, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a
    concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with
    Pennsylvania    Rule   of   Appellate   Procedure   1925(b),   within   21   days.
    Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement on April 1, 2014. In lieu of a
    formal Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court filed a one-paragraph
    memorandum that same day, indicating that it was relying on the reasoning
    set forth in its prior March 12, 2014 opinion. See PCRA Court Memorandum,
    4/1/14, at 1. Thereafter, on June 17, 2014, Attorney Quinn requested leave
    to withdraw in accordance with Turner/Finley and their progeny. Appellant
    On appeal, Attorney Quinn raises the following is
    behalf.
    [1.]   [Whether Appellant] was denied the effective
    assistance of counsel in that Attorney Meanix
    failed to call Sandra McCloskey as a witness at
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    J-S54021-14
    Turner/Finley Brief at 3.
    Commonwealth v.
    Koehler                                                                  ] scope of
    review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of
    record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the
    
    Id. In order
    to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner
    must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction
    or sentence arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9543(a)(2). These issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).                                ibility determinations,
    Commonwealth
    v. Spotz
    Court applies a de novo
    
    Id. Commonwealth v.
    Pitts, 
    981 A.2d 875
    (Pa. 2009), our Supreme Court reiterated the level of
    review necessary to secure permission to withdraw from representation
    pursuant   to   Turner/Finley.      The   Pitts   Court   stated   the    following
    requirements.
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    J-S54021-14
    1)         -                                  detailing
    the nature and extent of his review;
    2)           -
    each issue the petitioner wished to have
    reviewed;
    3)                                                    -
    were meritless[.]
    
    Id. at 876
    (citation omitted).
    -
    petition to withdraw; and (3) a
    statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or by new
    Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 
    931 A.2d 717
    , 721 (Pa. Super.
    2007) (citation omitted).
    [W]here counsel submits a petition and no-merit
    letter that do satisfy the technical demands of
    Turner/Finley, the court - trial court or this Court -
    must then conduct its own review of the merits of
    the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the
    claims are without merit, the court will permit
    counsel to withdraw and deny relief. By contrast, if
    the claims appear to have merit, the court will deny
    
    Id. (internal citation
    omitted).
    Herein, we conclude that Attorney Q
    complied with the requirements of Turner/Finley.         Specifically, Attorney
    Turner/Finley letter brief detailed the nature and extent of his
    review.    In preparing said filing, Attorney Quinn addressed, inter alia,
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    J-S54021-14
    s underlying claim that Attorney Meanix was ineffective for failing
    to call
    hearing, and determined that the issue lacked merit. Thereafter, Attorney
    Quinn explained why the PCRA court properl
    amended PCRA petition.       Finally, as discussed, Attorney Quinn served
    Appellant with a copy of his request to withdraw and advised Appellant that,
    if he was permitted to withdraw, Appellant had the right to proceed pro se or
    with pri
    request for leave to withdraw from representation satisfied the constraints of
    Turner/Finley.    We must now conduct our own independent review as to
    without merit.
    Meanix rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call Sandra
    Turner/Finley Brief at 3.      Appellant avers that McCloskey would have
    
    Id. To prevail
    on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the
    PCRA, a petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence
    -determining process
    (1) the
    -7-
    J-S54021-14
    underlying legal issu
    
    Koehler, supra
    at 132, citing Commonwealth v.
    Pierce, 
    527 A.2d 973
    , 975 (Pa. 1987).         ounsel is presumed effective,
    and to rebut that presumption, the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that
    
    Koehler, supra
    at 131 (citation omitted).       Furthermore,
    appellant fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence any of the
    Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 
    979 A.2d 908
    , 911 (Pa. Super. 2009),
    appeal denied, 
    990 A.2d 727
    (Pa. 2010).
    Upon careful review of the record,
    Turner/Finley letter brief, and the applicable law, and in
    iveness claim
    merits no relief. The record establishes that Appellant has failed to satisfy
    the first and third prongs of the aforementioned ineffectiveness test.   See
    
    Koehler, supra
    .
    Specifically, Appellant has failed to establish that his ineffectiveness
    
    Id. Commonwealth v.
    Stewart, 
    84 A.3d 701
    , 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
    -8-
    J-S54021-14
    banc) (citation and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 
    93 A.3d 463
    (Pa. 2014).   Herein, Attorney Meanix testified at the January 22, 2014
    evidentiary hearing, that he and Appellant discussed calling McCloskey as a
    on,
    -7.   Attorney
    part, [his] own belief that character witnesses deal better with hearing from
    
    Id. Attorney Meanix
    further noted that
    McCloskey telephoned him the day after the sentencing hearing, and
    inquired as to when the hearing would be rescheduled.           
    Id. at 7-8.
    McCloskey, on the contrary, also testified at the evidentiary hearing and
    averred that she never spoke with Attorney Meanix and was never informed
    aring. 
    Id. at 29.
    elected not to believe McCloskey.        PCRA Court Opinion, 3/12/14, at 4.
    as to her facts, not credible as to her responses to the [PCRA c]ourt and
    specifically not credible with regard to her testimony that she was never
    
    Id. Upon review,
    we
    ibility
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    J-S54021-14
    determinations.     When
    Commonwealth
    v. Spotz, 
    18 A.3d 244
    , 259 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).                 Accordingly,
    ney Meanix was ineffective for not calling
    McCloskey as a witness during the sentencing hearing lacks arguable merit.
    Additionally, Appellant has also failed to establish that he suffered
    prejudice as a result of                                    
    Koehler, supra
    .         o
    demonstrate      prejudice,   appellant   must   show    there   is   a    reasonable
    Commonwealth v. Michaud, 
    70 A.3d 862
    ,
    867 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Instantly, the record reveals that
    prejudicial impact on Appellant, as the PCRA court acknowledged that it was
    on at
    character letter McCloskey
    See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/12/14, at
    5.   O
    petitioner] has not de
    affected the outcome of the proceedings [pursuant to the third prong of the
    Pierce test], the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone and the court
    need not first determine whether the first and second prongs [of the test]
    Commonwealth v. Rios, 
    920 A.2d 790
    , 799 (Pa. 2007).
    - 10 -
    J-S54021-14
    Based on the foregoing, we discern no error on the part of the PCRA
    Accordingly, we
    petition to withdraw.
    Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/17/2014
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